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ABSTRACT 
 
Ryan Alexander Peeks: “The Cavalry of the Fleet:” Organization, Doctrine, and 
Battlecruisers in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1904-22 
(Under the Direction of Wayne Lee) 
 
This dissertation examines naval policymaking in the United States and Britain in the 
era of the First World War, from the elevation of Admiral John Fisher to the position of First 
Sea Lord in 1904 to the end of the Washington Conference in 1922. Specifically, it analyzes 
how each country’s navy developed policy and doctrine, and the ways in which institutional 
culture, strategic priorities, and administrative structure shaped these processes. The project 
explores these issues through both navies’ experience with battlecruisers, a then-new type of 
large warship with heavy guns, high speed, and light armor. While doing so, the project also 
sheds light on the comparatively neglected American battlecruiser program, showing how 
crucial the ships were to American conceptions of future naval wars.  
 Battlecruisers provide an ideal background for comparing British and American naval 
policy. The Royal Navy introduced the type, beginning construction on the first Invincible-
class battlecruisers in 1905. On the other hand, the United States was the last major naval 
power to accept battlecruisers, and only started building them in 1916. These disparate 
stories allow us to see how each navy identified strategic priorities, allocated resources, 
developed doctrine, designed warships, and changed doctrine and design in response to 
technological developments and wartime experience.  
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As the dissertation shows, the United States and the United Kingdom took very 
different approaches towards managing and maintaining sea power. Some of this was due to 
each country’s national culture and strategic situation, but the institutional culture and 
administrative structure of each service played a role as well. In Britain, the need to defend a 
far-flung empire was filtered through the Admiralty, which could be dominated by the 
theories and passions of a single man. Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy’s Mahanian 
worldview was constantly modified by the service’s “strategic elite” in the Naval War 
College and on the General Board. These differences were reflected in each country’s 
battlecruiser program: by the early 1920s, the Royal Navy built theirs for fighting battleships 
in major fleet actions, while the American battlecruisers were intended for scouting and long-
range independent operations.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE BATTLECRUISER AGE 
 
 More than any other class of warship, battlecruisers can be said to have a father.1 
Their particular mixture of high speed, heavy firepower, and light armor was the vision of 
British Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher who, in 1904, presented the First Lord of the Admiralty 
with a scheme of naval reform, including specifications for a new type of cruiser, “HMS 
Unapproachable,” designed to exploit “the first desideratum” of naval combat, “speed.”2 By 
1905, this sketch was the basis of the first battlecruiser, HMS Invincible, faster than extant 
battleships, with a uniform battery of heavy guns, and rather thin armor. Between the years 
1904 and 1922, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan combined to build twenty-seven 
of the new ships. Additionally, six American Lexington-class battlecruisers, as well as three 
British and four Japanese battlecruisers were cancelled in 1922 under the terms of the 
Washington Naval Treaty.3  
 At the same time as Invincible, Fisher’s Royal Navy was engaged in designing and 
building Dreadnought, a new-style battleship that lent its name to subsequent battleship 
                                                           
1
 Historians are split on whether to call the ships “battlecruisers” or “battle cruisers.” Although the latter term 
was in common use at the time, the former aligns with the shift in usage from “battle ship” to “battle-ship” to 
today’s “battleship,” and will be used throughout except when quoting documents or using titles from the 
period.  
2
 Admiral John Fisher, “The Fighting Characteristics of Vessels of War,” in Naval Necessities, Volume I, May 
1904, ADM 116/942, The National Archives, Kew, UK, 3 
3
 The terminology of the period was rather fluid, as one would expect from a new ship. While I reserve the term 
“battlecruiser” for ships built to the rough pattern of Invincible and its successors, this project examines fast 
capital ships like the British Queen Elizabeth-class battleships and the unbuilt American “torpedo battleship” as 
well.  
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construction. Dreadnoughts spread to many more countries than battlecruisers and, even 
where battlecruisers were being built, they far outnumbered their faster cousins. Dreadnought 
battleships, however, were simply a refinement of the centuries-old battleship type, and 
warships on the basic dreadnought pattern were still being built through the end of the 
Second World War. On the other hand, the vast majority of battlecruiser construction was 
concentrated into the 1904-22 period, and historians continue to debate whether or not post-
1922 ships like Graf Spee, Strasbourg, or Alaska can really be counted as battlecruisers. 
With that in mind, it seems fair to mark this period as the “Battlecruiser Age.” 
 Although not as numerous as dreadnought battleships, battlecruisers were at the heart 
of the naval arms race that did so much to lay the foundation for the Great War. Indeed, 
Fisher, the man most responsible for Dreadnought, viewed battleships as an anachronism, 
“strategically unnecessary but also tactically vulnerable and . . . ineffective.”4 His view of 
naval warfare was centered on the battlecruiser. Instead of a naval strategy based around 
fleets of battleships, Fisher foresaw a future of fast battlecruisers supported by a variety of 
lighter ships and submarines. Although this vision never came to pass as such, it was present 
in many of Fisher’s policies between 1904 and 1910.  
 The most radical of Fisher’s views remained unknown to the other three battlecruiser 
powers: Germany and Japan, who completed battlecruisers, and the United States, which had 
six under construction before the Washington Conference. Yet, it would be a mistake to 
claim that battlecruisers were “just another ship” in those navies. Battlecruisers were new, a 
                                                           
4
 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “Fisher’s Naval Revolution,” (Naval History, Vol. 10, No. 4 July/August 1996), accessed 
through ProQuest, p.2 on web version.  
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ship type without real antecedents.5 As such, all four navies were forced to consider how to 
integrate a new type of warship into their navies, and conceptualizing the period as the 
“Battlecruiser Age” highlights the differences between the services. Although all four 
pursued roughly similar policies with their battleship fleets, there were three discernable 
approaches taken to the battlecruiser issue. Both Germany and Japan eventually saw 
battlecruisers simply as more-effective armored cruisers and employed them accordingly, 
primarily as “fast wing” adjuncts to their battle line, a trend anticipated in Japanese cruiser 
design as early as 1904.6 
 On the other hand, the American and British navies tried to create new missions that 
leveraged the capabilities provided by fast ships with battleship-class weapons. Although the 
U.S. Navy was the last power to start building battlecruisers, by 1912 it had developed a 
novel battlecruiser doctrine around the missions of scouting, screening, and “distantial” 
operations, a role substantially different from their use of armored cruisers. The British Navy, 
of course, introduced the type, and in Admiral Fisher’s original conception, the ships were to 
be the centerpiece of a dramatic rethink of naval warfare. Even once it became clear that 
Fisher’s revolution was an incomplete one, British naval opinion never fully solidified on a 
particular use for the ships. 
                                                           
5
 If one chooses to view battlecruisers as a refinement of the armored cruiser type, the point still stands. The 
first recognizable armored cruiser (as opposed to earlier protected or belted cruisers) was the French Dupuy de 
Lôme (laid down 1888, launched 1890, commissioned 1895), and in the decade that separates its commissioning 
from the start of this project, the form and mission of armored cruisers were the subject of lively debate in naval 
circles the world over. William Hovgaard, Modern History of Warships (London: Conway, 1978, reprint of 
1920 ed.), 206. 
6
 Dirk Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World 
War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 113-4. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: 
Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1997); 64, 160-3.  
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By focusing on battlecruisers and related policy developments in these two nations, 
across the whole period from 1904 to 1922, we can achieve new insights into the cultural 
structures and organizational policies that affect military institutions as much as potential 
enemies and the balance of power. Although the American battlecruisers have been discussed 
briefly in other works, this project is the first large-scale consideration of battlecruisers in the 
U.S. Navy. Unlike most interpretations, I found that the American battlecruiser program was 
not a reaction to outside developments, like the German case, a refinement of prior ideas, like 
the Japanese Kongos, or a response to wartime experience. Instead, the American 
battlecruisers were designed from the keel up to match the U.S. Navy’s very particular vision 
of their place in American strategy. 
 In comparison, the British battlecruiser program has received quite a bit more 
attention from scholars of the Royal Navy. In the past twenty-five years, historians have 
begun to accept that battlecruisers really were at the center of Fisher’s “revolution.” The 
standard history had been Arthur J. Marder’s From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, which, 
though an impressive feat of research, was marred by the author’s insistence on viewing 
naval strategy through a Mahanian lens and a subsequent focus on fleets of battleships as the 
absolute naval policy of the age.7 This has been modified and superseded by subsequent 
work, especially the writings of Jon Tetsuro Sumida and Nicholas Lambert, from which the 
description of Fisher’s views at the start of the chapter was adopted.8 This interpretation, and 
                                                           
7
 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961-70), 5 vols.  
8
 The key works by the two men are Sumida’s In Defence of Naval Supremacy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) 
and Lambert’s Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 
Additionally, Lambert’s article “Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare” (Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 69, No. 2, April 2005) adds a critical discussion of British strategic communication in the WWI 
period, and Sumida’s article “Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought (JMH, Vol. 59, No. 4, Oct. 1995), which 
expands his argument concerning Fisher’s feelings on battlecruisers and battleships. The importance of their 
arguments is such that much of the older literature on the period is comparatively useless; without the essential 
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the authors responsible for it—Christopher Bell conspiratorially writes of the 
“Revisionists”—have come under fire in recent years, but the Sumida-Lambert approach to 
British sea power in the World War I period remains the standard for the time being.9  
 Likewise, the benefits of a transnational approach for turn-of-the-century military 
institutions are obvious, and well represented in the literature. Beyond its general advantages, 
the specific cases of the United States and Britain make for an interesting contrast, especially 
where battlecruisers are concerned. This particular pairing has most recently been examined, 
to excellent effect, in Katherine Epstein’s Torpedo.10 Apart from her work, other scholars 
have looked at the two navies, but usually in the context of the First World War itself or the 
interwar period.11  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
insight that Fisher’s favored ship was the battlecruiser, most arguments are based on faulty premises. Since the 
superseding of Marder’s arguments, however, there has been an explosion of excellent writing on the prewar 
Royal Navy Outside of this duo Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command 
(London: John Murray, 1996) and Robert Massie’s Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the 
Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), are both the product of superlative research and writing, though 
the latter has some weakness on issues of pure naval strategy. In the new century, a number of important works 
have been published, including Roger Parkinson’s The Late Victorian Navy (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2008), 
Shawn Grimes’s Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell & 
Brewer, 2012), and C.I. Hamilton’s The Making of the Modern Admiralty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). Finally, Lambert has written Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the 
First World War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), which recasts prewar British planning by 
focusing on Royal Navy plans to smother the German economy soon after the outbreak of war.  
9
  The most trenchant critique of Lambert’s conclusions can be found in Bell’s “Sir John Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution Reconsidered” (War in History, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 2011), which led to a rather intemperate 
exchange of essays between the two writers.  
10
 Katherine Epstein, Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). While Epstein’s book also looks at decision-making in both 
navies, her focus is on the linkages between naval policy, technology development, and the growth of the 
military-industrial complex and, as such, only tangentially concerns the foci of this work.  
11
 The two classics here are David Trask’s Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1918 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972) and Stephen Roskill’s Naval Policy between the Wars (New 
York: Walker, 1968-76, two vols.). More recently, Phillips Payson O’Brien’s British and American Naval 
Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936 (Westport, CT: Praegar, 1998) pursued a similar goal, though with less 
purely naval analysis than the other two books.  
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Extending this comparison to the entire 1904-22 period confers a number of 
advantages. Most obviously, the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty confirmed the U.S. and U.K. 
navies as the most powerful navies in the post-World War I world. Although this was very 
much not the case in 1904, the U.S. Navy was the only other service with the desire and 
capacity for comparable global ambitions. With the signing of the Entente, France tacitly 
acknowledged the reality of British naval power. Likewise, Japanese leaders conceded that 
their country lacked the resources to be a global power. Germany presents something of an 
ambiguous case, but the focus of German construction, strategy, and deployment remained 
the North Sea and the Baltic.   
 On the other hand, the U.S. Navy thought on a worldwide scale, even when 
considering defensive war. With newly acquired territory from the Spanish-American War, 
and a muscular interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. Navy was committed to 
“defending” a vast space stretching north to Point Barrow, south to Cape Horn, west to the 
Philippines, and east to Maine. These commitments forced American planners to consider 
operations on a global scale, even before the U.S. Navy was a global power. Of course, the 
officer corps of the U.S. Navy viewed the increase of American power as a given and 
assumed that the American fleet would eventually grow to match those commitments. As a 
result, much of the naval debate in the United States dealt with the large fleet the U.S. Navy 
wanted instead of the rather more modest fleet the U.S.N. possessed through the end of the 
First World War.  
More importantly, the U.S.N. never considered a “strategy of the weak” to offset its 
modest resources before the First World War. Between 1904 and 1922, there was no 
American echo of the French flirtation with a cruiser-based guerre de course strategy of 
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commerce warfare, nor did the Americans seriously attempt to leverage new technologies 
like the torpedo as the basis for refashioning fleet tactics or strategy. Indeed, the Royal Navy 
went much further in that direction than their American counterparts.12 Instead, American 
naval strategy was always based on the traditional model of naval power exercised by fleets 
of battleships, using the gun as their primary weapon.  
 In addition, ideas flowed freely between the two navies. Despite the lack of a formal 
relationship between the services before 1917, American and British officers were well 
aware of developments in each other’s countries. Of course, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s work 
was widely consumed on both sides of the Atlantic (although his influence inside the Royal 
Navy has been greatly overstated by previous generations of historians), but the connections 
went deeper.13 Over the period covered here, American and British officers corresponded, 
read each other’s professional journals (with the exception of the members-only Naval 
Review in Britain), and used the other country’s debates and policies to justify their own 
actions.14 
 This comparative and transnational approach also provides a new perspective on the 
often-stale history of the Royal Navy, which dominates the naval history of the period. The 
transnational work that exists usually positions the British Navy against its World War I 
                                                           
12
 Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution explains how the potential of torpedo warfare led to Fisher’s ideal policy 
of building swift battlecruisers and torpedo-armed “flotilla” vessels like destroyers, light cruisers, and 
submarines. Although many American officers were fascinated with the potential of torpedoes, as Epstein’s 
Torpedo documents, no one in a position of power or influence in the U.S. ever suggested anything nearly as 
radical. 
13
 The classic example of this overstatement is Marder’s From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, which is based 
on an ahistorically Mahanian approach to British naval policy.  
14
 For example, the Fisher Admiralty used a debate between two American officers—Mahan and his younger 
critic William S. Sims—to bolster the case for dreadnought-style warships in documents circulated to 
journalists and Whitehall policymakers. “Designs of Armoured Ships to be Laid Down in November 1907,” 
Admiralty publication, early 1907, RIC/4/2/3, Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, U.K., 4.  
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opponent the Kaiserliche Marine. Looking at 1904-22 as a whole, however, reveals the real 
threat to the Royal Navy to have been the United States Navy. Despite the overheated 
political rhetoric of the day, Germany never seriously threatened to usurp Britain’s positon as 
the top naval power; Britain simply had the capacity and the political will to build more ships 
more quickly than Wilhelmine Germany. On the other hand, the United States had the 
capability, money, and, for a time after 1916, appeared to have the political support to mount 
a challenge to the Royal Navy that the British state would struggle to match. Viewed from 
that angle, the Washington Treaty was a godsend for the British, confirming the obvious rise 
of American naval power, but preserving British equality without a lengthy and expensive 
arms race.15  
 Nevertheless, the two navies reached Washington through substantially different 
processes. Not only did the two nations face different political and strategic contexts, but the 
two services also thought about war in very different ways, bolstered by their wildly 
divergent organizational and institutional cultures and systems. With that in mind, this 
project focuses on the process of policymaking in both countries: the “how,” rather than the 
“what” or “why” of policy. 
 This relative emphasis on process over outcome is an artifact of the period under 
consideration. Between the end of the Russo-Japanese War and the beginning of the First 
World War, there were no naval actions on the scale expected of the next major war. In their 
absence, the development of naval vessels and strategies proceeded according to a set of 
untested (and untestable) assumptions about the future of naval warfare and the shape of the 
                                                           
15
 See, for example John Ferris’s Men Money and Diplomacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).  
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next war.16 As is well known, all sides failed to anticipate the naval element of the First 
World War, which was dominated by operational stalemate in the North Sea, and submarine 
commerce warfare. Even after the war both the American and British navies approached its 
legacy in ways that tended to downplay the importance of wartime trade protection in favor 
of endless debates over the legacy of Jutland, the one fleet action of the conflict.  
 To some extent, the content of British and American policies, though important, lose 
some of their salience here. Instead, I attempt to explain the effects of the structural and 
cultural forces acting on policymaking in both countries. Despite the rough similarity of the 
two navies, both based on fleets of battleships, outward congruence masked a world of 
difference in the way they approached their higher-level work. More than financial concerns, 
or the “objective” needs of military strategy, these structural and cultural forces explain much 
of the divergence in American and British battlecruiser policy. Specifically, these forces go 
some distance to explaining why the United States had a battlecruiser doctrine before the 
Great War, and the British, despite their decade-long head start with the ships, did not. When 
Fisher’s initial vision was rejected by his subordinates afloat and successors at the Admiralty, 
nothing took its place and, indeed, the Royal Navy was structurally incapable of developing a 
replacement doctrine. Battlecruisers remained a valued part of the British fleet, and service 
aboard them was coveted, but confusion over their role remained, and contributed to the loss 
of three British battlecruisers at Jutland.17  
                                                           
16
 This argument owes a great debt to Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), especially her sections on the interwar period.  
17
 See for example, the memoirs of Admiral Ernle Chatfield, the captain of the battlecruiser Lion during the 
First World War, who wrote that sailors aboard British battlecruisers viewed themselves as “the spear-point of 
the . . . Fleet, like the cavalry of a great army.” Alfred Ernle Montacute Chatfield, The Navy and Defence: The 
Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield (London: Heinemann, 1942), 139. 
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 This, of course, holds true for all aspects of British naval policy, especially on the 
operational and tactical levels. The Royal Navy was equally incapable of formulating and 
disseminating a doctrine for, say, its battleships.18 However, a set of accepted practices had 
grown up around the use of battleships, which had a lineage stretching back hundreds of 
years. In the absence of an explicit battleship policy, all officers had an innate sense that 
battleships should be concentrated in fleets, battleship tactics should be roughly linear, and so 
on. With battlecruisers, there were no such markers. For this entirely new type, officers had 
no institutional memory to draw on when figuring out how to use them.19 Once the ships 
began moving into the fleet, the result was an utter cacophony of ideas. By the eve of the war 
in mid-1914, the nine active-duty British battlecruisers were given over to three entirely 
different missions. 
 The American example throws these issues into sharp relief. This is not to say that the 
United States Navy was perfect in the early twentieth century. It suffered from myriad faults, 
some imposed by a parsimonious Congress and executive, but mostly self-inflicted by a 
blinkered officer corps in thrall to the cult of navalism. Still, in the years before the First 
World War, the American officer corps discussed and debated battlecruisers and by 1912 the 
General Board and War College had arrived at a firm policy regarding their design and 
employment. 
                                                           
18
 In “A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916,” Journal of Military 
History, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2003), Sumida suggests that the British did so. While this claim is discussed at 
greater length in chapter 5, the “technical-tactical synthesis” arrived at by John Jellicoe was so closely held that 
no scholar found evidence for it during the intervening 90 years. This suggests that the “synthesis” was not 
widely disseminated enough to meet the standard definition of doctrine or, indeed, to do much good for the 
Royal Navy in the First World War.  
19
 The best Captain Edmond Slade, the head of the War College, and a Fisher ally, could come up with in 1906 
was to compare battlecruisers to the 74-gun ships of the line of the age of sail, a comparison that overlooked 
issues of speed, armor and, to some extent, firepower. Edmond Slade, “Speed in Battleships,” War Course 
College, Portsmouth, May 31, 1906, RIC/12/5, Caird Library, 5-9.  
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 Making this argument first requires revising prevailing understandings of the U.S. 
Navy and its experience with battlecruisers. There is no equivalent to In Defence of Naval 
Supremacy or Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution in American historiography, and very little 
on which to build an examination of the American battlecruiser program in the secondary 
literature. In the standard textbook histories of the U.S. Navy, Kenneth Hagan’s This 
People’s Navy, and George Baer’s One Hundred Years of Sea Power, the six American 
battlecruisers barely merit a footnote.20 Even works more focused on the WWI period gloss 
over the shift in American naval policy that the 1916 Navy Bill represented. Although those 
studies acknowledge that the size of the construction program outlined in the 1916 act 
represented a watershed in American naval history, the planned construction of battlecruisers 
receives short shrift.21 A relative handful of works attempt to grapple with the American 
battlecruiser program at length, but these works all have serious shortcomings.22  
                                                           
20
 Kenneth J. Hagan’s This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: Collier Macmillan, 
1991) and George W. Baer’s One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1994). Baer (p. 100) even goes as to call the six American battlecruisers “heavy 
cruisers,” implicitly equating the 40,000+ ton Lexingtons with the 10,000-ton heavy cruisers of the 1920s and 
30s. Harold and Margaret Sprout’s The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1944) mentions them in passing, but garbles the story of their development.  
21
 William N. Still’s Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2006) is the standard work on the U.S. Navy in the First World War. As the title 
suggests, Still’s analysis leaves no time for the battlecruisers designed and authorized during the war. The 
situation is the same, though perhaps with better reason in Jerry W. Jones’s U.S. Battleship Operations in World 
War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998). David Trask’s Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval 
Relations, 1917-1918 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972) neglects to mention the ships, a major 
subject of transatlantic discussion as the U.S. Navy sought to learn lessons from the performance of British 
battlecruisers at Jutland. The Sprouts’ Toward a New Order of Sea Power discusses the ships briefly in places, 
but their focus on high-level political machinations, and their lack of access to critical Navy documents are 
serious blows. Likewise, the biographies of the three major naval figures of the period, Paolo Coletta’s Admiral 
Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), Elting E. Morison’s 
Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), and Mary Klachko’s Admiral 
William Shepherd Benson, First Chief of Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987) are 
largely silent on the battlecruiser issue.  
22
 One of the earliest such attempts, Ernest Andrade’s “The Battle Cruiser in the United States Navy (Military 
Affairs, Feb. 1980) is a five-page treatment of U.S. battlecruiser policy to the end of the Second World War, and 
riddled with errors. Donald G. White’s “The Misapplication of a Weapons System: The Battle Cruiser as a 
Warship Type” (Naval War College Review, January 1970), comes to some interesting conclusions, but is too 
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 These misconceptions and gaps are not just troubling for reasons of historical 
accuracy. Crediting the six American battlecruisers solely to fear of Japan, the financial 
environment of Woodrow Wilson’s Preparedness movement, or a reaction to the early years 
of the First World War obscures the debate surrounding battlecruisers in the U.S. Navy from 
1903 through the end of the Washington Conference in 1921-2. The first American 
discussions of fast capital ships in 1903-4 were made without reference to foreign designs or 
construction, and over the next two decades, the U.S. Navy spent as much time discussing 
battlecruisers as it did anything else. Although American officers paid close attention to 
developments abroad, by 1912, the Navy had settled upon an idiosyncratic battlecruiser 
doctrine that none of the other three battlecruiser powers embraced.23 
Unlike their British, German, or Japanese counterparts, the American officer corps 
developed a battlecruiser doctrine that primarily utilized its speed in a strategic, rather than a 
tactical, context. In that sense, there is some similarity to Admiral Fisher’s “pure” vision 
(which no American officers appear to have been fully aware of), except American naval 
planners never seriously considered the idea of using battlecruisers as a replacement for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
prescriptive, and is hamstrung by a reliance on Marder’s Mahanian framework. Norman Friedman’s U.S. 
Cruisers and William McBride’s Technological Change and the United States Navy discuss the design history 
of the ships and some of the engineering problems inherent in their specifications, but neither book is attuned to 
changes in the Navy’s mentality, strategy, or theory. Their perfunctory analysis along those lines leaves much to 
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fleets of battleships.24 Instead, the American battlecruisers were intended for what the U.S. 
Navy called “distantial” operations, detached from, but in service of, the American battle 
fleet. This mission came about by 1912, before the construction, or even serious design of, 
the six American battlecruisers. This uniquely American battlecruiser doctrine belies claims 
that the Lexingtons were only developed after examination of the first year of the Great War.  
 Of course, to a lesser extent, the same could be said for the Navy’s battleships, 
submarines, or destroyers, but the uniqueness of the American doctrinal outcome in 
battlecruisers makes it an ideal case study for examining how the U.S. Navy thought in the 
early twentieth century. The extant literature does a fine job of exploring these issues for the 
development of aircraft carriers in the interwar years, for example, but that debate came after 
and, in a sense, flowed from the earlier battlecruiser debate. In truth, it is almost impossible 
to extricate the later stages of battlecruiser discussion in the United States from the early 
stages of carrier development and ferment, a fact that the present literature tends to ignore.25 
The battlecruiser doctrine discussed above, however, was developed before the First World 
War, and following that thread through the prewar years highlights some of the virtues and 
vices of the American decision-making process in that era.  
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 In fact, the American battlecruiser experience throws light on a period in which the 
U.S. Navy developed ideas and institutions that reflected the country’s new status as a global 
power. Between 1904 and 1922, the Navy began planning in earnest for war with Japan, 
revamped the mission of the Naval War College, created the rudiments of a naval staff, and 
took part in the First World War. Not only did these events have a profound impact on the 
U.S. Navy, but in these years, the leadership of the Navy also passed from officers who had 
commanded ships and fleets in the Spanish-American War to a younger generation, who 
brought with them a very different approach to technological development and naval 
strategy.26 The creation of a battlecruiser doctrine in the years after 1910 represented a 
triumph for this younger generation of officers. 
These conclusions are based on extensive archival and primary research in the U.S. 
and Britain over the past three years, leavened with a critical reading of the secondary 
literature, especially on the British side. The bulk of the archival material comes from the 
National Archives in the U.S. and the U.K., as well as the U.S. Naval War College, the 
Library of Congress, and the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. In both countries, 
professional service journals have been invaluable, especially Proceedings of the United 
States Naval Institute in America and the Royal United Services Institute’s journal as well as 
the Naval Review in Britain. Officers in both countries were prolific writers, and much use 
has been made of works published by my subjects.  
 What follows is an attempt to explore the above themes and concepts through close 
examination of battlecruiser theory, practice, and policy in the U.S. and Britain. While the 
ships represented a small portion of each country’s fleets, they had an outsized effect on 
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naval budgets and thought. As the foundational ship of the age, battlecruisers are the ideal 
window onto naval affairs of the World War I period. Asking why both countries built them, 
why the United States took so long to do so, and why the U.S. and Britain placed their 
battlecruisers in such different tactical and strategic missions leads one to a set of answers 
that explains a great deal about how military institutions make decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: TRAINING, ADMINISTRATION, AND NAVAL STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE U.S. 
AND BRITAIN IN THE WORLD WAR I ERA 
 
 Before turning to the narrative portions of this project, a pause is in order to explain 
terms, and provide some background to each service’s situation at the start of the period 
analyzed. At the same time, the discussion below lays out the primary intellectual, cultural, 
and structural differences between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy. Even more so than the 
strategic or material factors that separated the two services, these differences in mentality 
explain their divergent policies in the World War I era.  
One of those major differences was each service’s approach to doctrine, which the 
U.S. Navy explicitly pursued from the mid-1910s, and the Royal Navy consciously 
eschewed. The term is used here with a keen appreciation of its multifaceted meaning, and 
the history of its use by military policymakers, historians, and social scientists. At its 
broadest, the political scientist Barry Posen has defined doctrine as “the preferred mode of a 
group of services, a single service, or a subservice for fighting wars.”1 Posen’s definition is a 
good starting point, but in defining this term, the voices of contemporary officers should not 
be ignored. “Doctrine,” a religious term for most of its history, first began to be used in its 
modern, military sense, in the period covered by this project. One historiographer has 
suggested that the modern conception of doctrine is the product of the German and British 
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armies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.2 If we accept that argument, the United States 
Navy was among the first military institutions to explicitly create a “doctrine,” and refer to it 
as such, though certainly not the first to have one.   
 It its earliest official uses, the U.S. Navy took a very broad view of the term. Speaking 
in 1912, for example, the President of the U.S. Naval War College explained that part of the 
college’s mission was to “spread abroad in the service both the general doctrine and its 
individual character building,” through “the investigation and exposition of strategic and 
tactical principles.”3 Although the notion of “doctrine” expressed here is somewhat broader 
that Posen’s, the basic conception is roughly the same; a set of ideas binding on, in this case, 
a service. By late 1917, when the Navy published an official doctrine, the term was defined 
as “a bond of mutual understanding . . . to coordinate decisions and to promote prompt and 
united action.” That understanding was based around a few simple concepts—offensive 
battle, action over maneuver, concentration—that guided fleet commanders and linked them 
to their subordinates without removing space for individual initiative.4 
 However, doctrine has a second, narrower, meaning that also applies to this project. 
This meaning is defined by Walter Kretchik as “a system of equipment, training, 
organization, and procedure . . .  to create a common understanding of individual and unit 
actions to be undertaken when necessary.”5 Though closely related to Posen’s definition, 
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Kretchik’s definition brings doctrine down to a lower level, highlighting its tactical and 
operational utility. Kretchik went on to define doctrine as approved by a high authority in or 
above a given service, and disseminated through “written guidance,” but that level of 
specificity is rather too limiting for services at the dawn of explicit doctrine formulation. 6 By 
1912, it is certainly fair to talk about a “battlecruiser doctrine” in the United States Navy, 
even if it was never explicated in anything as formal as a field manual or specific written 
guidance from the General Board. Likewise, the fleet or squadron orders prepared by unit 
commanders in the Royal Navy in the World War I period deserve consideration as doctrine, 
or at least attempted doctrine, despite their lack of high-level approval.  
Living with the modern American military’s penchant for jargon-filled manuals and 
white papers, we may think of doctrine as a fundamental component of an organized military, 
but that was not the case for the early twentieth century. Although the U.S. Navy came to 
embrace doctrine—in its guises as specific guidance and animating mentality—by the second 
decade of the century, this process was not matched in Britain. This is not to say that the 
Royal Navy tried and failed to create service-wide doctrines, but instead that the idea was 
alien to their way of doing business before the First World War.7 As one exasperated 
reformer put it in 1913, “[w]e seem so alarmed at the possibility of fostering a heresy that we 
commit ourselves straightaway to the ‘doctrine of no doctrine,’ which is in itself a dogma.”8 
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 As useful as doctrine can be to military organizations, it is not a panacea. Much of the 
recent work on doctrinal development demonstrates how flawed doctrine can lock a military 
service into a decade or more of flawed policies, plans, and equipment. The classic example, 
of course, is pre-World War I Europe and its “ideology of the offensive,” which allowed 
European militaries to ignore mounting technical and empirical evidence that attack-minded 
doctrines were becoming increasingly untenable.9 In fact, the lack of a firm doctrine may 
have helped the Royal Navy in waging the First World War at sea; overspecialized officers 
and ships may have had a harder time coping with the dizzying variety of threats faced and 
operations undertaken during the war years.  
 With that said, the role of doctrine is one of the biggest differences between how the 
American and British navies thought in the early twentieth century, and one of the primary 
factors in the mixed performance of the British battlecruiser fleet in the First World War. 
While custom and received wisdom were sufficient for managing warship types with a long 
lineage like battleships and light cruisers, it proved unequal to the task of finding a niche for 
its battlecruisers, a fundamentally new category of ship. By contrast, when the U.S. Navy 
finally began building the ships in 1916, they did so from the perspective of a decade plus of 
debate on the strategic and tactical place of battlecruisers and already possessed a list of 
desired design attributes. To use a term borrowed from Meir Finkel’s On Flexibility, the U.S. 
Navy demonstrated its “doctrinal flexibility” to a greater extent than its British counterpart.10  
                                                           
9
 This is the main argument of Jack Snyder’s The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the 
Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).  
10
 Meir Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 55-6. 
20 
 
 Possessing a formal doctrine, however, was evidence of major differences between 
the two navies, not its cause. In accounting for the U.S. Navy’s “doctrinal flexibility,” we 
must turn to the cultural and organizational factors underlying policy developments. Neither 
the Royal Navy’s unwillingness and/or inability to come up with a battlecruiser doctrine nor 
the U.S. Navy’s enthusiastic adoption of the doctrine paradigm can simply be explained 
through an analysis of the officials running either Navy in this period. In fact, culture and 
organization represent the only plausible explanations. While the culture and organization of 
both navies were not static, changes in these categories came slower than shifts in policy and, 
in both cases, underlay these policy shifts.  
 The best way to examine the cultural factors here is through the “strategic culture” 
framework first developed in the 1980s. As defined by social scientist Alistair Iain Johnston, 
strategic culture is “an integrated ‘system of symbols’ which acts to establish pervasive and 
long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military 
force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic.”11 Simply put, Johnston 
argues that culture does not lead military institutions to make irrational decisions. Instead, 
their decisions are rational, but culture defines what “rational” means in different countries 
and services. The use of this sort of analysis carries with it the foundational assumption that 
“elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in 
similar situations,” a conclusion borne out by the period examined here.12 Reasonable people 
can disagree about the “similarity” of the British and American situations in the early 
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twentieth centuries, but it is beyond doubt that most of the tactical differences in British and 
American warships sprang from choice rather than circumstance. In that sense, both navies 
were attempting to find the “best” way to fight at sea. 
 This cultural approach to military strategy and policy has been adopted by military 
historians in recent decades and, as defined by them, forms a large part of this project’s 
conceptual background. John Lynn’s definition of strategic culture provides a good starting 
point: “the way a state’s political and military institutions conceive of and deal with armed 
conflict,” formed from the confluence of a state’s “societal culture” and the unique “military 
culture” of the units, service, or services under examination.13 Although Lynn, like many 
other historians, used culture to analyze combat, the definition holds true for a discussion of 
policymaking.  
 Indeed, many military historians have used some elements of strategic cultural 
analysis to inform comparative works on military institutions.14 Viewed in that light, the 
approach meshes well with many of the implicit and explicit critiques of the “rationalist” 
perspective in Posen and Snyder’s work. Here, the most useful critique comes from Elizabeth 
Kier’s Imagining War. 15 In her examination of French and British army doctrine in the 
interwar period, she found that neither shifts in policy, nor the doctrines they entered the 
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Second World War with could be fully explained by the rationalist arguments of Posen and 
Snyder. Instead, Kier found that the process of doctrine formulation is inseparable from 
military culture—not the “military mindset” writ large as the two earlier authors, but the 
specific culture of the two subject militaries.16 
The literature tends to treat strategic culture as something rather too fixed. Although 
there were ever-present aspects of American and British culture that separated the two 
services from each other, within each institution, the strategic culture was hardly static. 
Generational shifts, and, especially in Britain, the First World War ensured that the mindset 
of the two officer corps in 1922 was very different from those of 1904. These shifts were 
more than men with a similar mindset reacting to a new set of outside stimuli; the entire way 
of thinking about warfare profoundly changed in both countries. To give a short example, 
there is no chance that the U.S. Navy of 1904 would have been as eager to build 
battlecruisers as the U.S. Navy of 1912; on the contrary, it would have rejected them 
altogether.  
 Still, at their most basic levels, both navies certainly had different cultures, 
differences that manifested in a myriad of ways. As a number of authors have ably 
demonstrated, the U.S. Navy’s officer corps was thoroughly permeated with the ideology of 
navalism. At its simplest, American navalism can be described as “the dedication to the 
creation of an imperial navy,” based on a strong fleet of battleships.17 In practice, navalism 
encompassed a set of assumptions and beliefs about naval warfare that extended to almost all 
elements of American naval policy and strategy. Crucially, these beliefs were shared by 
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essentially the entire naval officer corps in the United States. While the 1904-1922 period 
witnessed constant debate amongst American officers, these were arguments about how best 
to achieve shared goals, not clashes about the direction of American naval policy.   
 A large part of this intellectual harmony came from their shared training. In the 
United States, all line officers were produced by the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis 
which gave the officer corps a certain “ease and depth of identification” with the Navy and 
each other. That, in itself is unsurprising in a military organization, although the American 
system was somewhat unique in educating all naval officers at the same site It also gave 
them a university education, though one with more emphasis placed on naval subjects like 
navigation than the liberal arts. Given the setting, however, it was perhaps inevitable that 
training at Annapolis tended towards academic lines; even subjects like seamanship were 
primarily taught in the classroom rather than aboard ship.18  
 At some point in their careers, most of the American officers bound for high 
command would attend the Naval War College, located in Newport, RI.19 While the War 
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College had several weaknesses—a short course of three to four months’ duration before the 
1911-12 session, poor institutional support, and low interest from the officer corps foremost 
amongst them—it nevertheless managed to play a role that belied its structural weaknesses in 
the early twentieth century.20 In their brief time at the War College, officers heard lectures 
from some of the sharpest minds in the U.S. Navy, helped to develop the Navy’s preliminary 
war plans, and debated the future of warship design and national strategy. Effectively, the 
students and staff served as an ersatz naval staff; lacking one in Washington, the Navy’s 
leadership played close attention to goings-on in Newport, and frequently commissioned 
reports on matters of policy and strategy.  
Founded in 1885, the War College sprang from an urge amongst a small group of 
officers, led by then-Commodore Stephen B. Luce, to professionalize the Navy. Mimicking 
the trend in professions like medicine and the law in the late 19th century U.S., the Naval War 
College helped to create “a specialized, theoretical body of knowledge . . . which would 
entitle [naval officers] to claim the status of a distinct body of practitioners possessed of a 
unique expertise.”21 In large part, this “body of knowledge” was provided by the works of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, an instructor at Newport. Mahan’s work gave the American officer 
corps a grand strategy based around colonies and large battle fleets as well as a common 
lexicon with which to discuss and analyze naval warfare; ostensibly neutral terms like “sea 
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power” and “command of the sea” were, for most American officers, defined through 
Mahan’s writings.22  
This latter aspect of Mahan’s work is perhaps more important than his strategic 
insights, and is certainly so for the period covered here. After all, American officers of the 
1904-1922 period knew Mahan variously as a peer, a teacher, a writer, and an influence, but 
not necessarily as an unimpeachable apostle of naval policy, especially when he wrote about 
current affairs. Writing in 1906, a War College graduate described Mahan, who “never was 
brilliant as an officer,” as “classed among the reactionaries and back numbers in questions of 
progress and right modern development. . . . I wish he would keep quiet on these matters.”23 
Though the author’s opinion was harsh, it was hardly rare. Henry Stimson’s famous quip that 
the Navy “frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in 
which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true 
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Church,” may have applied by the 1940s. Within the early twentieth century Navy, certainly 
among those officers who interacted with him, Mahan was respected, but not infallible.24 
Even those younger officers who disagreed with Mahan, and eventually curbed his 
influence in contemporary naval debates, agreed with him on the broad strokes of the 
“science of sea power.” Their dispute with Mahan revolved around their distaste for his 
historical approach, which they saw as unequal to the task of developing naval strategy in an 
age of rapidly changing technologies. Although they shared his belief in the “principles” of 
sea power, and mostly agreed with the principles themselves, officers like Bradley Fiske and 
William S. Sims believed that those principles could only be applied by officers with the 
technical expertise that Mahan lacked.25 
Still, as Stimson’s exasperation indicates, Mahan’s focus on naval warfare conducted 
by fleets of battleships (later, carriers were shoehorned in) remained at the heart of the 
American naval mentality well after his death in 1914.26 This was, however, because in 
advocating for them, Mahan stood as part of a group of reform-minded officers around 
Stephen B. Luce in the 1880s, all agitating in their own ways for a large battle fleet. Their 
arguments reflected the majority opinion of the officer corps, and as the Navy pursued its 
battle fleet policy from the early 1890s on, Mahan stood as the most skillful propagandist on 
its behalf. In other words, the key insights of Mahan did not change American naval opinion, 
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but couched those opinions in the terms of a professional ideology, justifying the officer 
corps self-understanding as “the masters of a special and distinct science of naval warfare.”27 
 Arguably, this definition of “professional” did not apply to the Royal Navy, based on 
its system of officer training, which was not nearly as concerned with intellectual formation, 
and not at all with theoretical naval knowledge. The training scheme for officers entering the 
British Navy experienced more upheaval than the American system in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, but in any of its iterations, it placed a premium on mathematics and practical 
naval and maritime skills. Most of the senior officers serving between 1904 and 1922 were 
products of two years in HMS Britannia, the Royal Navy’s training establishment for line 
officers (a very small number of aged officers, including Fisher, joined the Navy before the 
Britannia system, and were sent directly to sea as officer cadets). Boys as young as 12 years 
old joined Britannia, after passing a set of competitive examinations. There, the cadets were 
“forc[ed] . . . into a pre-conceived and rigid mould by the application of harsh, even inhuman 
discipline.”28 After those two years, officer trainees were dispatched to active vessels for 
service as midshipmen, where they developed and refined seamanship skills learned on 
Britannia. After that, the young sub-lieutenants were sent to the naval college at Greenwich 
to study for their lieutenants’ examinations. Later on, after passing their lieutenant’s exams, 
many line officers went to one of the Navy’s training establishments to qualify as experts in 
signals, navigation, gunnery, or torpedoes.  
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The last two specializations tended to attract the best officers, which was reasonable 
enough, as weapons are the entire point of a warship. However, as a Naval Review article 
noted in 1914, the Royal Navy’s promotion structure incentivized lieutenants (G) or (T) to 
focus on their specializations instead of general executive duties. As a result, many of the 
best and brightest in the Royal Navy spent most of the years between ages 22 and 38 (the 
earliest age for regular promotion to captain) working at technical establishments ashore or in 
very narrow duties afloat.29 
As the summary above suggests, officer education in the Royal Navy revolved around 
practical subjects relating to seamanship and fighting, merged with the academic 
knowledge—primarily mathematics, natural science, and engineering—needed to understand 
those skills. Although there were lectures on history at Greenwich, it was hardly the focus on 
the education on offer there. As Herbert Richmond, a talented historian and staff officer put it 
in 1913:   
An officer may pass from the rank of naval cadet to that of post-captain, or even 
admiral, without having his attention drawn to, or his interested stimulated in, the 
higher side of his professional work--the side, in fact, that concerns him as a captain 
and, more particularly, as an admiral. When he reaches these ranks he may go to the 
War College: but it is to be observed that in all the years that have passed since he 
was last under instruction he has had no incentive whatever to employ that portion of 
his brain that is concerned with analysis and reasoning.30 
 
Although the Royal Navy had a War College (initially called the War Course) from 1901 on, 
the available raw material was not ideal.31  
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Still, if an officer got to the War College, the quality of instruction was superb. Its 
first head, Henry May was a talented lecturer and thinker, and, before his premature death in 
1904, he contributed to the collection of a talented group of instructors. Preeminent among 
these was the naval historian Julian Corbett, who developed his theories of sea power while 
preparing his War College lectures. Although, as will be discussed below, the R.N. War 
College did not have the same impact on its service as the American version, a number of 
officers who rose to high command in the First World War passed through the institution 
beforehand, including David Beatty, Rosslyn Wemyss, and Roger Keyes. 32 Still, the Royal 
Navy entered the war “desperately short of first-class minds,” an indication of failures at the 
top and bottom of its officer education system.33 
Understandably, the British and American training systems produced different types 
of line officer (setting aside, for our purposes, their divergent means of training engineers and 
naval constructors). Broadly speaking, the U.S. Navy trained its officers to be officers first 
and seamen second, while the British system did the exact opposite.34 It would be very 
unlikely that Alfred Thayer Mahan, for example, a very poor sailor, could have had a lengthy 
career in the Royal Navy, which placed a premium on seamanship. Similarly, John Jellicoe, 
the first commander of the British Grand Fleet, was an officer of immense practical 
experience and technical knowledge who lacked any semblance of preparatory education for 
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the large-scale issues of strategy he confronted in that role. Indeed, he somehow managed to 
avoid reading Mahan’s work until his 1916 stint as First Sea Lord.35 This obviously gave 
American and British officers very different intellectual approaches and styles.  
 At the same time, the educational environment shaped the way officers perceived and 
identified themselves within the service. The influence of the Academy on the U.S. Navy’s 
intellectual formation has been discussed above, and loomed equally large in the officer 
corps’ self-identification. After all, an American officer would have had some contact with 
seven full classes of Academy graduates; his own class, as well as the three above and below 
his own. At any given time in his career, this would represent a substantial percentage of 
officers at his grade, and those that he did not know from the Academy, he most likely would 
have encountered at some point during his service. This increased the further up the ranks 
one went. For example, on July 1, 1914, there were 1,881 officers in the U.S. Navy, of whom 
237 were commanders, captains, and admirals.36 With so few officers in the middle and 
senior grades, it was nearly certain that if an officer did not know most of his peers, 
immediate subordinates, and superiors, he was “at most one or two acquaintances removed 
from knowing” them.37 Although the U.S. Navy expanded during the First World War and 
stabilized at a level larger than the prewar Navy, these connections amongst mid-level and 
senior officers continued well after the Washington Treaty.  
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 This feature of the American officer corps also explains the influence relatively junior 
officers could have over naval policy. With an officer corps so small and so homogenous in 
outlook and training, belonging to the same “club” erased some of the awkwardness of 
listening to low and mid-level officers. For example, William Sims, the officer responsible 
for bringing modern gunnery practices to the U.S. Navy, started doing so as a lieutenant 
commander, and soon became a trusted advisor to President Theodore Roosevelt. 
Throughout his career, Sims was widely respected in the Navy for his grasp of contemporary 
naval policy and technology. More broadly, every summer at the Naval War College, the 
Navy’s General Board took in the Summer Conference’s debates over naval policy—debates 
with frequent input those at or below the rank of lieutenant commander—and often adjusted 
their policies based on those arguments. Undoubtedly, the feeling of camaraderie cultivated 
at Annapolis helped to facilitate these exchanges of ideas. It certainly helped that, for most of 
the period under consideration, promotion in the U.S. Navy rested largely on seniority; 
advancement was almost automatic, curbing unseemly squabbles for promotion.38 
 The same could not be said for the British officer corps in the period. Although most 
line officers went through Britannia, their time there was short, their lives were unremittingly 
miserable, and the rigid divisions between classes (divided not just by year, but the time of 
their entrance within a given year), prevented the formation of broader social networks, as 
did the size of the British officer corps and the Royal Navy’s worldwide dispositions.39 
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Likewise, the midshipman experience, while fostering lifelong connections between those 
stationed on the same ship or in the same fleet, encouraged the development of narrow 
cliques of old fleet- or shipmates within a much larger officer corps. As an organization, the 
Royal Navy was riven with patronage networks based around particular senior officers, 
wardrooms, and service schools, like the torpedo school HMS Vernon and the gunnery 
school HMS Excellent, rather than the relatively broad familiarity American officers had 
with one another.40 
 The existence of these networks had a baleful impact on the Royal Navy as an 
institution. Senior officers like Fisher, and Lord Charles Beresford, his major opponent, 
maintained patronage networks of officers loyal to them who largely shared their views. 
While any senior officer would be expected to surround himself with like-minded aides and 
assistants, the narrowness of these networks prevented the free exchange of views between 
the Admiralty and fleet commanders afloat while factionalizing the officer corps. The 
struggle between the “Fishpond,” and Beresford’s partisans in the Channel Fleet, for 
example, came close to tearing the Royal Navy asunder in the first decade of the century.41 
Likewise, the sniping between staffs of the senior commanders of the First World War, John 
Jellicoe and David Beatty, poisoned the well in the postwar Admiralty. Richmond may have 
been slightly unfair when he complained of senior officers “promoted by favouritism and 
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ignorant of anything which demanded a close study,” but he was distressingly close to the 
mark.42 
 Understandably, the two navies approached the world in very different ways. The 
ideology of navalism, expressed through Mahan, undergirded all aspects of the U.S. Navy 
and injected a strain of impracticality into American naval planning. Well before the United 
States Navy reached rough parity with the Royal Navy in the early 1920s, American officers 
assumed that it was an inevitability and planned accordingly. For example, in 1903, the 
Navy’s General Board set a goal of a 48-battleship Navy by 1919 at the latest, a plan with no 
conceivable grounding in political, financial, or strategic realities (by comparison, the British 
fleet at the Battle of Jutland in 1916 had 28 battleships and 9 battlecruisers). Similarly, when 
American officers at the Naval War College pondered issues of naval strategy and theory, 
they did so on a grand scale, often without reference to the size and composition of the 
American fleet at a given time. This mismatch between desire and capability remained 
operative in the United States Navy until at least 1916.  
 The Royal Navy, on the other hand, did not have to justify its existence or size 
through any ideology. To anyone alive at the turn of the century, British naval power simply 
was, with no need for modifiers and explanations. Unsurprisingly, then, no one in the Royal 
Navy developed a comprehensive theory of sea power.43 Indeed, very few officers in the 
Royal Navy seem to have given larger issues of strategy and policy much thought. Those 
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naval writers that Britain did produce, mostly civilians like John Laughton and Julian 
Corbett, tended to develop descriptive theories of naval warfare, rather than the prescriptive 
“Mahanism” that dominated American thought in the era.44  
 British officers, even those in positions of influence, were disinclined to think deeply 
about those larger strategic issues that Americans considered essential to the profession. As 
Andrew Gordon pithily noted, “[t]hey thought they were good, but in ways that mattered, 
they were not. They thought that they were ready for war, but they were not.”45 Gordon’s 
analysis of the British Navy before the war focuses on tactical command and control, but his 
conclusion is equally true for higher-level strategic and policy matters. These, of course, are 
not subjects that every officer needed to concern himself with, but grounding in, and 
experience with these issues, were rare even in the Royal Navy’s high command. Herbert 
Richmond, for example, one of the few British officers who had devoted serious thought to 
matters of strategy and naval theory, frequently decried the “materialist” focus of the 
service’s leadership, which substituted the maintenance of a large fleet of individually 
excellent warships for strategic insight. It is hard not to agree with him when considering the 
prewar and early war debates over battlecruisers, for example, conducted as they were by a 
group of senior officers who seemed incapable of expressing their strategic and operational 
preferences in mutually intelligible language. 
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  Furthermore, these differing strategic cultures were modified by the institutions and 
administrative organization of the two services. We have already mentioned the two navies’ 
war colleges in the context of naval education, but their larger structure and organization also 
served to mediate and modify the decision-making process of both navies. Broadly speaking, 
the administrative structure of the U.S. Navy forced a measure of consensus into American 
planning and policy. The unwieldy apparatus of American naval administration was 
impossible to shift without everyone pulling in the same direction. By contrast, the structure 
of the Royal Navy encouraged dictatorial control over policy and materiel by the Admiralty 
Board, usually dominated by its most forceful member, either the First Sea Lord or the First 
Lord himself. Failing an assertive leader in either position, the Admiralty Board floated along 
without direction.  
 Admiral Fisher’s reforms would have been impossible without this structure of 
centralized decision-making. He also benefited from a subtle change in the Board’s structure 
when he entered office in 1904. At the time, the Board consisted of the First Lord, the Civil 
Lord, the Parliamentary Secretary—all political appointees; the (Permanent) Secretary, a 
civil servant; and four naval lords. To 1904, the duties of these four lords had been somewhat 
diffuse. After Fisher’s arrival, they were laid out as follows: The 4th Sea Lord, responsible for 
transport and stores; the 3rd Sea Lord, responsible for administration of materiel; the 2nd Sea 
Lord, in charge of personnel; and the First Sea Lord responsible for all of the above, as well 
as the “fighting and sea-going efficiency of the fleet.”46 These changes were made by the 
First Lord, the Earl of Selborne, at Fisher’s urging, and made the First Sea Lord the only 
naval member of the Board with executive functions. One historian has suggested that 
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Selborne made these changes “in the hope that the direction of a powerful individual might 
serve in the absence of an articulate bureaucratic mechanism of policy making.”47 If so, the 
shift was certainly a success.  
 In lieu of a formal staff, which he eschewed as a break on his prerogatives, Fisher 
relied on the R.N. War College and the Naval Intelligence Department to fill some functions 
of the absent staff. Even before Fisher’s arrival, the NID had been trending in that direction. 
From its beginning in 1887, the NID included a branch charged with drawing up 
mobilization schemes. By the time of Fisher’s elevation in 1904, the NID also had a branch 
dealing with trade, and another one concerned with war plans and strategy.48 In effect, the 
NID served as a proto-general staff. The NID, in the person of DNI Reginald Custance, was 
also responsible for the creation of the War College “to raise the profile of is department in 
Admiralty policymaking. Not only could the War College provide officers fit for NID 
service, but the NID also sent the War College questions it lacked the time or manpower to 
consider.49 
 Under Fisher, this arrangement was personalized. From the beginning, War College 
reports were sent around the Navy, but under Fisher’s patronage, the Course/College became 
a sort of personal think-tank, “a quasi-official body, under his control, to deal with the 
politico-strategic problems thrown up by his bitter rivalry with the Staff-led Army or with 
Admiral Sir Charles Beresford.” In concert with the NID, the College’s staff and students 
could partake in elaborate war games and simulations, analyze and discuss issues of strategy, 
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and send detailed memoranda on both up to the First Lord in the Admiralty. The 1907 War 
Plans, for example, which went some way to pitting Beresford and Fisher and each other’s 
throats, were primarily produced by an NID officer using the resources of the War College.50 
 This arrangement was informal, and there was no obligation on the part of Admiralty 
leadership to heed their advice. Before the First World War, the Royal Navy remained a 
hostile environment for staff work. Even the formal naval staff created in 1912 lacked 
statutory power and a spot on the Board. Many line officers seem to have viewed any sort of 
naval staff as an affront to the prerogative of commanders, and a dumping ground for officers 
incapable of real command. It did not reach full effectiveness until the First Sea Lord was 
“dual hatted” as Chief of the Naval Staff partway through the war.51 
 Furthermore, the sort of planning and staff work emphasized in the Royal Navy was 
rather limited. Both the NID and the War College developed war plans, but these were, as the 
War College’s first set of instructions outlined, “operations under existing conditions,” 
(emphasis added) not exercises intended to identify future needs or dispositions.52 Likewise, 
neither body was capable of, or interested in the creation of doctrine for the Royal Navy, 
principles that would have aided in discussing and making naval policy.53 Even the Naval 
Staff was not given any oversight of training functions until 1914. While at the War College, 
Corbett made some efforts along these lines, culminating in Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy in 1911 but the book, though excellent, hardly served as a guide for British naval 
thinking and policy during Corbett’s lifetime.   
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These weak staff bodies gave the Board, especially the First Lord and First Sea Lord, 
a great deal of latitude. The two men were, before the war, effectively free to make naval 
policy in concert, or with the acquiescence of one or the other. This was especially true in 
areas where policy could be quickly realized; fields like warship design or fleet dispositions, 
which demanded centralization, and did not require a large executive staff.54 However, this 
left naval policy at the whim of one or two individuals, one of whom, by recent custom, 
entirely lacked naval experience. Furthermore, there was no way to disseminate the 
assumptions and ideas behind these policies to the rest of the Navy, through staff officers 
returning to the fleet, central control over fleet training and operations, or common training.  
 If the British Navy suffered from too much centralization of policymaking, the U.S. 
Navy suffered from the exact opposite condition. Statutorily, the Secretary of the Navy, a 
rough analogue of the First Lord, exercised total executive control of the Navy. In practice, 
significant power rested with the uniformed heads of the Navy’s bureaux, the most important 
of which oversaw personnel (Navigation), weapons design and construction (Ordnance), 
warship design and construction (Construction & Repair), and propulsion (Steam 
Engineering). Apart from C&R, which was led by the head of the Corps of Constructors, the 
other bureaux mentioned here were run by line officers. 
 As with the First Lord, the Secretary of the Navy was a civilian politician, usually 
with no appreciable naval experience. Unlike the First Lord, the American secretary was not 
provided naval advisors to help him with the purely military, as opposed to administrative, 
aspects of the job. To aid him in making decisions, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long 
created the General Board in 1900. A successor to the Navy Department’s ad hoc board of 
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strategy advisors form the Spanish-American War, the General Board was a weak 
organization with no authority over the bureaux or the active fleet; responsibilities that 
remained the sole province of the Secretary. Leading it was Admiral of the Navy George 
Dewey, the victor at Manila Bay, overseeing a mixture of ex-officio members like the head 
of the Bureau of Navigation, and officers at or above the rank of lieutenant commander 
detailed for service on the Board.55  
 Dewey’s leadership of the Board between its formation and his death in 1917 was 
critical to its work, though too subtle to show up in its memoranda. Keenly aware of his 
personal limitations—he was never seen as a keen theorist, tactician, or technologist—
Dewey managed the General Board as “a moderator and facilitator.” His main tool of control 
was his power over selection to the Board itself, and its limited number of aides. Through 
that power, Dewey steadily pressed for “professional cohesion and incremental change,” 
rather than radical changes.56 
Outside of the Board, Dewey’s prestige gave it a legitimacy that belied its recent 
foundation. Although the Board had no statutory authority, it quickly came to be seen as the 
Navy’s brain, providing advice for the Secretary on every aspect of naval policy. While the 
Secretary was free to overrule the Board, its experience, the disjointed Bureau system, and, in 
the person of Dewey, the Board’s prestige, meant that it came to be seen as the “official” 
voice of the Navy as a service both within and without. Despite the greater statutory power 
wielded by the Bureau chiefs, the General Board often spoke loudest in internal debates, and 
                                                           
55
 Kuehn, Agents of Innovation, 11. 
56
 Bönker, Militarism in a Global Age, 294-6. See Ronald Spector, Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and 
Career of George Dewey (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974) for more on Dewey’s term as 
Admiral of the Navy, especially pp. 122-78. Daniel J. Costello’s “Planning for War: A History of the General 
Board of the Navy, 1900-1914” (Ph.D. diss, Tufts, 1968), and the first chapter of Agents of Innovation also 
discusses the General Board’s role before World War I at length.  
40 
 
frequently had a greater influence on the Secretary’s actions. When seeking to interrogate a 
Navy man on naval policy, Congress frequently chose a Board member. It is a mark of the 
success of this “system” that the introduction of a naval staff in 1915 initially caused more 
problems than it solved. Despite the increasing influence of that staff, the General Board 
played a key role in naval policymaking, especially in warship design, through the Second 
World War.57 
 For the 1904-22 period, however, the General Board was firmly in charge of 
developing war plans and strategy. In theory, these plans were developed with the Army 
through the Joint Board but, in practice, the General Board was unconstrained by external 
factors, and most of this work devolved onto a small committee of the Board itself. Rather 
than consultation with the Secretary, President, or State Department on politics, the Board 
relied on its own formulation of threats to the U.S. and its interests. These were based on 
navalist interpretations of world politics, undergirded by Mahan’s theories of commerce and 
empire. In their view, the United States was “destined” to exert predominant influence over 
the Western Hemisphere and Pacific, so long as those regions were protected from rapacious 
rising powers like Japan and Germany and a jealous Great Britain.58 As one War College 
document put it, German territorial expansion in the New World “is not sentimental; it is 
necessary, and the project has been consistently pursued.” The same document theorized that 
German fifth columnists disguised as recreational shooting clubs might seize control of 
Brazil, suggesting the level of geopolitical analysis current in the Navy’s strategic elite.59 
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 In line with the Board’s markedly bloody—perhaps paranoid—view of the 
international system, their construction policy existed on a grand scale. In 1903, Secretary 
William Moody asked the General Board how big the American fleet should be. The Board 
responded with a memorandum, General Board No. 420, calling for a gargantuan fleet of 48 
battleships, 24 armored cruisers, 48 protected cruisers, 48 scout cruisers, and 48 destroyers.60 
This armada was bigger than any extant Navy and, indeed, larger than the combined British 
and German fleets at Jutland in all classes except destroyers.61 Through 1908, the General 
Board’s authority over construction was tangled with that of the “innately conservative” 
Board on Construction, which retarded the development of dreadnought battleships.62 
Aiding the Board was the Naval War College. When the College was out of session, 
staff war games and report were frequently forwarded on to the General Board in 
Washington. The War College staff also helped the General Board develop training exercises 
for the fleet, often based on Newport war games.63 During the summer, the General Board 
decamped for Newport, to observe the year’s class debate a series of problems submitted to 
them by the Board. These “Summer Conferences” provided much of the War College’s value 
to the U.S. Navy. For a brief time in 1910-11, the Naval War College was responsible for 
developing the war plan itself, but that proved to be beyond the College’s capabilities.64   
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 In many ways, the U.S. Navy managed to overcome this ramshackle structure in the 
early twentieth century. While these disparate loci of power threatened to make the Navy 
ungovernable, the common background and training of naval officers conspired to ensure 
that the U.S. Navy made steady progress towards its goal of a large battleship fleet. The 
Naval War College, though not a formal part of the decision-making apparatus played a key 
role here. By giving the College problems to consider, and taking those suggestions 
seriously, the General Board ensured that their deliberations had input from a variety of 
officers representing a wide swath of the Navy.  
Like the RN War College, the American War College did some work on war plans for 
the present and near future, but the War College’s real planning value came from its more 
speculative endeavors. Detailed war plans could hardly be developed by the two-three dozen 
officers in each year’s class over their short summer course, and the handful of permanent 
officers were no more competent for that task. On the other hand, the Summer Conferences 
provided the General Board with general advice about force structure, warship design, and 
tactical doctrine, advice that the Board took into account in their deliberations. Likewise, the 
Board frequently commissioned studies or war games from the permanent staff to fill more 
immediate needs for expert analysis.  
 
*** 
  
 Many of the points made above will be extended in the following chapters. Still, they 
provide some sense of how both navies were intellectually and structurally situated in 1904. 
The major point is that the machinery of administration was incomplete in both countries: the 
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United States Navy possessed strong consultative organs, but little capacity to formulate 
strategy or change policy, even policies that required little to no civilian input. In the Royal 
Navy, on the other hand, the Admiralty Board was a strong decision-making body, but lacked 
support and personnel with the intellectual capacity to think through the big questions of 
strategy and policy. Both the NID and the RN War College could provide operational 
suggestions, but were culturally and organizationally incapable of providing advice on larger, 
long-term issues. Speaking very broadly, the two services’ approaches to administration and 
planning can be described as acting without thinking and thinking without acting. 
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CHAPTER 2: “ARMED SPEED” 
 
If one had asked a naval officer at the turn of the century what the next advance in 
warship design would be, they almost certainly would have pointed to the development of an 
all-big-gun battleship, which promised increased firepower, especially at long ranges.1 Credit 
for actually developing the first all-big-gun ship can go either to the United States, which had 
a design approved in March 1905, or the U.K., which had one under construction that 
September. Either way, development of the ships soon known as “dreadnoughts” was almost 
inevitable: the benefits to fire control and destructive capacity were simply obvious to many 
naval observers at the time. Long anticipated, HMS Dreadnought’s design could hardly be 
called a surprise.  
 In contrast, the development of HMS Invincible shocked naval opinion. There had 
been movement towards placing some large-caliber guns on armored cruisers, but actual 
work in that direction was not terribly advanced outside of Japan when Invincible’s 
characteristics were unveiled in late 1906. Their firepower made the three British cruisers a 
much greater menace to their foreign counterparts than Dreadnought, which would face 
foreign battleships already ostensibly armored against 12” fire. It is no surprise, then, that 
Invincible’s construction was tied far more to Admiral Fisher’s idiosyncratic version of 
warfare than a neutral reading of trends in naval design. Taken together with Britain’s lead in 
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logistics and shipbuilding capacity, the two new designs cemented the Royal Navy’s material 
superiority over other navies.  
The United States, on the other hand, was at the forefront of naval thought. Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s writings—critical to the development of the Japanese and German navies—
helped to give the U.S. officer corps an overarching strategic ideology. At the same time, the 
early development and importance of the U.S. Naval War College ensured that naval debate 
and discussion in the United States was of very high quality. Though the ideas developed at 
Newport were not always accepted by the Navy’s leadership, the U.S. Navy of the day had 
many officers accustomed to contemplating the abstract and intellectual side of their 
profession. To that end, American officers had been discussing and debating the issues 
surrounding all-big-gun ships at length since at least 1901.2 Based on those discussions, the 
General Board had started preliminary work on an all-big-gun battleship in January 1904.3  
 The years 1904-1907 highlight some of the sharpest distinctions between the 
American and British navies. While the Royal Navy quickly put Fisher’s designs into effect, 
American warship production lagged. American officers independently developed all-big-gun 
battleship designs (some, though not all, with speed similar to Dreadnought), and a type of 
fast battleship/heavy cruiser comparable to Invincible. In neither case, however, did the 
United States Navy lead the way in building such ships, hamstrung by an organization and 
decision-making process inimical to rapid change.   
  
*** 
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Admiral Fisher came into office in October 1904 with plans to reorganize the 
fundamentals of British naval policy. Indeed, Fisher had been selected for the role in large 
part because of his promise to reduce naval spending. Rather than basing the Royal Navy’s 
strength on fleets of battleships, stationed around the world, Fisher proposed scrapping a 
large part of the fleet, and protecting trade and the Empire with a relative handful of swift 
armored cruisers, supplemented by smaller, torpedo-armed warships and submarines for 
point defense in critical European waters like the Mediterranean and North Seas. In addition 
to reducing spending, Fisher felt that these policies would best suit rapidly maturing 
technologies like torpedoes, the submarine, and long-range naval artillery.4 
 Fisher’s preference for armored cruisers was not new. His preference for high speed 
and long-range fire can be traced as far back as 1882, while in captain of the then-new 
battleship Invincible.5 While commanding the Mediterranean Fleet from 1899-1902, his ideas 
matured into something like the ones he would bring to the Admiralty. In documents from his 
Mediterranean days, Fisher asserted the utility of high speed in battleships and cruisers, in 
forcing weaker fleets to fight. He also developed an appreciation for the value of long-range 
fire (then reckoned at 3-4,000 yards) once battle was joined.6 
 In 1903, while commanding the Portsmouth Dockyard, his last assignment before 
becoming First Sea Lord, he laid out his thinking to a group of civilian visitors:  
Size is everything, because in the first place it gives us the first desideratum, which is 
speed. Speed comes before all qualities, both for strategical as well as tactical 
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reasons. . . . It enables you to evade or bring on battle. It enables you to take up the 
most advantageous tactical positon. It increases coal endurance, because the higher 
the maximum speed, the higher the economical speed.7 
The best fit for these qualities at Portsmouth was not a battleship, but King Alfred, a 23-knot 
armored cruiser nearing completion in the yard. Armored cruisers were, he claimed, like 
armadillos set against ants when arrayed against smaller cruisers and destroyers.8 
 These attitudes were elaborated in memoranda Fisher wrote over the second half of 
1904 in preparation for assuming his First Sea Lord duties. The documents, collected soon 
after his installation and dubbed Naval Necessities, provide crucial insight into Fisher’s 
initial plans for the Admiralty. In addition, the collected memoranda reproduced marginalia 
from First Lord Selborne, which highlight the limits of what he was able to accomplish. 
Fisher’s suggestions touched on almost all areas of naval administration and policy, but the 
most radical were his suggestions for new warship construction, which would reduce the 
types of ship built for the Royal Navy to four: a battleship, an armored cruiser, a destroyer, 
and a submarine.  
 The battleship, which Fisher dubbed “Untakeable,” was to have 20 knots’ speed, and 
sixteen 10” guns. Though smaller than the 12” standard on recent battleships, sixteen guns 
represented four times as many large guns as contemporary battleships carried. At the same 
time, their much higher rate of fire would enable them, Fisher estimated, to send half again as 
much weight of projectile at enemy ships over the course of an engagement.9 Though 12” 
shells could obviously penetrate heavier armor, Fisher predicted that opposing warships 
“would be so wrecked, demoralized, and put out of trim,” by 10” fire on exposed works and 
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unarmored portions of the hull that armor piercing would not be necessary.10 
At the heart of his scheme was the armored cruiser “Unapproachable,” a 25-knot 
vessel with sixteen guns of the slightly smaller 9.2” caliber. The weight saved in the reduced 
firepower and the traditional lighter cruiser armor gave this ship five knots’ extra speed, and 
speed was the “first desideratum” of the sort of naval war Fisher wanted to fight. At any rate, 
9.2” guns were sufficient for fighting other armored cruisers, their intended quarry.11 Despite 
the slight differences in firepower, and the rather larger differences in speed and armor, these 
ships were projected to be the same weight, about 16,000 tons, and bore a greater similarity 
to each other than the typical difference between cruisers and battleships.12 This was no 
accident; Fisher believed that armored cruisers were the capital ship of the future, and that 
battleship construction would eventually be halted in favor of cruisers in the near future.13 
Ironically, the key quality that made his armored cruiser a battlecruiser, its 12” guns, 
was not Fisher’s idea, but suggested by a group of seven informal advisors, who had helped 
him shape his thoughts in the months leading up to his installation.14 Fisher’s initial 
comments about fire control in the Naval Necessities documents betray a lack of familiarity 
with the new practice in the Royal Navy, sparked by the development of continuous-aim fire 
by Captain Percy Scott and salvo fire by officers in the Mediterranean Fleet. To summarize a 
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very complex issue, advances in gunlaying and fire control promised greatly improved 
accuracy at the cost of some rapidity of fire. With those advances, larger guns with heavier 
shells were more useful than lighter guns that could be fired faster.15 
By the time he entered office in late October, Fisher had become convinced that his 
battleship would need 12” guns. For a time, he persisted in pursuing 9.2” guns for his 
armored cruiser, but his advisory group would eventually change his stance. According to 
Reginald Bacon, one of those advisors, soon after he took office, they convinced Fisher to 
put 12” guns on the cruiser designs as well, so that they could use their guns to batter 
battleships in a fleet action. They argued that a squadron or two of fast armored cruisers 
could flit around the ends of an enemy battle line, and attack those battleships from an 
advantageous position.16 
 These same men dominated the Committee on Designs, a group that Fisher convinced 
Selborne to appoint in order to consider his new warship ideas. This 14-member panel 
included six of the seven members of Fisher’s group of advisors and Fisher himself as a non-
voting chair.17 Unsurprisingly, the Committee looked favorably on Fisher’s new designs, 
although Fisher was only able to convince one member, the eminent scientist Lord Kelvin, to 
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drop battleships altogether.18 The main impact of the Committee was to settle on the form of 
the new warships; Fisher’s descriptions had not specified major design issues like the 
arrangement of the guns or the internal layout of the vessels, and they debated several 
different designs produced to Fisher’s pattern.19  
On the other hand, the Committee was not purely a rubber stamp body. Their report 
shows that the naval members held rather more conventional views on strategy and 
operations than Fisher. The section discussing the design and specifications of the eventual 
Dreadnought was far longer (5.5 vs. 1.5 pages) than the discussion of the armored cruiser 
designs, an inversion of the importance Fisher placed on the respective designs.20 Likewise, 
the Committee’s final report announced that the cruisers were “in reality, fast battleships,” 
suggesting something of the duties more conventional naval officers envisaged for them.21 
When the dust settled, the Royal Navy committed itself to build four new capital ships, HMS 
Dreadnought, and three of the new armored cruisers: Invincible, Inflexible, and Indomitable. 
Although the imbalance in numbers may seem like a victory for Fisher, the preexisting 
construction schedule for the Royal Navy already called for three armored cruisers and one 
battleship to be started in 1905-06.22 
The primary differences between the two designs and their predecessors lay in 
firepower and speed, Fisher’s preferred attributes; armor remained effectively unchanged:   
                                                           
18
 Sumida, Defence, 55-6.  
19
 Report of the Committee on Designs, 1905 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1905), RIC/4/2/1, 
NMM. 
20
 Committee on Designs, 26-34. 
21
 Committee on Designs 20-1. 
22
 Sumida, Defence, 55.  
51 
 
Lord Nelson Dreadnought Minotaur Invincible 
Speed (kts) 18 21 23 25 
Main 
Battery 4x12” 10x12” 4x9.2” 8x12” 
Armor (in): 
Belt  12 11 6 6 
Deck 1.5 3 2 2.5 
Turrets 12 11 7 10 
Barbettes 12 11 8 7 
 
 Viewed against Lord Nelson, the Committee’s claim that the Invincibles were 
effectively fast battleships is easy to understand.23 After all, the new armored cruisers 
mounted twice as many heavy guns as extant battleships. If used to cap the head or harry the 
rear of an enemy battle line, an Invincible could potentially bring six of its guns to bear 
against two of a battleship’s at long ranges. Even beyond the firepower imbalance, the four 
guns of a pre-dreadnought battleship provided insufficient ranging data for truly accurate 
long-range fire under the new control systems coming into vogue. Whatever Fisher’s 
intentions, his new armored cruisers could certainly fulfill a fast battleship role against fleets 
of pre-dreadnought warships.  
Whatever their function, the new ships were the product of Fisher’s initiative, rather 
than the considered opinion of the Admiralty. Although the Admiralty Board assented to the 
new designs, the legwork in conceptualizing and designing the ships took place outside of the 
regular structure for making such decisions. Fisher was not the only Senior Naval Lord (to 
                                                           
23
 Fisher’s feelings on the matter are somewhat more difficult to lay out. There is no doubt that Fisher believed 
his ships could fight battleships successfully, especially against pre-dreadnoughts that lacked the capacity for 
effective long-range fire. That, however, is not the same as saying that Fisher intended to have them do so. His 
mature strategic plans as First Sea Lord suggest that they were not, but by that time, it was clear that 
dreadnought battleship construction could not be halted. Similarly, Fisher deprecated the value of armor against 
large-caliber rounds. Viewed in that light, battlecruisers were an ideal platform, freed from the heavy armor that 
sapped battleships’ speed. This question becomes more than academic when asked after the First World War, 
where they were used in combat against German battleships and battlecruisers, to ill effect.  
52 
 
use the older term) to utilize special committees for decision-making, but they became even 
more prominent during his time in Whitehall. In some ways, they served as a substitute to a 
staff system, which Fisher consistently opposed. This substitute ensured that Fisher, not the 
First Lord or the Board, were at the center of Admiralty policymaking. Unlike a staff, these 
committees “could be evanescent, even when they appeared to be standing bodies.”24  
 Fisher’s construction policy was not only boosted by his adroit manipulation of 
Admiralty administration. Outside of the Admiralty, news from the Russo-Japanese War also 
supported the form of Fisher’s new cruisers, though not necessarily his thinking concerning 
their future employment. By virtue of their alliance, the British had a number of attaches 
embedded with the Japanese Navy in their ongoing war with Russia. The dispatches, which 
started to reach Whitehall in mid-1904, boosted the case for heavy guns, and showed that the 
Japanese had independently developed something like the battlecruiser formula. Even better, 
the Japanese idea came in the context of the prevailing pre-dreadnought model, so the foreign 
ship simultaneously confirmed Fisher’s initial insight and ensured that Invincible, when built, 
would definitely be the world’s most powerful cruiser by some distance.  
 According to the attaché reports, wartime experience led Japan to consider a new 
cruiser design (eventually to become the Tsukuba-class) of 12,000 tons and 21 knots, with the 
same armament as the next class of Japanese battleships.25 Another report relayed that the 
new battlecruisers were to have a 12-inch main battery, although it would retain the 
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secondary battery.26 Unsurprisingly, then, the initial report on the new cruisers warned that 
they “will not only be able to beat most battleships in a fight, but will be fast enough to run 
down . . . any warship now afloat,” an coincidental summation of Fisher’s own opinion of his 
new battlecruisers.27 
 The reports from Japan regarding long-range fire also lent empirical support to the 
decisions arrived at by Fisher and the Committee on Designs. Although long-range fire 
(distances of up to eight miles) in the war to date remained highly inaccurate, the attaché 
nevertheless stressed that “a single well-placed shot of large caliber can produce . . . blows of 
great force.”28 For example, the starboard bow of Mikasa, the Japanese fleet flagship, was 
“shattered” on August 10, 1904 at a range of 13-14,000 yards despite the 7” armor in that 
section. The report suggested that the steeper angles of descent at long ranges were to blame, 
and that the thick vertical armor of extant warships was not up to the task of stopping long-
range fire at those angles. 29  
 Had Fisher been inclined to listen, the news relayed from Japan would have been 
sobering. The 7” armor pierced by a Russian shell—not the thickest on Mikasa’s 9” main 
belt—was only half that of the 14” armor protecting the guns and ammunition in the 
barbettes and the critical personnel in the conning tower. In contrast, apart from 10” armor on 
its conning tower, 7” was the thickest armor installed on the Invincible, protecting only its 
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turrets and barbettes.30 Invincible may have been superior to extant battleships, but even at 
the ranges implied by Fisher’s focus on long-range gunnery, a pre-dreadnought was more 
than capable of disabling or destroying it with a single lucky shot. Fisher was fond of 
pronouncements to the effect that the speed of battlecruiser was their armor, but even at this 
early date, empirical evidence showed just how risky this assumption might be. Even if 
increased speed made hits less likely, the possible effects of a single hit with a modern 12” 
gun could be catastrophic if it hit the wrong place. The potential dangers increased if, as 
Fisher knew they would, foreign navies began to construct dreadnoughts of their own.  
 
*** 
 
 Even before the Russo-Japanese War, American officers had undertaken serious 
discussions about all-big-gun battleships and modified armored cruiser designs. Both ideas 
had come up in the 1903 Summer Conference and met with some support. A special 
committee of the Conference suggested that future American battleships should be built with 
a uniform battery of heavy guns.31 Although the suggestion did not make it into the official 
Conference report, the War College staff did send a memorandum on the issue to its 
president, noting that the 8” intermediate battery of the newest American battleships, the 
Connecticut-class, were incapable of penetrating battleship armor at ranges above 3,000 
yards. Given that the newest torpedoes had a range of 4,000 yards, the prospect of future 
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combat within the 8” gun’s effective range seemed remote.32  
 Likewise, many members of the Conference were unhappy with the current pattern of 
armored cruiser. One officer referred to them as “fast lightly armed and protected 
battleships.” Judged by that standard, they were deficient.33 Although they were “the highest 
type of scouting ship,” their expense, large complements, and inability to fight battleships 
made them “impractical to maintain . . . in sufficient numbers.”34 A number of officers 
suggested a hybrid between battleships and cruisers that could fulfill the cruiser role, while 
maintaining greater utility in battle. As laid out by the Naval War College staff after the 
conference, this ship would have a battleship’s size and armor, with four 12” guns, perhaps 
eight. Like in their ideal battleship, the intermediate battery of this ships was to be removed, 
and the weight saved given over to engines. It was hoped that these changes could produce a 
ship of about 22 knots, just as fast as contemporary armored cruisers. Such a ship “could do 
any duty that the armored cruiser is designed for, and be a worthy addition to the battle 
line.”35 
 These ideas were carried over into the 1904 Conference. Noting that most damage in 
the Russo-Japanese War had been inflicted by large-caliber guns, the entire Conference 
enthusiastically endorsed a report calling for a new battleship with ten or twelve 12” guns 
and no intermediate battery.”36 The Conference’s ideas would be incorporated in the South 
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Carolina class, the U.S. Navy’s first all-big-gun battleships, in the Navy’s 1905-06 
program.37 The 1904 Conference also endorsed a four 12” gun standard for cruisers based on 
the 1903 ideas.38 The Summer Conferences in 1905 and 1906 also adopted similar language, 
but the “reciprocal,” as the design became known in later years, never caught the fancy of the 
Navy’s leadership.39 
 These discussions at Newport highlight the U.S. Navy’s biases in favor of firepower 
and armor, and their comparative neglect of speed. Summer Conference attendees expressed 
concern about the firepower of American battleships, but were content to stand pat on the 18-
19 knot speed of extant battleships. This attitude led, in early 1905, to the semi-dreadnoughts 
of the South Carolina-class, all-big-gun ships with 18.5-knot speed. Likewise, their proposals 
for armored cruisers were intended to bring cruiser firepower and armor standards up to those 
of battleships. Speed, the major characteristic of armored cruisers, was untouched. 
Essentially, these abortive plans were intended to make cruisers into better battleships 
without improving their cruiser qualities. As strange as that might seem, it was in keeping 
with the U.S. Navy’s Mahanian emphasis on battle, if a ship that could stand in line could 
also adequately scout, it would be a boon for the Navy’s fleet action focus.  
 American officers did more than turn inward for new ideas, though. As the 1904 
Conference showed, the U.S. Navy was keeping a close eye on developments abroad, 
especially the Russo-Japanese War, albeit at some distance. Neither the Russian nor the 
Japanese Navies had especially cordial relations with the U.S. Navy, and there was a lack of 
                                                           
37
 Friedman, U.S. Battleships, 53-5.  
38
 “Question 40,” Summer 1904, RG 12, Vol. 10, NHC, 68. 
39
 After the unveiling of Invincible, the NWC design was dubbed the “reciprocal” because, while Invincible 
emphasized speed over armor, the American idea kept battleship-grade armor at the cost of some potential 
speed.  
57 
 
accurate, operational information reaching the U.S. before the war’s end. On the other hand, 
at least one American officer, Lieutenant Commander William Sims, enjoyed almost 
unfettered access to the Royal Navy, based in part on his relationship with Percy Scott, who 
was promoted to rear admiral in early 1905. In fact, Sims visited with Scott and other British 
offices while in Britain in the summer of 1905 on a fact finding mission, as part of his duties 
as Inspector of Target Practice, and President Roosevelt’s personal naval advisor. Already 
something of an outlier amongst his peers, Sims clearly imbibed some of his British friends’ 
opinions. Upon his return, he expressed views on armored cruisers that were in disagreement 
with the American consensus at the time.  In a July 25 letter to Roosevelt, Sims 
declared the trip a success in terms of new information on gunnery, but also related that he 
had “obtained certain information . . . of great importance in connection with the design of 
battleships.”40 That information was nothing less than the basic parameters of HMS 
Dreadnought, which Sims referred to as “DEVASTATION,” a ship with “ten or twelve 12-
inch guns and having a speed of 20 knots.” He also came back firmly in the uniform battery 
camp, claiming that there was “no difference of opinion” within the Royal Navy on the 
advisability of a uniform battery for battleships, as opposed to the all-big-gun ships requested 
by the General Board the previous year, which initially had a mix of 10 and 12” guns.41  
 In a subsequent report on the trip written up for the Office of Naval Intelligence, Sims 
went into more detail on the subject of guns, highlighting the difficulties inherent in 
managing “heavy guns of nearly the same caliber.” Those mixed batteries lengthened the 
spotting and aiming time for both types of gun, negating any possible advantage in loading 
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time from slightly smaller shells. Instead, he argued, a uniform battery for subsequent 
America vessels was necessary to allow for the “maximum possible hitting power;” the 
greatest combination of accuracy and rapidity possible.42 At the same time, as he explained in 
a later letter, with battleship armor ideally proof against intermediate battery, a duel between 
a new uniform battery ship and the extant type would rely on the ten or so 12” guns of the 
new ship against the four of the old.43 
 Sims’s trip also influenced his opinions on cruiser design. Some months after his 
return to the U.S., he laid out his ideal armored cruiser for President Roosevelt, a ship so 
similar to Fisher’s original “Unapproachable” that one wonders if one of his British contacts 
gave him a chance to glance at a copy of Naval Necessities while abroad. His opinions on 
uniform battery battleships were avant-garde in America, but hardly rare. His desire for a 23-
knot cruiser armed with “heavy turret guns of uniform caliber,” preferably of 10-inches, 
marked him as something of a maverick; by mid-1905, the opinion in the U.S. Navy was 
very much in favor of abolishing armored cruisers altogether instead of redesigning the type. 
 Sims’s depiction of the state of affairs in Britain was perhaps overblown. There was 
certainly no unanimity within the Royal Navy on the all-big-gun ships or the excess speed of 
the Dreadnought. At the same time, Sims’s conclusions did reflect the fact that the most 
extreme reformers were in charge at the Admiralty. Sims’s friend, Scott, in Whitehall on the 
express wishes of Fisher, was very much part of this cabal, and an officer in Scott’s position 
would have been able to give Sims the sensitive information he returned with. Certainly, the 
opinions expressed by Sims after his return from Britain very closely followed those 
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expressed by Fisher though not, perhaps, the Royal Navy’s most closely guarded secret: the 
specific details of the yet-to-be-constructed Invincible.  
 Sims, however, with his connections in the Royal Navy was somewhat unique in the 
U.S. Navy. For almost all of the American naval intelligentsia the most important 
developments were taking place not across the Atlantic, but on the other side of the Pacific in 
East Asia. Here, the discourse reflected the ongoing American debates internal to the U.S. 
Navy. The main vehicle for these discussions, the United States Naval Institute’s Proceedings 
journal had intermittently covered the war, and in the months after Tsushima, it ran a number 
of articles on that particular battle, written by officers of impeccable repute, including the 
Director of Naval Intelligence, Seaton Schroeder, and Mahan himself. 
 Even before Tsushima, though, Proceedings published a remarkable article by 
Commander Bradley A. Fiske, one of the navy’s most prominent thinkers, and an eventual 
Aide for Operations, a post that was later expanded into the modern Chief of Naval 
Operations. Like Sims, Fiske was considered very much in the avant-garde of naval thought, 
however Fiske lacked Sims’s contacts in England, and his work reflects a much “purer” 
strand of American thought, unleavened with foreign ideas. Fiske also possessed a rather 
forceful writing style, which gave his essays an extra punch.  
 In March 1905, even as the Admiralty was finalizing plans for their new ships, 
Proceedings published Fiske’s “American Naval Policy,” the prize-winning essay in its 
annual competition, a rather intemperate big-picture look at the role, composition, and 
strategy of the Navy that hammered at a number of shibboleths held by his brother officers. 
Foremost among them was his attack on Mahan’s understanding of naval warfare and the 
purpose of a navy. According to Fiske, the notion that a nation’s navy existed to protect trade 
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was a “British” idea, inapplicable to the mostly self-sufficient United States.44 Fiske readily 
conceded that trade was important, but for him the most crucial role of the Navy was “to 
enforce the policy which is necessary to a country’s preservation,” a notion that Fiske 
defined rather aggressively. As a young country, the United States was inevitably bound to 
fight a series of wars to secure its place in the international pecking order.45 
 In accord with his strategic thinking, Fiske also laid out his vision of the ideal “ship 
of the Battle-Fleet.” Unlike many of his American colleagues, Fiske argued that speed was 
the single most important factor for a battle fleet, claiming that in action, the faster fleet had 
the ability to initiate or refuse combat, pick its range, and maneuver itself into favorable 
firing positions. To accommodate the necessary machinery for high speed, and sufficient 
space for heavy armor and a uniform battery of twelve-inch guns, Fiske proposed that the 
American battleship of the future be “as large as the state of the engineering arts permits.”46 
 Despite this attention lavished on speed, Fiske was rather skeptical of armored 
cruisers. As desirable as a high fleet speed was, the need for a higher-speed ship was less 
pressing. In his own words, the role of the armored cruiser was “not accurately defined . . . a 
notion seems to be held by a few officers that their particular combination . . .  must result in 
something very valuable [because] they cost as much money as battleships.”47 Perhaps, he 
conceded, if the U.S. Navy’s extant armored cruisers could be given more armor, then there 
might be a role for them. As they existed, however, they were only useful for commerce 
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protection, a negligible role for the U.S. Navy in the event of war.48 Clearly then, building an 
armored cruiser was not worth the implicit sacrifice of a battleship, an attitude shared by 
most American officers at the time, and one that hamstrung development of battlecruisers in 
the U.S. Navy. 
 Fiske’s discussion of armored cruisers was even more interesting for what it left out. 
His article did not even attempt to assess their use in pitched battle. He may have caricatured 
British armored cruisers as only of use in commerce protection, but in reality British practice 
at the time was to consider armored cruisers an integral part of the battle fleet, as officers like 
Fisher were doing before the turn of the century. Even more to the point, Admiral Togo and 
his Russian counterparts in East Asia were using their armored cruisers in squadrons attached 
to the battleship formations as a matter of course.  
 The essay was also the subject of commentary from several intellectually active 
officers in the same issue. Excluding some of the more narrow critiques of the piece, 
especially from constructors, the article was generally well received with most attention 
focused on Fiske’s advocacy of offensive war, as well as the size and speed of his ideal 
battleships. As far as Fiske’s worldview was concerned, several of the commenters noted 
that, while they broadly shared Fiske’s commitment to a large navy, they found his extreme 
bellicosity distasteful. Indeed, in their eyes, the U.S. Navy’s role was be so strong as to 
prevent wars rather than courting them.49  
 The speed and size issues proved more contentious. Philip Alger, the journal’s editor, 
argued that although Fiske was entirely correct on the need for all-big-gun battleships, his 
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focus on size was misplaced. Instead, Alger advocated a larger number of smaller ships. 
Although he did not say so explicitly, such a fleet would be quite a bit slower than Fiske’s 
ideal, with individual ships lacking the space for the boilers and engines necessary to produce 
a speedy battleship.50 Lieutenant-Commander W. Irving Chambers, an expert on battleship 
design, generally agreed with Alger’s although he explicitly dealt with the speed issue, 
claiming that it would result in “too great a sacrifice of other essential qualities,” especially 
considering that Chambers felt that Fiske’s proposed ship would be too big to fit in most 
American ports.51  
In contrast, Captain C.H. Stockton agreed entirely with Fiske on battleship speed, 
calling it “refreshing and stimulating” to read such full-throated advocacy. 52 Specifically, 
Stockton related that foreign observers had long considered speed to be a major flaw in 
American battleship designs. He expressed the hope that Fiske’s ships would render armored 
cruisers superfluous. With this newfound speed, Stockton claimed that American vessels 
would be well placed to dominate combat at the longer ranges that a uniform battery would 
allow.  
 Fiske’s article obviously struck a nerve, and in the next issue of Proceedings, there 
was another fifteen pages of commentary on Fiske’s article. The previous issue’s respondents 
had been picked experts on the issues Fiske brought up in his piece, but the new discussion 
section was more akin to the “letters to the editor” section of a magazine than a symposium 
of experts. Still, although the new respondents were less eminent, their responses, four out of 
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five positive, provide some sense of what ordinary officers were thinking, although they 
brought up nothing that had not been mentioned already.53 
 At any rate, both Fiske and Alger felt that there was more to say, because in 
September Proceedings published Fiske’s “Compromiseless Ships,” a short defense of his 
ideal battleship. After some remarks on its technical feasibility, and dismissing concerns 
about Congress’s willingness to fund such a ship, he turned to the real obstacle in his way: 
Mahan. Quoting Mahan’s immediate response to Tsushima in Collier’s Weekly, Fiske noted 
that the great man felt as if the battle justified his theory of numbers counting for more than 
individually powerful ships. This position that favored large numbers of smaller battleships 
over small numbers of larger battleships, the fleet with a larger number of smaller vessels 
being more “flexible,” a position Fiske found unconvincing.54 While he conceded that more 
ships might be useful for preventing escape and overcoming “feeble resistance,” he thought it 
necessary to concentrated as much power into as few ships as possible when facing a strong 
enemy.55 
 After Fiske’s article, the focus of Proceedings shifted to debate over the Battle of 
Tsushima, rather than hypothetical designs. Although the journal would not carry a detailed 
piece on the Battle of Tsushima until December, once it did, the battle would dominate the 
journal for the next year, with five articles published in the next four issues through the end 
of 1906. Within the Navy, the debate morphed into one on battleship design, with the battle 
itself assuming a secondary importance. Most officers strove to “claim” the lessons of battle 
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for or against the “all-big-gun” battleship. Armored cruisers on the other hand, although in 
Togo’s line of battle, proved to be less contentious: everyone seemed to agree that they were 
pointless.  
 That December issue of Proceedings carried two articles on the war, one written by 
Fiske, clearly marking himself out as a rising star in the Navy’s intellectual elite, and another 
written by Captain Richard Wainwright, a former Naval Academy Superintendent and chief 
of Naval Intelligence. As Wainwright noted, much of the immediate commentary on the 
battle was written before reliable accounts were available, and the analysis was of a cursory, 
rushed, nature. After the publication of Togo’s after action report, though, there was enough 
information available for the sort of technical and detailed analysis that was a hallmark of 
Proceedings. Fiske’s article, “Why Togo Won,” was primarily concerned with issues of 
training, but Wainwright’s “The Battle of the Sea of Japan,” went further into material 
factors.  
 From the start of his piece, Wainwright discounted the Japanese armored cruisers. 
While conceding that they performed well in the battle, he claimed that this was due to the 
poor training and morale of the Russian sailors. Against a competent foe, the Japanese 
armored cruisers would have been the first target of the Russian fleet and driven off before 
the action began in earnest.56 Instead, Wainwright, like many of his peers, preferred a speedy 
battleship to a mixture of slow battleships and fast armored cruisers.  
When combined with the heavy long-range fire promised by the Dreadnought, 
Wainwright found speed especially useful. Not only could a ship of the dreadnought-type 
maneuver into a favorable firing position, but it could also place itself out of range of its 
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enemy’s intermediate guns, essentially restricting an enemy vessel to its four heavy guns. 57 
Indeed, Wainwright argued that speed in all its facets—“Speed in the ships, speed in making 
combinations, speed in making signals, and above all speed in making hits”—were the keys 
to modern warfare. Still, as his analysis makes clear, the speedy ships were to be battleships. 
Ships with only speed, like the armored cruisers, he saw as comparatively useless in a major 
engagement.   
In the next issue, Captain Seaton Schroeder, the Director of Naval Intelligence and an 
ex officio General Board member, weighed in with his “Gleanings from the Sea of Japan,”  
an honorable mention essay in the annual essay competition (the first prize went to a piece on 
promotion reform). As one might expect from such an essay, written by a very important 
officer, Schroeder’s piece punted on the contentious issues of battleship design. He 
acknowledged the importance of speed, and the importance of all-big-gun ships, but unlike 
Wainwright and Fiske, Schroeder was unwilling to endorse the larger battlewagons, coming 
to the somewhat tepid conclusion that, pending more information, smaller battleships seem to 
have more utility than their larger cousins.58  
 On the subject of armored cruisers, however, Schroeder’s conclusions, and language, 
were far less temperate. Schroeder noted, as many observers did, that both the Japanese and 
Russian fleets used their armored cruisers as an integral part of the battle line, a role that 
made little use of their speed and made their light armor and guns a severe liability. While 
most Japanese, and many British commentators took this as an endorsement of the type’s 
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robustness, to Schroeder, the battle proved that armored cruisers were an unnecessary luxury. 
In his words, “throughout this entire war, the armored cruiser has failed to justify its 
existence,” a stance that most American officers endorsed.59 
 Finally, in June Mahan himself weighed in on the battle. “Reflections, Historic and 
Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea” was, in a sense, a narrative of the battle, but 
by then Tsushima was a year old, and at the heart of the essay was Mahan’s interpretation of 
the battle’s impact on future developments. Specifically, Mahan’s article was an attack on the 
very idea of dreadnought battleships and, by implication, battlecruisers. The new ships were, 
he argued, indicative of “a simple trust in bigness . . . an absence of trust in anything but 
bigness.”60 
 As we have seen, “bigness” gave Dreadnought some measure of firepower and speed 
over its predecessors, qualities that Mahan depreciated. In his reading of the battle, the fire of 
the Japanese heavy guns was not the key weapon of destruction. Instead, he argued that the 
smaller guns of the Japanese fleet’s “so called ‘secondary battery’” proved decisive because 
of its effect on Russian personnel, the real target. At the same time, the rapid-firing 
secondary battery also gave a greater number of hits. Even if, as Mahan conceded, the 
secondary battery was unable to penetrate the heaviest battleship armor, there were still 
crucial targets like the bridge and especially funnels that remained more or less unarmored.61 
Mahan also argued that speed, while potentially valuable, was of subordinate importance in 
the design of battleships. Not only did constant increases in battleship speed result in “the 
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premature antiquating of good vessels,” but dramatic increases in speed could only be 
achieved by a dramatic increase in size—“a trust in bigness”—or by adding engines in lieu of 
guns. Neither option was acceptable to Mahan.62 
 Taken together, Mahan correctly surmised that these two trends—towards heavier 
batteries and faster ships—pointed towards a future of long-range actions, a position he 
found logically sound but empirically suspect. Indeed, he called seeking long-range 
engagements “a system which has never worked historically,” and one associated with 
weaker fleets concerned with retreat, not stronger fleets looking to defeat, destroy, or disable 
a foe.63 At the same time, fleets of battleships designed around these principles would be far 
more expensive than their predecessors, robbing navies of the critical impact of numbers in 
future wars.64 
 Lastly, Mahan turned his attention to cruisers, a class of ship he marked by “speed 
and coal endurance,” as opposed to the armor and firepower that defined battleships.65 For 
these ships, then, any “unnecessary” increase in firepower or armor above the bare minimum 
was akin to high speed in battleships. As Mahan put it, the term “armored cruiser” was as 
oxymoronic as “heavy light cavalry.”66 “Reflections” appears to have been written before 
Mahan gained any specific knowledge about the new armored cruisers building in Britain, 
but it is obvious that Mahan’s arguments against “traditional” armored cruisers counted for 
even more against armored cruisers armed with battleship-sized guns.  
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 Taken together, these four Proceedings articles do an excellent job of showing the 
state of the U.S. Navy’s thought on new developments in design. All schools of thought in 
the United States agreed on the primacy of battleships in the fleet and, in the absence of 
critiques, one can surmise that all more or less agreed with the prevailing line-ahead tactics. 
The two authors who ventured a specific opinion on armored cruisers, Schroeder and Mahan, 
found them useless. The main sphere of disagreement was on the nature of future battleship 
design—essentially a question of maintaining the pre-dreadnought paradigm or following the 
lead of the British. This split would come to dominate naval discussion in the U.S. over the 
next several months, and although the General Board championed the new pattern, it would 
take until mid-1908 and a special conference at the War College before the issue was well 
and truly dead.  
 These were the arguments and opinions that shaped the U.S. Navy as specific 
information about HMS Invincible trickled into the United States over the second half of 
1906. Not only was this a service with no time for “Armed Speed,” but one in which armored 
cruisers of any stripe were obviously on their way out. In other words, the 1906 U.S. Navy 
was a service uniquely ill-suited to consider the impact of Fisher’s new ships. Refusing to 
consider the battlecruisers as cruisers, early American discussion of the ships, as we will see, 
considered them a new type of battleship, and assessed their utility on that basis.  
 
*** 
 
 On the other side of the Atlantic, there was also a debate over the new ships. Although 
critics of Admiralty policy were not strong enough to change its course, there was substantial 
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agitation against Fisher’s promotion and policies from senior officers within the Navy.67 In 
time, the most dangerous member of the “Syndicate of Discontent” would be Admiral 
Charles Beresford, but initially the charge was led by Admirals Sir Cyprian Bridge, Reginald 
Custance, and Gerard Noel. Aiding them was Mahan’s “Reflections,” perhaps more popular 
in Britain than in the U.S., which functioned as the lodestar for conservative critiques of the 
new ships.68  
 Custance, the most intellectually accomplished of the group, wrote so many missives 
against Fisher, that he was able to collect them into a book, Naval Policy, published in early 
1907. In it, he drew a distinction between two schools of naval thought, the “historical,” 
which “hold that it is very important to study tactics and strategy by the light of history,” and 
the “materiel,” which “neglected the study of tactics and strategies, and have devoted their 
energies to the development of . . . ships, guns, armor, &c.”69 This materiel focus gave the 
Royal Navy the Dreadnought and the Invincibles, and the false belief in “superior materiel,” 
which “encourage[d] neglect to acquire skill . . . entirely opposed to the principles and 
practice of our forefathers.”70 
 Custance’s criticism of Fisher as solely a materialist was unfair (though, obviously, he 
was more concerned with material than most of his peers); Fisher had very definite ideas on 
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strategy and strong, though hazy, positions on tactics. He was, however, very poor—quite 
deliberately—at laying out the whole of his strategic vision. He even showed reticence to 
discuss strategy in depth in front of the Committee of Imperial Defence.71 Even some of his 
close aides and correspondents do not appear to have understood his ideal strategy, or chose 
to overlook the parts of it they saw. This, of course, is one reason why it took so long for 
historians to come to grips with the full Fisher worldview, and a contributing factor to the 
Royal Navy’s inability to grasp his ideas.  
 Custance’s criticism of Fisher as a materialist was one that would stick. Although 
most of the leading intellectual lights in Britain broadly supported the Dreadnought and, to a 
lesser extent, the Invincibles, a number of those who agreed with Fisher on the new warships, 
most notably Herbert Richmond and Julian Corbett, placed themselves on the historical side 
of the larger debate over naval policy.72 Indeed, Richmond would go on to blame the 
materialist focus of the prewar years for the poor tactical performance of the Royal Navy in 
the First World War.73  
 Undoubtedly, some of the criticism of Fisher arose not from any particular policies of 
his, but from his desire to change as much as possible as soon as possible. Dreadnought 
hardly represented the typically minor advance on prior construction. Furthermore, even 
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before Dreadnought and the armored cruisers were laid down, Fisher was already thinking of 
the next advance in construction. In this particular case, the vehicle for his pronouncements 
was another special panel. This one, the Committee on Navy Estimates, included Fisher, the 
Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries, and the Accountant General. As the only naval 
officer on the committee, and the only member with specialized knowledge in naval affairs, 
the committee, even more than the Design Committee, was intended to be a vehicle for 
Fisher’s opinions.   
The Estimates Committee would be allowed to lapse once it found Fisher the money 
to build his dreadnoughts, but in 1905, it still had a role to play.74 In its preliminary plans for 
the 1906-7 Estimates, the Committee laid out a radical vision for subsequent development. 
Although its recommendations were not finalized and sent to the Cabinet until November, the 
basic thrust of the plans is evident from the Committee’s first meeting on July 20.75 It should 
also be noted that the Committee’s fundamental conclusions were reached without very much 
in the way of specific information concerning Tsushima; as late as July 18 Herbert Richmond 
complained about the absence of any attaché reports from the battle.76  
 As opposed to his rather conservative counterparts in the United States, Fisher 
advocated a perpetual revolution is shipbuilding such that each year’s battleship and cruiser 
designs “will embody double the offensive power of any vessel of the same nominal class at 
present in existence.”77 As the report made clear, the committee considered speed, not just 
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fire, as an integral part of offensive power. To that end, while the preliminary version of the 
report placed the battleship at the heart of naval combat, both it and the final version lauded 
the Invincible design as “far too formidable for extant armored cruisers and battleships.78  
 But the new armored cruisers were yesterday’s news. Based on the design’s alleged 
superiority over battleships the committee wondered (and here, Fisher's hand was very much 
present) if there was a way to combine “the speed of the armored cruiser with the offensive 
and defensive strength of the battleship” in a single vessel, citing the Italian battleship Regina 
Elena and preliminary studies from former French Minister of Marine Jean de Lanessan as 
previous stabs at the concept. With respect to Fiske, these promised to be the real 
“Compromiseless Ships,” vessels with superior speed, firepower, and armor. With such a 
ship, the report argued, a British admiral could secure a favorable position in battle and 
pursue a beaten enemy with his strongest units. Left unsaid were the potential savings in the 
construction and, even more importantly, the massive manpower budget by merging the two 
types, but at some point the proposed hybridization would certainly have resulted in a smaller 
number of large warships.79 At any rate, Fisher’s plans for perpetual revolution were at odd 
with the traditional Royal Navy policy of allowing other navies to take the risk of major 
advances before outbuilding them with Britain’s many efficient shipyards.80 Unsurprisingly, 
the Committee’s suggestions were shelved, and the Royal Navy continued to build 
battleships alongside battlecruisers.81  
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These arguments were advanced at greater length in an early 1906 staff memorandum, 
“the Building Programme of the British Navy,” written to address some of the criticisms of 
Fisher’s construction policies. As Sumida has noted, the purpose of these and similar 
documents was to influence decision makers and friendly journalists more than presenting a 
fair discussion of Admiralty policy.82 Unlike the Building Committee’s reports, which 
attempted some sort of advance planning, this memorandum was very much an attempt to 
justify the Admiralty’s policy since Fisher’s elevation, taking the time to rebut criticisms 
made of his reforms and add a historical perspective that would have been out of place in an 
internal document.  
 The memorandum began with a lengthy discussion of technological developments in 
naval warfare from Trafalgar to Tsushima. Specifically, the document argued that the Russo-
Japanese war created “a new standard . . . regarding naval material.”83 Not only were smaller 
unarmored and protected cruisers shown to be useless, but that in battle, “that vital issue . . . 
old, small, slow, ill-armed and ill-protected vessels . . . can play no useful part whatsoever.”84 
To meet this challenge of the new era of warfare, and maintain the two-power standard, the 
memo suggested that Britain commit to building four “large armored ships of the 
'Dreadnought' type” every year, a figure which would have given Fisher the freedom to 
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divide the four between battleships and battlecruisers as he saw fit.85 
 The bulk of the criticism faced by Fisher’s new ships was essentially identical. 
Despite the Admiralty’s plans, the introduction of the new ships was hardly problem-free. 
Judging from the defenses made, criticism faced by the new vessels seems to have primarily 
revolved around their speed and displacement, as well as general sense that training and 
valor, not expensive new technologies would be sufficient to win future conflicts.86 Increased 
displacement, the memo argued, allowed for increases in “speed, coal endurance, gun-power, 
or protection,” and indeed, the displacement of the new dreadnoughts gave them “the 
offensive and defensive power of two, three, or even four battleships of the present day.”87 To 
the Admiralty, then, increased displacement was part and parcel of battleship development. 
 On speed, the memorandum took a somewhat more conciliatory view, freely 
conceding that “too much may be sacrificed to speed.” At the same time, though, the 
memorandum went on to claim that “in actual battle, as distinct from a game on a tactical 
board,” a faster fleet had a distinct advantage over a slower one.88 To maintain the strategic 
and tactical utility of speed, important to a navy worried about offensive and defensive 
commerce warfare, displacements would have to be increased to ensure that speed did not 
come at the expense of armor. 
 Indeed, the memorandum went beyond claiming that Tsushima was the advent of a 
new era of naval warfare; it enlisted the supposed lessons of the battle as positive support for 
the new designs. Although the memorandum took pains to remind its readers that the 
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Admiralty reached its conclusions “before the epoch-making fight of Tsushima . . . on 
theoretical grounds,” it was not above using the prestige of the battle or its victors as a key 
part of its justification.89 Not only were the new ships on solid ground theoretically, but 
“[o]wing to our position as Allies of the Japanese,” the Royal Navy had access to “earlier and 
more reliable information . . . regarding the lessons which should govern future 
shipbuilding,” lessons which were directly applied to Dreadnought and Invincible.90  
The Admiralty also tried to remove the sting from Mahan’s critique of “bigness,” 
through an idiosyncratic and opportunistic reading of the American debate. According to the 
“Building Programme” memorandum, while the state of affairs in the U.S. Navy had been 
used in defense of traditionalist critiques of the new ships, a closer reading of events across 
the Atlantic suggested that the U.S. Navy, or at least its most important elements, were very 
much in favor of dreadnought types.91 Not only did “[a] valuable paper printed in the current 
number [December 1905]” of USNI Proceedings on Tsushima,” Fiske’s “Why Togo Won,” 
support the Admiralty's arguments, but “Dewey, the Chief of the United States Navy 
[professed his] faith in large, powerful, armed ships as the best types for future 
construction.”92 
 Indeed, the memorandum went on to claim, the existence of a debate in the United 
States was merely an artifact of the U.S. Navy's administrative structure. In this reading, the 
debate over battleship construction was not one between modernizers and conservatives, but 
between the General Board, which asked for an all-big-gun battleship and the Board of 
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Construction, which favored a smaller 16,000-ton design instead.93 In other words, “in the 
United States, as elsewhere, naval executive officers are in favor of concentration of 
offensive power to the utmost practicable extent, by increasing the size of the battleship,” as 
against the Board of Construction, who had “no pretensions to firsthand knowledge of the 
requirements and fighting capabilities of warships.”94 
 Claiming such a clear-cut consensus in the United Sates was, at best, intentional 
obfuscation by the authors. Articles by the U.S. Navy’s Director of Naval Intelligence and by 
Mahan in the March and June 1906 issues of Proceedings belie the Admiralty claim that 
American line officers were solidly behind the all-big-gun battleship. Captain Schroeder’s 
conclusions were mildly in favor of smaller battleships, and Mahan was outright hostile 
towards them, and both officers spoke for sizeable constituencies in the U.S Navy. Even the 
General Board, in their September 1905 call for all-big-gun ships, stopped some way short of 
endorsing the speed that Fisher found crucial to the effectiveness of the Dreadnought, or 
indeed a uniform all-big-gun battery.  
 The Building Programme memo was intended for consumption outside of the Navy, 
but on the inside, officers still struggled with how to define and use the new large cruisers. 
One pro-Fisher officer, Captain Edmond Slade, the head of Royal Navy’s War College, and 
soon to be Director of Naval Intelligence, gave some indication of the role most British 
officers thought the new ships could perform in a May lecture at the College on “Speed in 
Battleships.” Embedded in the general pro-speed lecture was an attempt to lay out a 
taxonomy of modern warships. Like Mahan, Slade took exception at the name “armored 
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cruiser,” but where Mahan used it as a stick with which to beat the Invincible design, Slade 
argued that the name was an obfuscation. Invincible and its immediate predecessors were not 
“cruisers” of any sort, but in reality filled “the same part in the fleet as their prototype the 
74[-gun ship of the line], which is a role totally distinct from that of the cruiser proper.”95 
 Slade’s notion was an interesting one, and one of the earliest attempts to put the new 
ships in their own sui generis category. The particular comparison, the two-decked ships of 
the line of the late “age of sail” suggests the level of regard Slade held for the new vessels. 
The ships, first developed by the French (indeed, the first HMS Invincible was a captured 
French 74) made up the bulk of European battle fleets during the Napoleonic Wars and were 
noted for their speed and handling compared to their larger triple-decked counterparts. Not 
only, then, was Slade bringing these ships firmly into the battleship fold, arguing that these 
new ships had a role to play in the heat of battle, but also implying that their construction 
could, at some point, outpace that of orthodox battleships a stance that Fisher would certainly 
have appreciated and endorsed.  
 Still, Slade’s arguments were, in some way hollow. Skillfully, he made the 
battlecruiser sound palatable to mainstream opinion without actually echoing Fisher’s real 
rationale for their building. This was just one manifestation of what one biographer has called 
“the suggestion of the underhand that ran through” Fisher, and here it damaged his 
effectiveness as First Sea Lord.96 At no time does Fisher appear to have explained what he 
thought the battlecruiser’s mission was except, perhaps, to close members of the “fishpond.” 
As a result, the Royal Navy officers who would command the vessels had no guidance at all 
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as to what they were intended for. 
 Slade’s arguments were somewhat echoed in the Royal United Services Institution 
Journal’s June report on the new American armored cruiser Tennessee. Indeed, the British 
journal was rather more impressed with it than most observers in its home service, which 
discontinued armored cruisers after the last Tennessee was laid down in mid-1905. To the 
RUSI Journal, Tennessee “approximate[d] in fighting efficiency to the battle-ship,” although 
one must keep in mind that RUSI Journal made no mention of Dreadnought’s specifications 
until September. Compared to pre-dreadnoughts, though, while Tennessee’s main guns were 
smaller (10” vs. 12”), its high-velocity guns gave it a longer range and more penetrating 
power than most extant battleships.97 
 Regarding the three Invincibles, though, the Admiralty was still sending out mixed 
signals. In July, the Admiralty Board took exception to the Secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence’s contention that the new cruisers were “practically of equivalent value as 
battleships,” obviating the need for an increase in battleship production.98 Instead, they 
claimed, “[t]he Invincibles are armoured cruisers . . . not battleships in the same sense as the 
Dreadnoughts.”99 While the Board’s motivations were undoubtedly self-serving in trying to 
keep the construction budget as high as possible, the Board’s claim that the new cruisers 
lacked the Dreadnought’s “power of giving and taking hard knocks” was far from a spurious 
claim.100 
 Still, Fisher continued to press for his battlecruisers as battleships—or at least 
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battleship replacements—going far beyond Slade or the original design committee in the 3rd 
volume of his “Naval Necessities,” a collection of memoranda and Fisher’s ruminations 
released in August of 1906. To their creator, Invincible’s firepower made it more than an 
armored cruiser. In reality, he claimed, the vessel was a “fast battleship,” a common enough 
argument at the time. Fisher went further, arguing that the Invincibles “bear much the same 
relation to the ‘Dreadnought’ that the ‘Duncan’ [1901] and ‘Canopus’ [1897] classes do to the 
‘Formidiables’ [1898] and ‘Caesars’ [1896],” that is an advance over previous battleship 
construction. Fisher, then, was making the radical argument that the Invincibles were not only 
a type of battleship, but superior to even the Dreadnought, the supposed gold standard for 
battleship design.101 
However, Mahan’s arguments, both from his pen and those of Fisher’s domestic 
critics, still bedeviled the First Sea Lord. Many of the documents contained in the third 
volume of “Naval Necessities” were reactions to Mahanian critiques of the size and speed of 
the new vessels, especially Invincible. Fisher and Jellicoe, the Director of Naval Ordnance, 
defended both advances on the same terms, as reactions to “the recent development of . . .  
hitting frequently at long ranges,” which demanded both a battery of large guns to ensure the 
ability to make hits at distance and the speed to place those large guns in the most 
advantageous positions.102  
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*** 
 
 Similar discussions were taking place in the United States, albeit with far less 
information. Dreadnought was built without much in the way of specific security, and its 
design was a topic of debate around the world well before she launched. On the other hand, 
the Invincibles were built with the utmost secrecy, especially where their armament was 
concerned. The first mention of the new ships in Proceedings appear in March 1906’s 
“Professional Notes,” and merely related that the new British armored cruisers “will, we 
understand, be the most powerful that have yet been built,” with no sense of their dimensions 
or other attributes.103 As late as October 5, the Office of Naval Intelligence had no 
information on the speed, horsepower, torpedo armament, or armor of Invincible.104  
 When reliable information on the new British ships reached Washington later that 
month the General Board was sufficiently moved to send Secretary Charles Joseph Bonaparte 
a memorandum on the new ships as a supplement to their annual construction requests, 
which they had delivered earlier in October. In it, the Board took the firm stance that the new 
ships were “in reality battleships . . . designed to form a part of the battle line.”105 Indeed, the 
Board’s letter conspiratorially implied that the British designation of these ships as cruisers 
during their budgeting and construction was a clever ruse designed to limit the battleship 
construction of rival navies. 
 The Board also faced some of the same problems of categorization as their 
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counterparts in Britain. While the memorandum called the new British ships “battleships,” it 
went on to argue that the Invincible “merges the armored cruisers into the battleship,” an 
interesting choice of words given the British debates.106 While some in the Royal Navy 
wondered if the Invincible pointed the way to a future merger of the types, the American 
General Board claimed that the new ships were the merger themselves. Tellingly, though, the 
General Board did not take this opportunity to revise their construction requests. If Invincible 
was a battleship, it was not necessarily the sort that the General Board wanted. In that sense, 
claiming that the British vessels merged battleships with the despised armored cruisers was a 
backhanded compliment at best. 
 Around this time, the Navy League entered the fray. The League had been founded in 
late 1902 to press for the construction of a large Navy. Like other navy leagues at the time, a 
large part of its membership was drawn from the political, social, and financial elites of the 
country, but there was also a substantial element of retired (and, from 1907, active) Navy 
officers. Indeed, the League was founded in part because President Roosevelt threatened to 
court martial any officer who directly lobbied Congress over naval legislation. With the 
League’s journal, and its propensity towards anonymous articles and editorials, U.S. Navy 
officers could lobby for reforms, secure in the knowledge that it would reach many of the 
right people without the threat of court martial.107 The officers who wrote for the League 
tended to be on the younger side, so the League’s aggressively pro-battlecruiser stance hints 
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at something of a generational gap in the officer corps. Soon after news of Invincible’s 
characteristics reached the United States, for example, The Navy, the League’s journal of 
record, published an unsigned comment, “Armored Cruisers Passing,” calling for the 
construction of American Invincibles “the big-gun, swift battleship,” that could serve as a 
“rallying force for scout cruisers.”108 
 The main topic in the United States, however, was not HMS Invincible but HMS 
Dreadnought and the proper American response to it, a debate that pitted a majority of naval 
officers against a conservative group centered on Mahan. Although the naval bill passed for 
the 1906-7 fiscal year gave the Navy dispensation to build a single dreadnought of its own, 
the issue would not die. Sen. Eugene Hale (R-ME), the chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee took Mahan’s side, creating a rearguard action led by “one of the ablest men in 
the Senate and the outstanding naval authority in the world.”109 Together, their influence 
threatened to draw the Navy back towards the pre-dreadnought model.  
This debate had colored much of the analysis of Tsushima in Proceedings, and 
although it is clear that most officers favored larger battleships with uniform batteries 
(opinions were, however, divided on the subject of battleship speed), Mahan’s words were 
far more influential, and reached a much wider audience. By September of 1906, this debate 
had reached the attention of President Roosevelt who, though on cordial terms with Mahan, 
was firmly convinced that the Dreadnought was the future of naval design. There is little 
doubt then, that when he asked Sims, his naval aide, to prepare a report on Mahan’s 
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Tsushima article, Roosevelt expected a thorough rebuttal of Mahan’s article.110 
 Sims’s report did not disappoint. Combining points made in a 1905 memo for 
Roosevelt, “Method of Designing Battleships,” with trenchant critiques of Mahan’s position 
in favor of smaller, slower, mixed-battery battleships, Sims’s report was a blow against 
Mahan’s position. Rather than resting his analysis on theory and logic, Sims based his 
arguments on recent technological developments. He was, in essence, trying to separate 
Mahan the theorist from Mahan the commentator. After all, in his own words, Sims remained 
devoted to “those measures required to build a great fleet of the kind that Captain Mahan 
advocated—one prepared to defeat any opponent and able to achieve general and lasting 
command of the sea.”111 
 To that end, Sims argued that Mahan simply lacked the technical background in 
modern design, gunnery techniques, and equipment to make a considered judgment. For 
Sims Mahan’s position on the secondary battery, for example, was based on “mistaken 
assumptions in regard to . . . efficiency,” and an unfamiliarity with the armor distributions of 
the most recent battleships, which left all vital parts of the vessel behind heavy armor.112 The 
rest of the report continued in this vein, with Sims claiming that the fundamentals of modern 
gunnery demanded a uniform battery of heavy guns, large displacements, and high speed. In 
the end, Mahan’s case was wrong not because of poor theory, but because they were 
“founded largely upon mistaken facts [and] mistaken principles of gun-fire,” a damning 
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indictment, to be sure, but not as damning as it could have been.113  
 Both the author and the recipient agreed that the piece deserved a wider audience. 
With Roosevelt’s permission, Sims printed the article as a standalone pamphlet, which was 
widely distributed to officers in the U.S. Navy and, despite its sensitive details on American 
gunnery practices, to many of Sims’s contacts in the Royal Navy. It was also picked up by 
Proceedings, which reprinted a declassified version of the piece in the December 1906 issue. 
In fact, Sims personally delivered the galley proofs of the Proceedings article to Fisher on a 
late 1906 trip to Britain.114 
 Roosevelt, convinced of Sims’s correctness, took the time to enclose a copy of the 
pamphlet of Sims’s argument in a letter to Mahan, requesting a response.115 Mahan’s first 
response, two days after receiving the letter, was wholly inadequate; Mahan resorted to 
trying to deflect the question claiming “I do not pretend to be fully equipped in tactical 
resource, and hold myself retired, as a rule from such discussion, though I present my views 
when asked. The Institute asked me for a paper,” a rather weak defense given the firm claims 
laid forth in his Proceedings article.116 Tellingly, “Reflections” was the last piece Mahan 
wrote for Proceedings. While he maintained his credibility and influence with the public, and 
continued to write in the popular press, after Sims’s attack he was never again viewed as an 
expert on contemporary affairs within the Navy. On the other hand, the Navy’s thought 
remained very much Mahanian; The Influence of Sea Power remained the intellectual 
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wellspring behind its policies and undergirded most of its debates into and perhaps beyond 
the First World War.  
 Mahan’s more substantial response sent two weeks later was hardly more convincing. 
At one point, Mahan claimed “the tactical advantage constituted by superior speed. . . confers 
the offensive,” a contradiction in spirit, and most likely fact, from his “Reflections” article, 
which claimed that that speed gave little more than the power to run away.117 Although the 
letter tried to rebut Sims, by the end Mahan was reduced to conceding that “[t]he field is one 
which should be exhaustively studied by men younger and less occupied than I; by the 
coming men, in short, rather than by one of the past.”118 
 The “coming men” certainly concurred. In the aftermath of releasing his, Sims 
received a number of approving letters from his colleagues. The responses of his peers, mid-
level officers, were often quite vitriolic. To Fiske, Sims’s paper showed that “Mahan fell 
down because . . . he applied his general principles to conditions that did not exist, and so 
arrived at conclusions absolutely false.”119 An officer of Sims’s rank “regretted that I was not 
on the opposition side, for then I should have had the pleasure of being thoroughly convinced 
that I was entirely wrong.” That writer also expressed “surprise that a man for the soundness 
of whose opinions I had conceived a great respect should write such a weak article.”120 The 
most vicious letter, though, claimed that “it would be an excellent thing for the Service,” if 
Mahan, who “never was brilliant as an officer . . . would keep quiet . . . and solace his old age 
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with pleasant historical and literary reminiscence.”121 Tellingly, none of these letters, as 
crushing as they were, attacked Mahan’s theoretical vision, merely his lack of contemporary 
technical knowledge.  
 Sims’s article did more than encourage true believers, though. Senior officers also 
found Sims’s work impressive. Stephen B. Luce, the founder and first president of the Naval 
War College sent a congratulatory letter, although he stopped short of attacking Mahan, his 
longtime colleague and friend. The most thoughtful response among the senior leaders came 
from Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, the commander of the Pacific Fleet: “I used to think 
with Mahan but, a couple of years ago, I changed my mind. . . I realized that nothing 
mechanical will stay ‘put’—that you may fix a size to anything you please . . . but—while 
your back is turned the…thing has swelled to twice its former size.”122 
 In Britain, Sims’s piece also met with favor, both amongst his contacts who had 
received the ostensibly classified pamphlet, and those who read the Proceedings article, 
which was eventually reprinted by Naval Intelligence.123 In the months after its publication, 
Mahan’s piece had been used as a cudgel against the Admiralty’s new shift, although Fisher 
assured the First Lord that Mahan was “passé, and has become a second—and equally a 
bore!”124To the Admiralty, then, Sims’s piece was “proof” of Mahan’s weaknesses. Indeed, 
in early 1907, a collection of Admiralty memos on that year’s building program referred to 
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Sims’s piece as demonstrating “the American official arguments, as approved by President 
Roosevelt, against Captain Mahan’s views.”125  
 Despite the novelty of the Invincible, the dreadnought debate would be at the center 
of the House of Representatives’ late 1906-early 1907 hearings on the FY1908 naval 
appropriations bill. Perhaps, though, “debate” is too strong a word. Former Secretary of the 
Naval Charles Joseph Bonaparte and current Secretary Victor Metcalf both urged 
dreadnought construction, and Sims and Wainwright were called to testify on the strengths of 
the Dreadnought-type design. President Roosevelt sent in a letter, based off of Sims’s 
arguments, advocating large battleships.126 Indeed, all of the Dreadnought-related testimony 
heard by the House naval committee was positive.  
 In contrast, Fisher’s new cruiser design was almost entirely absent from the 
testimony, odd for a radically new ship whose specifications only reached the U.S. three 
months prior to the hearings. Secretary Metcalf echoed the General Board in referring to “the 
Invincible type, which are really fast battleships,” but when he went on to discuss the 
necessity keeping abreast of other naval powers, it is clear that the Dreadnought dominated 
his thinking and that of the other witnesses. The two secretaries, Sims, and Wainwright may 
have all called for “battle ships of the maximum size and speed,” in the 1907 bill, but it is 
clear from their testimony and the resultant Delaware-class the maximum speed was limited 
to 21 knots (Invincible, by comparison was designed for 25 knots).127 
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 Roosevelt’s letter can perhaps shed some light this lack of response. Speaking of the 
Invincible’s armored cruiser predecessors, Roosevelt argued that while they served some 
useful purposes, “it would nevertheless have been infinitely better to have spent the 
money . . . in the construction of first-class battle ships . . . taking the battleship all around for 
the purposes for which a navy is really needed, its superiority to the armored cruiser is 
enormous.”128 Regardless of what contemporaries chose to call them, Roosevelt’s argument 
also applied to the new British ships. Indeed, the “official” American terminology of “fast 
battleship” suggests an appreciation of capabilities far in advance of armored cruisers, while 
at the same time dismissing them as an unnecessary category of battleship. Since the United 
States was already building battleships—and preparing for 21-knot “fast” ones at that—there 
was no rationale for following the British lead on the Invincibles.  
 While the U.S. Navy entered 1907 officially uninterested in armored cruisers and the 
Invincible, there were serious attempts to look at other models of large warship. Early in 
January, Lieutenant Commander Frank H. Schofield wrote Secretary Metcalf with a design 
he had developed while working in the Bureau of Ordnance.129 He suggested a fast, heavily 
armored ship that derived most of its offensive power from torpedoes instead of guns. 
According to Schofield, its 23-knot speed and “invulnerability to gun fire” would allow it to 
get close enough to an enemy fleet to launch a barrage of torpedoes, “the maximum of 
offensive power at the minimum cost.”130 Metcalf was so impressed with the design that he 
forwarded it to the General Board, who in turn commissioned a study on the “torpedo 
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battleship” from the Naval War College. In theory, the torpedo battleship promised to add an 
element of speed to the American feet without any trade-offs in armor, while maintaining 
high firepower, a combination that even the most partisan battleship proponent could 
endorse.  
 Rear Admiral Raymond Rodgers, the NWC President, returned to the General Board 
in late March with a report questioning the feasibility of Schofield’s calculations, specifically 
wondering if the speed, armor, and firepower of Schofield’s sketch could be obtained on a 
realistic displacement. Rodgers also attached a short treatment of the ship from Commander 
H.M. Dombaugh, a staff instructor at Newport, who had an altogether more interesting take 
on Schofield’s ship. Dombaugh recognized the value of speed in large ships, but argued that 
the proper model was not the Schofield design, but HMS Invincible. He saw the British ship 
as “the embodiment of the ideas of . . . the 1904 Conference,” which produced the sketch 
design of the 12” “reciprocal.” Indeed, Dombaugh argued that the torpedo armament of 
Invincible (which he referred to as an “armored cruiser), five tubes, was sufficient for it to act 
in the role Schofield proposed for his creation while its artillery firepower made it more 
versatile.131 
 But the War College’s fascination with the torpedo battleship did not stop in May. 
Over the summer a group of five staff members (more than half of the faculty assigned to 
Newport), including Dombaugh, put Schofield’s ship through its paces on the game board, 
finding that the side with the “Schofields” almost always won, with the torpedo battleships 
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forcing opponents on the defensive.132 Admittedly, the committee conceded that many of the 
torpedo battleship’s capabilities were conjectural, and that the games assumed the virtual 
invulnerability of the Schofields to enemy fire; the Schofields were given 50% more armor 
points than extant battleships.133  
Furthermore, the committee was concerned with the Schofield design’s slim margin 
of speed over the Dreadnought, only two knots. For a ship reliant on high speed, the 
committee found this narrow superiority problematic. Instead, the full committee echoed 
Dombaugh’s earlier report and proclaimed Invincible to be the best real-world way to 
approximate the advantages of Schofield’s ship, although they focused their attention on its 
firepower rather than its torpedoes. Faster than the Schofield, sporting a battery of heavy 
guns, and “very well protected,” the committee saw Invincible as the ideal speedy adjunct to 
the American battle fleet while also providing an unspecified level of “greater general 
usefulness,” elsewhere. Nonetheless, a more-heavily armored version of the 1904 
“reciprocal” remained their ideal model. 134 
 Like the War College staff, the attendees of the 1907 Summer Conference, the first 
since Invincible’s unveiling, found the new British ship fascinating, especially in comparison 
with the Tennessee-class armored cruisers that represented the last word in American 
armored cruisers. The British ship worked its way into three of the questions on the agenda, 
and in the responses to all three, the Conference enthusiastically endorsed building similar 
ships for the U.S. As with the earlier “reciprocal” design, supporters’ enthusiasm did not 
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come from Invincible’s qualities as a cruiser but rather because the British ship was “in all 
respects except armor, a battleship.”135 Although their armor precluded them from serving in 
the interior of the battle line, squadrons of Invincibles could serve on its extremities as a “fast 
wing,” a role “with the object of forcing the enemy, while subject to the full fire of one's 
guns, to perform disadvantageous maneuvers, with consequent loss of effective fire on his 
part.”136 
 Unlike their superiors on the General Board, colleagues writing in Proceedings, or 
civilian policymakers, officers at the Naval War College found the British Invincible type 
very appealing. Far from Roosevelt’s argument that other large vessels were a waste of time 
or the attacks made on armored cruisers in general, and high speed large warships in general, 
the officers charged with charged with considering and teaching naval strategy asserted the 
need for some sort of speedy capital ship to pair with the forthcoming American 
dreadnoughts. Over the next few years, the Naval War College would remain the spiritual 
home of the American pro-battlecruiser case.  
 In this the War College was not just set against the top of the naval hierarchy, but also 
the editorial stance of Proceedings which, over the course of 1907, published a number of 
articles touting the supposed futility of designing large warships with speed in mind. Like 
most officers, Philip Alger, Proceedings’ editor had supported the pro-Dreadnought case, but 
on the subject of armored cruisers and the new “Invincibles,” he appears to have been 
determined to hold the line. Over the course of 1907, his journal published, somewhat 
unusually, three foreign articles (one British, and two French, which Alger translated himself) 
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that dealt with the issue of speed in large warships, two of them with commentary from 
American officers attached, quite a noticeable trend in a journal with only approximately 40 
articles a year.  
 The first French piece, by M.J.A. Normand, a designer of warships for the French 
Navy, was a dry engineering piece on the design issues brought on by larger, faster 
battleships, such as dealing with increased weight and length. Normand did not explicitly 
discuss whether these changes were beneficial, or detrimental, although his analysis made it 
clear that as speed, and its companion length, increased, armor, weight, and cost became 
more and more problematic.137 The commentary, provided by D.W. Taylor, a future director 
of the Constructor Corps, took a more explicit stance. While Taylor conceded the utility of 
speed in a battleship, he also claimed that “reduction of speed allows length . . . the most 
objectionable dimension of a man-of-war, to be reduced.”138 For Taylor, the issue was not so 
much speed in general, but some indefinite level of excessive speed, at which sacrifices made 
in armor became counterproductive.  
 The next issue’s article “Armor and Speed,” was also taken from a French journal, 
and took a more polemical approach to the issue. Its author went beyond the previous piece 
and positively asserted that “speed is weakness,” especially when compared to armor.139 At 
the heart of the essay’s argument was a novel interpretation of technological development. 
Speedy ships, it was argued, derived their entire value not from being fast, but from being 
faster than contemporary ships, making them comparatively useless as they aged. On the 
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other hand, armor maintained some marginal utility even when surpassed by subsequent 
developments; older battleships could be used for secondary purposes or harbor defense, 
while older, now slower, cruisers were simply useless.140 
 The last of the speed articles, from the December issue, by a British officer, Lt. A.C. 
Dewar, focused on the value of speed in tactics and strategy. The article, which combined 
two pieces originally published in the British United Service Magazine, was reproduced in 
Proceedings annotated with comments, presumably from Alger, and accompanied with a 
response from Cmdr. A.P. Niblack, an American. While Dewar’s article studiously refrained 
from making any definite conclusions one way or another, Proceedings’ annotations took a 
very dismissive view of any attempts to add speed to battleships. Indeed, in several places, 
the annotations suggested that superior speed was only useful for running away, a claim that 
Mahan had made the previous year.141 
 All of this discussion came against the background of severely strained relations 
between the United States and Japan. Before 1906, American naval planning was mostly 
concerned with threats from European powers, especially Britain and Germany. In 1906, 
though, longstanding hostility towards Japanese immigrants on the U.S. West Coast drove a 
wedge between the two countries. The immediate spark was a series of restrictive property 
and education laws passed by the city of San Francisco aimed at the city’s growing 
“Oriental” population in the wake of the 1906 earthquake. The Roosevelt Administration 
convinced local authorities to change the laws, and signed the “Gentleman’s Agreement” 
with Japan to reduce immigration. Nonetheless, tensions remained, and lingering until at 
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least 1945.142 
 Naturally, the Navy came foremost in any potential war with Japan, and the issue was 
discussed on the General Board and at the Naval War College, where the development of 
plans against Japan (the first of the famous “Blue-Orange” problems) was considered at the 
1906, and 1907 Summer Conferences. The United States’ position in the Pacific was not a 
good one. In the summer of 1906, the U.S. Navy had removed its battleships from the 
Pacific, to create a unified battle fleet in the Atlantic. In their place were a handful of 
armored cruisers, which, it was hoped, were fast enough to run away from Japanese 
battleships.143 The rudimentary plans developed called for the cruisers to sail to the West 
Cost and join the Atlantic Fleet (which would steam around South America), and then for the 
combined U.S. battle fleet to make its way to the Western Pacific and fight the Japanese 
Navy there.144 
These initial plans never amounted to much—the crisis was over by the 1908 around-
the-world cruise of the “Great White Fleet,” but it set the basic pattern for the Navy’s “War 
Plan Orange” down through the Second World War. As the General Board and the Naval War 
College adjusted and refined the plans over the next few years, the size of the Pacific, and the 
magnitude of the undertaking highlighted some major gaps in the U.S. Navy’s force 
structure. Foremost among them was scouting. After the end of armored cruiser construction, 
the Navy’s leadership never showed more than a desultory interest in constructing scouts. In 
time, battlecruisers would come to be seen as the ideal long-range scouts for a Pacific War, 
                                                           
142
 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 21-3. 
143
 William Reynolds Braisted. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1958), 188. 
144
 Miller, War Plan Orange, 32-8.  
95 
 
but by the end of 1907, the Navy was still more interested in exploring their potential on the 
ends of the battle line  
 When the time came for the General Board and the Secretary to lay out the next 
year’s building program in late 1907, both Metcalf and the Board called for a four-
dreadnought program with no armored cruisers of the traditional or Invincible models. 
Indeed, Metcalf claimed in his letter’s section on foreign shipbuilding that apart from 
Germany, foreign countries had stopped building armored cruisers. Paying special attention 
to the British case, Metcalf claimed that the line between armored cruisers and battleships 
“almost disappeared,”  as a result of the Invincible, leading the Royal Navy to discontinue 
armored cruisers as a class and focus on light cruisers and battleships.145 Without an extra 
level of detail, it is impossible to tell which side of the divide Metcalf placed the new British 
ships, though if he was echoing the General Board’s sentiments he would have considered 
Invincible a fast battleship rather than a heavy cruiser. 146  
  
*** 
 
As we have seen, the United States Navy in the early twentieth century was ill suited 
to accept the new British warships as cruisers, which Metcalf’s report confirmed. As he put 
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it, in American warships “special prominence has been given to [firepower] and armor 
protection—the essentially vital characteristics of any fighting vessel.” All evidence points to 
an overwhelming majority of American officers sharing Metcalf’s sentiments.147 In a service 
where debates raged around whether or not 21 knots was an “excessive” speed for a 
battleship, a lightly armored 25-knot cruiser-battleship hybrid was unlikely to gain much 
traction amongst uniformed and civilian policymakers. The Russo-Japanese War, which 
convinced the British and Japanese that armored cruisers had a role to play, had the exact 
opposite effect in the United States, where both sides of the battleship debate agreed that the 
ships were not worth building.  
Yet there was no agreement on replacements for the maligned cruisers. Invincible may 
have been a non-starter in Washington, but at Newport, a sizeable part of the War College 
staff recognized the utility of the British ship, even if they would have preferred a slightly 
different model. Indeed, the two alternatives that seem to have aroused the most interest in 
the United States were domestic, and explicitly designed for fleet actions: the 1904 
Conference’s “reciprocal” and Schofield’s torpedo battleship. Both native designs provided 
some margin of excess speed, while paying for that speed in firepower instead of armor, 
creating ships that could survive service in the heart of battle. Faced with no agreement over 
next steps, the U.S. Navy did nothing to replace or supplement its armored cruisers.  
In the United States, the Navy’s internal debate over warship design and construction 
took place in public and semi-public fora, and came to the attention of Congress and the 
President before ships were authorized and built. In Britain, initial discussions over 
Invincible and Dreadnought played out almost entirely within the Admiralty. Public 
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discussion over the new ships came later, in the form of criticism hurled at the Admiralty 
from disgruntled current and former RN officers and newspaper columnists after the ships 
had been designed, and construction commenced.  
 While this model of decision-making may have made the Royal Navy somewhat 
more efficient than its American counterpart, it would prove to have weaknesses. The 
American “system” made it very difficult for a ship type to be introduced or discontinued 
without the assent or acquiescence of the officer corps; even with a majority of officers on 
the side of the new dreadnought pattern, a group of conservatives led by Mahan almost 
managed to block the shift. On the British end, with decisions made by the Admiralty Board 
with the influence of a few aides, it was much easier to come to decisions or policies that 
those outside of the Whitehall bubble objected to. Moving forward, the problems inherent in 
the British model would become evident as strong criticism of Fisher and his policies was 
mounted from an important, and politically connected, admiral, Charles Beresford.  
 What is clear from both countries is that these very different outcomes were in large 
part a function of structure, contrasting the very powerful Admiralty Board with the very 
weak General Board. Fisher’s “revolution” did not only take place in Britain because of 
Fisher’s nationality, but also because the Admiralty Board’s power allowed for rapid shifts in 
policy if the First Lord or First Sea Lord were charismatic and driven enough. Even if the 
United States Navy had had an officer with Fisher’s opinions (unlikely), and that officer rose 
to a position of high command (very unlikely), there would have been no way for him to put 
his program into action without support from a large percentage of his subordinates. Lacking 
power, the Admiral of the Navy singly, or the General Board collectively, could only nudge 
the Navy towards its desired goal. If they had possessed the Admiralty Board’s power, the 
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United States would likely have had an all-big-gun battleship of 18-19 knots’ speed under 
construction perhaps six months earlier than HMS Dreadnought. As it happened, the first 
such warship was not under construction until late 1906, and the first American dreadnought 
would take another year to begin. 
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CHAPTER 3: DEFINITION AND DEBATE 
 
 At the ends of 1906 and 1907 respectively, the British and American navies appeared 
to have reached a rough stability in their attitudes towards the new ships. In Britain, Fisher 
may have been heavily criticized, but with the rest of the Admiralty Board acquiescing to 
many of his suggestions, it seemed that there was very little opponents could do to effect 
meaningful changes in Admiralty policy. In the United States, pro-dreadnought advocates 
were winning the internal debate (albeit in the face of an active traditionalist rearguard). 
While there were a few officers who supported the Invincible, the mass of U.S. Navy opinion 
regarded all armored cruisers with some measure of hostility, and neither the General Board 
nor the Secretary showed any inclination to put the type in their construction requests. 
 This apparent stability, however, proved temporary. In the United States, the broad 
consensus on battlecruisers shattered over the course two contentious Summer Conferences 
in 1909 and 1910. Over those two years, participants set aside the battlecruiser-as-scout ideas 
of the 1907 Conference, and debated the merits of a battlecruiser “fast wing,” with the ships 
used in much the same way as in Dombaugh’s 1907 game board exercises. At least four 
separate design concepts were advanced as an ideal fit for this role; a role whose existence 
was itself contentious. By late 1910 there seemed to be a narrow consensus in favor of the 
British design template for such ships, and that battlecruisers were part of the ideal well-
balanced fleet. This was, however, not echoed by a desire to build them in the prevailing 
funding environment, where they could take funding from the battleship program. The 
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General Board and the Secretary maintained a less nuanced position on the new ships, 
arguing that battlecruisers were a foreign luxury of indeterminate tactical and strategic value; 
unnecessary for the American fleet. Even if money for battleships and battlecruisers had been 
available in those years, the U.S. Navy would not have built the lighter ships.  
 In Britain, battlecruisers continued to be built in the absence of serious debate on their 
form and function. Instead, the main debates in the Royal Navy revolved around two 
challenges to Fisher’s policy. The first was the alleged vulnerability of the country to 
invasion, a fear stoked by service rivalry and the Conservative opposition to the Liberal 
Campbell-Bannerman government. This, however, paled in comparison to the feud between 
Fisher and Charles Beresford, the commander of the Channel Fleet. Ostensibly started by 
disagreements over wartime policy, this dispute quickly metastasized, until it made Fisher’s 
position as First Sea Lord untenable in late 1909.  
 Yet, within this atmosphere, Fisher managed to secure the construction of five more 
battlecruisers: Indefatigable, a slight improvement on the Invincible type, and the other two 
ships of its class, Australia and New Zealand, funded by their eponymous Dominions. These 
were followed by Lion and Princess Royal, designed to a newer, much more powerful 
standard. Still, all five were authorized, designed, and built without serious discussion in or 
outside of the Admiralty as to their purpose or operational role in time of war.  
  
*** 
 
 Once the full effect of Admiral Fisher’s reforms kicked in, his term in office was 
dogged by almost constant scandal and opposition, fomented by the Conservative press, and 
101 
 
aided by disgruntled officers with personal and professional reasons to oppose Fisher.1 
Among the more persistent attempts to embarrass the Admiralty was the so-called “invasion 
scare.” The issue was an evergreen one, resting on a bedrock of service politics. Army 
leaders used the threat of a “bolt from the blue” surprise invasion as justification to argue for 
a higher military budget and, for some, the institution of conscription. The Committee of 
Imperial Defence had studied the issue in 1903, returning the verdict that a sudden invasion 
was impossible, and after the study’s results were released in 1905 political interest in the 
issue cooled down.2 
 Matters came to a head in June 1907, however, when four former Army officers, 
including the Times’ military correspondent, Charles Repington and ex-Army Commander-
in-Chief Lord Frederick Roberts, delivered a memorandum on the possibility of a sudden 
German invasion to Arthur Balfour, formerly Prime Minister and now Leader of the 
Opposition.3 Balfour, who had been in office for the 1903 report, had staked out a position on 
the Navy’s side of the issue. The 1907 report’s distinguished authors, however, and its 
assumption that Germany, not France, was the main danger prompted Balfour to submit the 
report to Sir George Clarke, the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.4 Based on 
his cover letter, Balfour was concerned that it might be within the capacity of Germany’s 
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growing merchant fleet to sneak a 70,000-man army across the North Sea without warning, 
catching the Royal Navy unawares.5 
 After a CID subcommittee was formed in November 1907 to consider the possibility 
of German invasion, Lord Roberts fleshed out his argument, claiming that a strike without 
warning was “good German military doctrine,” and “the sole means by which Germany can 
hope to contend with us.” Furthermore, Roberts noted that the new Home Fleet, lacking 
bases on the East Coast, was stationed in the Channel, giving the German fleet the 
opportunity to delay or blockade it at the Straits of Dover long enough for an invading force 
to land. At any rate, it was primarily composed of warships with nucleus crews, preventing 
them for responding to an unexpected attack. 6 As a result, Roberts urged the strengthening of 
the army, presumably at the expense of the naval budget.7 
 The Admiralty’s response to the new criticisms was swift. In August, Fisher argued 
that the only body capable of making pronouncements on naval issues was the Admiralty 
Board, and certainly not a committee of four former army officers with “no claim whatever 
to special knowledge of naval administration.” Far from being a detriment to defense, he 
claimed, the new Home Fleet organization made an invasion less likely. With the newest, 
strongest, warships in the Home Fleet, and an overwhelming superiority in destroyers and 
submarines, Fisher found the prospect of an attack “chimerical,” He suggested that the claim 
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was more an unsophisticated attempt at increasing the Army’s budget than an honest attempt 
at defense planning.8 
 Despite Fisher’s disdain, the forces arrayed on the side of an inquiry—the Leader of 
the Opposition, the ex-Army chief, and the Times’ chief military correspondent—were too 
influential, and the consequences of a successful invasion too grave for the CID to ignore. A 
subcommittee of the CID was appointed to consider the matter further. Although the 
subcommittee released a report in mid-1908 backing Fisher’s views on the matter, the issue 
continued to fester in the press and Parliament until 1909, bound up in the wider Beresford 
melee.   
 However, it would be unfair to imply that all of the criticism of Fisher and his 
reforms was as self-serving as the invasion issue. Just as the United States had Mahan and 
other conservative officers who advocated against dreadnought construction, there was a 
great deal of honest opposition to Fisher and his policies, although in the British case they 
had no way to push their agenda through the Navy itself. As we have seen, opponents of the 
Royal Navy’s new emphasis on a smaller number of larger, faster, ships stationed in fewer 
places were forced to find other avenues of attack, especially the press. Understandably, 
Fisher’s partisans also fought back through magazines and journals. Foremost among these 
dueling articles was “Recent Attacks on the Admiralty,” written by the eminent historian 
Julian Corbett in The Nineteenth Century and After’s February 1907 issue. 
 The major issue Corbett emphasized in the article was design, especially criticism of 
the Invincibles. Corbett especially attacked the conservative argument that the Board 
“departed from . . . tradition” in focusing on large cruisers designed for battle rather than 
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scouting and then “regarding these cruisers as part of our battle strength.” To critics like 
Custance, these departures from orthodoxy created two major problems for potential 
operations. Firstly, the expenditure of resources on large, expensive cruisers prevented the 
construction of smaller cruisers for scout work in the numbers necessary for efficient 
operation. At the same time, with such a large percentage of the fleet’s heavy guns in the new 
armored cruisers, detaching them for reconnaissance in lieu of their smaller counterparts 
would dangerously weaken the battle fleet in the face of the enemy.9 
 Corbett’s defense of Admiralty policy on this indictment was to claim that modern 
technology had created “a fundamental change . . . in the conditions of the cruiser problem.” 
The increase in speeds in all classes of ships since the conversion to steam had narrowed the 
speed gap between battleships and cruisers.10 At the same time, with Germany theoretically 
able to rapidly convert its large, fast ocean liners into auxiliary cruisers, the British Navy 
needed something fast enough to catch them and well-armed enough to outfight them, both 
dubious propositions for a light scout cruiser. Even better, argued Corbett, modern armored 
cruisers could be detached from the battle fleet because wireless telegraphy (W/T) made 
communication over vast distances instantaneous, allowing them to return to the fold if 
necessary.11 
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 At the same time, Fisher’s critics continued to use Mahan and his famous Tsushima 
article from Proceedings. They appear to have taken to heart Mahan’s view that the Russo-
Japanese War proved the uselessness of armored cruisers, and that the Dreadnought (and, by 
extension, Invincible) were too big and lacked a sufficient secondary battery. Corbett 
dismissed the first concern by pointing to the new Tsukuba-class proto-battlecruisers under 
construction in Japan. To defuse the second, Corbett made an appeal to the authority of 
gunnery experts on both sides of the Atlantic, arguing that “[t]he practical men,” as opposed 
to “theorists,” were of the opinion that the all-big-gun battery increased the accuracy and 
efficiency of gun laying.12 
 Corbett was already identified with the Fisherite wing of naval opinion, but this 
article seems to have moved him firmly into the First Sea Lord’s inner circle. After the 
article’s publication, Fisher wrote Corbett that the piece was “just the thing ‘to meet the 
present distress’ as St. Paul would say!”13 Indeed, the very next day Fisher asked if he would 
be interested in a paper on “Fleet Distribution [and] Protection of Commerce. . . . Are you 
going to keep that talent wrapped up in the napkin of criminal modesty?”14 Corbett’s 
involvement in Fisher’s attempt to bolster naval education is covered below, but Fisher also 
considered Corbett a valuable ally in policy debates. That support led to Corbett receiving 
opportunities to write Admiralty position papers in addition to his journalistic and historical 
endeavors. To some extent, Corbett’s help was valuable: D.M. Schurman has argued that the 
skill of Corbett’s arguments were key to “postponing the fall of Fisher from 1907 to 1909.”15 
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 Though clever, Corbett’s article was insufficient to stem the tide of opposition against 
Fisher and his policies. Early in 1907, the Admiralty released another collection of 
memoranda and articles, titled “Designs of Armored Ships to be Laid Down in November 
1907,” to push back against critiques of Dreadnought and Invincible as well as showing that 
those ships were the pinnacle of naval development. Indeed, despite its title, the pamphlet 
spent far more space defending Admiralty policy and savaging its critics in and out of 
uniform than it did discussing the new ships. Still, within these constraints, the pamphlet 
provides a rather good snapshot of the state of naval debate within Whitehall and the press at 
the time by showing what attacks the Admiralty felt it necessary to rebut and their strategies 
for doing so.  
 Fisher’s introduction set the tone for the pamphlet. The documents inside did not just 
support Admiralty policy, but “completely dispose[d] of” dissent and showed “the 
‘Dreadnought’ [was] an unqualified success . . . every feature of the design has been 
justified.”16 Taken as a whole, the pamphlet appears to have served two purposes, in addition 
to the two mentioned above. The documents within tried to show that the Admiralty as a 
whole undertook development of the Dreadnought and Invincible, not just a Fisher-led cabal. 
Further, these warships were designed without reference to the Russo-Japanese War, 
portraying Fisher and his advisors as visionary rather than reactionary. The first point, as we 
have seen, is somewhat dubious. As to the second, the design of the two ships really was 
based on first principles rather than on close observation of events in the Far East.  
 The second purpose of the pamphlet as a whole, and most of the individual 
documents contained within, was to rebut Mahanian critiques of the new warships. Three of 
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the entries, a letter from Atlantic Fleet CinC William May, a report from DNI Ottely, and an 
unsigned policy memo all made reference to William Sims’s anti-Mahan piece. The 
ostensibly classified pamphlet form of Sims’s article was also the last document in the 
collection, with a cover letter from the author. Although that version of the piece was 
intended for circulation within the U.S. Navy, Sims evidently recognized Fisher’s Admiralty 
as full of kindred spirits, suggesting, “[a]s the paper is an answer to the opponents of the all-
big-gun ships . . . some of the arguments will interest you.”17 
 Sims’s wish was something of an understatement. The piece was a godsend to an 
Admiralty beset by critics using Mahan’s stature to attack its policy; the Sims’s arguments 
struck at the heart of Mahan’s credibility as voice on current affairs. In his introduction, 
Fisher went so far as to call Sims’s opinions, “the American official arguments, as approved 
by President Roosevelt,” a claim that, exaggerated as it was, would probably have done an 
effective job of undercutting Mahan in the eyes of journalists and government officials 
reading these documents who had no specialized knowledge of naval affairs.18 The 
Admiralty seems to have been especially taken with Sims’s arguments regarding high speed 
and size. 
 At the same time, Sims’s piece also burnished the Admiralty’s claims regarding 
innovation instead of simple reaction. Ottley, for example, portrayed Sims’s work as an 
argument founded “entirely upon the ascertained facts of the Russo-Japanese War,” a gross 
misrepresentation of Sims’s article, which used examples from the war to support his 
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preexisting opinions.19 Doing so, however, allowed Fisher and his lieutenants to contrast the 
American argument based on empirical evidence, with the British decision, “acting on . . . 
exceptional experience in . . . tactical handling,” made “some months previously to the battle 
of Tsu-Shima [sic].”20 This argument, if taken to its logical conclusion, moved the debate 
over the Dreadnought and Invincible away from the Russo-Japanese War to ground that 
required a deep knowledge of naval technology theory, which would not apply to most press 
critics.  
 But it would be a mistake to paint this publication as a simple attempt to relate Sims 
to domestic policymakers. These authors, for example, were much more willing to make a 
positive case for speed than Sims, who saw it as a component of gunnery, not useful for its 
own sake. In contrast, the collection’s authors argued that speed was of the essence for the 
British fleet, whose “object must always be to meet and annihilate [the enemy] in the shortest 
possible time.”21 William May, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, offered a more tepid 
endorsement of speed, and claimed that a “preponderance of speed” was useful to an admiral, 
although he wondered how long the British Nay could sustain such a dramatic edge in speed 
over its competitors.22 
The pamphlet’s contents also attempted, somewhat confusedly, to explain what the 
battlecruisers were for. The material provided implied that the new ships, though called 
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armored cruisers, were intended to lie somewhere closer to the battleship end of the 
spectrum, at least for the time being. As Ottley noted, the battlecruisers, though inferior to 
the Dreadnought for pitched battle, were “superior to any European battleship at present 
afloat.” He went on to argue that battlecruisers allowed the Royal Navy to overwhelm 
foreign armored cruisers, utilizing the same armadillo analogy Fisher used when he was still 
CinC Portsmouth.23 The unsigned policy memo in the collection went further, hearkening 
back to Captain Slade’s 1906 argument that the battlecruisers “fulfil the same part in the 
Fleet as their prototype the 74 . . . totally distinct from that of the Cruiser proper.”24  
 The portions of the enclosed reports dealing with the battlecruiser’s function should, 
in keeping with Sumida’s warning about “secret” Admiralty papers, be taken with an 
exceptionally large grain of salt. What we know of Fisher’s own strategic vision, as 
incomplete and poorly reasoned as it sometimes was, tells us that his plans for the ships were 
far more revolutionary, to the point of doing away with battleships altogether. At the same 
time, this somewhat more moderate appreciation of their uses was far more in keeping with 
the opinions of the service at large.  
 Fisher’s strategic and materiel reforms brought with them an implicit challenge to the 
Royal Navy’s way of thinking about war. His polices aroused severe opposition from 
traditional-minded politicians and naval officers, but Fisher’s plans also clashed with 
traditionalist arguments on a conceptual level. This was a level of analysis that the senior 
leaders of the Royal Navy, Custance possible excepted, were singularly ill-equipped to 
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handle, both for reasons of education and temperament. Although Fisher himself was unable 
to explicate his thoughts in this manner, he made ready use of those who could, most notably 
Julian Corbett, who began lecturing at the War College in 1902.25 
Despite his lack of formal education and his own rather muddled strategic thinking, 
Fisher was a firm proponent of improving education for officers. He had been the driving 
force behind the 1902 “Selborne Scheme” of officer education, which called for common 
training of executive, engineer, and marine officers up to the rank of lieutenant.26 While First 
Sea Lord, Fisher pushed for more rigorous academic training for officer trainees, and 
showered attention the Royal Naval War College, including a 1906 plan to expand the 
school.27 From mid-1904, Captain Edmond Slade, a very able officer who was later named 
DNI, led the College. As originally conceived, the British War College had many similarities 
to its American counterpart. Like Newport attendees, British officers at the War College 
(which moved from Greenwich, to Devonport, to Portsmouth and, eventually, back to 
Greenwich) were exposed to lectures on a variety of naval topics combined with board game 
exercises which bore a great resemblance to those being conducted across the Atlantic.28  
 Yet, the two institutions occupied somewhat different roles in their respective 
hierarchies. In the United States, the Naval War College was a vital part of the naval 
establishment. Not only was the War College the home of Mahan, but in the absence of a 
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general staff, the U.S. Navy turned to the instructors and students at Newport to fulfill many 
of its functions, including war planning. Indeed, as Ronald Spector has noted, the War 
College was the only entity in the U.S. Navy that had the capability to perform this sort of 
staff work; the General Board lacked the staff and the resources to do much more than make 
general pronouncements on strategy.29 The President of the Naval War College had an ex 
officio slot on the General Board, and indeed, by the middle of the first decade of the century, 
some connection with the War College was increasingly seen as an ideal prerequisite for one 
of the plum positions on the General Board.30  
 The British War College, on the other hand, was a different beast. Although the Royal 
Navy was larger than the American fleet and had worldwide responsibilities, the Admiralty 
also lacked a staff department. Herbert Richmond, one of Fisher’s naval aides, who went on 
to a glittering career as a staff officer and theorist, painted a sobering picture of naval 
planning in 1907, a situation he called “beneath contempt.” According to Richmond’s diary, 
a senior Admiralty official had told him that there were no war plans in existence because 
“the circumstances are altering daily,” obviating the need for formal planning. Lacking “real 
solid thinking,” Richmond thought that the Navy was “in the hands of every faddish who has 
a gift of the gab and a little more intelligence than the average.”31 
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 In theory, the RN War College could have gone some way towards rectifying that 
situation, as it did in the United States. In practice, the school was unable to fill the ersatz 
staff role as effectively. Even Reginald Custance, who had helped to found the college, 
expressed concern that the education on offer could give officers a useless veneer of 
knowledge, “learning the definitions by heart,” instead of thinking for themselves.32 The 
college even had trouble being assigned enough qualified ratings for the school’s clerical 
work.33 The quality of the students was also uneven. With an understandable bias towards sea 
service, the sort of talented officers who leapt at a chance to attend a summer conference or 
course at Newport tended to avoid Portsmouth. Even Richmond, a well-respected theorist, a 
future War College president, and a high-ranking staff officer during the Great War, avoided 
a term at the College. 
 Still, from 1905 the RN War College had a remit to “study tactical and strategic 
problems sent down to it by” the Naval Intelligence Division at the Admiralty.34 Indeed, as 
Richmond related while railing against the state of planning in the Royal Navy, some officers 
felt that the War College “fulfilled the duties now carried out by the German Admiral stab 
[sic].” Unsurprisingly, Richmond heaped scorn on the idea that “officers under instruction 
learning the very elements of the strategic side of their profession . . . can fulfill the duties of 
a trained staff and prepare plans for war.”35 Others, however, viewed the shift less 
unfavorably. Julian Corbett, an instructor there, for example, excitedly wrote in early 1906 
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“[w]e are fast becoming something like a general staff.”36 More to the point, Fisher used the 
War College’s special campaigns branch as, in effect, his personal war staff from 1906 on.37  
 This arrangement perfectly suited Fisher’s preference for ad-hoc committees that 
relied on his prestige and support for their existence and influence, perhaps too perfectly. It 
was unlikely to challenge Fisher, could be dissolved or disassociated at any time and, 
crucially, only dealt with war plans. As the extant German and Japanese and the future 
British and American staffs suggested, the work of a true general staff went beyond drawing 
up war plans. In some ways, their work with education, training, and materiel were more 
important than their war plans, which were always subject to modification by the commander 
on the scene if war broke out.38 
 Given the nature of Fisher’s reforms the material and, especially, training functions 
absent from the War College loom large. In many important ways, they were, contrary to 
Corbett’s enthusiasms, nothing at all like a war staff. Beyond his close informal advisors, 
who could modify, but not change his vision, Fisher took very little outside guidance in 
developing plans for his warships. It is impossible to believe that a staff would have 
appreciably changed his mind, but they may have interrogated his assumptions about 
developments like, for example, the designs of his next battlecruisers, Indefatigable and Lion, 
and intervened in the disputes over fire control that, some have argued, doomed the 
battlecruiser concept.39 
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 Likewise, a formalized staff may have helped to create a battlecruiser doctrine in the 
Royal Navy. Perhaps the biggest problem with battlecruisers in active service was their 
unfamiliarity, and the consequent lack of a service-wide understanding on how they were to 
be used. Fisher himself offered very little guidance to subordinates, and even if he had, there 
was no mechanism to transmit that guidance to the fleet. As battlecruisers began to enter the 
fleet in 1908-09, their employment was essentially left up to individual squadron and fleet 
commanders, and by the time war came in 1914, there was no common body of battlecruiser 
doctrine or practice to draw on.  
Whatever its faults, the RN War College had its own Mahan in the person of the 
civilian naval theorist and historian Julian Corbett. Corbett put his time at the War College to 
good use, developing a set of theories that, intentionally and unintentionally, fleshed out and 
systematized many of Fisher’s precepts. When interviewed twenty years later, former 
students of his would say that Corbett had a “preference for getting the better of the enemy in 
some other way than coming to blows . . . his teaching did not preach that to destroy . . . the 
enemy’s armed force was the primary military aim.” According to them, while he was 
respected, “[h]e did not know enough about the sea, sea terms, or sailing ships, to lay down 
the law” in naval theory. 40  
 Leaving aside the value judgments, the description of Corbett’s views is broadly fair. 
Throughout his career as a writer, Corbett urged the Royal Navy, and British policymakers to 
aim at the “ultimate object of the war,” rather than an enemy’s forces, viewing the former as 
in keeping with British traditions and interests. 41 Indeed, he bemoaned the influence of “the 
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continental theory of concentration and overthrow” in the British military and its single-
minded focus on coming to grips with the enemy and, in the event of a major war, landing 
major forces on the Continent.42 One author has suggested that Corbett’s work amounted to 
“the first fully fashioned national strategic doctrine.”43 
 However, Corbett did not spend all of his time at Portsmouth composing and 
delivering historical lectures. His position also afforded him the opportunity to lay down his 
strategic precepts unencumbered by the need to lecture on a particular war or period in his 
so-called “Green Pamphlet,” printed in early 1909 as a sort of textbook for his students. 
Later, the ideas expressed therein would be at the heart of his Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy (1911), a longer treatment of his strategic ideas.44 
 The Green Pamphlet presented a rather striking contrast to the Mahanian thought that 
dominated the American navy and was quite popular in Britain as well. While Corbett agreed 
with Mahan that naval strategy was based on the control of communications, he had an 
altogether more nuanced understanding of Mahan’s central tenet of “command of the sea.” 
Corbett’s pamphlet identified two types of sea command, general and local, which could in 
turn be either temporary or permanent. Permanent general sea control, which is the closest to 
Mahan’s command of the sea, was described as a rare situation derived from the almost total 
destruction of an enemy’s navy. The best example he could give of it was the situation in the 
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Russo-Japanese War after Tsushima, with almost the entire Russian Navy underwater, in 
Japanese hands, or trapped in the Black Sea.45 While Corbett and Mahan both based their 
thinking primarily on the “second Hundred Years’ War” between France and Great Britain, 
they obviously took very different lessons from it. Unsurprisingly, Corbett took a less 
aggressive approach to battle. We have already seen from his lectures that Corbett did not 
necessarily view the opposing fleet as the proper target of a naval campaign. While it could 
certainly be useful, a fleet in a rush to come to blows could “assist [the opposing fleet] in 
evading you,” and even let it cut one’s lines of communication.46  
 Corbett’s position at the War College also got him tangentially involved in the 
baroque machinations of the notorious 1907 “War Plans,” developed by a special committee 
at Portsmouth.47 They can be traced to the attempts of the Director of Naval Intelligence, 
Charles Ottley, to draft war plans, “if for no better reason . . . than to deflect potential 
criticism of [Fisher’s] administration for not having done so.” By late 1906, Ottley’s efforts 
were successful, but his office, in preparations for the Hague Conference, lacked the 
resources to draft the plans. Instead, responsibility for developing them was given to a four-
man committee headed by Captain George Ballard, a former naval intelligence staffer. 
Ballard was assisted by Marine Captain M.P.A. Hankey, who Ballard had worked with in the 
NID. The other two committee members are unknown, but one appears to have been an 
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expert on mines, and the other on gunnery. At any rate, the other two men contributed little to 
the final effort; Ballard and Hankey were at the War College in Portsmouth while drafting 
the plans and the unknowns evidently stationed elsewhere.48 
 Four months later, the Ballard Committee returned to Fisher with a set of war plans. 
These appeared to have been cobbled together out of old War College studies, and material 
borrowed from the NID.49 The original Ballard Committee report no longer exists. In its 
stead, there are various versions of Admiralty “War Plans” from 1907, released as another 
one of Fisher’s “secret” reports. In addition to material added from the War College and 
Admiral A.K. Wilson, the outgoing head of the Channel Fleet, the new pamphlet contained 
an introduction written by Julian Corbett at Fisher’s behest.50 
 The Ballard Committee’s recommendations will be discussed later in the chapter, but 
for now, let us focus on Corbett’s introduction, “Some Principles of Naval Warfare.” Calling 
it Corbett’s is perhaps unfair to him. Fisher not only commissioned the paper, but also gave 
clear instructions on its writing, especially the section on battlecruisers, and then revised 
Corbett’s final draft.51 As Nicholas Lambert notes, “it reflected Corbett’s own views only in 
so far as they confirmed to the admiral’s requirements.”52 Still, checking this document 
against his “Green Pamphlet” and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, his 1911 book, 
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quite a lot of Corbett’s own thinking shone through the constraints of the War Plans 
collection.  
 Unusually for the time, Corbett’s introduction deprecated the value of the battle fleet. 
While it was certainly useful for gaining local command of the sea, “for the actual and direct 
control . . . battle fleets are unnecessary and unsuitable,” the real exercise of control resting 
on cruisers. From there, Corbett argued that the traditional understanding of the relationship 
between the battle fleet and the flotilla was flawed. Cruisers, destroyers, and the like were not 
there to support the battleships; battleships existed “to be the support of cruisers and flotillas 
to enable them to control maritime communications.”53 This control, rather than scouting and 
screening the main fleet was the true role for cruisers and the flotilla, one that he rated rather 
more important than prevailing British and American practice allowed.  
 Fisher’s additions appear most obviously in the sections on battlecruisers. The new 
“Invincibles,” Corbett was made to argue, were a way to bridge the gap between flotilla and 
battleships. When operating against an enemy’s smaller ships, they offered “resistless 
power,” allowing the Royal Navy to sweep sea lanes of unfriendly cruisers, protecting British 
communications and allowing British cruisers to focus on sea control.54 At the same time, 
when attached to the battle fleet, the speed of the Invincible enabled a British commander to 
“grasp a flying enemy by the tail, and hold him,” ensuring a decisive engagement against a 
weaker fleet. Accordingly, battlecruisers were nothing less than “the expression of the most 
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cherished and distinctive aspiration of our great masters of the art [of war];” ships equally 
useful for winning command of the sea and exercising control over it.55 
 It is understandable why Fisher found Corbett’s talents so useful. Even without heavy 
editing, Corbett’s thinking meshed rather well with Fisher’s own thoughts\.56 Fisher 
envisioned a future Royal Navy split between the smaller ships and submarines of the flotilla, 
which would provide defense against raids and invasions, and the battlecruisers, which would 
provide both the means for securing command of the sea, and shoulder most of the burden of 
controlling it.57 Corbett’s overall strategic vision was not as radical as Fisher’s, but his 
theories offered up a justification of the battlecruiser with somewhat more abstraction than 
the defenses that came directly out of the Admiralty, operating on the same level as Mahan 
(apart from the latter’s ill-fated Tsushima piece, a foray into detailed contemporary analysis).  
 Even with Fisher’s interjections and edits, Corbett’s theories offered a distinctly 
British counterpart to the ideas of Mahan.58 Although both men essentially started with close 
study of the same material, Corbett’s writings are far less prescriptive than those of Mahan. 
In that sense, Corbett merely codified a strand of thought that was, if not dominant, prevalent 
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in British strategic culture. Although Corbett, like Mahan, was too ignorant of certain facets 
of modern warfare to be completely useful as a strategist, his theories had some utility as a 
lens through which officers could comprehend and analyze naval issues of day, which, to 
some extent, it was.  
 Still, the Royal Navy lacked any sort of systematic strategic training for officers or, 
more tellingly, a staff to carefully consider these issues and make recommendations. In some 
senses, the NID and War College fulfilled some of those roles, but their influence on service 
policy was limited. In both cases, their staff functions interfered with their statutory roles, 
and there was no guarantee that the First Sea Lord would heed their advice. Indeed, the 
Ballad Committee episode highlights the ad hoc nature of planning in the Royal Navy. Even 
then, once the Committee produced its report, it was bowdlerized and co-opted as a political 
cudgel by Fisher.  
 
*** 
 
 Corbett’s development and reworking of his theoretical ideas in 1906-7 are a great 
contrast to the intellectual situation in the United States, where Proceedings spent the whole 
of 1907 making thinly veiled attacks on speedy battleships and the new British vessels. The 
journal’s first issue of 1908 saw that case made far more explicitly by Ensign R.R. Riggs, 
attacking battlecruisers in particular, rather than the concept of speed in general in his piece 
“The Question of Speed in Battleships.” Despite the 1907 Conference’s support for the new 
British ships in lieu of “traditional” armored cruisers, Riggs put both in the armored cruiser 
category, a class he clearly had no use for.  
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An armored cruiser, Riggs argued, “is nothing in the world but a battleship in which 
guns and armor have been sacrificed for three knots’ speed,” putting them at a disadvantage 
when matched against battleships.59 If not designed for fighting battleships, Riggs asked, 
“what is she intended for? Surely not as a scout,…for vessels of a fifth the displacement 
could do this work as well….By escaping from a stronger enemy she will never win wars. 
History teaches that it is only by the shock of armed fleets that this is done….Every argument 
against [armored cruisers] holds good against the battle-cruisers of the Invincible type.”60 
This highlights again the American obsession with major battles to the exclusion of other 
forms of warfare. 
 In summing up his argument, Riggs revealed the influence of Mahanian doctrine 
when he argued that wars were “not to be decided by skirmishing or cross-raiding, but by one 
or more pitched battles. . . . [E]very nerve should be strained both in peace and war to 
prepare for these battles. As armored cruisers have been shown not to be as valuable . . . as 
are battleships, they are a mistake.”61 This sentiment could have come directly from the pen 
of Mahan in 1905 and demonstrates again that while Mahan was unsuccessful in preventing 
the adoption of dreadnoughts, his ideas remained the bedrock of naval culture in the U.S. The 
assumptions remained, repurposed here in an attack on cruisers. 
 More importantly, Riggs’s piece shows the lingering confusion in the United States 
about how to categorize the new vessels. Despite referring to them as “cruisers,” Riggs’s 
analysis rested on analyzing their performance as battleships, as opposed to the 1907 
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Conference, which had considered them both as “fast battleships” and scouts, a role that 
Corbett’s analysis ignored. Neither role fully captured the utility of the new ships. Viewing 
them as battleships highlighted their disadvantages in firepower and armor compared to 
orthodox battleships, while looking at them as scout cruisers highlighted the immense 
expense of battlecruisers compared to the light cruisers usually detailed for such duty. If 
there was value in the battlecruiser concept, in lay in, as Corbett argued, their ability to fulfil 
both roles in the same vessel. 
 This confusion extended to the American promotion exams in strategy and tactics 
required of all aspiring lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains. Of special 
interest here are two guides produced for officers on opposite sides of promotion board 
examinations. The first, written in 1908, by and for officers undergoing examination in the 
Pacific Fleet attempted to provide its readers with acceptable answers for potential questions. 
The other, compiled at the Naval War College, provided officers sitting on promotion boards 
with questions they could ask and sample “correct” answers. Taken together, these 
documents give some indication of the state of thought in the U.S. Navy. Instead of the 
sometimes avant-garde or controversial views expressed in conference or journals, these 
answers tell us what was considered inoffensive and middle-of-the-road enough to pass 
muster at promotion boards. 
 Compared to Proceedings and Mahan, the anonymous Pacific Fleet officers took a 
moderate stance on the utility of speed. It was, they claimed, useful on both the strategic and 
tactical levels while maintaining that it could not “substitute for armament” in battle.62 On 
the other hand, they did agree that the rationale behind battlecruisers was flawed. As an 
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answer to a question on the possibility of removing arms or armor from a battleship to 
provide for high speed, they suggested answering with a flat “No.” At the same time, 
however, they conceded that “the whole subject is one on which . . . many fine writers 
disagree,” a rather clever non-answer.63  
 On the other hand, their discussion of armored cruisers was surprisingly positive:  
[Battlecruisers] [c]an be used as fast wing of battle fleet; scout to press home a 
reconnaissance; to fight other armored or unarmored cruisers; blockade closer [to a 
defended coastline] than a battleship. convoy troop ships or other unarmed vessels; 
destroy commerce; and where the guns are heavy enough, can assist in battle line and 
pierce armor; protect either by convoy or patrol, lines of communication, or by 
running enemy's commerce destroyers to earth.64 
 
 Simply put, it is breathtaking to see such a positive description of armored cruisers in 
the United States in 1908, especially in a document that rejected (however tepidly) 
battlecruisers, which had, of course, been supported by the 1907 Conference. Indeed, this 
discussion of the tactical uses for armored cruisers reminds one of nothing so much as 
Corbett’s justification for battlecruisers quoted above. Of particular interest is their claim that 
armored cruisers with heavy guns could serve in the line, not merely as a fast wing. Given 
that the newest armored cruisers in the U.S. Navy’s arsenal were the 10” Tennessees, this is a 
difficult claim to reconcile with the authors’ suggestion not to build battlecruisers. Oddly 
enough then, the document is in the strange position of rejecting battlecruisers as a design 
while being rather bullish on their capabilities. 
 The guidebook for examiners offered a similar conundrum. In response to an identical 
question on sacrificing protection and/or firepower to create a faster battleship, the 
conclusion was that the sacrifices were not worth it. While the advantages of a ship that 
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sacrificed firepower instead of armor were noted, and the ability of such “fast battleships” to 
press home a torpedo attack were mentioned, the undesirability of making sacrifices 
remained. If more speed was desired, the only option on offer was increasing the size of the 
battleship to prevent a reduction of offensive or defensive strength, hearkening back to 
Fiske’s “Compromiseless Ships” article.65 Still, the document affirmed the value of 
battlecruisers in abstract. Another answer, to a question on the composition of a “well 
balanced fleet,” asserted that “fast battleships or battle cruisers,” were essential to the 
functioning of such a fleet. Tellingly, this ideal fleet did not include armored cruisers, being 
composed entirely of capital ships and flotilla.66 
 What is to be made of these two documents, both of which seem to lack internal 
consistency? Obviously, the U.S. Navy had yet to reach a firm consensus on battlecruisers. 
Still, even in two documents designed to present cautious and inoffensive views, two general 
principles can be seen. First was an acknowledgement of the utility of, depending on 
language, battlecruisers, fast battleships, or heavy armored cruisers to, at the very least, 
support battleships in action. Despite these claims, both sets of authors took exception at their 
design on a theoretical and categorical level. In a sense, then, these arguments boiled down to 
understanding the use and value of battlecruisers while, in keeping with American notions of 
naval theory, preferring battleships.  
 Of course, he promotion board guides were attempting to lay out middle-of-the-road 
positions, not set a course for future American naval policy. For that, we can turn to the 1908 
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Battleship Conference held at Newport in the wake of widespread sniping and discontent 
over the newly designed North Dakota, the second ship in the Delaware-class. Ostensibly, 
the Conference was prompted by Commander Albert Key, who saw the under-construction 
North Dakota at the Fore River Shipyard in Massachusetts while seeing to the fitting-out of 
his own Salem, and wrote a letter to the Secretary detailing its perceived flaws, a copy 
making its way to President Roosevelt as well, through Sims. In reality, the Conference was 
an attempt by insurgent mid-level officers, including Sims and W.L. Rodgers, to air their 
grievances concerning fundamental issues of battleship design and the design process.67 
 Looking strictly at the discussion of North Dakota, the Battleship Conference 
displayed an institution ill-suited to consider battlecruisers. Many of the officers who agitated 
for a conference to begin with found the armor of the North Dakota unforgivably light.68 At 
least one of the Conference committees doubled-down on this argument, claiming that the 
North Dakota’s armor was too light because she was too fast, recommending a slower speed 
and more weight given to armor. Although the General Board’s Conference Committee and 
the Reconciling Committee recommended maintaining the 21-knot standard for all current 
and future construction, a navy where a 21-knot battleship was a major point of contention 
was hardly a navy poised to accept a 25-knot battlecruiser.69 
 The case against the North Dakota was perhaps best made by Rear Admiral Caspar 
Goodrich, a former commander of the Pacific Squadron, in a statement to the Conference as 
it was considering its final report. To Goodrich, the new battleship had “[a] wholly 
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unjustifiable lack of protective qualities,” so few, in fact, that he saw the preceding South 
Carolina-class ships as more than a match. To be fair, North Dakota was faster than the older 
ships, if only so she could “make use of its superior speed in an ignoble way,” in battle. 
Instead, argued Goodrich, with the North Dakota and its sister ship Delaware, the United 
States had the opportunity to build a ship of any displacement, “which would be floating and 
formidable after DREADNOUGHTS and ERSATZES had all gone to the bottom.” He 
conceded that such as ship could even have the high speed that some of the younger officers 
favored “for various reasons which I am unable to fathom.”70 
 Despite his age and irascibility, Goodrich was hardly a reactionary in the vein of 
Mahan. Indeed, Goodrich had been one of the officers to congratulate Sims on his 
dismantling of the old master. In his call for matching displacement to desired qualities rather 
than fitting capabilities to a given displacement, Goodrich echoed Fiske’s call for a 
gargantuan “compromiseless ship.” Like many of his fellow officers, Goodrich viewed speed 
in large ships as a luxury, very much secondary to concerns of arms and armament. In fact 
the entire Conference voted, by a 33-15 margin, to reduce the speed of future battleships to 
20 knots, if it allowed for increased armor.71 
 Most importantly, the 1908 Battleship Conference placed responsibility for setting 
warship design parameters firmly into the hands of the General Board, which had competed 
with the Board on Construction and the Bureau of Construction and Repair for influence over 
warship design. By dissolving the Board on Construction, and placing C&R in a decidedly 
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subordinate role, warship characteristics were firmly determined by line officers, who could 
more easily tailor their specifications to prevailing tactical and operational requirements.72 
 Secretary Metcalf’s annual report from 1908 reflected the general mood laid out at 
Newport. Rather than viewing battlecruisers as cruisers, or as a new sui generis class of 
warship, Metcalf’s report followed the lead of his subordinates in treating them as a subset of 
battleships. The “so-called armored cruisers of the Invincible type,” he claimed were really 
“fast battle ships,” with speed emphasized instead of protection.73 Still, despite his 
acknowledgement that Britain, Japan, and Germany were all building “fast battle ships,” 
Metcalf’s construction requests echoed the General Board’s call for four battleships “of the 
heavy single caliber, all big gun type,” with a similar speed profile to North Dakota, and no 
armored cruisers of the new or old types.74 
 The events of 1908 showed that the U.S. Navy was still grappling with battlecruisers 
on a conceptual level. In the documents quoted above, the new ships were referred to 
variously as “battleship cruisers,” “(heavy) armored cruisers,” “fast battleships,” and “battle 
cruisers,” each name betraying a different understanding of their place in a fleet and their 
wartime role. Unlike in 1907, however, there was now little mention of using the new ships 
primarily as scouts; discussion seemed to revolve around their utility as an aid or supplement 
to traditional battleships. At the same time, there were no voices in Proceedings, at the 
Battleship Conference, or on the General Board willing to speak up for their construction, nor 
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much talk of domestic counterparts like the 1904 Conference’s cruiser or the Schofield 
torpedo battleship. 
 1909, however, would be different, at least at the Summer Conference. Mostly 
ignored by Proceedings, the General Board’s memos, and the Secretary during that year, 
battlecruisers would be a major topic of discussion at Newport, as participants discussed both 
their form and their function. Although the full Conference would not go so far as to 
recommend battlecruiser construction, its deliberations went some way towards clarifying the 
theoretical position of battlecruisers in American thought. 
 It should be pointed out that this hesitancy towards battlecruisers was confined to the 
Navy itself. The Navy, the organ of the Navy League, for example, retained respect for the 
new ships, playing off the argument that the new ships were merely a type of battleship. In an 
editorial on “The German Cruisers” (the just-commissioned proto-battlecruiser Blücher and 
the forthcoming battlecruiser Von der Tann), The Navy agreed with the U.S. Navy consensus 
that armored cruisers were obsolete, before pivoting and claiming that the new German ships 
“are, in fact, battleships about equal in strength to our new North Dakotas.”75 A later article 
on the British Navy asserted that both Dreadnought and Invincible were both “‘capital 
ships,’—that is vessels of immense size and power fitted in every respect to take their place 
in the line of battle.”76  
 Naval opinion, on the other hand, was moving in another direction, producing one of 
the more fascinating Summer Conferences of the era. Battlecruisers had been on the docket 
in 1907, but at that early date, the participants lacked a full appreciation of the impact of the 
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Dreadnought and battlecruiser, and that conference’s discussion of the lighter ships was 
marked by giddy optimism and a lack of analytical rigor. 1909 provided the first opportunity 
for attendees to look at battlecruisers after they had entered service. The later date also 
allowed the Conference to consider the changes in the rest of the naval world. By 1909, 
dreadnought battleships were no longer a topic of serious debate; they were the accepted 
standard of naval power. Battlecruisers themselves were not just a British curiosity; the 
Kaiserliche Marine had tried—and with Blücher failed—to match Invincible and were 
gearing up for another attempt, the future Von der Tann.  
 Despite this, when viewed from Newport the place of battlecruisers was still 
uncertain in this brave new naval world. The British use of these ships was confusing, to say 
the least. Although Invincible and her sisters were classified as armored cruisers, their 
placement with the battleships of the Home Fleet suggested that they were destined for some 
sort of fast wing role. At the same time, the standing American prejudice against cruisers and 
towards heavy armor made these ships, which existed outside of tidy classification schemes, 
difficult to come to grips with. Looking through the 1909 Conference’s reports, we see a 
maturing appreciation of the strengths and limitations of battlecruisers matched with a 
hesitancy to embrace the type.  
Fortunately, enough preliminary material has survived to allow us to trace the 
Conference’s full process of thought and revision.77 The documents evince a great deal of 
confusion, as attendees attempted to comprehend and explain the prior years of flux within 
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the Navy’s prevailing strategic culture. Of particular significance were the questions on 
scouting, fleet composition, and especially the design of fast wing ships, which asked the 
attendees to consider design priorities for a fast battleship: “powerful battery with limited 
protection,” or “moderate battery with heavy protection?”78 
 On the topic of scouting, Question 14, the 1909 Conference tended to agree with their 
predecessors in 1907, the 1st and 3rd Committees’ report claiming “the armored cruiser 
[specifically, the battlecruiser] is the only ship that can meet the qualifications of speed, 
endurance, size, and fighting power” required of naval scouts.79 The 2nd and 4th Committees 
agreed on the attributes of the ships, but warned that they had “a place in the line of battle” 
that would prevent them from being assigned to the detached duty necessary for satisfactory 
scouting.80 Splitting the difference, the Reconciling Committee’s report, eventually adopted 
by the entire Conference, saw a role for heavy cruisers in scouting, but noted that as one new 
heavy cruiser would cost at least as much as 4 smaller scouts, it would be a mistake to hope 
for an all-battlecruiser scouting fleet.81  
 The Conference’s report regarding the eventual size and disposition of the fleet also 
returned a pro-battlecruiser verdict. A previous stab at the question in 1904 had suggested a 
ratio of 2:3 between armored cruisers and battleships, but the Reconciling Committee and the 
Conference as a whole revised the ratio in light of the German and Japanese fleets, 
recommending instead the same 1:2 ratio that the General Board had laid out in their 1903 
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building program memo. Considering Germany the greater threat, the Conference set a goal 
of a fleet large enough to defeat a projected German battle fleet of 42 battleships in 1917. 
Granting the U.S. a margin of superiority around 25%, the Conference concluded that by 
1917, the U.S. Navy should consist of 54 battleships, which required the construction of 25 
battleships over the next seven years. The 1:2 ratio would give the U.S. a strength of 27 
armored cruisers, the 17 new vessels all being battlecruisers.82 
 This was, to say the least, an ambitious building program. As the Conference was 
surely aware, no Secretary of the Navy would be bold enough to request six capital ships a 
year for the next seven years, and Congress, which blanched at funding two, would never 
approve such an outlandish program of construction. By way of comparison, the landmark 
1916 bill called for sixteen ships started over a period of five years. Still, this report shows 
that, given an essentially unlimited amount of money, there was some support for building 
battlecruisers in the U.S. Navy. As minor as that sounds, it represents something of a change 
from the official Navy of 1906 which apparently would have preferred to put all available 
funds into orthodox battleship construction rather than “wasting” it on cruisers.  
 The most important question, however, was Question 20, dealing with the design of a 
hypothetical fast capital ship.83 The reports themselves will be considered below, but before 
delving into them, it is worth pointing out the rider that the Conference voted to attach to 
their final report:  
RESOLVED: That in the opinion of the Conference, the use of the word "battleship" 
should be confined to the heavily armed and armored ship on which the issue of any 
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action must ultimately depend; and that instead of such terms as cruiser-battleship, 
reciprocal, low-power battleship, fast battleship, or other equivalent coined word or 
combination of words, the term "armored cruiser" should be used.84 
 
Reading this, one is struck by how many names were in common usage to describe a fast 
capital ship, somewhat unusual for types of warship, which tend to have one widely accepted 
name. The bewildering number of terms gives some sense of the confusion that heralded the 
arrival of battlecruisers to the U.S. in 1906. Tellingly, while the Royal Navy settled on 
“battle cruiser” as the official term for the vessels, the 1909 Conference eschewed any 
attempt to equate them with battleships. In the United States, battleship orthodoxy remained 
supreme, and while there were, as we will see, officers who thought that faster ships had a 
role to play alongside dreadnoughts, their place in the American understanding of naval 
warfare would, for the near future, remain secondary. 
 On Question 20, the two committee reports endorsed ships on either extreme of the 
question. The 1st and 3rd committees were willing to compromise on the number of guns to 
allow more weight for engines, so long as the caliber of those guns remained large and the 
armor remained as thick as that on contemporary battleships. Essentially, then, their report 
hearkened back to the 1904 design, judging armor to be more important than sheer firepower 
in securing the safety of a fast adjunct to the fleet. Although the report acknowledged the use 
of such ships for scouting, their real purpose was to fight in the line and, perhaps, to serve in 
a fast wing across the head of an enemy column.85 
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 On the other hand, the 2nd and 4th Committees backed a “heavy battery with lighter 
armor.” As the report freely admitted its “fast battleships,” essentially battlecruisers on the 
British, or perhaps German, models would be at a disadvantage when trying to cap a column 
of opposing battleships, but such a role was unlikely. As the British, German, and Japanese 
fleets all possessed ships that could form a “fast wing,” in battle the role of the American 
ships would be to fight with their counterparts, in the line of battle, but not necessarily 
against battleships per se. While scouting, a battlecruiser’s higher firepower would give it a 
better chance of piercing an enemy screen, whose ships would be hard-pressed to get in range 
of a battlecruiser, let alone wound it.86 
 The Reconciling Committee, then, was faced with the prospect of trying to merge two 
incompatible views on design. The committee’s majority report mirrored the stance of the 1st 
and 3rd Committees in favoring a moderate battery with heavy protection. Commander C.S. 
William’s Minority Report, however, heaped scorn on the idea of the, in his words, “low-
power battleship,” which, with fewer guns, would present an unforgiveable diminution of a 
fleet’s firepower. Given the fiscal environment in Congress, Williams foresaw these vessels 
being appropriated as battleships and eventually forced into line against ships of equal 
protection and far superior firepower. While Williams made it clear that he did “not favor 
obtaining increased speed [by] reducing either her gun power or her armor,” if such ships 
were to be built, they should be of the heavy battery/light armor type, which he called a 
“heavy armored cruiser.”87 
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 The extent to which Williams’s case rested on the semantic difference between a 
“low-power battleship” and “heavy armored cruiser,” is a fascinating example of the power 
that naval officers assigned to a ship’s classification.88 In Williams’s mind, one of the key 
dangers of the heavy armor/small battery ship was that it would be classified as a sort of 
battleship and sap the battleship strength of the Navy. Presumably, then, his dividing line 
between battleships and cruisers was based on armor; the “low-power battleship” could stand 
up to a pounding that the armored cruiser could not meet.  
 Faced with the two reports, the Conference as a whole adopted Williams’s reasoning, 
although the final Conference report on Question 20 took a more positive view of the ships 
than Williams. According to the Conference, the “heavy armored cruiser” was superior to the 
heavy armor/small battery ship in scouting and pursuit, while both types were equally useful 
for screening and while the more heavily armored ship was, perhaps, better at heading off an 
enemy column, it was a role that either could fill. Evidently, more weight was assigned to the 
scouting and screening missions of the ship, because the report took pains to point out that 
while these speculative vessels could be used in the thick of the melee, “they are not intended 
to fight in the line against full power battleships,” putting them firmly in the armored cruiser 
category. This statement perhaps explains the Conference resolution quoted above to ensure 
that these and other similar vessels were placed firmly in the cruiser category. 89  
Interestingly, the Conference’s final report also made a new point neither original 
committee report touched on. On the assumption that both ships represented a deviation from 
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the battleship type rather than an evolution of the armored cruiser, the final report argued that 
the reduction in firepower between a standard battleship and a “low-power battleship” was a 
known quantity. On the other hand, the loss in protection from lighter armor was an unknown 
quantity, both because firepower played some role in protection and because the precise 
value of a given weight of armor was impossible to quantify. 90 
The end of the year planning documents from Washington highlight the lack of 
formal policy influence the Conference possessed. As usual, the Summer Conference 
remained in front of the Secretary and General Board on the subject of battlecruisers. Again, 
the Board declined to request battlecruiser construction, while the new Secretary of the Navy, 
George von Lengerke Meyer, merely noted in his annual report that the “so-called ‘armored 
cruiser[s]’” building abroad were really fast battleships, a rather pointed inversion of the 
Conference’s insistence that these ships were cruisers.  
 By the end of 1909, the U.S. Navy’s unwillingness to replace armored cruisers stood 
out. The U.S. joined the other major naval powers in rejecting pre-Russo-Japanese war type 
armored cruisers, but it remained the only one that had not settled on a replacement. Japan 
had, for the time being, focused on proto-battlecruisers of the Tsukuba type while Britain, of 
course, had developed the battlecruiser type. Initially, Germany had responded with Blücher, 
a uniform-battery cruiser with medium caliber guns. Now the German navy was in the midst 
of building Von der Tann, built to the same general template as Invincible, with more armor 
and somewhat more speed. 
 At this point, four options dominated American discourse on fast capital ships. The 
first was to mimic the British Invincible, perhaps mitigating the lack of armor that many 
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American officers found problematic. This was the solution suggested by the 1909 
Conference. The next three were domestic solutions, not yet tried abroad. The first of those 
was Schofield’s torpedo battleship, which had risen to the level of consideration by the War 
College, the General Board, and the Secretary. Although it seemed moribund by 1909, some 
lingering attachment to it remained, and it would resurface again in 1912. Next came an 
updated version of the 1904 Conference’s reciprocal, the “low power battleship,” of high 
speed, heavy armor, and a somewhat reduced main battery favored by the 1909 Reconciling 
Committee, and imperfectly reflected in the Japanese Tsukuba. Lastly came Fiske’s 
“compromiseless ship”; the suggestion that given enough displacement, ideal speed, 
firepower, and armor could be achieved, albeit at great expense, a solution that pre-figured 
the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships the post-Fisher Admiralty would build in lieu of more 
battlecruisers. 
 As the 1909 Conference suggested, opinion was beginning to coalesce around the 
battlecruiser option, if a fast capital ship were needed (a point that there was, as of yet, no 
movement on from the Secretary or General Board). Still, there was not yet a consensus on 
what such a ship would do. It was recognized that a fast capital ship was admirably suited for 
scouting and screening or the fast wing role and could, perhaps, serve in the line, but it could 
not fulfill all three roles simultaneously. Even if the Board and Secretary acquiesced in their 
construction, there would never be enough to parcel out for two or three separate missions. 
As the Navy moved into 1910, there was wide agreement that the U.S. could find a use for 
such ships if built, but there was no general on the wisdom of building them or on which use 
they would be turned to.  
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*** 
 
 The end of the decade was rather more exciting on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Fisher had spent most of his tenure in office feuding with critics in and out of the Navy and 
by 1909, his most ardent critics had managed to turn him into a figure of political 
controversy and a possible liability to the government. Smelling blood, they moved in for the 
kill. In early 1909, the Admiralty had removed Admiral Charles Beresford from command of 
the Channel Fleet. Beresford, who had served as a Conservative MP from the 1870s through 
1903 in parallel with his naval career, was able to turn his dismissal into a party political 
issue, forcing a CID inquiry onto the Admiralty. Although the inquiry more or less 
exonerated the Admiralty and Fisher, his position had become untenable, and he was forced 
to resign on January 25 1910, to be replaced by Arthur Wilson.91 
The trouble started in 1907, when Beresford was shown part of the War Plans 
document, and told that it was the preferred Admiralty approach to war, though the document 
was never presented to Beresford as an order. By this point, Beresford was firmly attached to 
the anti-Fisher opposition. Despite being consulted during the initial design process, 
Beresford had been one of the earliest critics of Fisher’s new capital ships.92 In 1906, his 
advocacy in favor of the 6” intermediate battery over 12” guns, based on the Mediterranean 
Fleet’s battle practice, forced a direct rebuttal from Jellicoe, the Director of Naval Ordnance 
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in the “Designs of Armoured Ships” pamphlet.93 Beresford was also an implacable foe of 
armored cruisers of all stripes, believing them a mistaken concept.94 The fact that Beresford 
considered himself a candidate for the First Sea Lord role held by Fisher certainly did not 
help. . 
Now in command of the Channel Fleet, Beresford resented both the implicit check on 
his own authority to use his fleet as he wished, and the approach that the War Plans took. In 
particular, Beresford seems to have been briefed from the report’s plan “A,” which mostly 
nearly approximated the opinions of the Ballard Committee.95 The plans, developed for a 
fleet with Dreadnought in active service, but none of the Invincibles, sheds little light on 
Admiralty plans for the new battlecruisers, but highlights again the disconnect between the 
views of the “Fishpond” and the rest of the Navy.  
Plan “A” proposed a war with Germany revolving around economic warfare, rather 
than a clash of fleets. According to the plan, “a cordon of unarmoured vessels would be 
established” in the English Channel and Scotland-Norway gap to ensure “the total exclusion 
of shipping under the German flag from all ocean trade.” The North Sea cordon would be 
supported by a force of armored cruisers, while the main force of battleships would be 
stationed at the Humber, about halfway up the East Coast of England, able to support either 
cordon. Cruisers stationed abroad would sweep the seas of German commerce.96 
After taking some time to consider the plans, Beresford sent the Admiralty an 
extended critique, saying that they “must have been written by some Essayist for some 
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Lecture.” In particular, Beresford seems to have taken exception at their assumption that 
German commerce ranked above the German fleet as a target. His stance was common for a 
senior officer of the day, but the way in which he made his argument was intemperate, to say 
the least. He reserved special scorn for the sections dealing with cruisers calling them 
“[a]bsolutely incorrect.”97 Beresford’s arguments may have been sharpened by Vice Admiral 
Reginald Custance, his second-in-command, and another opponent of Fisher’s policies.98 
 Understandably, the Admiralty was upset with Beresford’s missive. Beresford, they 
claimed, had made a series of inappropriate, insubordinate complaints to the board, “the tone 
of some of them being  . . .  unusual and improper.” They also took exception at his attempt 
to write a new war plan, which called for the use of more vessels than the Royal Navy 
actually possessed. Beresford, the memorandum alleged, believed that his new posting 
“carried with it the plenary powers of an admiralissimo.” Furthermore, if the Admiralty 
failed to do his bidding, the Board’s memo alleged that Beresford threatened to spearhead a 
political attack on Admiralty policy.99 
 The situation became so contentious that Beresford was called in for a meeting at the 
Admiralty in July, where the Board described Beresford’s part as “a series of clumsy 
fencings, evasions, and dodgings . . . often contradictory.”100 After being sidelined and 
marginalized by the Board, which suggested that Wilson would be recalled from retirement 
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and given the overall active command in the event of war, Beresford did indeed turn the 
matter into a political football, intensifying widespread discontent with Fisher amongst 
conservative (and Conservative) naval officers and journalists.101 From 1908, Beresford’s 
allies called for a highly damaging inquiry into Admiralty policy, a call that only intensified 
after Beresford was removed from command in early 1909.  
Despite the cloud hanging over the Admiralty, normal work continued in the midst of 
the back and forth between supporters of the Board and Beresford partisans. In mid-1907, the 
1908-09 program was set at one battleship and one armored cruiser. Crucially, this cruiser 
represented something of a step back after the Invincibles: the particulars of the new cruiser 
were similar to the German Blücher, as well as Fisher’s very first battlecruiser plans; 25-knot 
ships with 6” belt armor and 8x9.2” guns for a main battery.102 This climb down was 
probably due to the Cabinet’s desire to reduce naval costs, or at least keep the trend line 
flat.103 
By the end of March 1908, though, the Admiralty had received permission to build a 
follow-on to the Invincibles, rather than another armored cruiser. Part of the credit or blame 
can be assigned to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, H.H. Asquith, who mistakenly told 
Parliament that month that the Admiralty was planning to build a battleship and a “battle-
cruiser” in the coming year.104Asquith’s blunder may have given Fisher cover, but there were 
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also concerns about German construction: the Kaiserliche Marine had followed up the 
Blücher with plans for a battlecruiser to match British construction.105  
By March 31, Director of Naval Construction Philip Watts presented the Board with 
what he called a “new ‘Invincible.’” After the tremendous increase in power made with the 
Invincible, the new ship—the future Indefatigable—represented something of a return to 
normal patterns of design and construction, and the new designs simply refined the Invincible 
model rather than setting a new standard. The wing turrets were given greater arcs of fire, the 
ship was lengthened, and the weights tweaked, but the result was the same: a 25-knot 
warship with eight 12” guns. With no foreign battlecruisers to contend with, Fisher and the 
Admiralty were evidently content to stand pat with their new design.106 
 Trouble, though, was brewing on the other side of the North Sea. While the British 
design was being finalized, the German Navy had laid down their first real battlecruiser, Von 
Der Tann. Faster and more heavily armored than Invincible—almost to the level of British 
battleships—the German design was a far more capable ship than Invincible or Indefatigable, 
which would not even be laid down until February 1909. Fisher’s prediction that it would 
take foreign navies years to come to grips with the battlecruiser concept was true, but the 
assumption that British designs would remain ahead of their rivals was proving tenuous.  
 Von der Tann was a perfect illustration of the risks the Royal Navy ran by trying to 
get in front of the innovation curve. On one hand, Fisher’s designs had forced a global 
construction freeze as rivals made sense of the new ships, but on the other, by setting a 
benchmark the British gave other navies a defined set of specifications to meet or surpass. 
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This very dynamic, as shown in the Franco-British armored cruiser competition of the 
previous decade, is precisely why the Royal Navy’s traditional policy was one of letting 
other navies suffer the teething problems of innovation while relying on production 
efficiency and resources to swamp the competition in production of mature types. By 
complacency in the Indefatigable design this problem was exacerbated; not only had the 
Royal Navy missed a chance to maintain its qualitative lead, but tightening resources were 
put into a ship that would be outclassed from its commissioning. Invincible and Dreadnought 
may have shocked rivals into a construction freeze, but what was the four year period 
separating Invincible and Indefatigable’s successor, if not a virtual design freeze? 
 This should not have caught the Royal Navy unaware. By September 1907 the Naval 
Intelligence Department had already noted that the Germans had a preliminary design, “F,” 
that was anticipated to cost £440,313 more than the Blücher.107 This increase, greater than 
the price difference between Invincible and Minotaur, must have aroused some sort of 
suspicion at the Admiralty during deliberations over the 1908-9 budget, but it evidently did 
not after planning. Instead of taking the six months between the intelligence report and the 
unveiling of the preliminary German design to shift the goalposts again, the Board elected to 
stand pat.  
 With the chance to remain ahead of the competition missed, the next crucial point for 
the Royal Navy came in the summer of 1909 when the Dominion governments met in 
London to discuss imperial defense. The Australia and New Zealand governments had both 
agreed to donate dreadnoughts to the common defense as a result of the 1909 “dreadnought 
crisis,” and the lower house of the Canadian Parliament had passed a resolution authorizing 
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the construction of an independent Canadian Navy. This meeting, requested by the Australian 
government represented a chance for the Dominions and the Royal Navy to coordinate on 
strategies and construction priorities.108 
 More than any other official documents from the later years of his first stint in office, 
the records from this conference gives a sense of Fisher’s mature strategic vision. To all three 
Dominion governments, he urged the purchase of a “vessel of the ‘Indomitable’ [Invincible] 
class.” By the time of the Conference, it was clear that the New Zealand and Canadian 
donations would go into the Royal Navy while the Australian ships would serve as the 
nucleus of a local navy under Dominion control. In conversations with the Australians, 
Fisher seized on this point, arguing that a battlecruiser was the perfect ship to stiffen the 
spine of the light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that would make up the Australian 
Navy, a “citadel . . . round which the smaller vessels” could rally. In theory, an Australian 
battlecruiser would make short work of any German armored cruisers, the largest warships 
the Germans could possibly spare from the North Sea.109 To put it into Corbett’s terms, these 
ships would help Britain utilize the control of the sea won by a superior battle fleet in 
Europe.  
 To the Canadians and New Zealanders, Fisher made much the same argument, 
projecting the New Zealand battlecruiser on the China station, and the Canadian ship in 
British Columbia, each supported by a “fleet unit” of small cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines contributed by the Dominions. Tellingly, the Pacific Ocean in 1909 was almost 
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entirely free of potential enemy capital ships. Japan remained bound by the alliance, the 
United States had recently shifted their entire battleship strength to the East Coast, and 
Germany maintained little more than a small cruiser squadron at Tsingtao. This plan, then, 
was the culmination of Fisher’s ruthless downsizing program upon assuming office. Rather 
than relying on a motley collection of old battleships and cruisers, Fisher’s plan for the 
control of the entire Pacific Ocean rested on three battlecruisers and a relative handful of 
support ships. After the conference, Australia and New Zealand both appropriated funds to 
build “their” battlecruisers in British yards, while the Canadians declined, concentrating 
instead on building up a squadron of smaller vessels on each coast. The Dominion 
battlecruisers, however, would be sister ships to the Indefatigable rather than the expensive 
new Lion-class introduced in the 1909-10 Navy budget.   
 Hand-in-hand with his proposals for battlecruisers roaming the Pacific was Fisher’s 
increasing pessimism about the survivability of large ships in narrow seas set on by packs of 
torpedo-armed destroyers and submarines. An Admiralty memorandum from April 1909, 
presumably written by Fisher or with his heavy input, predicted a “complete approaching 
revolution,” in which the North Sea would be rendered unsafe for large warships by the 
widespread use of small ships with torpedoes.110 Theoretically, this was another data point in 
Fisher’s crusade to end battleship production and placing Britain’s navy in hands of pelagic 
battlecruisers and swarms of small combatants in restricted waters. By 1909, though, it was 
clear that Fisher’s opinions would never be enacted unaltered, but it still gives some 
indication of his state of thinking. 
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 The next British battlecruiser, the last designed under Fisher’s guidance, was the 
major leap missing in the Indefatigable and her sister ships Australia and New Zealand. The 
1909-10 program battlecruiser was originally intended to be another Indefatigable, but the 
parameters of the Von der Tann, and rumors of the next German battlecruiser, Moltke, 
convinced the Board to accept Fisher’s desire for a remarkable leap in speed and power over 
both of the German designs. Armed with 13.5” guns instead of the 12” guns of Indefatigable 
or the 11” guns of Von der Tann, and with a designed speed of 28 knots, Fisher intended the 
next battlecruiser, HMS Lion, to provide a shock comparable to the original Dreadnought 
and Invincible, freezing German construction again.111  
 As with Invincible, Fisher faced some pushback from within the Admiralty. Fisher 
had wanted all eight large warships of the 1909-10 program to be Lion-class battlecruisers, 
but he was prevented from doing so by the Board, especially the Second Sea Lord, Vice 
Admiral Francis Bridgeman-Bridgeman, who kept the ratio at two battlecruisers against six 
battleships. Bridgeman, who had been in charge of the initial tactical trials for the Invincible-
class, came out of them convinced that battlecruisers “must never be considered as 
dreadnoughts,” and were merely large armored cruisers.112 Bridgeman’s sentiments—he 
would become First Sea Lord in 1911—would have serious consequences for the British 
battlecruiser program down the road, but for now, all he could do was prevent Fisher from 
entirely switching capital ship construction over to battlecruisers.  
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While Bridgeman was able to keep the battlecruisers in the 1909-1910 program 
down, he had no discernable impact on their design, which crept towards “fast battleship” 
status. Despite maintaining the same basic qualities as Invincible—high speed, heavy guns, 
light armor (9” at the belt)—Lion and, to a lesser extent, the German ships, represented a 
dramatic change of capability for battlecruisers. Since the Dreadnought, battleship speeds 
had stayed reasonably consistent at 20-21 knots. Battlecruiser speeds, however, had gone 
from the 24 knots of Invincible to 28 knots, increasing their speed advantage over the battle 
line, while the change in armament allowed for even greater offensive power. In fact, Lion 
was approximately 8,000 tons heavier than Indefatigable and 4,000 tons heavier than the 
Orion-class battleships that joined it in the 1909-10 program. Generating 70,000 horsepower 
and displacing 26,000 tons, Lion was certainly an impressive ship, and one that Fisher 
thought would start the migration from battleship to battlecruiser.113 
It is here, Andrew Gordon has argued, that British battlecruiser policy went off the 
rails: “[t]he issue of exactly what the Lion class and Tiger were built for is a tricky one: they 
were thoroughly armoured for fighting armoured cruisers, but still inadequately so for their 
fellow battle cruisers. . . . Thus is illustrated the ephemeral nature of Fisher’s original battle 
cruiser theory.”114 Gordon’s critique is somewhat unfair. The issue of whether or not the 
Lions were underarmored is a tricky one, but their armor distribution was not an oversight or 
mistake. By 1909, Fisher appears to have lost all semblance of trust in heavy armor. Armor 
protection could, of course, be maintained against the smaller guns of older armored cruisers, 
or the flotilla, but against battleship weapons, the only answer was not to be hit in the first 
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place. Rather than trading blows, the key to battle would be overwhelming enemy ships with 
a flurry of hits before they could respond. Based on those assumptions, the armor of the 
Lions was more than adequate.115  
A public case for Fisher’s pro-battlecruiser/anti-armor stance was made by Reginald 
Bacon, formerly the first captain of Dreadnought, and one of Fisher’s most trusted deputies. 
Shortly after Fisher’s exit in early 1910, Bacon, recently retired from the post of Director of 
Naval Ordnance, delivered a speech on “The Battleship of the Future,” to the Institution of 
Naval Architects, likely expressing sentiments he had held during Lion’s redesign. His 
speech took as its basis Fisher’s argument that the development of torpedoes and mines had 
turned the present battleship “merely into a vessel for fighting other battleships,” and one ill-
suited for fighting them under the conditions of modern warfare. 116 Furthermore, the rapidly 
increasing power of naval artillery made designing armor proof against new guns developed 
“in the reasonable future” an impossibility.117 What, then, would future battleships look like? 
 According to Bacon, the answer required a radical rethinking of the battleship 
paradigm. Armor, increasingly useless, could be done away with. In the absence of linear 
tactics, battle would degenerate into a series of “duels” between individual ships or 
squadrons. In this new environment, high speed would be essential and the battleship would 
take the form of “a large armoured cruiser,” in short, a battlecruiser, with “attendant torpedo 
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craft.”118 These sentiments, which Fisher certainly shared, explain his seeming unconcern 
about the armor protection of his new Lions.  
 Of course, if all of this were true, why did the Royal Navy continue to build 
battleships? In the 1909-10 program, the battlecruiser Lion and the battleship Orion were 
conceived with the same role in mind: to be the most powerful ship in a fleet, and serve as 
citadels around which other classes of vessels could perform their vital work. Orion was 
designed for the linear tactics of the day, while Lion was intended to provide better service in 
what Fisher and Bacon thought would be the modern battlespace, swarming with threatening 
torpedo boats and submarines. Both visions could not be right: if the theories behind the Lion 
were correct, Orion was useless, and if the traditionalists were, Lion was unnecessary. 
Instead of resolving this dispute, the Admiralty Board threw a bone to both camps, giving 
Fisher some of what he wanted, while ensuring that Britain continued to build battleships.  
 This dispute was one that a war staff or a more robust war college system could have 
mediated, pushing the Royal Navy in the direction of backing one vision or another. If so, 
that direction would probably have been towards the traditional reliance on battleships and 
linear tactics. Setting aside any discussion of the correctness of Fisher’s vision, those ideas 
were shared by very few officers in the Royal Navy, and almost all of those were personally 
connected to him in some way.119 Amongst the great mass of Royal Navy officers, including 
those in day-to-day control of its battlecruisers, Fisher’s plans for the type were simply 
unknown.  
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  By mid-1909, the first three battlecruisers were in commission, and assigned to the 
First Cruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet. However, the diary of Herbert Richmond, now 
captain of Dreadnought, and Home Fleet flag captain, contains complaints about 
maneuvering with “Invincible [and] this mixture of ships with such different qualities  . . . 
bad in a squadron.”120 Context suggests that Richmond’s complaints had to do with 
maneuvering Dreadnought alongside Invincible and her sisters, but the issues with the new 
ships were equally acute when sailing in formation with, respectively, pre-dreadnoughts and 
orthodox armored cruisers. With different speeds, and different armaments optimized for 
combat and different ranges, creating a one-size-fits-all tactical combat plan would have been 
almost impossible until there were enough dreadnoughts and battlecruisers to form 
homogenous squadrons in 1911.121 
 The Home Fleet commander, William May, seems to have had little to say on the 
matter; at least according to his flag captain, Herbert Richmond (“He has the haziest idea of 
strategy. . . . He never himself prepares the cruiser exercises . . . he reads them [and] doesn’t 
understand them.”).122 Likewise, the First Cruiser Squadron commander, Stanley Colville, 
seems to have given little thought to the new capabilities of his ships. Richmond laid this 
state of affairs at the feet of the Admiralty: “it seems to me that some doctrines are wanted, 
laying down, by reasoned argument, the functions the Admiralty propose of each class of 
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vessel. As it is, it is simply a jumble without form…. No methods of using cruizers [sic] or 
destroyers exist.”123  
As discussed earlier, Fisher was fond of misleading critics, the Cabinet, and the Navy 
at large as to the real rationale behind his proposals. Doing so allowed him to get more of his 
policies passed, but at great cost to the Royal Navy’s intellectual and doctrinal well-being. 
By Fisher’s departure in early 1910, how many of the men stationed on one of Fisher’s 
battlecruisers, or helping to direction a squadron or fleet of them understood just what 
exactly their purpose was? To belabor an obvious point, this was another negative 
consequence of Fisher’s single-handed revolution, which transformed the Royal Navy’s 
material circumstances without altering its thought.  
 
*** 
 
Neither the Lion nor Bacon’s speech went unnoticed in the United States. Building on 
the intense debate over battlecruisers at the previous year’s Summer Conference, 1910 was a 
bumper year for the discussion of battlecruisers in the United States. In Newport, officers 
attached to the Naval War College conducted game board exercises involving battlecruisers, 
while the ships were again a topic of rich discussion at the Summer Conference. In 
Washington, Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer was sufficiently moved to commission a 
series of sketch battlecruiser designs from the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and at the 
end of the year, both the General Board and the Secretary discussed the ships at length in 
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their annual reports. Still, lasting consensus and concrete action remained impossible to come 
by.  
One of the more interesting submissions in this debate came from Naval Constructor 
David W. Taylor, who gave a talk on foreign developments in design over the summer at 
Newport, using Bacon’s comments as a foil. Taylor, who would go on to run the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair during the First World War, was baffled by Bacon’s reasoning 
which contained some “peculiar ideas as to armor protection.”124 In line with most American 
officers, Taylor was unwilling to declare armor useless. Indeed, Taylor found Bacon’s 
designs positively dangerous, leaving too much to chance in an artillery duel between 
relatively unarmored ships. Instead, he argued, the United States needed “vessels that can 
take as well as give punishment, vessels that will stand punishment long enough to give 
superior skill a chance to win always.” Such a ship might be expensive—Taylor threw out a 
figure of $17-18 million, rather more expensive than current US battleships—but Taylor was 
convinced it was the only “common sense solution.” The alternative, too horrible for him to 
contemplate, was to follow the British lead and build “giant destroyers of 35 knots speed . . . 
and convert naval warfare into a kind of enormous game of hide and seek.”125 
Elsewhere in the U.S. Navy, officers were playing games with battlecruisers. 
Lieutenant Commander Ridley McLean, an officer attached to the General Board, utilized 
evidence from the game board in an analysis of Invincible-type ships as a fast wing.126 As he 
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put it, the question at hand was if a fleet of sixteen Delaware-class battleships and four 
battlecruisers could defeat a homogenous fleet of twenty Delawares.127 McLean found that 
the fleet with battlecruisers would indeed win a hypothetical matchup, commenting that in 
the event of a battle against a foe with battlecruisers, the United States would be “severely 
handicapped if we did not have a fast wing to oppose it and hold [them] in check.” In the 
end, McLean endorsed a squadron of battlecruisers as “a more valuable addition to a fleet of 
sixteen,” than a squadron of battleships.128 In other words, rather than battlecruisers being a 
replacement for battleships, the view of Fisher and some of his circle, McLean found that 
their value lay mainly in a fleet already well-supplied with battleships. 
 Lieutenant Commander C.T. Vogelsang, an instructor at the War College, took a 
dimmer view of the fast wing mission. Utilizing the same thought exercise as McLean, 
Vogelsang came to the opposite conclusion: the side equipped with a fast wing would lose 
under normal battle conditions, with both fleets cruising in column. Simply by forcing 
combat, the admiral of the homogenous fleet would give his opponent “the option of 
accepting the battle with the speed of its [battlecruisers] neutralized and at a disadvantage as 
to armament or protection,” or fighting without the battlecruisers as they looped around, 
outside of fighting range, to the head of the opposing column.129  
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However, Vogelsang was not an anti-speed zealot on the level of Riggs or some of 
the more conservative elements of the fleet. To Vogelsang, building battlecruisers for the 
purposes of a fast wing was “to do violence to a principle that has brought . . . much glory to 
the flag,” but he recognized the potential utility of such ships as advance scouts or screens, 
noting its special utility in a region like the North Sea where the tremendous fuel expenditure 
of battlecruisers was less of an issue. He viewed such ships as a naval luxury for the U.S., 
pointing out that even if designated as scouts, a commander would be forced to use them in 
the line absent an adequate number of battleships.130 
Leaving aside specific debates about design, Vogelsang and McLean provided a fair 
preview for the discussion of battlecruisers at the 1910 Summer Conference.131 Here, the 
battlecruiser issue was restricted mostly to one question, number eleven, which asked the 
participants to “[d]iscuss the tactical and strategical value of superior speed in a fleet. What is 
the best use to make of a fast wing in a battle fleet; and what is the best type of ship for a fast 
wing?”132 Although the question itself assumed that the fast wing idea had some utility, the 
Conference’s committee reports and the discussion of Question 11 would show that most of 
the officers at Conference had serious reservations concerning the desirability of a fast wing. 
The First Committee’s report questioned the notion of a fast wing, arguing that 
superior speed was not important enough to secure with the “artificial method of reduction in 
armament or armor,” contradicting a point that was very much implicit in the original 
question. Far better, they argued, to obtain increased speed, if desired, through increasing 
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displacement or unspecified advances in engine technology.133 If such a ship were deemed 
necessary, however, their report suggested taking the British Lion (which the committee saw 
as a type of battleship rather than cruiser), removing half of its guns, and using the weight to 
increase her armor and torpedo armament, a solution the committee likened to Schofield’s 
torpedo battleship.134 
The Second Committee also argued that the fast wing type was unnecessary in the 
United States, claiming that the “[e]nergy, time and money,” needed to design and build such 
a ship would be more profitably spent on battleships and, at any rate, the “strategic location” 
of the United States did not warrant the construction of these ships.135 If the U.S. Navy were 
to build a battlecruiser, the committee recommended imitating Von der Tann, presumably 
impressed by her mixture of reasonably heavy armor and firepower as opposed to the higher 
speed of Lion.136 
The majority of the Reconciling Committee sided with the First Committee’s report, 
endorsing a 30-knot ship with 10” armor, four 14” guns and twelve torpedo tubes, essentially 
a modified Schofield.137 The minority report, though, took the question in another direction. 
The working assumption in the United States was that a ship of the “fast wing,” would lie on 
the spectrum roughly between the British battlecruiser ideal and the 1904 Conference’s 
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“reciprocal,” but the minority report suggested going back to the idea of the “compromiseless 
ship” as a model for the fast wing, if not the entire battle fleet.138 Such a ship would have the 
speed and firepower to do real damage if in position to attack the head of an enemy column, 
but would also retain enough armor to fight in the line at no disadvantage.139  
Thrown for discussion to the entire Conference, Question 11 proved contentious. 
Indeed, neither the Reconciling Committee’s majority nor minority reports were accepted. 
Instead, a majority of the attendees endorsed something like HMS Lion as the ideal “fast 
wing style of ship;” a 30 knot ship with eight 14” guns. The final report on the question drew 
a strong distinction between battleships and fast wing ships. Battleships, the report claimed, 
were defined by armament, protection, and speed in that order, while the fast wing vessel 
needed speed and firepower before protection. Still, the construction of any type was in the 
distant future; the Conference passed a separate resolution calling for the U.S. to forgo the 
fast wing unless the vessels could be added to the naval budget in addition to two yearly 
battleships.140 
Separately from the Conference, Secretary Meyer was also considering battlecruisers 
that summer. In June, he asked the Bureau of Construction and Repair the same question the 
1909 Conference had been asked about preferences between a fast, lightly armed ship, and a 
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fast, lightly armored ship. 141 The request was not entirely unexpected. The Bureau had 
conducted some research into giving the Wyoming-class battleships 25.5 knot fast wing 
companions, and the six designs arrived at were forwarded to Meyer.142 
The designs show that the Bureau had ideas on potential battlecruisers somewhat at 
odds with the line officers who made up the majority of the Summer Conference participants. 
Although the speed of all six designs was lower than that of HMS Lion, the percentages of 
armor by weight on the designs ranged from 20-24%, roughly comparable to Lion’s 23% and 
far lower than Von der Tann’s 30% (Wyoming, by way of contrast, was at approximately 
26%; part of the discrepancy can be explained by Von der Tann’s relatively small size and 
weight devoted to engines; but German battlecruisers as a rule really were quite well 
armored). Interestingly, the Bureau’s designs all produced ships that were at, or lower than, 
Wyoming’s 26,000 ton displacement. Apart from the first design, an attempt to out-power the 
Lion with ten guns and only eight inches of belt armor, the C&R sketches remind one of 
nothing so much as updated Invincibles, lacking the 70,000 horsepower engines of Lion 
(Design III, a six-gun design, topped out at 61,000 hp.) or the lavish armor of the Von der 
Tann. In short, the Bureau’s designs were an attempt to match an already-obsolete design.143 
A set of speculative designs, however, was not the same thing as a commitment to the 
type, and the General Board and Secretary both declined to request the type in their annual 
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reports. Meyer’s report argued, in keeping with the wording of the Summer Conference’s  
“fast wing” question, that it was no longer appropriate to think of battlecruisers as a subset of 
armored cruiser. Instead, “nations building such ships are in reality building two types of 
battle ships, fast and slow.”144 Given the choice between the two, the slow variety were more 
acceptable for the United States. The General Board, on the other hand, dealt with 
battlecruisers at length (while continuing to call them armored cruisers), deploying a 
complex argument that owed a great debt to Vogelsang’s report on the vessels.  
To start with their simplest conclusion, the Board rejected the “fast wing” as a 
separate ship type, claiming, “the armored cruiser is not a permanent element of the fighting 
line but may be used as a temporary adjunct to it.” In other words, while armored cruisers 
might be able to pitch in alongside battleships, it was not their main role, and could not be the 
basis for their design, as it clearly was to the 1910 Conference attendees. Rather than viewing 
this as a new conclusion, the General Board enlisted history to burnish their claim, asserting 
that this role had  
“not changed since the original inception” of the type.145 
Instead of viewing the American lack of battlecruisers as a potential danger, it is clear 
that the Board saw it as an advantage for the United States. Foreign navies may have decided 
to trade armor and firepower for speed, but in any situation where “either fleet had sufficient 
battleships to enable it to oppose battleships to armored cruisers,” the advantage lay with an 
all-battleship fleet, like the U.S. Navy. Indeed, this advantage made armored cruisers an 
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unnecessary luxury for the United States, which could go on laying down battleships without 
wasting money on “problematical” heavy cruisers. As an added bonus, the Board could use 
this reasoning to suggest, as they did with Germany, that the U.S. Navy needed to counter 
competitors’ battleships and armored cruisers with an equal number of battleships, a formula 
that they used to push for a yearly five-battleship program until 1917 to match the German 
battleship and cruiser combined strength.146  
If nothing definite was decided on in 1910 in the United States, it was clear that the 
idea of the battlecruiser, or something like it, as a fast wing was dead in the water. Even as 
the Summer Conference debated designs, the Conference as a whole urged the Navy not to 
build them unless it did not interfere with battleship plans, a condition that the Conference 
surely knew the Department and Congress would never meet. Still, both the Conference’s 
final report and the C&R sketch designs made it clear that if the United States were to build 
the ship, there was a larger constituency for following the British lead towards a new 
Invincible or Lion than there was for the Von der Tann (surely the most perfect example of a 
“fast battleship” to date), or breaking new ground with a Schofield or 1904 reciprocal. If 
battlecruisers were to be built in the United States, it was becoming clear that they would be 
improvements on the British model. 
 
*** 
 
In late 1909, Herbert Richmond wrote, with characteristic acidity, about “[t]he legacy 
of Fisher—no thinking department, no plans for war, no knowledge of an enemy’s plans or 
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movements.”147 What Richmond and many other observers wanted was a staff. By October 
1909, pressure from outside the Admiralty forced Fisher to set up the Navy War Council “to 
consider naval strategic problems and war plans.” Unsurprisingly, it proved to be another 
body with little power or influence outside of its chair, the First Sea Lord. Other members of 
the Admiralty Board could occasionally thwart Fisher’s more radical ideas, but largely Fisher 
persisted in running the Admiralty like a squadron or a fleet; supported by a small group of 
trusted aides who could implement his ideas, but never come up with their own.148  
Across the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy was beginning to create a system of long-range 
planning centered on the General Board. Though it had little statutory authority, there was no 
other planning body in the Navy Department that could take on the role.149 From 1908, the 
General Board had sole authority to determine warship specifications within the Navy (of 
course, Congress or the Secretary could set tonnage limits or otherwise modify the Board’s 
proposals). Already, the Board had begun to turn the yearly conferences at Newport for 
advice on fleet composition and strategy. Though this jury rigged system was not perfect (the 
Newport attendees did not necessarily have any aptitude for planning, the College was only 
in session for a few months a year, and attendees changed with every session), throwing 
questions to the Conference broadened the perspective of the General Board, and brought 
them into closer contact with the active fleet.  
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The above organizational factors played out in the way both fleets approached 
battlecruisers in the 1907-10 period. In the United States, a consensus developed amongst 
Summer Conference attendees and the General Board that battlecruisers were of little use as 
a battleship supplement or replacement. Viewed from the perspective of American naval 
theory and policy, the opinion was a logical one. There may have been other roles that 
battlecruisers could fill, but their value was limited in a battleship role for a navy that 
maintained its faith in traditional linear tactics. By 1910, the General Board felt confident 
enough about these conclusions to lay them out at length in their annual construction 
memorandum for the Secretary. 
In Britain, on the other hand, no such consensus was forthcoming. Admiral Fisher had 
strong opinions on these vessels, but his opinions were known to and shared by few others. 
As the first battlecruisers began to enter the fleet, there was no Royal Navy battlecruiser 
doctrine disseminated from the Admiralty, and no urgent attempt to forge one amongst the 
officers commanding the first three battlecruisers in active service. If we are to believe 
Richmond, the Home Fleet lacked any semblance of an understanding on how to use any of 
its cruisers. Absent service-wide agreement on battlecruiser employment, the Royal Navy 
risked a potentially dangerous disconnect between the design of the ships at the Admiralty 
and the employment of ships with the fleet, a danger that would indeed manifest itself during 
the First World War.  
Turning to consider the two navies in isolation, the U.S. Navy engaged in a much 
more serious debate over the impact of the new ships than in previous years. With tangible 
British ships entering service, and the second generation of battlecruisers under construction, 
it was clear that they were no mere passing fancy. They were, however, very difficult ships to 
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fit into the American way of naval war. Although there was a faction of officers in the Navy 
that would have been pleased to have the new ships, far more, including most of the ones in 
influential positions, viewed the new vessels with a large measure of skepticism, failing to 
see their advantages over dreadnoughts. Considering how contentious the dreadnought 
debate was in the United States, battlecruisers were just too radical a step to take. After all, 
any of the more common critiques of the Dreadnought applied more so to battlecruisers.  
Still, one can see signs of a general agreement that battlecruisers would be ideal for 
some sort of screening or scouting role, although those issues were lost amongst debate over 
the fast wing. The issue was cost, both in an absolute sense and in the usage of scarce 
resources. The question for the future was whether or not battlecruisers were seen as valuable 
enough in those “lesser” roles to justify their tremendous expense and gargantuan crews. 
Through 1910, the answer was clearly “no,” but opinions would begin to shift in the next few 
years.  
In Britain, on the other hand, the years covered in this chapter were mostly ones of 
stasis as far as battlecruisers were concerned. Fisher, clearly the dominant force on the 
Admiralty Board, continued his support for battlecruisers, and the Royal Navy continued to 
build them. At the same time, the Admiralty’s proposals for Dominion battlecruisers, and 
their support for the “fleet unit” model at the 1909 Imperial Conference give us a sense of 
what British policy may have looked like had Fisher stayed on.  
As we know, Fisher did not. His replacement as First Sea Lord, Arthur Wilson, was 
broadly sympathetic to Fisher’s reforms and ship designs, but was not nearly as radical a 
strategic thinker. While the Royal Navy would continue to build battlecruisers, they had lost 
their primary advocate and theorist. Until a new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston 
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Churchill, stopped battlecruiser production in 1912 in favor of a British twist on the 
“compromiseless ship,” the Royal Navy would continue to construct the vessels, but do so in 
the absence of an animating doctrine for them. 
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CHAPTER 4: IN SEARCH OF A MISSION 
 
 By 1910, an observer privy to the inner workings of the American and British navies 
would have noticed that both navies were moving away from the debates of the past five 
years and towards “official” battlecruiser policies. In the United States, this took the guise of 
the General Board’s conclusion in late 1910 that battlecruisers were a “problematic” class of 
ship, best countered with more battleship construction. Although the role of battlecruisers in 
the fast wing had proved contentious in Newport during the 1909 and 1910 Summer 
Conferences, the Board’s unambiguous stance on the matter effectively closed debate on the 
subject.  
 Likewise, the Admiralty appears to have staked out a rough battlecruiser policy by the 
time Fisher left office in early 1910. The First Sea Lord had been allowed to construct 
battlecruisers, but the Board kept him from building them to the exclusion of dreadnought 
battleships. As a result, the Royal Navy built a relative handful of battlecruisers alongside its 
much larger battleship program, relegating battlecruisers to the position of supplement rather 
than replacement. Both the First Lord, Reginald McKenna, and First Sea Lord Arthur Wilson 
expressed contentment with this building policy, and planned to carry on with it.  
 In both countries, however, these policies proved short-lived. Just months after the 
General Board’s 1910 construction memorandum, news of Japanese battlecruiser 
construction reached the United States, spurring new discussion on the type in the United 
States. Critically, this discussion revolved around battlecruisers as scouts and makeweights in 
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the early stages of a Pacific War. When viewed in that context, battlecruisers posed less of a 
threat to the battle line and American notions of naval warfare. American officers had 
discussed battlecruisers in a scouting context ever since the type’s introduction, but those 
discussions had always been overshadowed by contention over their use in a fast wing role. 
With that debate tabled, the thrust of the American battlecruiser debate could shift to the 
scouting mission.  
 In Britain, on the other hand, the policy was shattered by the failure of the Admiralty 
to manage the Royal Navy. On subjects ranging from administrative policy, to the ballooning 
naval budget, to plans for war with Germany, the McKenna-Wilson axis proved unequal to 
the tasks facing it. After both men were sacked within a few months of each other in 1911, 
the Admiralty was firmly under the thumb of the new First Lord, Winston Churchill. With 
the support of his First Sea Lord, Francis Bridgeman, Churchill moved to unravel key aspects 
of the Fisher legacy, especially in construction, where battlecruisers were removed from 
1912-13 Programme in favor of slower, better armored, “fast battleships.”  
 
*** 
 
 Fisher’s successor was perhaps the only senior officer who commanded respect from 
all quarters. Admired for his personal qualities (he had been awarded a Victoria Cross for 
conspicuous gallantry during the Mahdist Revolt), Arthur Wilson had also remained aloof 
from the Navy’s internecine struggles during Fisher’s term in office. Beyond his 
comportment and demeanor, Wilson was also seen as an exceptionally keen tactical mind. 
Although he had retired upon turning 65 in 1907, his retirement came with a promotion to 
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Admiral of the Fleet, and another five years on the active list. This allowed Fisher and 
McKenna to tap him as the next First Sea Lord, while the two conspired to place a thorough 
Fisherite in the post upon Wilson’s final retirement.1  
 None of this made Wilson an especially keen administrator. Wilson was judged 
stubborn by peers, subordinates, and superiors, and lacked the capacity to delegate. Indeed, 
Wilson’s earlier stint as 3rd Naval Lord/Controller had been cut short in 1901 due to his 
inability to work with others. This tendency remained when he returned in early 1910, and 
may have been intensified with his new role; Wilson seemed to treat other Board members as 
mere aides, rather than senior officers with their own responsibilities.2 Still, Wilson was 
broadly sympathetic to Fisher’s reforms, and if he was an “autocrat,” he was not interested in 
dragging the Royal Navy onto a new course. 3 
  Unfortunately, Wilson and McKenna were forced to deal with the rapidly expanding 
Germany Navy and its perceived threat to Britain. Further afield, the Royal Navy also faced 
the prospect of Italian and Austrian dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean Sea. A crucial artery 
for imperial communications and trade, the Mediterranean had been home to, before Fisher, 
the strongest fleet in the Navy, tasked with protecting those communications from the French 
Navy. With the signing of the Entente, Germany was clearly the main threat, but the 
combined Austro-Italian fleet was large enough to contest control of the Mediterranean. 
Critically, what war plans there were relied on the cruisers and battleships of the 
                                                           
1
 N. Lambert, “Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvett-Wilson,” in The First Sea Lords, ed. Malcom Murfett (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1995), 35-7.  
2
 Lambert, “Wilson,” 38-39. 
3
 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 
Volume I (London: Oxford UP, 1961), 211-13. 
166 
 
Mediterranean Fleet joining forces with the Home Fleet in the North Sea to provide an 
effective margin of superiority over the Kaiserliche Marine.4  
 The McKenna-Wilson Admiralty also had to deal with the situation in the Pacific. 
With a small German squadron in Chinese waters, reasonably friendly relations with the 
United States, and an alliance with Japan, the major power in East Asia, the Pacific would 
seem to be a relative backwater in British strategic planning. However, at the previous year’s 
Imperial Conference, Fisher had committed the Navy to the maintenance of three “fleet 
units” in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, centered around one battlecruiser supplied 
from each of New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As early as January 1910, 
elements in the Admiralty wondered whether such a preponderance of force was necessary so 
far from the North Sea without extra construction to pick up the slack.5 
 All of these problems were exacerbated by the soaring cost of naval expenditures. 
Fisher had been appointed First Sea Lord in large part because of his plans to reduce 
spending. McKenna, appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1908, had also been chosen for 
his supposed ability to curb spending, yet neither Fisher nor the Fisher-McKenna axis proved 
able to come to grips with the naval budget. Admiralty figures produced in late 1912 show 
that Fisher’s reforms did indeed cause a decline in spending, from approximately £41.7 
million pounds in 1904-5 to a low of £34 million in 1907-8. By the time of the Estimates put 
forth in 1911, the last Fisher would have been officially involved in drafting, the total had 
climbed again to £46 million.6 Unfortunately, Fisher’s economies consisted largely of 
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scrapping older ships, saving money that would have been spent on their upkeep, and putting 
their sailors in newer ships. Under Fisher, the number of officers and men barely dipped, 
shrinking from in 130,000 in 1905 to 127,000 in 1907 before rising again to 131,871 in 
March 1911.7 
The temporary savings Fisher delivered in maintenance and logistics covered up a 
massive increase in the construction budget. The 1911-12 estimates called for nearly three 
times as much new tonnage as the 1906-7 Programme.8 The issue, however, was not merely 
the amount of new construction. The cost of ships had also risen dramatically, a problem that 
could be mostly laid at the feet of battlecruisers, whose cost had risen £300,000 between 
Invincible and Lion, as compared to a difference of approximately £100,000 between 
Dreadnought and the Orion-class battleships designed alongside Lion. If the Minotaur class 
of armored cruisers, the last built before the introduction of battlecruisers, is included, the 
increase in per-unit cost over the previous six years rises to about £600,000.9 
 Expenditures were only part of the reform that Fisher promised. His ideal, 
streamlined, Royal Navy would operate in a significantly different manner than its 
predecessors. Rather than command of the sea based on scores of decrepit battleships and 
cruisers strewn across the world’s oceans, Fisher suggested a smaller number of 
battlecruisers to ensure command of distant seas, combined with a  powerful flotilla to 
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protect the British Isles and Mediterranean. Coupled with a radically enhanced education 
system, Fisher hoped to cement British dominance at an affordable price.  
 Even before he left office, it was clear that not all of his rosy predictions would come 
to pass. From the first, it was clear that neither the First Lord nor the remainder of the 
Admiralty Board would allow him to cut battleships out of naval planning altogether. 
Education, too, was a mixed bag. His education scheme for naval cadets could be fairly 
termed a success, but the position of the Royal Navy’s war college was far from secure. More 
fundamentally, the promised savings had proved to be almost illusory. On the positive side of 
the ledger, the combination of the Dreadnought and the Invincibles had essentially frozen 
armored cruiser and battleship construction abroad as rivals attempted to cope with the new 
British ships. Additionally, at the time of his removal in early 1910 his plan for “fleet units” 
in the Pacific was still Admiralty policy, and perhaps the purest expression of his ideal grand 
strategy.  
 How, though, had Fisher’s tenure changed the Navy’s institutional strategic culture? 
Although Fisher and McKenna had staffed the Admiralty and the major commands with 
Fisher loyalists before his resignation, the evidence from Wilson’s term as First Sea Lord 
suggests that while Fisher’s reforms made an impact at the policy and grand strategy levels, 
outside of the Admiralty little had changed.10 Lacking much in the way of staff, most war 
planning was left to the individual fleet commanders, especially after the Beresford fiasco. 
Furthermore, Fisher, though an active promoter of a unique grand strategic vision and 
construction policy, had comparatively little to say on the matters of strategy and tactics, 
beyond a preference for engagements at long range and high speed, and a number of well-
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worn belligerent bromides (e.g. “You hit first, you hit hard, and you keep on hitting”).11 To 
some extent, Fisher had changed the Navy’s policy, and to a much greater extent, its 
materiel. It remained to be seen, however, what the senior officers in direct command of the 
fleets did with the new Royal Navy.  
 Overall, the officers responsible for meeting the challenges enumerated above had 
precious little training for their responsibilities. There was no naval staff and, as Slade and 
Richmond had discussed in 1907, still no group of officers competent to perform high-level 
staff work. The existence of the Naval Intelligence Department mitigated this to some extent, 
but it was not really set up to develop detailed plans or coordinate action in time of war. The 
War College lacked the prestige, the personnel, or the quality to serve as an ad-hoc staff as it 
did in the U.S. Although the men running the school were generally competent, the course 
was set up for senior commanders and captains; not the officers who would be in a position 
to perform the majority of staff work. Even those that did attend frequently left for other 
postings before the eight-month course concluded.12 Indeed, according to Richmond, this rot 
extended through the Royal Navy’s educational system; by the end of 1911, he was 
convinced that the college at Osborne for naval cadets had reached a point of crisis, failing to 
produce officers of imagination or even technical competence.13 
Here, a useful comparison may be made with the education system inside the U.S. 
Navy. Of course, the Naval Academy was older and far more prestigious than the Osborne 
school. More importantly, though, the U.S. Naval War College was far more central to the 
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American naval establishment. Service on the faculty or attendance at the Conferences were 
a way for comparatively junior officers to make a tangible impact on naval policy, and 
certainly by 1910 some stint at the War College was seen as a major plus in those aiming for 
command of a fleet or membership on the General Board. Furthermore, the Conferences 
tended to smooth the rough edges of philosophical or strategic disputes in the U.S. Navy. It is 
fair to say that the U.S. Navy’s officer corps, and certainly its senior leadership, shared a 
general idea of naval war and strategy gleaned from the pages of Mahan. As we have seen, 
disputes did crop up, but there was never a serious challenge to the notion of the U.S. Navy 
as a battleship-dominated force organized around winning wars through an overwhelming 
victory in a single major battle.  
The Royal Navy’s structure and culture did not allow for such intellectual uniformity. 
Of course, the Royal Navy, like all navies, placed a premium on sea service, and with ships 
stationed all over the world, even after Fisher’s reforms, the service was unable to create 
something on the order of the conference system in the U.S., which allowed dozens of 
officers to cycle through the College without having to spend a year or more tied down in 
Newport.14 The choice between an education of undetermined value for a nonexistent staff 
career and remaining on the recognized cursus honorum at sea was a stark one, and the R.N. 
War College never attracted the same caliber of officer as the American one. Even an officer 
as interested in strategy and naval history as Richmond would find it better for his career to 
stay afloat (often in postings he loathed), than to risk stagnation ashore working through 
problems of strategy and command. 
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On the other hand, officers in the Royal Navy, at least in the major fleets, had far 
more opportunity than their American counterparts for realistic war exercises with dozens of 
ships on each side and thousands of square miles of sea to practice in (the arena for the 1906 
Grand Manoeuvres, for example, stretched from Gibraltar to Scotland). However, even these 
exercises were not as realistic as they could have been. In early 1911, Richmond bemoaned 
the practice of giving the commanders of exercises their problems well before the start of 
exercises; early enough to develop intricate plans. Despite their somewhat limited utility, 
these exercises still gave British officers some experience with actual squadrons and fleets in 
the same areas they were expected to fight them in.  
On the level of theory, Fisher’s term had brought the Royal Navy no closer to any 
sort of productive consensus. A possible window into this is Julian Corbett’s Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy (late 1911), his attempt at laying out a general theory of naval affairs in 
a manner akin to Mahan’s. More than anyone else, including the man himself, Corbett 
attempted to put words to Fisher’s ruminations on strategy and policy, which is not to say 
that Corbett’s own tendencies did not already run in a similar direction (Indeed, the Army and 
Navy Gazette believed that Corbett’s analysis explained the genesis of the Invincibles).15 
Recapitulating Corbett’s arguments at length is unnecessary; primarily based on the “Green 
Pamphlet” he composed at the War College; it covers ground discussed in previous chapters.  
Responses towards Corbett’s opus were generally positive, but the most vituperative 
reviews came from naval sources, or from reviewers closely aligned with the Navy. While 
some officers praised the book, their general tenor was negative.16 An unidentified naval 
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captain, writing in the Naval and Military Record called it “the crowning mistake of Mr. 
Corbett’s career,” faulting him for believing “that his historical researches have qualified him 
to pose as a naval strategist . . . [he was] obviously incompetent to assess [naval affairs].”17 
Spencer Wilkinson, the military historian, and a man well connected with the Beresford 
faction, was also not a fan, seeing Corbett as the apostle of the Fisherite ideas he thought 
were wrecking the Navy.18 More importantly, Wilkinson argued that Corbett’s views were 
essentially unsound, running against the principles “the four great navies of the modern 
world are agreed as regarding as ‘fundamental.’”19  
Perhaps a more fundamental rebuke to the Fisher-Corbett theories can be found in the 
officers commanding the Navy in 1910-11. Even if Fisher had tried to pack the Admiralty 
and fleet commands with like-minded officers, it is fair to wonder how much of that 
agreement was related to construction and finance as opposed to strategy. William May, the 
commander of the Home Fleet when Fisher left office, had been 2nd Sea Lord for a stretch 
under Fisher, but it is difficult to argue that he was a kindred spirit. Richmond, who served 
under him as flag captain described him as “utterly unfitted” for “such an important charge as 
that of the Home Fleet.” While an officer in his position should “concern himself solely with 
strategy and tactics,” May “knows none of these. He has the haziest idea of strategy . . . 
backed perhaps by some totally inaccurate historical references.”20 Even if one discounts 
Richmond’s admittedly extreme point of view, nothing in his actions or writings suggest that 
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May was anything beyond an utterly conventional officer in thinking. Indeed, to the extent 
that May thought about battlecruisers, he appears to have viewed them as an especially 
capable sort of armored cruiser.21  
Even Wilson would show himself to be a disappointment. We have already seen that 
Wilson was temperamentally unsuited for the role of First Sea Lord, though generally a 
supporter of Fisher’s materiel reform.22 In the realm of tactics, however, Wilson was 
acclaimed as an uncommon talent, which made his failures as a strategist especially 
concerning. Asked about the Royal Navy’s strategy in the event of war at an emergency CID 
meeting called because of the Agadir crisis, Wilson outlined a secret plan of close blockade, 
developed without input from or the knowledge of fleet commanders, Naval Intelligence, and 
the Board.23 In fact, when Wilson had left London to go shooting in Scotland in the early 
stages of the crisis, he left the only copy of his war plans at the Admiralty in a locked safe.24 
Wilson’s tenure may have lasted longer if he had left his plans in the safe. Wilson’s 
ideas were recognized by the CID and senior naval leadership as suicidally reckless. It was 
also rather far removed from the strategy of flotilla defense in the North Sea that Fisher had 
espoused, and assumed that Wilson had as well. Indeed, Wilson’s plan was rather 
                                                           
21
 See, for example, May’s Home Fleet correspondence in MAY/10 in the National Maritime Museum. If we 
take Richmond to be an honest source, many of the cruiser exercises contained within were written by him, not 
May. Still, what remains is enough to confirm that May did not see battlecruisers as a separate category of ship 
requiring special consideration or tactics.   
22
 It should be noted that Wilson, and most officers who supported Fisher’s reforms during his tenure were 
supporters of Fisher’s policies as they were enacted, not as Fisher may have wished. Today, Fisher’s radical 
ideas concerning the abolition of the battleship, the ascendancy of battlecruisers, and the importance of the 
flotilla for defense are well-known, but it is highly unlikely that Fisher would have had so many supporters had 
his full views been disseminated widely through the RN. Viewed from outside the Admiralty, Fisher’s preferred 
construction policy appeared to be one of outbuilding Germany in modern dreadnought battleships. 
23
 Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, 204-5.   
24
 Hamilton, Making of the Modern Admiralty, 224.  
174 
 
contemptuous of the potential of torpedo boats, destroyers, and submarines, placing the 
Royal Navy’s armored cruisers and battlecruisers possibly within sight of the German 
coast.25 
The Agadir crisis proved to be the last straw for McKenna, already under intense 
pressure from his Cabinet colleagues to create a naval staff, which Fisher had convinced 
McKenna to oppose.26 McKenna would be replaced by Winston Churchill in the fall and 
Wilson forced out soon after. In their year and a half at the Admiralty, almost no movement 
had been made on the pressing issues facing the Royal Navy. Although McKenna fought for 
new construction, the ships themselves remained ruinously expensive, the fleet’s strength 
was stretched thin between the Pacific, Mediterranean, and North Sea, and very little 
progress had been made on how to fight with the new ships Fisher’s building push had given 
the Navy. The McKenna-Wilson partnership had produced almost no forward motion for the 
Royal Navy at large or for how to employ the new battlecruisers. The decisions made over 
the next three years, though, would have a tremendous impact on the development and 
employment of battlecruisers in the Royal Navy.  
 
*** 
 
By 1911, news of Japanese battlecruiser construction had reached the United States, 
recharging the American debate on the vessels. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Imperial 
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Japanese Navy had begun construction of the Tsukuba-class armored cruisers, proto-
battlecruisers armed with four 12” guns, along with the pre-dreadnought panoply of smaller 
caliber guns. Seemingly content with them, the next class of armored cruisers, the Ibuki-class 
maintained the same layout as their predecessors. By early 1910, though, the IJN’s leadership 
had begun to consider imitating the battlecruisers of their British allies, and in January of that 
year, the Japanese government asked for, and received, detailed plans of the Royal Navy’s 
Indefatigable.27 Later that year the Japanese Navy’s leadership approved plans for the 
Kongo-class, four battlecruisers armed with 14” guns. The lead ship in the class was laid 
down in a British yard in January 1911.  
Although it would take some time for hard data on her specifications to reach the 
United States, the knowledge that Japan was building a “real” battlecruiser caused some 
reappraisal of battlecruisers, with an eye towards their utilization in the Pacific. The Navy 
League was even quicker than the USN to demonstrate enthusiasm for battlecruisers. 
Although the League accepted the logic of keeping the battle fleet in the Atlantic, in March 
The Navy printed a speech from Sidney Ballou, head of the League branch in Honolulu, 
calling for the construction of battlecruisers to add steel to the U.S. position in the Pacific in 
the event of war. An opponent of splitting the battle fleet, Ballou claimed that a squadron of 
battlecruisers in the Pacific would preserve the American position until the battle fleet 
arrived. With “the broad Pacific to play hide and seek in,” a squadron of battlecruisers, able 
to outrun anything more powerful and outfight anything faster could keep a larger Japanese 
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fleet off balance and threaten the communications of any expeditionary force bound for the 
Philippines or Guam. 28 
The General Board itself adopted similar reasoning in an unusually early construction 
memorandum, written towards the end of May. Pointing towards British, German, and 
Japanese battlecruiser construction, the Board asked President Taft’s new Secretary, George 
von Lengerke Meyer, to consider battlecruisers in the Department’s next budget, and 
requested that the Bureau of Construction and Repair study possible designs. Reading 
between the lines, it is clear that the Board saw battlecruisers as a possible solution to 
covering two oceans with one battle fleet; looking at battlecruisers “with a special view for 
service in the Pacific Ocean,” they were clearly more capable than the older cruisers that 
made up the Asiatic Fleet and, if properly handled, could harass the Japanese Fleet without 
the danger of being forced to action by a superior foe. Technically, the memorandum did not 
add a battlecruiser alongside their formal request for four battleships in the 1912 bill’s 
building program. Indeed, the General Board took pains to insist that if Meyer found 
battlecruisers a worthwhile addition to the naval bill, it would only be acceptable on top of 
and not in lieu of the four battleships.29  
Delving deeper into the memorandum, it is not possible to figure out what exactly the 
Board thought battlecruisers were, the memo specifying neither form nor function. Rather 
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than assigning a name to the class, the memorandum referred to them as “large armored 
vessels of high speed, similar to those building in Great Britain, Germany and Japan,” a term 
that could refer to the Indefatigables, Lion, Von der Tann, the new German Moltkes, or 
Kongo, a collection of ships representing two, possibly three, distinct design philosophies.30 
The mission of these new ships was equally vague. The wording suggests something similar 
to Ballou’s idea above, which would have been a dramatic departure from Mahanian 
orthodoxy on concentration and the post-1905 interdict on armored cruisers but it could just 
as easily refer to scouting for the main fleet as it made its way across the Pacific. The 
previous year’s Conference had discussed battlecruisers in the context of a fast wing but, of 
course, the ships in the Pacific would have no line to be the wing for until several weeks into 
a theoretical Pacific war. 
The 1911 Conference, with the Board in attendance, tended to agree with the Board 
that battlecruisers were a key part of the ideal fleet, while filling in some of the blanks in the 
Board’s arguments. As usual, while a number of questions dealt obliquely with battlecruisers, 
one dealt with the ships directly. Question #2 asked the Conference to consider all aspects of 
“battleship cruisers” and armored cruisers. While the 1909 Conference had seen the new 
ships as a type of armored cruiser, the 1911 instructions clearly differentiated between them, 
although the sub-questions imply that this difference did not necessarily extend to 
employment.31 The questions asked of armored cruisers suggest that the Navy still lacked a 
coherent idea of how to use their extant armored cruisers. Interestingly, the question also 
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asked the participants “why does England need battleship cruisers?,” a question that, as we 
have seen, was never really asked in Britain.32 
The Conference’s final report on Question #2 makes for interesting reading. The 
authors, Lieutenant Commander T.T. Craven and Lieutenant T.F. Caldwell, started the piece 
with an examination of the history of the orthodox armored cruiser, recapitulating the 
American difficulties with the type. In their telling, armored cruisers were a British response 
to the very specific threat of the French Jeune Ecole. Faced with the potential of guerre de 
course with oceangoing French cruisers, the British began to construct cruisers bigger and 
stronger than their French counterparts to protect sea lanes. The authors argued that in 
following that strategy the French “were led away from the true doctrines of sea power,” and 
furthermore they asserted that the British response, though necessary to meet the French 
threat, sparked an unsound fascination with the ships around the world, an oblique indictment 
of pre-Russo-Japanese War American naval policy.33 
The “old” armored cruiser, they argued, was “a hybrid, a compromise . . . 
unsatisfactory.” Of course, this exact point, the armored cruiser’s combination of high speed 
and reasonably heavy armament is precisely what led Fisher to place armored cruisers at the 
center of his understanding of naval warfare before the Designs Committee convinced him to 
add battleship guns to them in early 1905. For these Americans, though, (and we should 
remember that this was adopted by the Conference without alteration) armored cruisers were 
expensive to build, expensive to maintain, too powerful to detach for raiding or scouting, and 
too weak to lie in the line. As the authors put it, armored cruisers were “not designed for a 
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maximum of service while accompanying the battle fleet,” a mortal sin in the Mahanian 
orthodoxy that prevailed in the U.S. Navy.34 
Looking at the American stable of armored cruisers, Craven and Caldwell struggled 
to find a role for them that would justify their immense construction costs. In battle, the 
authors suggested that armored cruisers could protect their fleet from torpedo attack (a role 
the British delegated to far cheaper light cruisers and destroyers), cover an American torpedo 
attack (though the Navy at this time was severely deficient in torpedo boats and destroyers), 
and perhaps lay mines. After battle, they could be used for attacking disabled battleships, or 
attacking an enemy’s train. Craven and Caldwell did mention the possibility of using 
armored cruisers to scout, but concluded that the proliferation of battle cruisers made that 
role untenable.35 
Although the report freely acknowledged that “battleship cruisers” were the direct 
descendants of the “unsatisfactory” armored cruisers, the authors saw them as far more useful 
in naval combat. In battle, Craven and Caldwell argued that battlecruisers could make an 
important impact in a fast wing role. More importantly, though, they emphasized the 
independent role of battlecruisers. Positing that “[t]he tactics of today . . . are those of 
surprise,” the authors suggested four independent missions for battlecruisers beyond scouting 
and screening. With their speed and firepower, battlecruisers could also be used: 
(1) To delay or oppose the advance of an enemy through certain strategical waters 
(2) To reach and defend an advanced position ahead of an enemy’s raiding force 
attempting to securing a base 
(3) To seize a base before an enemy can defend it by interrupting landing and 
defensive operations.  
(4) To cut off and defeat any detachment of an enemy before it can be supported. 
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All four of these new missions suggest that battlecruisers, acting in concert, could be more 
profitably used away from the battle fleet, or even the fleet’s screen, a type of mission the 
authors had rejected for armored cruisers earlier in the same document. Tellingly, the first 
three on the list would figure prominently if battlecruisers were built, as the General Board 
suggested, with an eye towards the Pacific.36  
 Turning towards the United States, both Craven and Caldwell acknowledged that the 
ideal counter to German and Japanese battlecruisers would be American ones, albeit “heavier 
and more powerful,” than Japanese and German models. However, they doubted the 
willingness of Congress to provide for a full division of five battlecruisers, and considered 
anything less to be pointless. Indeed, given the constraints on the American naval budget, the 
authors argued battlecruisers should never be allowed to take a spot in the funding queue 
ahead of battleships.37 With Congress still showing no sign of agreeing to the Navy’s 1903 
48-battleship program, Craven and Caldwell’s support for battlecruisers in the US was so 
tepid as to be non-existent.  
 On the other hand, their section on “England’s Need for Battleship Cruisers” was 
more bullish on the place of battlecruisers, in ways that had very little to do with Britain’s 
specific strategic context. Although the report mentioned commerce and the importance the 
British placed on speed, the main difference Craven and Caldwell highlighted was the greater 
size of the British Navy. For a big navy, “Battleship cruisers are as necessary . . . as are 
Cavalry to an Army.” Like cavalry, battlecruisers might not be the most useful tool in all, or 
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even in most, situations, but they were invaluable in their particular sphere.38 In this 
document, then, battlecruisers were trapped between being a necessity and a luxury. Craven 
and Caldwell’s analysis painted these two choices as a binary rather than a spectrum. At 
some point, when the U.S. Navy had “enough” battleships, battlecruisers would become a 
necessity, but until then, building them was an unnecessary diversion of resources from the 
battle fleet.39  
 The Conference’s consideration of Question No. 2 shows that the two authors were 
more or less attuned to their fellow participants. Battlecruisers were noted as the source of 
division within the Conference, with one faction favoring battlecruisers as the only effective 
class of scouts, and another arguing that they were merely the dreadnought equivalent of the 
thoroughly unsuitable armored cruiser. Instead, they argued, enough dreadnoughts should be 
built to allow “for reconnaissance in force,” with battleships.40 Although there were a handful 
of fast wing advocates, the Conference made it clear that if battlecruisers would be built their 
primary purpose would be scouting and other detached operations.  
 Answers to questions asked about scouting and screening went even further in 
arguing for battlecruisers. The discussion over Question 4, on the use of scouts, turned into a 
debate on the ideal ship for scouting, with one side taking the stance that battlecruisers were 
the ideal scout and the other holding that a lighter cruiser, around 6-8,000 tons would be a 
better alternative. Tellingly, though, even the partisans of the smaller scouts conceded, that 
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they would need to be backed up by fast, heavy vessels.41 Although question six, on 
screening, asked its authors to confine themselves to U.S. Navy as it existed in 1911, the 
question’s solution made a pitch for the indispensability of battlecruisers, arguing that they 
were not a type of battleship but had a “definite and essential function which will become 
obvious in future warfare,” namely blinding enemy scouts. Although the solutions to 
Questions four and six made no mention of specific spending priorities, it is clear that the 
authors considered battlecruisers an essential part of naval warfare, not just a supernumerary 
luxury.42 
 Another scouting solution, written by William Sims, went even further in favor of the 
battlecruisers, arguing that the ships were not a response to, or companion for, dreadnoughts 
but intended for “a service, the necessity for which has always existed.” Furthermore, Sims 
tied American reluctance to build battlecruisers to a reliance on Mahan and an unwillingness 
to “reason for ourselves.” More analytically, the solution echoed the response to question six 
in arguing that without battlecruisers, the U.S. Navy had no hope of containing enemy scouts 
or protecting its own, purpose-built light scouts lacking the ability to “maintain contact in the 
presence of a number of battleship cruisers.”43 
 Overall, the solutions posed to the questions asked at the 1911 Conference show how 
the terms of the battlecruiser debate in the United States had shifted after the Board’s stark 
refusal to consider them for the fast wing role in late 1910. The two previous Conferences, 
while conceding the utility of battlecruisers for scouting, had discussed them almost entirely 
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in the context of major fleet actions. It would be going too far to say that the Conferences 
regarded them as a species of battleship, but there is no doubt that they were primarily 
discussed as a fast wing adjunct to the battle line. In both years, majorities had rejected the 
notion of building them for that role. Part of the opposition, of course, came from the cost of 
such vessels and their potential to divert resources from battleships, but at the same time, the 
wisdom of using lightly armored ships in the heat of battle was very much in doubt. 
By 1911, the focus had almost entirely reversed. The solutions put forth considered 
the battlecruiser as a ship for screening, scouting, and independent action, with the fast wing 
role as a secondary concern. In the 1911 reports there are none of the extreme caveats that 
marked battlecruiser discourse in 1909 and 1910. Battleships might be more important, and 
the money not on the table for battlecruisers, but the reader gets a palpable sense that the 
ships were necessary or at least desirable at some point in the U.S. Navy’s near future. If 
battlecruisers were not necessarily useful for fighting in the major battles most American 
officers assumed would decide future naval wars, the emphasis placed on scouting and 
screening suggests that they were seen as a key element of making sure such battles occurred 
at a time and place conducive to American success.  
Of course, the 1911 Conference was more than a debating society. Like its 
predecessors, it also played host to tactical and strategic war games, allowing the attendees to 
test out and modify war plans for, this year, Japan. Contained within the Conference’s report 
is a rulebook for the strategic and tactical games, which includes the numerical values 
assigned to various classes of ship for the purposes of the games; the data for dreadnought 
and pre-dreadnought battleships, armored cruisers, and battlecruisers is provided below: 44 
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Class Speed (kts) "Fighting Value" 
"Life 
Points" "Normal Gun Fire" 
[Dreadnoughts
] 21 30 100 1 
[Pre-
Dreadnoughts]  16 20 67 ⅔ 
Battleship 
Cruisers 25 20 67 ⅔ 
Armored 
Cruisers 20 10 33 ⅓ 
 
By 1911, the designs of battleships and armored cruisers had become more or less 
standardized across the major navies. Comparing battleships of the same date shows that 
although national philosophies shaped design—German battleships with more armor and 
slightly smaller guns, for example—the differences were small enough that they could be 
treated as the same for war gaming purposes.  
Battlecruisers, as defined by the U.S. Navy, were more fluid. Classification seemed to 
rest on the size of a ship’s largest guns, since the German Blücher was classified as an 
armored cruiser based on its 8.3” main battery (although it could steam at 25 knots), and the 
Japanese Tsukuba as a battlecruiser. In other words, the American definition of battlecruiser 
ran the gamut from the 21-knot 4x12” Tsukuba to the 28-knot, 8x13.5” gun Lion. Whatever 
the class, for the game to assign battlecruisers as much survivability (i.e. armor) as pre-
dreadnought battleships was a baffling decision, which might perhaps have been fair for the 
well-armored Von der Tann, but certainly not any other extant battlecruisers in 1911.45 
Indeed, the values ascribed to battlecruisers in the War College’s war games were 
sufficiently divorced from prevailing designs to make one wonder if they represented an 
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ideal for a theoretical American ship than an attempt to reflect reality. The War College 
records are incomplete concerning the raw data for early war gaming, but it is worth 
wondering if the war game’s one-size-fits-all approach to battlecruisers played a role in 
American planning. 
Issues with the war gaming system cropped up in 1911, though in a different context. 
Towards the end of the Conference, the topic of Commander Frank Schofield’s torpedo 
battleship again came up, and it was subjected to testing on the game board. The committee 
assigned to the project determined that Schofield’s assumptions concerning his ship’s ability 
to encircle an enemy fleet and deliver a torpedo attack unsupported were themselves 
unsupported, and suggested that a torpedo element to the fleet would be best delivered by 
squadrons of destroyers.46  
Schofield, a member of the committee, disagreed, penning a minority report that 
alleged six major errors in the committee’s testing: inexperienced players, “game board 
conventions that did not represent the truth within . . . reasonable limits, severe limitations on 
the performance of torpedoes, an underestimation of “surprise tactics,” underestimation of 
“the value of an imposed defensive attitude,” and that the torpedo battleship was only tested 
against “the most modern of fleets.” He concluded his report by alleging that any result could 
be gained on the game board “if suitable conventions are adopted,” and that the failure of the 
committee to recognize the paradigm-shifting value of his invention skewed the results.47 
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Taken as a whole, Schofield’s gripes were exactly what they seem: a rant from a sore 
loser. Still, Schofield made a number of valid points about the nature of the War College’s 
games. Although skill and familiarity with the rules played a role in which side won or lost 
(and we may safely ignore Schofield’s criticism in those areas), the underlying numbers 
could play a major role in the outcome, especially in smaller scale tactical games. If the 
assigned values reflect the initial War College attempt to analyze HMS Invincible in 1907, it 
might explain why the War College was so bullish on the British ship in the fast wing role.  
The War College’s deliberations in 1911 seem to have had a tangible impact on the 
Board at the Conference. Towards the end of the Conference, on August 29, the Board asked 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair to look into potential designs for a 29-knot 
battlecruiser with eight 14” guns, twenty-four 5” guns, and whatever armor could be fit onto 
a hull of less than 30,000 tons. Using Lion as a rough guide, these instructions were for a ship 
with rather light armor, certainly when compared to German battlecruisers, suggesting that 
the General Board was essentially in agreement with the Conference’s findings on the proper 
role for battlecruisers.48 
The 1911 Conference was also the start of a new program at the War College. 
Alongside the officers assigned for “instruction” at the War College for the summer months 
were the members of the new “Long Course,” a year-long program of intensive instruction, 
simulation, discussing and writing for four students, including Sims, now a captain and fresh 
from commanding a battleship in the Atlantic Fleet.49 The Long Course was an attempt by 
                                                           
48
 Friedman, U.S. Cruisers, 62.   
49
 The future careers of all four students justify the decision to intensify War College education. Sims, of course, 
went on to command U.S. Navy forces in Europe during World War I. The other students were Commanders 
J.S. McKean and Yates Stirling, who would both reach flag rank and Captain E.H. Ellis, USMC, who greatly 
contributed to the Marines’ development of amphibious warfare before his premature death in 1923.   
187 
 
War College faculty to teach the principles of warfare, strategy, and tactics to a small group 
of elite students; adding value instead of merely collecting the wisdom of the yearly 
conferences.50 While the Conferences had an educational component, war gaming and the 
annual questions were clearly at the heart of the experience even if, as we have seen, the 
Conference’s opinions could shift wildly from year to year based on the attendees. With the 
Long Course, the College could, in theory, mold the next generation of flag officers.51 
The Long Course also took some of the sting out of the War College losing most of 
its planning functions. To break a deadlock on the Board, the War College had been given 
full control over development of operational war plans in late 1910. The College’s war plan, 
presented in the fall of 1911, was too pessimistic for some General Board members, and 
came under attack, especially from Fiske.52 Raymond Rodgers, the War College President 
protested that the college’s tiny staff could not be expect to train officers and plan for wars 
without more officers and an in-house planning staff. Secretary Meyer demurred, and handed 
responsibility for war planning back to the General Board.53 
Despite losing the responsibility, the War College was on the cusp of a much greater 
contribution to war planning. Starting in 1910, the War College experimented with the 
“applicatory system” of exercise used in the Army War College and foreign, especially 
                                                           
50
 Ronald Spector’s Professors of War argues that the War College was considered a rather unimportant part of 
the American naval establishment in 1911, but his argument rests on formal signifiers of importance. It is true, 
for example, that War College attendance was not a formal prerequisite for high command, but the percentage 
of war college graduates in important positions like the General Board was far above their percentage of the 
senior officer population at large. Still, without an established program of intensive training, the U.S. Navy, like 
the Royal Navy, lacked a corps of officers with training in a strategic-minded direction.  
51
 Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), 121-4.  
52
 Miller, War Plan Orange, 80-1. 
53
 Bönker, Militarism, 271-2. 
188 
 
German, military schools. The Naval War College version was based on large-scale war 
games: 
When a problem had been decided upon, the staffs of both sides would prepare 
monographs on the armed forces of the two states and their economies, supplies and 
natural resources. In the next phase, they prepared studies of the time required for 
mobilization in each state. Then studies were prepared of the logistic capacities of 
each side and estimates made of the time necessary for supplies the main bases to 
reach the theatre of operations. The last phase was the actual conduct of the map 
maneuver as a two-sided game.54 
  
As Spector noted, all phases of an applicatory exercise were excellent training for staff work 
and, to a lesser extent, operational command. In fact, the entire applicatory system, except 
the map exercises, was staff work, and could be adapted for use by staff officers with no 
modification.55 As will be discussed below, this is precisely what happened when the U.S. 
Navy developed a working staff system in the First World War.56 As an added bonus, actual 
war plans written under this system could be tested at the War College with a minimal level 
of adaptation. By late 1911, when W.L. Rodgers assumed the War College Presidency, the 
applicatory system was on its way to become the foundation of training at Newport.57 
The applicatory system also allowed the War College to push for the development of 
a naval doctrine in the U.S. Navy. Using the system to “send identical clear and concise 
orders to all his subordinates, a commander could ensure that his plans would be carried out 
                                                           
54
 Spector, Professors of War, 118.  
55
 See, for example The American Naval Planning Section, London (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1923), a collection of memoranda from the WWI U.S. Navy headquarters in Europe. Absent the context, they 
read like Newport student exercises.  
56
 Of course, the applicatory system was only as good as its output. Into the 1920s, the political analysis in 
Office of Naval Operations war plans remained painfully amateurish.  
57
 Bönker, Militarism, 270-3 and Spector, Professors of War, 117-19. See also Captain W.L. Rodgers, “The 
Field of Work to be Filled by a Naval War College,” Proceedings, June 1911, 353-77, which lays out Rodgers’s 
ideal at greater length.  
189 
 
precisely as he had envisioned them.58 The perfect example of this system in action is the 
Atlantic Torpedo (Destroyer) Flotilla, which Sims commanded after his War College tour. 
Although Sims, a gunnery expert, expected and preferred command of a new battleship, his 
time with the destroyers proved valuable. Aided by Commander William V. Pratt and 
Lieutenant Commander Dudley Knox, who had been War College staffers during the first 
Long Course, Sims set about applying the new Newport methods to the operation of his 
flotilla.59  
 Speaking at the War College on the back of that experience in 1914, Sims marveled at 
the effect the applicatory system and other new methods had on his torpedo flotilla. In 
addition to making major decisions by a “conference” of the flotilla’s officers, Sims and his 
subordinates tested and developed a torpedo attack doctrine that allowed them to: 
[M]ake a fairly successful attack immediately after receiving information as to the 
area within which the ‘enemy’ may be found. Not long ago it required a written order 
of over 1200 words and blue print to tell the individual destroyers what they had to 
do. Through the use of the doctrine, the flotilla can now make a more successful 
attack upon receipt of a radio message of about 30 or 40 code words.60 
 
In other words, the applicatory system helped with both the development of a 
successful attack doctrine, and provided the means to carry it out efficiently. Combined with 
the intense training on offer with the Long Course, the applicatory system deepened the 
sophistication and rigor of American war planning.61 As Long Course graduates like Sims 
moved into positions of responsibility in the First World War and after, they brought the 
tenets of the system with them, making it standard U.S. Navy practice.  
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That first Long Course class spent a great deal of time on battlecruisers, and would 
present their opinions at the 1912 Conference. Before then, Sims, the start pupil, outlined his 
own thinking in two pieces he wrote late in 1911. The first, to Admiral H. B. Jackson, the 
director of the Royal Naval War College, asserted that “battleship cruisers of the Lion type” 
were essential to the functioning of a major battle fleet, and argued that the U.S.’s lack of 
battlecruisers was endangering the battle line. Interestingly, Sims’s support was conditional 
on the size of the U.S. Navy; while prior decisions against battlecruiser construction were 
defensible, by late 1911 he felt that U.S. Navy had sufficient battleship strength to allow for 
the diversion of resources to battlecruisers.62 
The next month, William Rodgers, the new President of the U.S. War College, 
forwarded one of Sims’s Long Course reports to Secretary Meyer. Based on war games 
conducted during the Course, Sims’s piece, and its cover letter essentially gave the 1911 
Conference’s conclusions on battlecruisers the stamp of official War College approval. 
Rodgers’s letter and Sims’s report both argued that the Lion-type battlecruiser would, in 
Sims’s words, “enable a Commander-in-Chief to drive in the enemy’s screen and prevent his 
own screen being pierced,” while adding firepower to the line in a pinch. Sims’s report also 
came with an endorsement extracted from a letter written to him by one of his many Royal 
Navy contacts.63 This officer took much the same stance as the Americans on the uses of 
battlecruisers, but also considered their role in the fast wing as “of inestimable value.”64 
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The letter from the War College came in after Secretary Meyer had drafted his annual 
report for Congress, so there is no way of knowing if it would have affected his conclusions, 
but the report Meyer wrote echoed the General Board and Summer Conference’s conditional 
support for battlecruisers. Expanding the American battleship fleet took priority over 
battlecruisers, “which cannot be regarded as equal to a battleship of the best type in general 
usefulness.” Meyer formally requested a two-battleship program, but did inform congress 
that a battlecruiser beyond the two battleships would “most desirable,” though apparently not 
important enough to place in the departmental budget.  
 Still, even this weak support for battlecruisers by the Navy’s policy-making organs 
represented a change from the prior year. At the same time, the 1911 Conference had entirely 
changed the direction of American discourse on battlecruisers, shifting from primarily 
considering them as a fast wing, to viewing them as cruisers in the original sense of the word; 
ships intended for detached operations away from the line of battle. This viewpoint had been 
adopted by the Conference without the fireworks of the past two years and was formally 
endorsed by the President of the Naval War College who was, of course, a member of the 
General Board.  
 This understanding of the battlecruiser laid out in 1911 would remain the basic 
American view on battlecruisers through the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Although 
there would be disputes over how much the ships could contribute in a fleet action, most in 
the U.S. Navy accepted that, if built, their primary role would be away from the fleet. The 
only outstanding issue was the question of relative importance. Sims and, by implication, 
Rodgers had endorsed the second-generation battlecruiser as a key part of the fleet, but the 
Board and the Secretary were obviously unwilling to go quite that far. It remained to be seen 
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how important the scouting role truly was to the policy makers in the United States. In 1911, 
the general impression given is that Meyer and the General Board thought that the Navy’s 
funding was enough to allow battlecruisers or battleships, but not both. 
 
*** 
 
 In Britain as well, battlecruiser construction was sacrificed due to budget constraints 
in the 1912-13 program. Although the Royal Navy had a budget beyond the dreams of even 
the most ardent American navalist, the constant increases in British naval expenditures were 
an increasingly heavy burden on the resources of the state—perhaps as much as 25% of all 
government spending.65 The new First Lord, Winston Churchill, confronted a host of 
challenges when he moved to the Admiralty—Germany, the lack of a naval staff, stagnant 
ideas amongst senior admirals, just to name a few—but the money issue was the most 
threatening. Whatever his personal views on their utility and employment battlecruisers were 
axed because of the financial pressures on the Admiralty.  
 Early in Churchill’s term, the Royal Navy shed the last bits of Fisher’s global 
strategy, even though Fisher and Churchill were active correspondents, especially once 
Churchill assumed his duties at the Admiralty. In Churchill’s first few months, Fisher sent a 
stream of letters, trying to win the younger man over to his ideas on strategy, construction 
priorities, and ship design. At the heart of Fisher’s proposed suggestions was a suggestion to 
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drop battleship construction in favor of a new type of battlecruiser guaranteed to “stagger 
humanity!”66  
 Fisher’s battlecruiser was a 30-knot ship armed with eight of the new 15” guns under 
development by the Ordnance department.67 This speed was achieved by both a switch to oil-
fired engines, a dramatic increase in length, and a reduction in armor. Although Fisher, no 
engineer, never developed a sketch design of his ideal ship, his December 6 letter to 
Churchill gives some sense of its armor protection: 
Ship designers] are always running about to see where they can put on a little more 
armour! To make it safer! You don’t go into battle to be safe! No, you go into battle 
to hit the other fellow in the eye first so that he can’t see you! Yes! You hit him first, 
you hit him hard and you keep on hitting. That’s your safety! You don’t get hit back! 
. . . [D]isassociated from dominating speed that gun is futile . . .  [b]ecause you want 
to fight when you like, where you like and how you like! And that only comes from 
speed . . . A big margin of speed over your Noah’s ark Dreadnoughts of 21 knots!”68 
 
In his previous writings, Fisher had been somewhat unclear as to the intended use for his 
battlecruiser; at times implying that their main role was sea control against enemy cruisers, 
and at time suggesting that they could handle battleships unaided. Here, however, Fisher’s 
language was unequivocal: through firepower and speed, Fisher expected a fleet composed of 
such vessels to defeat a fleet of dreadnoughts in battle.  
Fisher, of course, had originally been appointed First Sea Lord in part due to his 
commitment to economy, and in his letters to Churchill, he claimed that his new ship would 
dramatically cut costs despite its speed and size. According to Fisher, his ship would cost 
approximately £1,995,000, as opposed to £1.9 million for the 1911-12 program’s Iron Duke-
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class battleships, and £2.2 million for Tiger, its only battlecruiser. Although the touted cost 
savings seem minor, Fisher was presumably anticipating the potential cost of the 1912-13 
program’s ships if the Royal Navy persisted in the “d—d costly” standard dreadnought 
model with heavy armor and 21 knots’ speed, which Fisher dubbed the “Tortoise” type.69  
Fisher’s reasoning appears to have swayed Churchill, but in the face of a united front 
from the Board led by Bridgeman, a longtime battlecruiser opponent, the 1912-13 Estimates 
did away with battlecruisers altogether.70 Instead, the Admiralty built four “fast battleships” 
of a new type, a hybrid between dreadnoughts and the already-hybridized battlecruisers. The 
Queen Elizabeth-class ships had the eight 15” guns of Fisher’s battlecruiser concept, but 
instead of a lightly armored 30-knot vessel, the new warships topped out around 25 knots. To 
achieve that speed, weight was saved as much as possible. In addition to the oil firing 
engines, Philip Watts, the Director of Naval Construction, shaved as much armor as he could 
off of the design. Although the armor’s maximum thickness was a respectable 13”, the armor 
belts tapered off rather quickly at the ends of the ship and, of course, the design had one 
fewer turret than previous generations of British battleships.71 
  Tactically, the new British battleships were designed for the always-elusive “fast 
wing” role, which the Royal Navy had tended to assign to battlecruisers. Indeed, the Queen 
Elizabeths were designed only for the fast wing. While 25 knots was faster than the 21-knot 
dreadnought standard adopted by the other major navies, it was not enough to keep up with 
the newest battlecruisers, making the ships less useful for the sort of flotilla and scouting 
                                                           
69
 Fisher, Letter to Churchill, December 3, 1911, CHAR 13/2. The figures for Tiger and Iron Duke are from 
"Summary of Draft Navy Estimates, 1913-14," January 1913, ADM 116/3151, TNA, Kew.  
70
 N. Lambert “Admiral Sir John Fisher & Flotilla Defence,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 4 
(October 1995), 645. 
71
 Breyer, Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 141.  
195 
 
work that battlecruisers were capable of performing. Their cost also exacerbated the financial 
problems facing the Admiralty. At a cost of 2.4 million pounds, Queen Elizabeth was 
500,000 pounds more expensive than the Iron Duke-class battleships of the previous year’s 
program, and still 200,000 pounds more costly than HMS Tiger.72 
 In a sense, it is somewhat incorrect to claim, as I did earlier, that the Queen 
Elizabeths signaled the end of battlecruisers in the Royal Navy. Instead, it would be better to 
say that the new ships signaled an end to Fisher’s influence over the British battlecruiser 
program. Whatever their official designation, the new battleships filled the same niche that 
many British officers placed their battlecruisers in. These warships were fast wing vessels 
par excellence, designed from the keel up to serve in that role. From that perspective, they 
represented a rationalization of British policy: instead of shoehorning battlecruisers in a role 
they were not quite intended for, the Churchill Admiralty recognized standard practice in the 
active fleet and adjusted construction accordingly.73 
  In the realm of national policy, Churchill’s 1912-13 Estimates suggested a temporary 
suspension of the two-power standard that had formed the backbone of British naval 
planning. In its place would be a commitment to keep new British dreadnought construction 
(counting battlecruisers as dreadnoughts) at a level 60% above the Kaiserliche Marine’s new 
construction.74 Not only would this shift save money, requiring the Royal Navy to build only 
four capital ships over the next year, but it also reflected changing political realities. 
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Although the Entente was not a formal alliance, the last year’s Agadir crisis highlighted how 
firmly embedded Britain was in the Franco-Russian alliance. Formally allied with Japan, and 
with no conflicts with the United States in view, the two-power standard was clearly an 
expensive relic. Indeed, if anything, the 60% standard was itself rather conservative.  
Even if the 60% standard was a step in the right direction, the expense of the Queen 
Elizabeths sabotaged any attempts to save money in the realm of construction for the 1912-
13 Navy budget. The £500,000 gap between the cost of Queen Elizabeth and Iron Duke was 
rather more substantial than the typical difference between subsequent ship classes; it was 
even about three times the difference between the cost of Dreadnought and Lord Nelson.75 
Indeed, Queen Elizabeth was more expensive than Tiger, restoring the traditional relationship 
between battleship and cruiser costs. Still, Tiger was a one-off, and there were four Queen 
Elizabeths in the 1912-13 budget (colonists in Malaya, unprompted, funded the construction 
of a fifth, HMS Malaya). If these “fast battleships” were the last word in capital ship 
construction, next year’s ships could be reasonably expected to be even more expensive. 
Combined with their more-expensive fuel, the Queen Elizabeths, whatever their military 
merit, were a looming financial disaster.  
To their credit, Churchill and his advisors were well aware of this dynamic. Within 
the Admiralty, the Board’s Finance Committee had been reconstituted in mid-1911 with an 
eye towards curbing expenses, but for the 1913-14 Estimates, it was reduced to rationalizing 
the continued increase of the naval budget, estimated at approximately one million pounds 
for the upcoming year.76 At the heart of their explanation was an understanding that the 
                                                           
75
 "Summary of Draft Navy Estimates, 1913-14.”   
76
 “Reports of the Finance Committee,” i.  
197 
 
savings promised by Fisher had merely kicked the can down the road. Under the 
“’Scrapping’ policy of 1904-5,” the Admiralty shed the costs associated with a thousand 
vessels and saved administration costs with the closure or reduction of most overseas 
Stations. While these provided a one-time reduction in the Admiralty’s costs, by 1908-9, the 
gains from that policy had disappeared.77 
 Not only had Fisher’s reforms failed to make a structural change in Admiralty 
finances, his introduction of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers had supercharged the naval arms 
race, increasing the amount by which each class was costlier than its predecessor. Just as 
important, the increasing technological sophistication of warships made them “more rapidly 
obsolescent. . . . Up to within a few years ago you could give a Battleship 20 years of life in 
the front rank. You will be fortunate now-a-days if she is not left out-classed before much 
more than half that time has elapsed,” a point illustrated with the increasing cost of ever-
larger guns and shells.78 
 Of special note in this process was speed, Fisher’s favorite attribute, and his key 
contribution to British ship design. As an illustration of associated costs, the Committee 
estimated the price for a given speed in a 22,500-ton battleship and a 26,000-ton battlecruiser 
(by the Lion/Orion generation, British battlecruisers were heavier than their battleship 
counterparts due to engine weight):  
Speed (knots) Cost for Battleship (£) 
19 220,000 
20 240,000 
21 265,000 
22 330,000 
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  Cost for Battlecruiser (£) 
25 400,000 
26 430,000 
27 480,000 
28 555,000 
Even more than firepower, speed dramatically increased the cost of a given ship, the cost of 
each marginal knot much higher than the last. Fuel costs also went up hand-in-hand with 
speed, the committee calculating that the price of keeping a battleship fueled for a year had 
gone up approximately 70% since 1903 due to increased expenditure.79 Naturally, the weight 
of these figures fell more on battlecruisers than their slower brethren. The primary attribute 
of the lighter ships was speed, and speed was a critical part of the improvements made from 
class to class. On the other hand, apart from the Queen Elizabeths, the top speed of 
dreadnought battleships in all navies had hovered around 21 knots since the introduction of 
the type.  
 Churchill and the board seized on the suppression of battlecruisers in presenting the 
Estimates to the Cabinet in January 1913. In a note attached to the summary of the Estimates 
given to the Cabinet, Third Sea Lord Archibald Moore announced that the Board had “come 
to the conclusion that the most costly vessel should also be the most powerful, and a new 
type of fast battleship (“Queen Elizabeth”) . . .  will, it is believed, eliminate the battle 
cruiser.” In Moore’s telling, the replacement of the battlecruiser allowed the Admiralty to 
give up “the almost extravagant demands of the battle cruiser type for a thoroughly superior 
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tactical advantage in Fleet action.” 80 This conclusion suggests that the Royal Navy, like its 
American counterpart, was having doubts about the survivability of battlecruisers in battle. 
 Replacing battlecruisers with a somewhat less expensive battleship substitute was not 
enough, though. Five capital ships were needed in the 1913-14 fiscal year to keep pace with 
Germany and building five Queen Elizabeths would have been financially and political 
infeasible. Instead, the Admiralty, in a change from standard practice, introduced the 
Revenge/Royal Sovereign-class battleships, which were slower, smaller, and cheaper than the 
Queen Elizabeths. With the same armament, and comparable armor, the main savings came 
in propulsion. Unlike the oil-fired Queen Elizabeths, the R-class returned to cheaper coal. 
Designed to achieve speeds of 23 knots, they also required far less in the way of engine 
equipment. Overall, the switch saved nearly £300,000 per ship.81 
 Having turned away from the Fisher program in shipbuilding, Churchill’s Admiralty 
also scrapped his grand strategy. Fisher had been a firm proponent of the “fleet unit” system 
worked out at the 1909 Imperial Conference, whereby Australia and New Zealand agreed to 
fund a battlecruiser each, along with assorted smaller ships, for service in the Far East and 
Pacific. In theory, these two fleet units could exercise control of the region’s sea lanes and 
overpower any German attempts at cruiser warfare in the area. In fact, these fleet units, 
composed of battlecruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, were probably the 
closest Fisher came to putting his unfiltered ideas into practice.  
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 The fleet unit plan remained on track under McKenna and Wilson after Fisher was 
forced out, but Churchill’s Admiralty saw the prospective fleet units as a profligate waste of 
two powerful warships that could best be used against the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea.82 
Furthermore, moving them “home” to the North Sea would save money; supplying and 
maintaining major warships at the Antipodes was much more expensive than utilizing the 
extant infrastructure in Europe.83 HMAS Australia was the property of its eponymous 
dominion, and the flagship of its navy, but HMS New Zealand was a gift to the Royal Navy. 
The ship was originally earmarked for the China Station, and funded by the New Zealand 
government with the expectation that it would be used in the Far East. In early 1912, the 
Admiralty informed New Zealand that the ship would instead be sent to the North Sea upon 
its commissioning later that year, promising that an armored cruiser would be sent in its 
place.84 The New Zealand government was understandably upset (especially after the 
promised armored cruiser turned out to be the light cruiser Hampshire), to the point of 
sending its Defence Minister to London for a set of frosty discussions with Churchill and the 
CID, but legally the ship was British, and there was nothing they could do to change the 
decision.  
 Churchill also ran into roadblocks when the Admiralty attempted to remove 
battleships from the Mediterranean Fleet. The proximate spark was the 1912 German navy 
law, which did not dramatically expand the Kaiserliche Marine, but provided for a greater 
proportion of it to remain fully manned in peacetime, renewing fears of a German “bolt from 
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the blue” attack. Combined with the growing strength of the Austro-Hungarian and Italian 
navies, maintaining British preponderance in the Mediterranean was nearly impossible in the 
short term.85 Instead, Churchill suggested recalling the Atlantic Fleet from Gibraltar to 
southern England and taking the Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to Gibraltar, using them as 
a reserve that could either reinforce the Home Fleet or assert British power in the 
Mediterranean.86 Within the Mediterranean itself, Churchill suggested applying Fisher’s 
ideas of flotilla defense and using a force based on submarines, destroyers, and light cruisers 
to protect British trade and interests on a budget.87 
 The opposition in this case was rather more formidable than the New Zealand 
government. Arrayed against it were the Foreign, War, and Colonial Offices, as well as the 
British-controlled Egyptian Government, none of which could be waved away. In the wake 
of Churchill’s proposal, both the General Staff and Foreign Office wrote memos for the CID 
on the supposed dire consequences of the Mediterranean battleships leaving for Gibraltar. 
The War Office claimed that removal would open up Malta to an Italian invasion and 
potentially allow Austria-Hungary to attack Cyprus.88  
 The Admiralty argued that they simply could not spare any battleships from the North 
Sea, and maintain the desired 3:2 ratio over Germany.89 Under pressure from other 
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departments, the Admiralty agreed to an eventual eight-battleship Mediterranean fleet, all 
eight ships coming from subsequent supernumerary construction, including three to be 
funded by the Canadian government.90 In the meantime, the Admiralty suggested holding the 
Mediterranean with a fleet based on two, later four, battlecruisers. When added to French 
forces in the region, the Admiralty claimed, the battlecruisers would be sufficient to ensure 
Entente hegemony in the area.91 
 The exact role for these ships was unclear. According to Churchill, they were “units 
of the greatest value and strength,” but did not represent an equal or superior replacement to 
a squadron of battleships. Instead, these vessels, which “need never fight unless they choose, 
and can always fight whenever they wish,” held out a chance to keep the Austro-Hungarian 
and Italian navies off balance if war came before the new eight-battleship Mediterranean 
fleet became available. Indeed, he seemed to place far more trust in the abilities of destroyers 
and submarines when it came to defending Egypt and Malta. It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that four battlecruisers were to be placed in the Mediterranean for the purely 
negative reason of saving four battleships for the North Sea.92 
 
*** 
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 By the end of 1911, the attitude of the British and American navies towards 
battlecruisers had undergone another set of transformations. In the United States, the General 
Board confirmed the War College view that battlecruisers were better suited to a scouting 
role, while the Admiralty Board announced its intention to do away with battlecruisers 
altogether. The two cases present stark dissimilarities—especially the difference between 
firm British policies and weaker American “preferences”—but in both cases, the shifts 
reflected serious attempts to meet each navy’s strategic challenges. 
 As constituted in 1911, the U.S. Navy hardly needed battlecruisers to aid the battle 
line in combat. In fact, despite the General Board’s protestations and dark warnings, the 
battleship fleet in the Atlantic was practically the only part of the U.S. Navy fit for purpose. 
The U.S. might not have had as many battleships as the navalist officer corps desired, but as 
a percentage of the total fleet, the U.S. Navy was rather top heavy. Even if the Navy’s 
leadership could not find itself in them to stop asking for battleships, their mild support for 
battlecruisers suggested that they at least recognized a problem.  
 Battlecruisers represented a comprehensible solution to the U.S. Navy’s scouting and 
coverage problems. Rather than investing in smaller warships (which may have raised 
uncomfortable questions about naval necessities with the Secretary and in Congress), 
battlecruisers preserved the big-ship focus of the U.S. Navy’s building program, essentially 
functioning as the battleship of the flotilla. More practically, in the event of war, 
battlecruisers built for Pacific service would do a better job of keeping the Japanese fleet off 
balance than the smaller cruisers in the Asiatic Fleet. At the very least, their speed and 
firepower gave them a chance to survive long enough for the Atlantic fleet to make the long 
trek around Cape Horn.  
204 
 
 Likewise, the Royal Navy’s attempt to do away with battlecruiser construction 
represented a reasonable appreciation of battlecruiser practice in the Royal Navy. Whatever 
Fisher had intended them for, neither officers in the active fleet nor the Admiralty Board 
shared his views. By late 1911 or early 1912, the fleet unit plan seemed hopelessly unrealistic 
to policymakers in Whitehall: a frittering away of precious capital ships in secondary 
theaters. The ships were being used operationally as screens and tactically as a fast wing to 
the Home Fleet’s battle line. As Bridgeman indicated as early as 1908, their suitability for 
this latter role was questionable.  
 The Queen Elizabeth class of fast battleships were more suited to British naval 
practice. Faster than the battle line, their speed was not as excessive as the Lions, allowing 
for an armor scheme that at least approximated those of 21-knot dreadnoughts. The new fast 
battleships may not have been able to chase down commerce-disrupting cruisers, but they 
could serve as a fast wing, and had the recovery speed to steam a short distance away from 
the battle line, if a rallying point for the scouting and screening flotilla was needed. 
Turning towards process, the examination of battlecruisers in 1911 worked in both 
countries about as well as their systems allowed. In Britain, the Admiralty Board developed 
the Queen Elizabeth class, in accordance with the operational needs of the fleet and the 
financial pressures on the government. In the United States, the General Board stopped shy 
of formally requesting a battlecruiser, but explicated a vision of it that lay outside of the fast 
wing role posited for it earlier. 
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CHAPTER 5: “NO ONE REALLY KNOWS THEIR FULL VALUE” 
 
 Just as the Royal Navy was moving away from battlecruisers, the U.S. Navy was 
beginning to accept them. Curiously, the reason for both shifts was the same: the perceived 
unsuitability of battlecruisers for the fast wing mission. In Britain, this led to the 
development of the Queen Elizabeth class of “fast battleships,” specially tailored for that 
elusive role. On the other side of the Atlantic, this unsuitability opened the door for the 
discussion of battlecruisers for scouting, screening, and “distantial” operations in mid-1911. 
Although no concrete designs came about, the Board’s description of ideal qualities pointed 
towards an American Lion: a high speed/low armor mix.  
 In both cases, the changes were based on sound reasoning flowing from the specific 
circumstances of each navy. Ever since he had first proposed building battlecruisers, Admiral 
Fisher’s plans for them had been modified almost beyond recognition. First, he had 
acquiesced to build them with battleship-grade weapons. Then, the opposition of the 
Admiralty board forced the construction of dreadnought battleships alongside the Lion. 
Finally, after his removal, the Churchill Admiralty did away with his fleet unit plan and tried 
to retrench in the North Sea. Along the way, standard practice in the Royal Navy appears to 
have treated the battlecruisers like a species of battleship. Under those conditions, replacing 
battlecruisers with ships designed from the keep up for fast wing warfare made perfect sense.  
 Likewise, the American shift towards battlecruisers reflected American practice and 
the strategic situation of the U.S. Navy. For a variety of reasons, some silly, some fair, 
American battleship doctrine did not place a premium on speed, concentrating instead on 
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armor and firepower. Viewed in that light, the General Board’s firm refusal to consider 
battlecruisers as a supplement to the battle line made sense. At the same time, the Board’s 
nod towards a Pacific role for the ships highlighted both the U.S. Navy’s heavy tilt towards 
the Atlantic in warship distribution, as well as the fleet’s dire lack of scouting assets.  
 Changes to the Admiralty’s construction plans and ship distribution, as well as the 
General Board’s tepid support for battlecruisers did not necessarily commit subordinates to a 
particular course of action. In both countries, 1912 and 1913 would be marked by attempts 
on the part of both services to grapple with the changes engendered by their leadership. In the 
United States, this was still a Newport-focused process—after all, the General Board had 
merely indicated a desire to consider building battlecruisers, but in Britain, this process 
brought in the officers in operational command of battlecruisers, as well as the brand-new 
Admiralty War Staff.  
 By 1912, the interplay between the General Board and the Naval War College was 
well established, and the battlecruiser issue merely provided another example of the system 
working. Analysis from the first War College Long Course and the 1912 Summer 
Conference sharpened the General Board’s initial foray into battlecruiser designs. The War 
College also took the lead in examining the new British “fast battlecruisers,” and input from 
War College staffers was one of the reasons the General Board declined to endorse the new 
ships. 
 In Britain, the Royal Navy’s strategic apparatus continued to face difficulties. The 
Queen Elizabeths had an obvious place in the Royal Navy’s battle fleet, but battlecruisers 
lacked a set role. The chaotic decision-making process in the Royal Navy failed to give them 
one. Instead, plans and suggestions from all quarters put forth a bewildering array of possible 
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missions for the British battlecruiser fleet. None, however, could be called “official.” As a 
result, when war came in mid-1914, the Royal Navy had no set battlecruiser doctrine—
explicit or implicit—to guide their deployment.  
 
*** 
 
 Along with changes to naval finances and the distribution of the fleet, Winston 
Churchill played a major role in the creation of a naval staff, formally constituted in early 
1912. With advice from Battenberg and officers at the War College, Churchill set up the 
Admiralty War Staff, with a Chief of War Staff supervising departments devoted to 
intelligence, mobilization, and operations. The step was hardly revolutionary; in form, it 
resembled the old intelligence and mobilization departments with a few extra clerks. Still, the 
changes finally gave the Royal Navy a body formally devoted to war planning, even if the 
operations section, split off from the previously independent mobilization department, proved 
unable to develop long-range plans beyond the opening stages of a war. 1 
 True to form, Churchill organized the War Staff to ensure that he retained an outsize 
role in naval planning. The first chief of staff was Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, 
appointed without the knowledge of Bridgeman, who played very little role in the creation of 
the staff. To make matters worse, Troubridge, formerly Churchill’s naval secretary, was 
picked largely for his loyalty to the First Lord. Although his role was theoretically to provide 
naval advice to the First Sea Lord, Churchill decided that the Chief of Staff should report to 
the First Lord as well. This setup did little to improve naval administration and planning—
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the First Sea Lord was free to ignore advice from the Chief of Staff, who had no 
responsibility for turning his plans into policy—but it suited Churchill’s desire to play an 
active role on the operational side of the Navy.2 
 In addition to the problems at the top of the War Staff, it lacked a body of trained 
officers to perform its necessary work.3 To help remedy this situation, the R.N. War College 
started a staff course for officers at the rank of commanders and below in 1912, likely on the 
initiative of Battenberg. Here, the purpose was to teach the rudiments of staff work, rather 
than the high-level theory and strategy taught at the War Course. Although the first class of 
staff officers contained some notable talents, at fifteen members, the course was too small to 
supply an adequate number of trained officers for staff work at the Admiralty and afloat.4 
 Intellectuals within the Royal Navy were unimpressed with the staff college, and it 
directly led to the formation of the Naval Review in 1912-13, a professional journal along 
similar lines to the American Proceedings, intended to provide some elements of the 
professional education denied to most naval officers.5 As Herbert Richmond noted in its first 
article, “[a]n officer may pass from the rank of naval cadet to that of  . . . admiral, without 
having his attention drawn to . . . the higher side of his professional work—the side, in fact, 
that concerns him as a captain, and, more particularly, as an admiral.” While there was the 
War College, officers had “no incentive whatever to employ that portion of [their brains] 
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concerned with analysis and reasoning before going there.”6 Richmond and the other six 
“young Turks” who started the journal were still unhappy with the quality of the staff course, 
as the makeup of the founding members suggests.7 Among the seven officers who started the 
Review, five had some connection to the first staff course at the War College: Commander 
Kenneth Dewar was an instructor, and four of the others were students.8 
 Unsurprisingly, the first issue of the Naval Review carried an article on education 
from Commander Reginald Drax (named Reginald Plunkett at the time), one of those four 
founders who was attending the staff course.9 In that article, Plunkett railed against an 
education system that started “with the Kings of England,” and finished “with the formulae 
of theoretically gunnery. We test the brain by compelling it to store the memory with 
interminable facts, and recite them parrot-like at examinations.” This system, then, 
deliberately avoided areas, like doctrine, where there was no immediate right or wrong 
answer: “Our dogma becomes this, that in order to avoid the dangers of heresies it is better to 
commit ourselves to no definite doctrine and no official accepted principles.”10 
 Despite the changes brought in under Churchill, the pessimistic stance taken by the 
Naval Review’s founders was essentially correct. With or without a staff, the Royal Navy 
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remained weak where doctrine and strategy were concerned, a failure of education and 
institutions. Under Churchill’s direction, the Royal Navy had stopped future battlecruiser 
construction, but upon the outbreak of war the service had the world’s large battlecruiser 
fleet—ten in service or under construction—at its disposal. Despite having them, as the two 
years leading into the First World War would show, operationally and doctrinally the Royal 
Navy was no closer to figuring out how to use the ships already at their disposal than it was 
when they first entered service.  
During the 1912 negotiations over British strategy in the Mediterranean, for example, 
Admiral Bridgeman had two opportunities to discuss battlecruiser strategy, and both times, 
he delivered highly suspect answers. On the first occasion, an Admiralty memo for the 
Cabinet concerning the movement of battlecruisers to Malta, Churchill credited Bridgeman 
with the following sentiments, quoted directly:  
At present the British battle cruisers have an immense prestige in themselves; no one 
really knows their full value; it is undoubtedly great—it may be even more than we 
imagine. In the Mediterranean they could operate with great effect; their speed, their 
armour, their armament, are all great assets, even their appearance has a sobering 
effect.11  
As a statement of intent, this extract was remarkably fuzzy. Coming from Bridgeman, it was 
troubling. Even though he had been a critic of theirs during an earlier stint on the Board, 
“imagining” the value of battlecruisers was part of Bridgeman’s job description, one that he 
had undoubtedly failed at. Seven years after Fisher’s Designs Committee and four years after 
the Invincibles began to enter service, the First Sea Lord was unable to explain what these 
large, expensive ships were actually for. By mid-1912, the Admiralty had moved on from 
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battlecruisers, but that does not explain the absence of a policy for the ships the Royal Navy 
had in commission and construction.  
 The next month, in a CID meeting attended by a Canadian delegation. Bridgeman had 
another chance to explain what the new ships were for, providing a more concrete, though 
still troubling, description:  
Admiral Bridgeman explained that the functions of the battle-cruiser were scouting 
and heading-off and pursuing enemy ships, in which latter capacity they would be 
most useful in compelling an unwilling enemy to come to action by concentrating 
their fire on the rear of his line, and thus forcing him to accept this as the alternative 
to abandoning his rear ships.  
During a battle action they would be used to concentrate their fire on the head 
or rear of the enemy's battle fleet, from a position exterior to their own line of battle, 
which their speed would enable them to reach: they would rarely be detached to any 
considerable distance from the battle fleets to which they were affiliated.12  
If Bridgeman’s statement was an accurate reflection of his feelings on the matter, one is left 
to wonder why he and the Board agreed, albeit under pressure, to send four battlecruisers to 
the Mediterranean to serve as the centerpiece of British power in the region. In the absence of 
British battleships, the fast wing mission would be impossible (there seemed little stomach in 
the Admiralty for that level of integration with French forces in the Mediterranean), pursuit 
of an enemy battle line ill-advised, and the scouting mission unnecessary.  
 Clearly, Bridgeman did not like battlecruisers, preferring the Queen Elizabeth class to 
future battlecruiser construction, but that was no excuse for his unwillingness to consider 
their role. Apart from scouting, the missions described above would be better suited to the 
capabilities of the more heavily armored fast battleships than they would be for the lighter 
battlecruisers. The ten British battlecruisers authorized to date, though, did exist (or soon 
would), and demanded a coherent doctrine. Instead, Bridgeman had essentially suggested 
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two; in theory, the same ships could perform both roles, but would be hard-pressed to carry 
them out in the same engagement.  
 Bridgeman’s claims suggest an incomplete rejection of Fisher’s ideas, and a 
potentially dangerous mismatch between materiel and mission. Under Churchill, the 
Admiralty had abandoned Fisher’s policy of using battlecruisers to secure sea control outside 
of the North Sea and Mediterranean, preferring instead to employ them in ways guaranteed to 
put them under the guns of battleships. At the same time, Churchill and Bridgeman seem to 
have implicitly accepted Fisher’s argument that battlecruisers could, if necessary, 
successfully fight battleships, a dangerous assumption that their American counterparts had 
rejected two years earlier.   
 At least one officer in an important post was willing to go further than Bridgeman in 
tying battlecruisers to the battle fleet. Jellicoe, by now the commander of the 2nd Division of 
the Home Fleet (and effective second in command of the fleet) came to similar conclusions 
while writing up a set of “War Orders and Dispositions” for the fleet, in the event of Jellicoe 
having to assume command the whole formation if the commander was incapacitated in war. 
Throughout, Jellicoe assumed that battlecruisers would be an integral part of the battle fleet, 
assigning specific roles to them in the approach and before the engagement.13 In both cases, 
battlecruisers would ideally use their speed to take up positions on the van and rear of an 
enemy formation and engage the battleships there, in the hopes of forcing them to turn away, 
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masking some of their fire.14 Functionally, Jellicoe’s conception of battlecruisers was 
indistinguishable from the “fast wing” role the U.S. Navy had rejected by the end of 1911. 
 Jellicoe’s position on battlecruisers here is especially interesting because apart from 
Fisher, there was perhaps no one as intimately connected with the ships. He had been on the 
1904/5 Designs Committee while serving as Director of Naval Ordnance and, as 3rd Sea 
Lord/Controller played a key role in the design of the Lion-class. Fisher had been fond of 
saying that the battlecruisers’ speed was their armor, citing their ability to refuse combat with 
heavier ships, but here was Fisher’s protégé explicating tactics that deliberately placed them 
under the guns of battleships. 
 Also writing on strategy around this time was Rear-Admiral David Beatty, 
Churchill’s naval secretary, who would go on to command the Grand Fleet’s battlecruisers in 
the first half of the First World War. Interestingly, Beatty advanced a third role for 
battlecruisers, lying between the scouting and fast wing roles discussed earlier. While he 
posited a role away from the main fleet for battlecruisers, he also advocated keeping 
battlecruiser squadrons concentrated, allowing them to serve as redoubts for dispersed light 
cruiser scouting lines, but not scout themselves. This disposition of forces, Beatty claimed, 
made the best use of both types’ fundamental combat capabilities.15  
Curiously, Beatty’s memo also favored the close blockade strategy that had so 
horrified the CID—and most naval officers—during the Agadir crisis, and forced both 
McKenna and Wilson out of office. Unbelievably, Wilson’s plan for a blockade had never 
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been superseded, and remained the only extant war plan, although Churchill, Bridgeman, and 
Home Fleet CinC George Callaghan all found it equal parts baffling and terrifying. Two days 
after Beatty’s memo, the Admiralty board would formally rescind Wilson’s plan, but the 
matter of a replacement remained open.16  
 This was an opportunity for the new War Staff to make its mark, and, at Churchill’s 
insistence the job of formulating a new war plan was given to a committee led by 
Troubridge.17 In place of a close blockade, Troubridge developed the idea of maintaining 
something structured like a close blockade, but at a further remove from the German coast. In 
a memo on the exercises that Churchill prepared for the Prime Minister, the system was 
described as “a long, more or less stationary ‘Cordon’ of armoured cruisers and destroyers 
maintained at sea of an indefinite period beyond the immediate striking distance of the 
enemy’s flotillas” in the middle of the North Sea.18  
 Churchill found the plans ridiculous, as did Admiral Callaghan, and the former 
refused to make Troubridge’s cordon Admiralty policy unless they passed muster under 
warlike conditions in the 1912 Summer Manoeuvres. Taking place in the North Sea, the 
exercises were carried out by two sides, “Blue” and “Red.” The Blue side, representing 
Britain, controlled most of the British Isles, with the exception of the southern English coast, 
which belonged to the Red side. Red was given three possible objectives: landing a force on 
the Blue coast, attacking Atlantic trade with  a force large enough to resist everything but a 
battleship fleet, and attacking Atlantic trade while diverting Blue’s battleship fleet 
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somewhere else. The Blue side, as the Home Fleet analogue, started the exercise with 
destroyers and cruisers in a “cordon” across the North Sea.19  
 During the exercises, the cordon system performed miserably, and the plans were 
quickly removed, along with the unfortunate Troubridge.20 Admiral May, the Umpire-in-
Chief, noted that the cordon spread armored cruisers (including battlecruisers) far too thinly 
for them to concentrate when necessary. Instead, he suggested placing a line of “ships of 
small fighting value but high speed,” 40-60 miles in front of concentrated armored cruiser 
squadrons, which would allow the larger cruisers to shadow an enemy fleet breaking through 
the patrol line or destroy isolated raiders.21 Churchill’s summary for the PM went a step 
further, calling the cordon system “a serious misuse of various classes of vessels with great 
resulting waste of war power.”22  
 The 1912 Manoeuvres were the first to give an accurate picture of battlecruiser 
employment. As May noted in his final report, the 1912 exercises were the first where ships 
were “taken at their proper fighting value,” rather than “standardized in classes to which they 
do not really belong,” an especially important distinction for battlecruisers, which had 
previously been treated as standard armored cruisers in exercises.23 At these exercises, both 
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sides were equipped with battlecruisers: Indefatigable, Lion, and Indomitable with the Blue 
fleet, Invincible and Inflexible with Red.24 
 In keeping with Troubridge’s system, the Blue battlecruisers were spread out along 
the cordon, rather than with the Blue battle fleet, although they did converge onto the clash of 
the Red and Blue battle fleets. In that situation, the Blue battlecruisers skirted the edge of the 
action, steering away from the Red battleships, but not before the Red fleet commander 
claimed kills on Indefatigable and Lion. May granted the claim on Indefatigable, but argued 
that Lion did not spend enough time within 9,000 yards of the Red fleet (the maximum 
distance allowed for “fire” during the maneuvers), to count as out of action.  
 With hindsight it is easy enough to point out that in the 1916 battle at Jutland, the 
British and German battlecruisers opened fire at over 18,000 yards and that Indefatigable and 
Queen Mary were destroyed at those ranges and Lion nearly so.25 Even before the war, 
though, it was clear that combat could take place well over 9,000 yards. Jellicoe’s “War 
Orders” memo, for example, called on armored cruisers, battlecruisers, and battleships to 
open fire at 15,000 yards, and to avoid closing within 7,000 for fear of torpedoes.26 While a 
certain level of unreality is to be expected from exercises, these overly conservative game 
rules suggest that the Royal Navy’s leadership held dangerous assumptions about the 
survivability of battlecruisers in action.  
 The Red battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible spent much of the exercise period 
chasing commerce, but transited the Blue picket line with the Red battle fleet. May’s after-
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action analysis suggested that the Red commander might have kept his cruisers too close at 
hand; one Blue picket, HMS Shannon, survived long enough to report the presence of Red 
battleships. Curiously, May felt that the presence of the Red battle fleet could be inferred by 
the presence of their battlecruisers, an odd sentiment hinting at some of the difficulties 
inherent in employing such expensive ships.27 
As early opponents of battlecruisers warned, commanders would feel tempted to keep 
such powerful ships with the battle line, rather than risking the possibility of their being out 
of reach when battle came. At the time, Corbett and other defenders had claimed that 
wireless would enable battlecruisers to stay in touch with their fleet commanders, and the 
Blue side in the 1912 exercises demonstrated the practicality of this. Still, while the Blue 
battlecruisers were present for the exercise’s main battle, their role was minimal and even 
under the game’s overly conservative rules one was destroyed and another nearly so. The 
Red battlecruisers seemed successful enough as commerce-raiders—or at any rate, neither 
May nor the summary for the Prime Minister mentioned the Red battlecruisers’ raiding as an 
area for improvement—but guerre de course was hardly a mission that justified their great 
expense or firepower. As far as battlecruisers were concerned, the 1912 Manoeuvres 
demonstrated that the Royal Navy still had no idea how to use them.   
 Jon Tetsuro Sumida has suggested that by the end of 1912 Jellicoe had repudiated his 
earlier embrace of long-range battle in favor of a “technical-tactical synthesis” characterized 
by rapid fire at medium ranges, joined by Churchill and Battenberg, the new First Sea Lord, 
both in search of a replacement for the failed cordon system. 28 They hoped that this new 
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tactical doctrine would counter the threat of German torpedoes. Although the new tactics 
would bring the British battle line closer to their German counterparts, the British were 
confident that their gunnery procedures would enable them to destroy the German line in 5-8 
minutes, giving them time to turn away before a German salvo of torpedoes could strike 
home. Indeed, Sumida argued that the “R” class battleships were designed with these tactics 
in mind.29 This sort of short-range engagement, however brief, represented a tremendously 
dangerous strategy for the lightly armored British battlecruiser fleet, yet there is no indication 
that anyone considered the role of battlecruisers in this schema.  
 
*** 
 
 Across the Atlantic, by 1912 the U.S. Navy had already reached a tenuous consensus 
on what battlecruisers were and what their mission was, but intense discussion continued 
over how much importance to place on that mission and on those ships. The USN was 
operating under what it considered strained financial conditions, and the main question 
concerning battlecruisers remained: could the Navy justify building a battlecruiser or 
battlecruiser squadron at the expense of an equal number of battleships? This question and its 
possible answers remained at the heart of the American debate through the beginning of the 
First World War.  
 At Newport, the officers in the Long Course continued their work on war with 
Germany, culminating in a report written up for the 1912 Conference and edited by C.T. 
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Vogelsang and F.H. Schofield, two of the instructors at the War College. In the Long 
Course’s war games, focused on Germany, German battlecruisers had proved difficult for 
commanders playing the Americans to handle, as noted by Sims, clearly the outstanding 
student in that first course, and confirmed by the college’s President in his late 1911 letter to 
the Secretary, which passed along one of Sims’s reports. At the end of the course, Sims’s 
opinions remained unchanged; writing sometime in mid-to-late 1912 he noted that in the 
event of war it would be child’s play for a German commander to blind his American 
counterpart. That would allow the German fleet train to cross the Atlantic unmolested, thanks 
to the German edge in scouting vessels—a category that, to Sims, included battlecruisers.30 
 The Long Course’s full report, however, was more hesitant. In theory, their 
contribution to the 1912 Summer Conference was a discussion of German battlecruisers 
being used to screen the American fleet, but the bulk of the report was taken up by a more 
general discussion of battlecruisers and their possible use to the American Navy. Although 
the report affirmed the widespread view that their main value lay in “distant and detached 
duty,” the authors were unsure if they could fulfil that role in the American Navy. Even if the 
Navy began constructing battlecruisers, the report noted that their utility would be minimal, 
considering that both Germany and Japan would have an overwhelming superiority in the 
type due to their head start.31 In the absence of battlecruiser superiority or parity, the authors 
found that the initial American battlecruisers would be confined to a role in and around the 
battle fleet, where they would be ill suited to service in the line and. If used as a fast wing, 
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their ideal employment would require “considerable delay in beginning a battle,” as they 
maneuvered into position.32 
 Despite the Long Course’s failure to arrive definitive conclusion (hindered greatly by 
Schofield’s continued advocacy for his torpedo battleship within the document), the report 
did suggest increasing the speed of battleships as a possible counter to German and Japanese 
battlecruisers.33 Although a fast battleship would not be used for the detached operations 
niche by the battle line-minded U.S. Navy, as the Long Course solution pointed out, it was 
unlikely that the first few American battlecruisers would be either. The fast battleship 
suggestion would allow the U.S.N. to maintain their traditional battleship-focused building 
while further minimizing the possibility of foreign battlecruisers running circles around the 
American battle fleet. Assuming, for the moment, that the battle fleet strategy was an 
effective one, the Course’s reasoning was solid, showing a preference for strategic vision 
over tactical details.  
 A dispatch from an attaché in London, Captain Edward Simpson, confirmed that this 
was still a possibility. Simpson had the thankless task of trying to understand British 
battlecruiser policy in the wake of the Queen Elizabeths and to interpret it for American 
consumption. Based on press clippings, Churchill’s speeches before Parliament, and an 
interview with well-known Fisher critic Admiral Custance, Simpson came to the accurate at 
the time conclusion that British battlecruisers were to be used “as a fast wing of the battle 
fleet,” though he freely conceded that opinions, even within the Royal Navy, differed greatly. 
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Oddly enough, the material available to Simpson gave him the impression that “the technical 
advisors of the First Lord evidently favor these vessels,” which, as we have seen, was 
certainly not the case.34 Still, Simpson’s report, which probably would have been available to 
the Summer Conference class, highlights the gaps between American and British 
understandings of battlecruisers. As the Conference and the General Board would show over 
the rest of 1912, the American vision for using the battlecruiser type was shifting away from 
pitched battle.  
 In mid-July, Constructor R.H. Robinson kicked off the summer’s battlecruiser 
discussion with a speech to the Conference on battlecruiser design, focusing on the issue of 
speed, where the gap between battleships and battlecruisers had steadily risen. The speed of 
modern battleships remained at 21 knots, but newer German and British battlecruisers could 
achieve between 6.5 and 10 knots greater speed; enough to be a tactical menace to battleships 
even with their firepower and armor restrictions. While he saw the development of an 
American battlecruiser force as the ideal solution to the problem, he dismissed that 
possibility as impractical given Congress’s typical funding. 35 In its stead, Robinson proposed 
increasing the speed of future American battleships, much like the Queen Elizabeths, 
although Robinson conceded that such ships would be “too large at least for present financial 
conceptions, if not for the technical imagination.”36 
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 Although Robinson found the prospect of American battlecruisers remote, he had 
been Construction and Repair’s lead designer on the General Board’s 1911 request for a 
battlecruiser design. By the summer of 1912, he had expanded the Board’s original request 
into a number of studies which juggled the variables of speed (26, 29, and 32 knots), range 
(five, seven, and eight thousand miles, although the eventual sketch designs had much greater 
range), and armor (main belts of 8, 11, and 14 inches) with a set main battery of eight 14” 
guns. Unlike the Board’s original request, which would have created a lightly-armored ship, 
Robinson’s conception of a battlecruiser was more in line with the “fast battleship” school of 
thought; he regarded the 8” armor designs as a bare minimum, and he expressed a clear 
preference for the more heavily-armored ships, although as we will see, his conception of 
their mission was far more modest. The designs, however, proved somewhat problematic. 
Had they been built, constructors would have dealt with unprecedented issues of drivetrain 
and hull length.37 
 Robinson expanded on that talk in his answer to the Conference’s annual battlecruiser 
question. Although he finally concluded that battlecruisers were “a luxury that cannot be 
afforded,” his journey to that response undermined the substance of his conclusion. Quoting 
Sims’s 1911 Conference report at length, Robinson argued that battlecruisers were perfectly 
suited for scouting and screening, while adding suggestions that battlecruisers could also be 
used for “the early occupation of a base . . . near our lines or the relief of a threatened 
base.”38 Tactically, Robinson was less certain, noting that the side with a battlecruiser fast 
wing only tended to win game board exercises when also superior in battleships, although he 
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was quite taken with the idea of using battlecruisers for torpedo attacks.39 Overall, then, 
Robinson found battlecruisers invaluable for scouting, screening, and other “distantial” 
operations while acknowledging some potential utility in battle. Ideally, they would be part 
of the U.S. fleet, but they were of secondary importance next to battleships.  
 Captain C.M. Knepper, the other respondent on the battlecruiser question, came to 
much the same conclusion as Robinson, though because he did not deal with financial 
considerations his conclusion appeared to be more favorable. His report was far more notable 
for his attempt to analyze the evolution of the type. As he put it, “[t]he Invincible is a highly 
developed armored cruiser. The Lion is nothing but a fast battleship with decreased 
protection and armament.”40 Although Knepper did not show his reasoning, one imagines 
that the shift in nomenclature had something to do with the larger guns of the Lion (though, 
of course, when Invincible was built, her long-range firepower was greater than most 
contemporary battleships). As we have seen, in the U.S. Navy of the day, a “fast battleship” 
was far more desirable than a “highly developed armored cruiser,” even if the British 
intended to use both ships for the same missions. Knepper’s report is another example of the 
growing American fascination with the second generation of larger, faster, battlecruisers.  
 The generally pro-battlecruiser tenor of the Conference (neither Knepper’s nor 
Robinson’s reports sparked any contentious discussion in the Conference’s full 
deliberations), highlighted the shift in the American battlecruiser debate and the widening 
gap between how American and British officers understood battlecruisers and their mission.41 
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This was echoed by the new War College President, W.L. Rodgers, who had been one of the 
primary advocates for the 1904 Conference’s proto-battlecruiser. Towards the end of the 
Summer Conference, in mid-August, Rodgers had written a short note to Secretary Meyer 
highlighting the importance of speed in the battle fleet. That attribute could “guarantee a 
certain degree of strategic freedom,” in the face of a superior enemy fleet, a clear allusion to 
the situation faced by the United States in the event of a war with Germany.42 Rodgers’s 
suggestion, though, was not necessarily an endorsement of battlecruisers, merely a plea for a 
faster battle fleet, although in the past Rodgers’s advocacy for speed had taken the form of a 
ship that Americans tended to classify as a type of battlecruiser. 
 However, Rodgers’s opinion was not the only one in the War College. In early 
August Commander William Veazie Pratt, an instructor at Newport, gave Rodgers a memo, 
“Speed of Battleships,” that took aim at the notion of increasing the speed of capital ships. 
The memo could perhaps pass without comment, but Pratt was on the cusp of a glittering 
career in naval administration, which would see him wield considerable influence on naval 
policy over the next twenty years. When William S. Benson was appointed Chief of Naval 
Operations in 1915, Pratt was made his top assistant and head of the planning section, a 
position from which he directed naval policy and provided a great deal of guidance to his 
nominal superior, solid in his role, but no policy intellectual. From there, Pratt became a 
member of the General Board, and a key advisor to the American delegation at the 
Washington Conference, before ending his career as Chief of Naval Operations. It is also 
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worth noting that while Pratt was a Naval War College instructor, he had never attended as a 
student.43 
 Pratt was also implacably hostile to battlecruisers, which was on full display in this 
particular memorandum, which argued that it was “clearly in the wrong to attempt to gain 
fighting efficiency in . . . the battleship line, by an increase . . . of a few knots speed if that 
means sacrifice of guns, armor.” He went on to claim that ships designed for combat at high 
speeds, “should evolve from the destroyer up, not the battleship down,” a clear dig at 
battlecruisers. In practice, this would mean high speed and good protection combined with a 
minimal main battery; a ship somewhat along the lines of the Schofield torpedo battleship. 
All of these qualities were, Pratt assured Rodgers, “not entirely conjecture, but . . . based on 
results obtained from problems worked out on the maneuver board.”44 Left unsaid was the 
fact that much of the data fed into maneuver board problems also rested on conjecture. 
 Despite Rodgers and Pratt, the General Board requested battlecruisers in their 1912 
construction letter. Furthermore, the Board eschewed their typical yearly suggestions in favor 
of a 5-year building program, echoing the long-term building plans in Japan and Germany. 
Altogether, the Board called for the construction of 8 battlecruisers and 21 battleships to 
commence between 1913 and 1917, creating an end strength of 8 battlecruisers and 32 
battleships by the end of 1920. After that, the General Board projected an additional 4 
battlecruiser, 16 battleship plan, a tacit admission that the 48-battleship standard could not be 
met by the original 1920 date. For the 1913 bill, the Board proposed two battlecruisers to go 
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along with four battleships, albeit with the proviso that battlecruiser construction should only 
take place if all four battleships were constructed.45   
 As usual, the Board was at the 1912 Summer Conference, and their time at Newport 
seems to have affected their requests. Though the Board did not adopt Knepper’s definitional 
hair-splitting between battlecruisers derived from cruisers and those developed from 
battleships, their argument was somewhat similar to Robinson’s focus on “distantial” 
operations. As the Board put it, “we must have [battlecruisers] to hope for successful 
conflict. . . . These vessels have a military value not possible to obtain from other types or 
combination of types,” although they never specified what that particular value was. The 
proposed fleet organization attached to the building request, though, suggested that their role 
was to be those detached operations discussed at the conference. While the battleships were 
grouped into divisions of eight, no higher organization was suggested for the proposed 
battlecruiser force, suggesting that they would not be deployed en masse.46 
 There is some evidence to suggest that the Board’s newfound appreciation for 
battlecruisers was influenced by the 1912 Conference. A preliminary attempt at developing a 
construction program by a Board subcommittee in mid-July simply reprinted the 
“problematical” language used in the 1910 construction memo.47 The records of the General 
Board are rather incomplete before the First World War, but the Summer Conference is the 
only major event to take place between July and September 1912. A second straight Summer 
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Conference that favored the battlecruiser type may have boosted the ships in the eyes of the 
Board.  
 Secretary Meyer passed on the Board’s recommendation for the 1913 bill, but left 
them out of the Navy Department budget submitted to Congress, which merely called for 
three battleships and twelve destroyers. Economy almost certainly played a role—in front of 
the House Naval Committee, Meyer estimated that a battlecruiser would cost almost 40% 
more to construct than a similar battleship—as did the Board’s clear preference for battleship 
construction to take precedence.48 For both Meyer and Congress, however, battlecruisers 
were an afterthought, and apart from Meyer’s short discussion of costs, they were entirely 
absent from Congress’s deliberations over the 1913 bill.   
 Although the General Board must have been well aware that their proposed 
battlecruisers would never see the light of day, preliminary design work continued into late 
1912, even after Meyer had stripped the battlecruisers from the Navy Department’s 1913-14 
budget recommendation. Unsurprisingly, Robinson’s studies from the Conference were used 
as the base for C&R’s preliminary design, which has been lost. However, the General 
Board’s initial requests were for a modification of Robinson’s 29-knot, 11” armor 
combination, which had an estimated range of nearly 10,000 nautical miles; enough for 
service in the Pacific.49  
 Towards the end of 1912, this preliminary design was sent for comment to the Naval 
War College, receiving comments from both Pratt and Rodgers. Surprisingly, the two men 
who had clashed on the issue of speed found themselves in agreement on the unsuitability of 
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the design, and battlecruisers in general for the United States at the time. Rodgers claimed 
that battlecruisers were a “naval luxury,” marked for “secondary strategic objectives.” Unlike 
battleships, they were unable to “lend the utmost tactical support to the main body in general 
action,” and thus had no place in a U.S. Navy constrained by a miserly Congress.50 
 Pratt’s attack on battlecruisers was more wide-ranging, taking aim at the value of 
speed, and determining from board exercises that neither a war with Japan or Germany 
would be materially affected by American battlecruisers. More importantly, Pratt showed 
himself to be one of the very few American officers who understood Fisher’s original 
battlecruiser rationale and its subsequent modification:  
England built battle cruisers and this is the order of her thought: (a) Battle cruisers 
built for strategical reasons. (b) Found that strategical reason was not enough to 
justify building such ships. (c) Proceeded to find tactical use for such ship. (d) Having 
found it, proceeded to develop its employment with battleships. (e) In 1912 dropped 
the battle cruisers from program.”  
 
One can certainly quibble with the suggestion that the British had indeed found a tactical 
niche for their battlecruisers, but overall Pratt’s breakdown of British policy was a sound 
account. 
Pratt’s warning that the United States risked following the British path is harder to 
defend. The U.S. Navy had taken the opposite path from the British: first considering the 
battlecruiser tactically before settling on “strategical reasons” for their construction, and all 
without the sunk costs of ships ill suited for prevailing naval policy. Despite the seeming 
logic of Pratt’s dismissal, it was Rodgers’s argument that really reflected the tacit shift in the 
American battlecruiser debate. Rodgers rejected the ships not simply because their 
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performance in battle would be poor (though he did make that argument). Instead, he rejected 
battlecruisers because they were intended for those “strategic” missions of scouting, 
screening, and the like, that would keep them away from the battle fleet entirely, and it was 
the battle fleet that remained at the center of American strategic thinking. All other missions 
remained secondary. Despite the shift in thinking about battlecruisers, Rodgers and most of 
the American officer corps believed that fighting and winning major battles would provide 
enough strategic benefits to offset the urgent need for battlecruisers, though having them 
would certainly be a positive.  
This shift towards considering battlecruisers as vessels intended for “strategical” 
work would have dramatic implications down the road. Two successive Summer 
Conferences, the 1911-12 Long Course, and the General Board all agreed that battlecruisers 
were perfectly suited for their proposed subordinate mission, a far cry from the 
contentiousness over the fast wing role. With the conceptual hurdles cleared, the only 
barriers to battlecruiser construction in the United States were now financial. Even with the 
avowedly Mahanian ethos of the American officer corps, a critical mass of officers in key 
positions believed that battlecruiser construction would be a net positive for the U.S. Navy, if 
the money could be found to build them alongside a robust battleship program.  
 The financial barriers rose substantially with the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 
March 1913. Neither Wilson nor his naval secretary, Josephus Daniels, were terribly 
interested in the Navy and certainly not interested in the sort of naval program large enough 
for the Navy to feel comfortable with the addition of battlecruisers. Still, the General Board 
did not lower its sights. In 1913, the Board gave Secretary Daniels a request for four 
battleships, sixteen destroyers, and eight submarines, pursuant to the five-year program the 
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Board put forward the year before. Indeed, the memorandum to Daniels laying out the 
proposed plan lauded the five-year program as “necessary to insure a fleet in 1920 of 
measurable equality with the fleets of the principal foreign powers.” In other words, the 
General Board did not give up its earlier support for battlecruisers, but shifted it further down 
the five-year plan in favor of battleships, the favored capital ship.51  
As for battlecruisers specifically, 1913 was a year of stasis in the U.S. Navy. The 
General Board declined to request them, while continuing to regard them as a part of a well-
balanced fleet, and battlecruisers were again conditionally endorsed by the Summer 
Conference.52 The prevailing position was admirably summed up by Captain James Oliver, a 
member of the Newport clique, who wrote that battlecruisers were “absolutely unrivalled in 
performance of the special service of ‘security and information,’” but there was no consensus 
on “how we value this special type in comparison with types about which we have no doubt. 
. . . It is very doubtful if for our navy any of us would exchange a DELAWARE for an 
INVINCIBLE.”53 
 The one thing that was determined was that the United States would not follow 
Britain in building “fast battleships” on the Queen Elizabeth model. The idea was not a new 
one in the United States—it could be said to date to Fiske’s “Compromiseless Ships” article 
in 1905—and enthusiasm for it seemed to pick up in 1912 as it became clear to many officers 
who wanted battlecruisers that the money for them and battleships would not be forthcoming. 
Robinson, for example, suggested speedy battleships as a possible stopgap in his July 1912 
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Newport talk. Rodgers took up the mantle in the General Board’s deliberations over the 
specifications of the 1915 program battleships in late 1913. Arguing that a fleet with no 
capital ships faster than 21 knots was vulnerable to being brought to battle under unfavorable 
terms by opponents with battlecruisers and fast battleships, Rodgers urged the board to 
increase the design’s speed above 21 knots. Rodgers was overruled.54 Indeed, the next year 
the Board actually lowered the speed requirements for the 1916 program battleships to 20.5 
knots.55 
 By the start of the First World War, the U.S. Navy had reached an internal consensus 
on what battlecruisers were for. If the United States were to build battlecruisers, they would 
be on the British model of high speed, high firepower, and low armor, and they would be 
employed in what American officers referred to as the “strategic” roles of scouting, 
screening, and long-range independent maneuver (although it might have been more accurate 
to refer to such roles as “auxiliary” rather than “strategic”). While there was some 
disagreement on precisely how valuable those roles were, there was near-total agreement that 
they could only be built if suitable progress was made in the battleship construction program.  
 There were, however, some suggestions that the United States could forgo 
battlecruisers altogether. Pratt, of course, was loudly opposed to the ships, but the real push 
came from officers otherwise well disposed towards battlecruisers who thought that 
something like the Queen Elizabeths could be the future of naval warfare. There was a great 
deal of fascination with the new British battleships. One member of the 1914 Long Course 
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class suggested that battlecruisers could “be merged into the battleship,” in the near future, 
obviating the need for specialized battlecruisers.56 Such a ship would conform to the 
American focus on battleships, and both Constructor Robinson and NWC President Rodgers 
had suggested the “fast battleship” as a way to add speed to the American fleet without 
sacrificing battleship construction.  
 These arguments suggest something of the hold that the major fleet action held over 
the minds of the U.S. Navy. The suggestion of building fast battleships did nothing to solve 
the scouting issues; there was not a chance that an American fleet commander would allow 
his newest and most capable battleships to range away from the rest of the formation. Based 
on the internal arguments used to promote battlecruisers, they should have been a higher 
priority than battleships. On the eve of war, the U.S. Navy possessed the third-largest 
battleship fleet in the world, no battlecruisers, and only three purpose-built scouts. Even after 
two years of concern over foreign battlecruisers, and the scouting situation, the General 
Board could still not bring itself to prioritize battlecruiser construction.57 
  
*** 
  
As the Royal Navy entered 1913, its battlecruiser program was in the process of shutting 
down, as work continued on the last two ships, Queen Mary and Tiger. However, those ten 
ships still played an important role in war planning and training. By early 1913, when 
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Winston Churchill’s former naval secretary, Rear Admiral David Beatty, took control of the 
First Battle Cruiser Squadron in the North Sea, it comprised five ships: Invincible, 
Indomitable, Indefatigable, Lion, and Princess Royal. Beatty was not shy about expressing 
his opinions about how his squadron should be used, producing a series of documents 
highlighting the fogginess at the heart of British battlecruiser practice.  
 A month after assuming command, Beatty presented his squadron with a memo, 
“Functions of a Battle Cruiser Squadron,” that laid out his thinking concerning his new 
command, and enumerated its possible duties in war. He listed five potential roles, four of 
which involved supporting friendly cruisers conducting reconnaissance or blockade. This 
fifth and seemingly crucial role, however, was to form the fast division of a battle fleet.58 In 
this memo and elsewhere, Beatty exuded confidence in his squadron’s ability to play such a 
role: “the power of the ship is to be gauged by her offensive rather than her defensive, and 
the best defensive is an overpowering offensive.” Beatty seemed unworried about his thin-
skinned warships going up against the German battle fleet.59 
 Beatty took these attitudes into the 1913 exercises, the last before the First World 
War (in 1914 the exercises would be shelved in favor of a cheaper test deployment). In them, 
the Blue forces, representing the U.K. would square off against a Red force meant to simulate 
the High Seas Fleet, and a smaller squadron representing an Austrian force attempting to 
rendezvous with the Germans. After grumbling over the prior year’s results, based on the 
absence of physical transports, the scenario was essentially unchanged.60 The Red Fleet was 
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again tasked with attempting to break commerce-raiders out of the North Sea, and land to an 
invasion or raiding force somewhere in the British Isles. Callaghan, of course, commanded 
the Blue side, while the Red fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Jellicoe, granted a 
temporary reprieve from his duties as Second Sea Lord to take part in the exercises.61 Each 
side had battlecruisers; Lion, Princess Royal, and Indefatigable on the Blue side, under the 
command of Beatty, while the Red Fleet received Indomitable and Invincible.62 
 Jellicoe’s Red Fleet ended the main portion of the exercises victorious, having 
managed to land an “invasion force” in the Humber estuary, despite a spirited attempt by the 
1st BCS to shadow their approach, even in the face of what Beatty considered “cheating” on 
the part of Jellicoe.63 One midshipman aboard Indomitable noted that the Red Fleet’s 
battlecruisers were used as a fast wing during a “battle” on August 1, “crossing their T 3 
times” in about half an hour’s fighting.64 
Unsurprisingly, battlecruisers loomed large in Jellicoe’s post-exercise report. In that 
report, the first conclusion was that battlecruisers “dominate the situation absolutely. . . . A 
Commander-in-Chief . . . cannot feel safe until they are disposed of.” He then went on to 
laud “[t]he power possessed by a compact battle squadron of superior speed to that of the 
enemy’s fastest battleships,” a force that could, with support from battlecruisers and 
destroyers, make short work of enemy cruiser patrols.”65 Clearly then, Jellicoe was more 
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sanguine concerning the utility of battlecruisers than the Admiralty and, indeed, perhaps 
more so than Beatty, who had written in his April memo that their primary missions were 
support functions.66 
 However, a closer look at the exercises suggests that battlecruisers were not as 
effective as Jellicoe’s effusive praise would suggest. In the first session of the exercises, 
Beatty was able to find the Red Fleet and launch a spoiling attack on its lead squadron, but 
that attack was unsuccessful, as was a subsequent chase by the Blue battle squadrons. In the 
second session, the Blue battlecruisers again found the Red battle fleet, but this time (it is 
unclear whether this was on orders from Callaghan or on the initiative of Beatty) attacked. 
While the attack caused some damage to Red, nothing was sunk except the three Blue 
battlecruisers, all within one hour and ten minutes of launching their attack.67 
 What the 1913 exercises lacked, though, were any extended encounters between Red 
and Blue battlecruisers, the scenario that appears to have dominated Beatty’s thinking in the 
year leading up to the First World War. Correspondence with Callaghan and the Admiralty 
show his vigorous criticism of any plan to reduce battlecruiser strength in the North Sea. 
While some of it was undoubtedly the understandable pique of a squadron commander losing 
assets under his control, his intensity and his later behavior suggest that this shift was 
heartfelt. Although it did not appear as one of the potential missions of the 1st BCS in 
Beatty’s April 1913 memo for his squadron, negating German battlecruisers became an 
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increasingly important part of Beatty’s self-conceived mission, perhaps because of the 
success Red battlecruisers had in costal raids in the 1913 Manoeuvres.  
 Despite the seeming logic of using the 1st BCS against its opposite number, the notion 
flew in the face of British battlecruiser policy. Both Fisher’s original conception of the 
battlecruiser, and its place in the British fleet rested on its asymmetric qualities.68 In all the 
debates about the function of the battlecruisers from Fisher through the 1913 exercises, 
emphasis was placed on using battlecruisers as a fast wing against slower battleships or 
against weaker light and armored cruisers. Even the anti-battlecruiser Churchill Admiralty 
maintained this policy, sending battlecruisers to the Mediterranean facing the battlecruiser-
free Italian and Austro-Hungarian navies. The Queen Elizabeths, built to replace 
battlecruisers, were intended to fill their fast wing functions with a bespoke ship. The 
possibility of German and British battlecruisers maneuvering against each other as they tried 
to establish fast wings had of course been anticipated, but not to this extent.  
 The extent to which the British battlecruisers were ever intended to fight or even 
neutralize their opposite numbers is debatable. The first four battlecruisers were designed and 
built in a world with no foreign analogues, and, at least while Fisher remained in office, were 
intended for sea control purposes that would have found them matched against commerce-
raiders, mostly cruisers and converted liners. After the introduction of Von der Tann, the 
exact purpose of the British vessels becomes more difficult to divine. Lion was obviously 
intended to outclass the German ship, but it is difficult to argue that she was intended 
specifically to seek her out in the event of war. Statements from senior Admiralty officials 
and the design of the Queen Elizabeths suggest that the primary missions of the British 
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battlecruiser force remained scouting and the fast wing. Even the iconoclastic Naval Review 
carried articles supporting the fast wing mission for battlecruisers. Late in 1913, the Review 
carried the third part of a study of tactics by founding member Captain Edward W. Harding, 
RMA, a gunnery expert. In that piece, Harding argued that battlecruisers were a key part of 
“the battle squadron,” especially for work as a fast division.69  
 Beatty’s contribution towards the discussion was to attempt to shift the mission of the 
1st BCS more narrowly onto countering the German battlecruisers, though Beatty and flag 
captain Ernle Chatfield continued to work on the fast wing issue.70 Several weeks after the 
1913 Manoeuvres, Beatty wrote a memo for Callaghan, decrying the possible shift of 
Indefatigable from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, a shift that eventually occurred in 
December. In that letter, Beatty pointed out that detaching Indefatigable would create parity 
between the German and British battlecruisers in the North Sea, at four each.71 In fact, Beatty 
felt the current five to four margin was “insufficient,” as the Germans could easily recall 
Goeben from the Mediterranean. The prospect of “bare equality” without Indefatigable was 
too horrible to contemplate. This was all complicated by both countries’ construction 
schedules, which would allow the German squadron to add its newest member, Derfflinger 
some months before HMS Tiger was commissioned.72 The letter was sent to the Admiralty 
by Callaghan with his “full agreement,” although that was obviously insufficient to sway the 
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Board, especially in light of the prior agreement over the Mediterranean reached at the CID 
in 1912.73 Even after the Admiralty agreed to put New Zealand in the North Sea upon her 
return from a visit to its namesake, Beatty brought up the matter again in March 1914, with 
somewhat more urgency, given the imminent commissioning of Derfflinger.74 Callaghan 
echoed his subordinate, in claiming that battlecruiser superiority in the North Sea was 
“essential” to British control.75 
 Beatty’s constant worries over battlecruiser parity were almost certainly linked to a 
change in his conception of the 1st BCS’s role. In a memo to mark one year in command of 
the squadron he had tightened his language concerning the squadron’s missions, identifying 
only two, the “strategical” work of supporting cruiser patrols and the “tactical” work of the 
fast wing.76 Despite that language, the document clearly pinpointed the German battlecruiser 
fleet as the main target of the squadron. Even in support of cruiser operations, Beatty wanted 
the ships of the squadron to remain in sight of each other at all times, concentrating its 
strength. He also wanted a permanent escort of light cruisers for the squadron, allowing it the 
freedom to operate as an independent tactical unit.77 
 Beatty’s new focus belied his earlier statement that battlecruisers primarily served a 
support function. A battlecruiser squadron whose elements had to remain within sight of each 
other was not a squadron that could provide effective ordinary support to a diffuse scouting 
                                                           
73
 Callaghan to Admiralty, September 12, 1913, ADM 1/8372/46.  
74
 Beatty to Callaghan, March 10, 1914, ADM 1/8372/46.  
75
 Callaghan to Admiralty, March 25, 1914, ADM 1/8372/46.   
76
 This language would also be used by officers in the U.S. Navy to describe the role of battlecruisers, though in 
that case, Americans tended to argue that only the “strategical” missions were fit for the ships.  
77
 Beatty, “Battle Cruisers,” March 3, 1914, ADM 1/8372/46.  
239 
 
force. Indeed, the only security such a squadron could realistically provide would be against a 
concentration of large enemy ships. All of this assumes that the 1st BCS would even be in a 
position to support Home Fleet’s cruisers. With an attached light cruiser squadron, the 1st 
BCS would have the capability for independent action much further afield from the battle 
fleet or scouting lines. The focus on German battlecruisers almost ensured that he would 
have the desire to do so. 
 In a way, Beatty’s vision for his squadron was a deeply conservative one. Rather than 
seeing his primary mission as using his ships’ unique capabilities to overwhelm smaller ships 
or run circles around larger ones, Beatty posited a role that pitted them against the most 
similar German vessels, something of a return to the type-against-type logic that ruled all 
naval warfare before the invention of the torpedo. As discussed earlier, the entire rationale 
for battlecruisers, with both Fisher and his successors was to utilize their advantages against 
lighter and/or slower ships. While other British officers certainly contemplated battlecruiser 
vs. battlecruiser action as a natural component of large-scale battle, Beatty was one of the 
few who appeared to encourage such an encounter independent of a fleet action. Subsequent 
authors have criticized similar strategies, because battlecruisers “could not even fight each 
other,” but it would be fairer to say that Beatty’s approach did not maximize the utility of his 
ships’ capabilities.78 
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 Beatty’s ideas were not just out of step with the original rationale for battlecruisers 
and the prevailing understanding of them as primarily a fast wing. As of mid-1914, they were 
at odds with Admiralty plans. In mid-July, the War Staff’s Operations Division proposed to 
liquidate the battlecruiser squadrons and form “Mixed Cruiser Squadrons,” a plan that seems 
to have had the approval of Churchill and Battenberg. The plan proposed the creation of four 
mixed cruiser squadrons, each composed of two battlecruisers and four light cruisers after 
Beatty’s appointment ran out in 1915.79 All four mixed squadrons would be attached to the 
Home Fleet. The text deals solely with organization and deployment, but the only possible 
advantages for such a reorganization would be in trade protection, as well as  supporting 
scouting and screening; certainly not chasing German battlecruiser formations around the 
North Sea or forming a fast wing. Although eight out of ten British Empire battlecruisers 
would be in the North Sea, this planned disposition would strike a blow against the 
concentration and common training necessary to meet the German battlecruiser force in a 
pitched battle.80 
 
*** 
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At the end of the 1912 Summer Conference, NWC President W.L. Rodgers laid out his 
vision of the Naval War College in a final lecture: 
The work of the College . . . has two branches. Its business is to spread abroad in the 
service both the general doctrine and its individual character building; but further, it 
must push original work, and in conjunction with the fleet, it must develop its 
doctrine as circumstances require and keep abreast of the times. The War College 
therefore devotes itself to the investigation and deposition of strategic and tactical 
principles. . . . [T]he object is to develop a uniform method throughout the service[.]81  
 
Many of the reasons for the difference the British and American approaches to battlecruiser 
policy in the years before World War I can be found in that quotation. In the United States, 
the “investigation and deposition of strategic and tactical principles” was the province of the 
Naval War College, students, staff, and General Board members collectively during the 
summer conferences, and individually as instructors conducted board exercises and thought 
about war in the offseason. In a sense, this status was by default; the General Board could 
have fulfilled that role, but they had neither the staff nor the remit for such work. The 
Atlantic Fleet served as a means of testing War College doctrines and operational ideas, but 
lacked the staff and the time to generate such ideas itself.  
 In Britain, on the other hand, the U.S. Navy’s conception of “doctrine” was mostly 
foreign, at least in the sense of service-wide principles. Instead, as one officer put it, there 
was a “doctrine of no doctrine.”82 Much of this was certainly down to the British policy of 
giving fleet commanders wide latitude, but even when the Admiralty tried to develop a 
policy for the North Sea through the Naval Staff, it ended in near disaster. There was a 
bewildering array of officials and entities that could claim input into British naval policy, 
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strategy, and doctrine. All of these—the Cabinet, the CID, the First Lord, the Admiralty 
Board, the War Staff, and the Home Fleet—were acting well within their responsibility, but 
the result was chaos. Within the Navy, the lack of a clear process prevented the development 
of tactical and operational doctrines, which would have made it a more efficient fighting 
machine.  
 Interestingly, in mid-1914, Churchill tried to push the Royal Navy in the direction of 
the United States. Against the advice of Battenberg and Jellicoe, Churchill pushed for the 
creation of a Training Division within the naval staff. As he put it at the time: 
The individual studies, which in the absence of any coordinated system, have been 
pursued by many officers of senior or comparatively senior rank have led to a 
diversity of opinion prejudicial alike to the formation of a common body of doctrine 
and to continuity of training and instruction.  
 
As C.I. Hamilton notes, the term “doctrine” was very uncommon in the Royal Navy; he 
suggests that Churchill picked it up from contact with Army officials. Although the Training 
Division plan was allowed to lapse after the outbreak of war, Churchill’s intervention 
correctly diagnosed part of the problem with Royal Navy policy. It is tempting to consider 
what British battlecruiser plans would have looked like if a Training Division had existed a 
few years earlier and had an opportunity to “indoctrinate” the Royal Navy.83 
 The squabbling over battlecruisers provides an example of how damaging the 
“absence of any coordinated system” could be. As British operational policy lurched from 
plan to plan, the prospective duties of battlecruisers changed greatly. Close blockade, distant 
blockade, the attack by divisions, the cordon system, holding the line in the Mediterranean, 
and the “tactical-technical synthesis” all required different tasks for the British battlecruiser 
force, especially when added to Beatty’s novel interpretation of his squadron’s duties. None 
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of these missions were especially close to Fisher’s original vision—still the basis for British 
battlecruiser design—and the ships that came out of that vision were not especially well 
suited for their new missions. Halting battlecruiser construction in favor of the Queen 
Elizabeths was a sensible move for the Admiralty Board, but it provided no solution for 
employing the extant battlecruisers.  
 Moving into the First World War, this problem was exacerbated by the three men at 
the center of battlecruiser policy. Beatty remained, but both Callaghan and Battenberg were 
removed from their posts early in the war, to be replaced, respectively, by Jellicoe and 
Fisher. By the end of 1914, the Royal Navy had a First Sea Lord, a Grand Fleet commander, 
and a battlecruiser squadron commander with wildly divergent ideas on how to use the 
battlecruisers at their disposal. Collectively, the combinations and permutations of these three 
incompatible views would contribute to disaster at Jutland and potential disaster at several 
other points during the war.  
 Contrary to Sumida’s conclusions in “A Matter of Timing,” one can certainly indict 
the Admiralty for its doctrinal failings in the years immediately before the First World War, 
failings that are thrown into sharp relief by comparison with their American counterparts. 
The “technical-tactical” synthesis of decisive medium-range battle was a marvel of planning, 
but a plan shaped by a small cabal in Whitehall was insufficient for the issues facing the 
Royal Navy at the time it was developed. The Churchill Board may have done away with 
battlecruisers in 1912, but the last of the prewar battlecruisers did not enter the fleet until late 
1914, and the first of the R-class battleships was not ready until early 1916. It is not enough 
to concede that the implicit British doctrine entering the First World War was “antithetical to 
. . .  the battle cruisers;” a doctrine that ignored existing warships in favor of far-off 
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construction was unequal to the Royal Navy’s self-recognized duty to prepare for a war that 
could come at any time.84  
 On the other hand, the United States Navy possessed a coherent battlecruiser doctrine 
that encompassed both their employment in combat and a set of design parameters, a doctrine 
that supplemented the U.S. Navy’s extant fleet and strategic understanding. Crucially, this 
nascent doctrine was developed in part by officers with recent experience at sea talking 
amongst each other at Newport. Essentially, then, the eventual construction of battlecruisers 
would just add ships to a fleet whose officers already had a strong sense of their use. Rather 
than radically changing the U.S. Navy, battlecruisers would fill a well-identified role.  
 In that sense, 1912 assumes an importance than many writers on the U.S. Navy 
overlook. To say that American officers “evinced little interest” in battlecruisers before 1915 
is to miss a dramatic shift in the U.S. Navy’s internal vision of an ideal fleet.85 Prior to 1912, 
the General Board gave no evidence that they desired to build battlecruisers, whether or not 
the money existed. Indeed, the General Board’s discussion of the ships in 1910 suggests that 
battlecruisers were placed in the same category as armored cruisers: intrinsically flawed 
ships. By 1912, this dismissal had been flipped; instead of unnecessary fast wing ships, 
battlecruisers were very useful scouts. Battlecruiser construction remained predicated on 
progress towards an “acceptable” number of battleships, but there had nevertheless been a 
substantial shift in doctrine. This change can only partially be credited to foreign 
construction. After all, the U.S. Navy had known of British battlecruisers and German 
battlecruiser construction in 1910 when the General Board dismissed the type.  
                                                           
84
 Sumida, “A Matter of Timing,” 132.  
85Bönker, Militarism, 114.  
245 
 
 It is true that Japanese battlecruiser construction induced the General Board to change 
course in early 1911, but their tepid endorsement of May 1911 was a hasty reaction to 
Japanese construction. The Board gave some sense of the strategic function of American 
battlecruisers, but no hint of their operational role. For that, the Board turned to the Naval 
War College, which, over the course of 1911-12, refined earlier appreciation for the 
battlecruiser’s potential in scouting and screening into a focus on “distantial” work. These 
“strategical” roles—as opposed the “tactical” work of the fast wing—became the accepted 
raison d'être of battlecruisers within the U.S. Navy, and remained the basis for the General 
Board’s battlecruiser designs through the Washington Conference. 
 
246 
 
CHAPTER 6: “LIKE THE CAVALRY OF A GREAT ARMY” 
 
 On the eve of the First World War, the British and American navies had divergent 
notions of a battlecruiser’s mission. However, members of both services took a decidedly 
equine approach to describing them. At the 1911 Summer Conference, the final report 
referred to battlecruisers as “the cavalry of the fleet.”1 Likewise, Ernle Chatfield, Beatty’s 
flag captain, recollected nearly thirty years later that battlecruiser crews looked on their ships 
as “like the cavalry of a great army.”2 Soon after the Great War, Churchill referred to the 
battlecruisers as “the strategic cavalry of the Royal Navy,” and lauded their commander, 
Beatty, as a man with a “mind . . . rendered quick and supple by the situations of polo and the 
hunting-field.”3 
 Of course, the shared cavalry metaphor covered up huge differences in intent. In 
Chatfield’s telling, the “cavalry” of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet were “the spear-point of the 
Grand Fleet,” suggesting the capacity for decisive action.4 In the American version, the 
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battlecruisers were like cavalry because of the “many conditions when cavalry should not be 
employed to the greatest advantage;” like their land-based counterparts, battlecruisers had 
their uses, but they were a resource that required careful husbanding.5  
 In the opening year of the First World War, a strong case could be made for the 
British interpretation of the cavalry metaphor. Under the leadership of Beatty, the First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron (1st BCS) seemed to embody the values of the cavalry charge. The 
battlecruisers were by far the most active portion of the Grand Fleet, and took part in 
successful engagements in the Heligoland Bight, and at the Falklands and Dogger Bank. 
Although those battles revealed troubling information about the state of British fire control, 
they confirmed that battlecruisers were capable of overpowering smaller cruisers, and that 
the 1st BCS was a match for the German battlecruiser squadron in the North Sea.  
These successes masked the incoherence that remained at the heart of British 
battlecruiser policy, as reflected in the distribution of the nine active British battlecruisers at 
the start of the war. With Beatty in the North Sea were the four ships of the 1st BCS: the three 
new ships built to the Lion pattern (Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary) and HMS New 
Zealand, a sister ship to the older Indefatigable. As part of the 1912 agreement forged at the 
CID, the four oldest battlecruisers (Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable, and Indefatigable) 
were in the Mediterranean as the nucleus of the Mediterranean Fleet after the withdrawal of 
British battleships from that station, although when war was declared, Invincible was 
undergoing a refit in Britain. Lastly, HMAS Australia, a sister ship to Indefatigable and New 
Zealand, was with the navy of its namesake dominion, despite the Admiralty’s clear desire to 
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have the ship in European waters.6  
 This distribution represented the three distinct strains of British battlecruiser policy to 
date. The Australia was the last vestige of Admiral Fisher’s stillborn “fleet unit” policy, an 
attempt to exercise British sea command in the Pacific through battlecruisers and flotilla 
rather than battle fleets. The four older battlecruisers in the Mediterranean were the result of 
Churchill’s Admiralty retrenchment in the North Sea; when forced by other government 
departments to maintain capital ships in the region, the Admiralty responded by sending 
battlecruisers, seen as the least-painful loss from the heavy units in the North Sea. Lastly, the 
1st BCS represented the main change of the Churchill years; the concentration of all heavy, 
modern, units in the North Sea. 
 Likewise, the three men with the largest impact on British battlecruiser practice—
Jellicoe, appointed to command the Grand Fleet at the war’s start; Beatty, in charge of the 1st 
BCS; and Fisher, recalled to replace Battenberg in late October—had different conceptions 
of the battlecruisers’ role. Broadly speaking, Beatty continued to see his ships as a check on 
the German battlecruiser squadron, Jellicoe viewed battlecruisers as battle scouts and a fast 
wing, while Fisher continued to see the vessels as critical to a sea control strategy. Through 
1915, they were just about able to muddle through, but the circumstances of that first year 
never required the 1st BCS to act in concert with the Grand Fleet’s battleships.  
 On the other side of the Atlantic, the war indirectly gave the General Board the 
chance to build battlecruisers. At the beginning of the war, the prospects for increased 
construction seemed remote, but the war shocked the country, and provided political cover 
for higher military spending. Off the back of President Wilson’s “preparedness” movement, 
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the U.S. Navy was given a veritable blank check. Finally given “enough” money to build 
battlecruisers alongside battleships, the Board returned with a $500,000,000 plan to build ten 
battleships and six battlecruisers over the next five years.  
 With the opportunity to build battlecruisers, the Board stuck to its guns and returned a 
decidedly “light cavalry” set of specifications. Although some of the more exuberant 
battlecruiser partisans in uniform predicted the imminent demise of dreadnought battleships 
in favor of battlecruisers, the General Board’s design was far too light to serve as a 
replacement. Instead, the General Board proposed the ne plus ultra of scouts; a ship with 
more speed, more guns, and far less armor than any battlecruiser in the British, German, or 
Japanese fleets. The design process, along with the final specifications reaffirmed the 
Board’s commitment to the scouting and “distantial” missions: the ship was simply too light 
for anything else. In essence, the General Board, secure in their theories, designed a ship that 
flew in the face of wartime practice.  
 
*** 
 
Admiral Callaghan was forced out of his command of the Home Fleet as soon as the 
war started. In his place, the Admiralty Board sent Admiral John Jellicoe, who assumed 
command of the newly renamed Grand Fleet on August 4. Jellicoe, who had been on the 
original Committee on Designs, was a “fishpond” member in good standing—Fisher had 
been grooming the younger man for high command since his arrival at the Admiralty in 
1904—but was well respected in all quarters.7 A gunnery officer by training, Jellicoe had 
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been at the heart of the materiel changes in the Royal Navy over the past ten years, serving at 
the Admiralty as Director of Naval Ordnance, 3rd Sea Lord, and 2nd Sea Lord. Additionally, 
he was regarded as a keen tactician, and feted for his performance in command of the 
aggressor fleet in the 1913 exercises. Clearly, he was the obvious choice for such an 
important command.8 
Although Jellicoe was a protégé of Fisher, his views on battlecruisers tended towards 
the conventional. To the extent that he thought about them at all, he saw them as a fast wing 
to the battle line.9 In a report written for Churchill in mid-July, while he was still 2nd Sea 
Lord, Jellicoe had argued that the forthcoming Queen Elizabeth class of fast battleships 
should be counted as part of the Royal Navy’s battlecruiser strength, a stance that only makes 
sense if the battlecruisers’ primary mission was the fast wing.10 While the Queen Elizabeths 
were fast enough to maneuver against the head of the German battle line, as he was well 
aware, they were not fast enough to keep up with German or British battlecruisers in a chase. 
When the British entered the war in early August, the three battlecruisers present in 
the Mediterranean were the first to involve themselves. The German battlecruiser Goeben, 
stationed in the Mediterranean was naturally the primary target of the British warships, but a 
combination of poor leadership, inferior speed, and bad luck (Invincible and Indomitable had 
                                                           
8
 For more information on Jellicoe’s life, see A. Temple Patterson’s Jellicoe: A Biography or Winton’s Jellicoe. 
Reginald Bacon, Jellicoe’s contemporary, also published The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe (London: 
Cassell, 1936), which is enlivened by Bacon’s familiarity with the subject.  
9
 After the war, Jellicoe claimed that battlecruisers “were designed and built in order that they might keep in 
touch with the enemy and report his movements when he had been found.” However, his expressed sentiments 
before the war and in the war’s early stages belie that claim. At the very least, Jellicoe considered battlecruisers 
an integral part of the battle fleet in action and appears to have viewed that role as their primary mission. 
Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 (New York: Doran, 1919), 304.  
10
 Jellicoe to Churchill, July 14, 1914, The Jellicoe Papers, vol.1, 37-40. When faced with the possibility of the 
Queen Elizabeths actually joining the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser formations during the war, Jellicoe quickly 
changed his mind.  
251 
 
actually come across Goeben hours before the British declaration of war before losing her in 
the night), meant that the only British ships to encounter Goeben were a collection of cruisers 
under the command of Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge. Citing the Goeben’s greater range, 
speed, firepower and his explicit orders to avoid a fight with a superior force, Troubridge 
declined action, allowing Goeben to sail unmolested to the Dardanelles and join the Ottoman 
Navy. Troubridge was court martialed for his decision and, though acquitted, his career was 
ruined.11 
Although most of the attention paid to the Goeben chase rightly focuses on 
Troubridge and the definition of a superior force, the entire episode demonstrated the 
importance of speed to battlecruiser operations. At the time, SMS Goeben was the fastest 
large warship in the Mediterranean, allowing its commander, Wilhelm Souchon, to sail from 
the Adriatic to bombard French North Africa and sail from there to the Dardanelles almost 
entirely unmolested. On the other side of the situation, the failure of the three British 
battlecruisers to run Souchon to the ground raised serious questions about the utility of a 
battlecruiser that was not the fastest ship in its area. For a class of ship marked by its speed, 
the lack of superiority made the three British battlecruisers little more than large gun 
platforms with light armor. 
On the other hand, the battlecruisers in the North Sea played a more active role in the 
war’s opening acts. One of Jellicoe’s first moves after getting the Grand Fleet situated in 
Northern Scotland was to launch a sweep of the North Sea with most of the forces under his 
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command. While this sweep did not find any Germans, his initial plans suggest something of 
his feelings on battlecruisers. The Grand Fleet was divided into four parts, led by the light 
cruisers, ten miles ahead of two armored cruiser squadrons, followed by the battlecruisers on 
the other side of a fifteen-mile gap which were themselves fifteen miles ahead of the battle 
fleet. From this position, Beatty’s battlecruisers could have served as a redoubt for the light 
and armored cruisers to fall back on, but, being about an hour’s steaming behind, would have 
been incapable of helping them press home a reconnaissance.12 Instead, their position, too far 
from British cruisers to aid their searches and too close to the main fleet to effectively screen, 
suggests that Jellicoe thought of his battlecruisers primarily as an aid to the main fleet (when 
the full Grand Fleet sortied) rather than ships with a major role to play in scouting. 
The 1st BCS was also involved in the first surface engagement of the war in the North 
Sea at Heligoland Bight, which displayed the ability of battlecruisers to make a quick and 
decisive impact on cruiser actions. In late August Commodore Roger Keyes, in command of 
British submarines in the North Sea, and Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, commanding a 
detachment of light cruisers at Harwich hatched a plan to ambush German cruisers and 
destroyers on patrol in the Heligoland Bight.13 The operation was originally to be supported 
by Invincible and New Zealand, but at the last minute, Jellicoe decided to add another light 
cruiser squadron and the 1st BCS from the Grand Fleet as extra support, a fact that was not 
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relayed to the British submarines in the area.14 In the end, the sortie ran into heavier-than-
expected German resistance and had to call on the battlecruisers for support to cover their 
withdrawal. 
That support was provided by a high-speed run from Beatty’s forces, which sank two 
German cruisers in the space of twenty minutes and gave Tyrwhitt space to retire.15 With 
three German cruisers and a destroyer lost at the cost of no British ships sunk, the Battle of 
the Heligoland Bight was lauded as a British victory. It was also the first test of British 
battlecruisers in combat, and the “cavalry” appeared to have arrived just in time to save the 
day. Herbert Richmond, Assistant Director of Naval Operations, lauded the skirmish as a 
perfect use of battlecruisers in his diary, though he strongly criticized the confused staff work 
that marred the operation’s planning and execution.16 The battle also cemented Beatty’s 
reputation as a daring leader. The Admiralty believed, with good reason, that the Bight was 
swarming with German torpedo boats, submarines, and mines, all potentially deadly to 
British capital ships, yet Beatty seems to have had no hesitation in throwing his command 
into the fight.17  
Despite the material success of the 1st BCS, and the dashing image of its commander, 
gunnery was a concern. Although Beatty’s squadron had received special permission to 
practice at ranges as great as 16,000 yards before the war, at the 5-7,000 yards experienced at 
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Heligoland, the quality of the battlecruiser fire was troubling. Chatfield wrote after the battle 
that visibility was poor, making it near impossible to take ranges with the directors and very, 
very difficult for the individual turret periscopes as well. Even the Argo clock, a critical piece 
of equipment for continuous aim fire, broke after the first salvo.18 To sink the two German 
cruisers dispatched by the battlecruisers, Lion alone fired 119 shells from its main 13.5” 
guns.19 
Even considering the poor visibility, this was a dismal gunnery performance. 7,000 
yards was almost point-blank range by 1914; somewhat below the ranges Sumida has 
identified as Jellicoe’s ideal, and well below the ranges at which these battlecruisers were 
designed to fight. Fisher’s original battlecruiser concept assumed that advances in fire control 
gave the Royal Navy an ability to score hits at long ranges where battlecruisers would outgun 
pre-dreadnoughts. Indeed, the high speed of battlecruisers was intended to maximize this 
supposed advantage, by allowing them to reach an ideal position before unleashing a flurry 
of high caliber fire. Even with the spread of dreadnought-type battleships, the ability to hit at 
range would allow battlecruisers to sink cruisers and destroyers beyond torpedo range, and a 
number of British officers believed that the speed of battlecruisers enabled them to attack an 
enemy battleship column from ahead or behind, where most of the enemy fire would be 
masked. 
The fight off Heligoland suggested that the assumptions behind this conception of the 
battlecruiser were rather problematic. Fisher’s original battlecruiser idea placed firepower 
over armor because he assumed that the British ships could overwhelm an opponent in a 
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flurry of shells to open an engagement, preventing them from exploiting their weak armor.20 
However, if shooting remained so poor, the hoped-for debilitating fire—the key assumption 
underpinning the battlecruiser design—would never come, creating problems against both 
German battleships and the heavily armored German battlecruisers. Indeed, given the 
commonalities between battlecruiser and dreadnought fire control systems, Jellicoe’s alleged 
preference for a short medium-range battle followed by a turn out of torpedo range may have 
been beyond the technological capacity of the British fleet. 
Outside of European waters, HMAS Australia spent the first few months of the war 
fulfilling its intended mission of trade protection in the Far East. Specifically, Australia 
protected troop convoys, and joined in the search for the German East Asia Squadron, a 
collection of two late-model armored cruisers and four light cruisers that spent the early 
weeks of the war attacking Allied shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. While Australia 
did not catch the raiders, it seems as if her presence in Australasian waters was enough to 
convince the German commander, Vice Admiral Maximilian von Spee to decamp for South 
America with his squadron, save for one light cruiser that remained in the area, a partial 
success for the fleet unit model. 
A month after von Spee left for South America, Admiral Battenberg was forced out 
of the Admiralty to be replaced by Fisher. Battenberg had evinced no special interest in 
battlecruisers during his term but, of course, they were at the center of Fisher’s strategic 
worldview. It is no surprise, then, that upon the German East Asia Squadron appearing off 
the coast of Chile, and destroying the cobbled-together British forces in the area at Coronel 
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on November 1, his response hinged on battlecruisers. Using the North Sea battlecruisers as a 
central strategic reserve, he sent Princess Royal to the Western Atlantic to watch the 
Germans ships interned in New York harbor and the Panama Canal while sending Invincible 
and Inflexible (no longer in the Mediterranean) to the Falklands, the closest British base to 
Coronel. Even at a time like this, Fisher was unable to avoid a touch a personal pettiness. The 
latter two ships were placed under the command of Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee. Sturdee, 
a man Fisher and many others in the Admiralty disliked, was the Chief of the War Staff, and 
this appointment allowed for his replacement by someone more amenable.21 
This use of battlecruisers—exactly what Fisher had intended to use them for when the 
type was invented—sat uneasily with other elements in the Navy. Soon after the three 
battlecruisers had been detached for service in the Atlantic, Beatty wrote to Jellicoe arguing 
that his squadron “should always remain a concentrated force,” to enable it to meet its 
German opposite number, pointing to Coronel as an example of the dangers of numerical 
inferiority.22 The next week, Beatty reminded Jellicoe that Callaghan had endorsed, and 
Jellicoe confirmed, that Beatty’s primary object were the four German battlecruisers and 
Blücher, a force that could not be met by the three British battlecruisers active in the North 
Sea, Lion, Queen Mary, and New Zealand.23 For his part, Fisher, who had placed all of the 
North Sea battlecruisers under Beatty’s command, ensuring concentration when all were 
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present, held on to his original battlecruiser rationale, informing Beatty that “It’s NOT 
numbers that tell, but GUNNERY! . . . Hit the target!”24 
At the Admiralty Richmond feared that Fisher “will dissipate our forces,” an affront 
to the principle of concentration. He was especially concerned about Princess Royal 
steaming around the Western Atlantic with nothing her size to fight.25 Jellicoe, too, was 
worried about concentration, though for a somewhat different reason. Although he passed 
along Beatty’s request to the Admiralty, and shared his concern about their superiority over 
the German squadron, he related to Fisher that his ideal was to “form two battle cruiser 
squadrons, one for each end of the line when line of battle is formed.” Ideally, one squadron 
would be composed of the three Lions and Tiger, when ready, with the older battlecruisers in 
a separate squadron. The Queen Elizabeth, nearing full commissioning, would be assigned to 
one of the two battlecruiser squadrons, depending on her speed at trials.26 
As it turned out, Fisher’s use of battlecruisers as a strategic reserve proved successful. 
Invincible and Inflexible arrived in the Falklands the day before von Spee intended to attack 
the main port. Surprising von Spee’s squadron with their presence in harbor, the two 
battlecruisers, and their escorts proceeded to chase the German squadron, sinking the two 
German armored cruisers and two of his three remaining light cruisers in an engagement 
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whose result was never seriously in doubt. SMS Dresden escaped, and was finally cornered 
and sunk the following March.27 
Strategically, the Falklands were a vindication of Fisher’s faith in the battlecruiser 
and its trade-protection mission. In a single day, two battlecruisers had effectively destroyed 
the last remaining group of German warships outside of European waters at very little risk to 
the battlecruisers themselves. As the CID Secretary put it in a message to Fisher, the battle 
was “your triple triumph: A personal triumph. A triumph of correct strategical principles. A 
triumph for your type of ship.”28 Julian Corbett saw the episode as Fisher “at his best—swift, 
miraculously swift . . . dictated by a sure intuition.”29 Even Richmond, unhappy with the 
removal of Princess Royal for North America was willing to concede that the battle was a 
good use of battlecruisers.30 
Tactically, though, the Battle of the Falklands confirmed the gunnery problems faced 
in the Heligoland Bight. Under ideal visibility conditions, and nearly unmolested by German 
fire, the two battlecruisers only hit with 7% of their shells, taking five hours to dispatch two 
armored cruisers, at distances between 12,000 and 16,000 yards. These distances were longer 
than typical pre-war battle practice (although the prewar 1st BCS, which neither Invincible 
nor Inflexible were part of, had conducted exercises at that range), but well within range. 
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After firing 1,200 shells between them, the two battlecruisers were left with around 30 
rounds per gun; it is perhaps fortunate that they were not the ships that ran down Dresden.31 
The quality of British ammunition may have contributed to the poor performance, but 
the main problems again were spotting and control, the executive officer of Invincible noting 
the difficulty of gunnery against “constant changes in course and speed,” as well as 
Inflexible’s smoke.32 Inflexible’s head of gunnery, Lieutenant Commander Rudolf Verner, 
told his captain after the battle that he “had the feeling that I was perpetually ranging and had 
no grip on the target.”33 Perhaps this was because the range finders affixed to the two 
battlecruisers lacked the ability to determine accurate distance at those ranges; an incredible 
oversight.34 At any rate, two of the rangefinders on Inflexible at least, were put out of action 
due to smoke and splinters, while another one gave consistently inaccurate ranges.35 With 
that level of performance, the ability of battlecruisers to have a decisive impact in battle 
against the High Seas Fleet or the 1st Scouting Group must have been thrown into serious 
doubt. 
Just days after the Falklands, German battlecruisers shelled the towns of Hartlepool, 
Scarborough, and Whitby, in northeast England, causing little military damage, but killing 
more than a hundred Britons, mostly civilians. British intelligence had given advance notice 
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of the sortie, though not its destination, and the entire Grand Fleet steamed to catch the 
raiders on the way back. Although one of the Grand Fleet’s light cruiser squadrons spotted 
the German battlecruisers on their way back to Germany, in time for Beatty to attempt an 
interception, a combination of poor visibility, unclear communications and a convoluted 
chain of command (the commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron, nearby, but not involved in 
the chase, outranked Beatty and was thus technically in charge of the warships in the area) 
conspired to allow the Germans to make a narrow escape without encountering heavy British 
ships.36 Interestingly, an Admiralty report on the battle sent to the unit commanders 
concerned a few weeks later suggested that if Beatty had been willing to spread his 
battlecruisers out of visual range of each other, the German ships might have been brought to 
action, although Jellicoe contended that this would have been a violation of “the invariable 
rule” of concentration.37 
Although the December 16 battlecruiser raids were not the first of the war, they 
prompted serious changes in the organization of British forces in the North Sea. The raid had 
a great political impact in Britain and on the 20th, under what must have been intense 
pressure from the Cabinet, the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet’s battlecruisers and a 
squadron of light cruisers to Rosyth in the Firth of Forth, some 200 miles south of the Grand 
Fleet’s base in Scapa Flow. It was hoped that this would place them in a better position to 
intercept German raiders attacking the English coast, though it added some obvious 
                                                           
36
 This account of the action is primarily based on the records concerning the battle in BTY/3, NMM.  
37
 Admiralty memorandum, January 6, 1915, and Jellicoe to Admiralty, January 14, 1915, BTY/3, NMM.  
261 
 
difficulties in getting the Grand Fleet’s battlecruisers and battleships to link up on the 
increasingly rare occasions when the entire fleet sortied. 38 
Understandably, Jellicoe was opposed to the move. Three days after the initial order 
was sent, he wrote Fisher of his “fear” that “this perpetual idea of raids will affect our 
strategy.” This was especially galling as, in his view, preventing nuisance raids from 
battleships, let alone battlecruisers, was essentially impossible. Beatty, on the other hand, 
was getting exactly what he had wanted ever since the 1913 exercises: permission to focus 
his entire attention on the German battlecruisers, and an escort of light cruisers—a screen 
that allowed his squadron to operate independent of the rest of the Grand Fleet.39 While 
Beatty’s cruisers were formally under the command of Jellicoe in the Orkneys, the move 
down the coast gave the British battlecruiser force a great deal of autonomy; almost 
independence. 
Even better for Beatty, by the start of 1915 it appeared as if he would get control of 
Queen Elizabeth once she entered active service. Churchill had promised him the ship at the 
end of November, a move that would have strengthened Beatty’s squadron at the cost of 
some speed, though she was about as fast as the three earliest battlecruisers under ideal 
conditions.40 Fisher went a step further, promising to add Queen Elizabeth to Inflexible, 
Invincible, and Indomitable as a second division of the BCS.41 This would have created a 
rather powerful force, though one of uncertain mission. If the goal of placing the 
battlecruisers in Rosyth was really to stop German battlecruiser raids, the addition of a 
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slower battleship would stiffen the BCS’s spine, but would do nothing to help the BCS catch 
German raiders.  
Fisher certainly realized this issue, and spent the two months after the Battle of the 
Falklands and the December 16 raids leveraging the fresh wartime prestige of battlecruisers 
into new construction. On December 19, Fisher came to Director of Naval Construction 
Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt with specifications for a new battle cruiser, “Rhadamanthus,” 
a 32-knot battlecruiser with six 15” guns and “armored like ‘Indefatigable.’” The ship, Fisher 
assured D’Eyncourt, “will immortalize you.”42 More prosaically, the ship would use up 15” 
gun mountings originally destined for an R-class battleships of the 1914-15 program. Not 
only, then, did the Rhadamanthus design offer a chance to prepare battlecruisers on the 
cheap, but fulfill his long-held goal of replacing battleship construction with battlecruisers. 
Rhadamanthus proved a hard sell. Despite Fisher’s enthusiasm, Churchill demurred, 
telling Fisher that he was “entirely opposed” to new capital ship construction, fearing that 
they would still be under construction by the time the war ended.”43 Facing this roadblock, 
Fisher attempted to enlist Beatty and Jellicoe to his cause, writing to the latter for “a casual 
sort of letter which I can show to the Cabinet (not as if you were responding to my request; 
not an official memorandum),” to force action upon the Admiralty.44 Jellicoe did send the 
letter on the 29th, but by December 28, D’Eyncourt was informed that he had permission to 
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proceed with the design, Fisher having told Churchill that Jellicoe supported the 
battlecruisers on Christmas.45 
Repulse and Renown were laid down on January 25, 1915, and the two ships 
represent, perhaps, the purest expression of Fisher’s design principles.46 Much has been made 
of Fisher’s outsized role in getting the initial group of three battlecruisers designed and 
approved in 1904-5, but even those designs were filtered through a committee of experts, 
who were at least partially responsible for giving them 12” guns instead of the 9.2” guns the 
original “Naval Necessities” memorandum had called for in 1904.47 A close look at the 
design process for Repulse and Renown shows that the only voice that mattered was Fisher’s. 
D’Eyncourt, ostensibly responsible for the design, merely followed the directions laid out in 
the (very short) ‘Rhadamanthus’ memorandum. 
Writing after the war, Churchill claimed that Fisher’s “surge of impulse” convinced 
him and, presumably, the remainder of the Board to acquiesce in Fisher’s plan to turn 
Repulse and Renown into battlecruisers.48 If true, the episode highlighted how broken the 
Admiralty’s system of warship design truly was. Although Fisher and D’Eyncourt had a 
model of the new design made to show Beatty and Jellicoe, at no point did Fisher or 
D’Eyncourt consult with the two men who, presumably, would be responsible for using the 
new ships in combat, about the ships’ capabilities. Indeed, in late January, Fisher rejected 
Jellicoe’s suggestion of adding an extra turret to Repulse and Renown.49 Even if Fisher had 
                                                           
45
 Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 291.  
46
 D’Eyncourt, “Enclosure on H.M.S. ‘Repulse’ Progressive Trials,” September 16, 1916, DEY/27/2, NMM.  
47
 Fisher, “Naval Necessities, Vol. I,” ADM 116/3092, TNA, 62. 
48
 Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. I (New York; Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), 495.  
49
 Fisher to Jellicoe, January 22, 1915, FG&DN, 143-.4.  
264 
 
been inclined to listen to others on the design of his pets, Jellicoe’s letter came far too late in 
the greatly accelerated design cycle. For his part, Beatty seems to have been completely in 
the dark about their construction schedule as late as January 28.50 Jellicoe’s request suggests 
that he was well aware of the remarkably poor shooting of the battlecruisers at Heligoland 
and the Falklands, and wanted an extra pair of guns to give a better chance of hitting the 
target.51 It is also virtually certain that both men would have asked for increased armor; at 
least on the level of the Lions. 
However, by this point, the Admiralty had been hijacked by the passions of Churchill 
and Fisher. We have already seen how Fisher was able to create his own construction policy 
with little to no oversight, but his nominal superior was also able to push through his plans. 
Upon the war’s outbreak, Churchill, who took a broad view of his prerogatives, bypassed 
both the Admiralty Board and the Admiralty War Staff in favor of an ad-hoc “War Staff 
Group” that replaced the staff’s functions. Although the Chief of Staff was a member, it also 
included Churchill, the First Sea Lord, the Second Sea Lord, and the Permanent Secretary. 
Aided by unattached senior officers like Callaghan and Wilson, this body usurped much of 
the authority of the Board and the Admiralty staff while concentrating power in fewer 
hands.52 
Despite the eminence of many War Staff Group members, they proved unable to 
resist Churchill’s combination of executive authority and passion.53 After just two weeks of 
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war, Richmond had written about “the servile Sea Lords & C.O.S. when faced with 
Churchill’s penchant for plans that were more spectacular than sensible.54 In early January, 
when asked to plan a Board-approved (but fortunately never carried out) scheme of 
Churchill’s to capture the island of Borkum, off the Frisian coast, Richmond wrote that the 
idea was “quite mad . . . I have never read such an idiotic, amateur piece of work as this 
outline in my life.”55 Early January was also when Churchill set his Dardanelles plan into 
motion that would eventually end his term in office, another operation conceived without the 
input of the Board.56 Instead, Churchill communicated directly with Vice Admiral Sackville 
Carden, the British commander in the Eastern Mediterranean.57  
The day before Repulse and Renown were laid down, the German and British 
battlecruiser forces fought near the Dogger Bank, where the German 1st Scouting Group was 
supporting a light cruiser attack on a British fishing fleet, thought to be there for espionage 
purposes.58 Having received advanced notice of the sortie from signals intelligence, the 
Admiralty sent the entire Grand Fleet to meet the raid, with Beatty and the lighter forces in 
front to flush the Germans towards the battle squadrons. In the end, the British were unable 
to force the Germans north towards the remainder of the Grand Fleet, and main portion of the 
battle was a running artillery duel between the two sets of battlecruisers, five British, and 
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three German, along with Blücher. In the end, the British did sink Blücher, but the rest of the 
Scouting Group escaped, and Lion suffered extensive damage. 
The Battle of Dogger Bank took place at long ranges—firing started at 20,000 yards 
and dropped to about 15,000 in the main part of the action—and again battlecruiser gunnery 
was suspect. Though Chatfield later assured Beatty that it was possible to score hits at those 
ranges, and SMS Seydlitz was nearly sunk by a British shell and a magazine fire, it was at the 
ragged edge of contemporary fire control, and nearly impossible to hit the target consistently. 
At these distances, spotters could not see the splashes of long misses, or the muted flashes of 
hits with AP shells. With short misses the only evidence available for gunnery control, 
Chatfield suggested aiming deliberately short in the future and then “work it up by small 
‘ups,’” until no short splashes were seen and, presumably, the target hit.59 Even worse, the 
Dreyer mechanical tables, at least the latest model installed in Tiger, used to track the rate of 
change in a target’s movement, lacked the ability to handle ranges greater than 17,000 
yards.60 If nothing else, the battle was proof that despite Fisher’s exhortations, battlecruisers 
were incapable of rapid, effective fire at long ranges, and could not come close to 
overwhelming the enemy squadron. 
During the battle, Lion was the only British ship to come under heavy fire, due to the 
Scouting Group concentrating its fire on the British van, and it took a fair amount of damage 
from their attentions. Although Lion was never in danger of sinking during the battle, her 
speed was reduced to 15 knots, leaving her unable to lead the pursuit of the remaining 
German ships (by this point Hipper had abandoned Blücher to her fate). Active command 
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was shifted to Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, the commander of the 2nd BCS aboard New 
Zealand, but based on a series of signaling mishaps, instead of pursuing the retreating 
Germans, as Beatty tried to signal, he turned his attention to the crippled Blücher, sinking 
her, but letting the other German ships escape.61 
Of course, had Moore correctly divined Beatty’s confusing orders and proceeded to 
chase the 1st Scouting Group, the result could have been disastrous. With Queen Mary and 
Invincible undergoing dockyard maintenance, and Indefatigable and Inflexible at the 
Dardanelles only five battlecruisers were available to Beatty on the day. The temporary 
disablement of Lion meant that only Tiger and Princess Royal were capable of catching the 
German battlecruisers, Indomitable and New Zealand being too slow. If the chase had 
continued, the duel between Tiger and Princess Royal on one side, and Derfflinger and 
Moltke on the other may have gone poorly for the British, especially since the recently 
commissioned Tiger was not yet up to full wartime efficiency.  
Furthermore, the battle highlighted the importance of small differences in speed in 
battlecruiser warfare. The six battlecruisers of the Invincible and Indefatigable classes 
(Australia was on the way back from the Far East at the time of the battle and would reach 
the North Sea in February), were near-useless for the sort of war that Beatty wanted to fight, 
and that the British forces in the North Sea had been fighting thus far. With the danger from 
submarines and mines, major units could not sortie very often, and certainly not in support of 
relatively expendable light cruisers. When the battlecruisers did sortie, it was to chase their 
opposite numbers, which the six older battlecruisers were simply unable to do. Critics of the 
type had suggested that a battlecruiser robbed of its speed was a near-useless warship, and 
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the evidence from the Dogger Bank suggested that this was equally true of undamaged 
battlecruisers superseded by newer and faster ships. 
There was a final, troubling suggestion from the battle. In an addendum to his formal 
after action report, Moore passed along his concerns about the armor of British battlecruisers. 
At the extreme ranges encountered during the battle, the horizontal armor of the British 
battlecruisers—the armored deck and the roofs of the turrets and conning towers—were too 
thin to handle the effects of plunging fire. As in battleships, the thickest armor in British 
battlecruisers was vertical, protecting the conning tower, turrets, and waterline. At the shorter 
ranges (10,000 yards at the most), and thus shallower angles of fire expected in combat by 
prewar designers there was little chance of a heavy shell striking a horizontal surface at any 
angle approaching perpendicular, allowing them to skimp on horizontal protection (the turret 
and conning tower roofs on the six older battlecruisers were only 2-3” thick).62 At 20,000 
yards, both German and British guns had to fire at an elevation at or above twenty degrees, 
greatly increasing the chances of a direct hit on the vulnerable roofs.63  
No immediate movement was made on the subject of armor, but soon after the battle, 
the independence implicitly granted to the battlecruisers was formalized with the creation of 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet in February.64 Beatty, senior to Moore, had the overall tactical 
command at Dogger Bank, but no day-to-day oversight of the battlecruisers outside of his 
own 1st BCS Adding this extra layer gave Beatty formal control over all of the North Sea 
battlecruisers, now split into three squadrons by class, as well as associated formations of 
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light cruisers and destroyers. In theory, though they remained a part of the Grand Fleet 
organization, such a move would make the forces stationed at Rosyth work as an efficient 
unit operating under the same fighting instructions and undergoing the same training. Had 
Moore been more familiar with Beatty, for example, the confusion over orders at Dogger 
Bank may have been resolved quicker.  
On the other hand, it was hard for Beatty—as it would have been for anyone in that 
position—not to falsely regard the BCF as an entirely independent formation free to pursue 
its war on the 1st Scouting Group instead of concentrating on scouting for the Grand Fleet. 
Indeed, a year into the BCF experiment, Jellicoe lamented to the new 1st Sea Lord, Henry B. 
Jackson, that Beatty was too inclined to think himself independent, viewing his role as 
initiating contact with the German forces more than scouting.65 On a more theoretical level, it 
is fair to wonder what exactly the point of a fleet of battlecruisers was, especially in the 
confines of the North Sea. In Fisher’s conception, the type was the antithesis of 
concentration, and the gap in speeds between the two component squadrons would make 
cooperative action difficult, as Dogger Bank had shown.  
Despite the problems revealed by the action at Dogger Bank, Fisher maintained his 
advocacy of the type. In a letter to Beatty in early February, he predicted that the 
battlecruisers would “finish the job” without the rest of the Grand Fleet coming to grips with 
the German battle squadrons.66 With Jellicoe, Fisher hedged a bit, claiming that the 
battlecruiser would win the naval war, but only if accompanied by the first two Queen 
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Elizabeths and stationed apart from the Grand Fleet in Rosyth, closer to German bases.67 
Fisher’s letter to Beatty also informed him that the Admiralty was preparing a “surprise 
packet for Tirpitz! . . . [S]o secret that the whole correspondence for them is only on one 
half-sheet of notepaper.”68 
This “surprise packet” Fisher referred to was not news of Repulse and Renown, also 
designed on “one half-sheet,” but a new class of “large light cruiser” Fisher intended for a 
war-winning operation in the Baltic. Developed with the assistance of Julian Corbett, Fisher 
planned to force the entrance to the Baltic, achieve local superiority there, and in conjunction 
with the Russian Army, land forces in Pomerania, near Berlin.69 To that end, the newly 
designed cruisers had an extremely shallow draft for use in Baltic waters. The cruisers also 
had incredibly light armor, the legacy of a government prohibition on new wartime capital 
ship construction (the first two wartime battlecruisers were technically redesigns of 
previously approved battleships).70 Although the plan belonged to Fisher and Corbett, there is 
little doubt that Churchill shared their understanding that the Baltic could be the decisive 
theater of the naval war.71 
The day after Dogger Bank, Fisher wrote Churchill, trying to convince him of the 
necessity for “a Cruiser of 32 knots speed and 22.5 feet draught of water, carrying four 15-
inch guns.”72 Churchill would later call these ships “an old man’s children . . . wanting in the 
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structural strength and armor which the new conditions of war more than ever required,” but 
he raised no objections at the time and allowed the idea to proceed.73 On January 29, 
D’Eyncourt presented the 3rd Sea Lord with preliminary plans for the large light cruiser, a 32-
knot ship with four 15” guns and 3” side armor, though rising to 9.7” in the turrets.74 Stanley 
V. Goodall, a constructor under D’Eyncourt, would later calculate that the armor on the new 
Courageous-class ships only accounted for 7.4% of the weight, 1,420 tons on a 19,171-ton 
displacement.75 
The Courageous, Glorious, and Furious, a slightly later addition to the class with a 
battery of only two 18” guns, were the last warships Fisher played a hand in developing, and 
they serve as a fitting monument to his second stint at the Admiralty. At a time when the fleet 
was discovering that hits at long range were a product of volume of fire more than precision 
and some battlecruiser officers were becoming very concerned about their ships’ protection, 
Fisher delivered two classes of ships that utterly failed to integrate wartime experience, as 
perceived by those who had actually experienced it. Had the ships gone through anything 
approaching a normal design process, it is probable that objections would have been raised, 
the first set of designs modified, and the second binned, but Fisher was able to take 
advantage of the chaotic wartime Admiralty and bypass formal discussion by going straight 
to the First Lord.  
The result was three ships even less suited to the actual naval war than Renown and 
Repulse. In early 1916 Beatty would call the under-construction vessels “freak ships which 
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with no defensive power and greatly reduced offensive (only four guns) could not be 
expected to engage successfully a heavily armored ship with double their offensive power,” 
adding that if Lion were so lightly armored, she would not have survived the Dogger Bank 
battle.76 In fact, as war experience had shown, with only four guns, the “freaks” would have 
had trouble hitting anything at battle ranges.  
Still, the outcome of this irregular process need not have been a failure. To name one 
example, the development of the first tanks, which took place at around the same time, also 
involved an ad hoc planning process overseen by Churchill. Fisher, however, despite his 
correspondence with and personal affection for Beatty and especially Jellicoe, was entirely at 
odds with the prevailing thinking in Scapa Flow and Rosyth. The result was the construction 
of five ships that took none of the supposed lessons of the war to heart. Although he was well 
aware of the conditions prevailing in the North Sea, given the opportunity to design 
battlecruisers from scratch, Fisher essentially created an updated version of the original 
Invincible class.  
The process leading to Fisher’s new battlecruisers did not reflect well on the wartime 
Admiralty, but it also stands as an indictment of the prewar Admiralty. Once the Churchill 
Admiralty decisively killed the fleet unit idea and decided to introduce Queen Elizabeths in 
lieu of new battlecruiser construction, the Navy’s leadership seems to have lost interest in the 
ships. Apart from the four ships sent as a makeweight to the Mediterranean, there seems to 
have been the idea that such large and powerful ships would be best used in the North Sea, 
but without a clear sense of how to use them. Beatty and Callaghan reached an understanding 
that their primary mission was going after their German counterparts, but this simplistic 
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strategy was not shared by the Navy at large, the Admiralty, or Callaghan’s successor, who 
viewed them as fast wing ships with an additional scouting mission. 
More than an administrative or strategic failure, the five wartime battlecruisers were 
evidence of a doctrinal failure—not a failed doctrine, but its complete absence. A prevailing 
battlecruiser doctrine—formal or informal—would not have prevented the tension between 
Beatty and Jellicoe over where to station the BCF and how much independence to give it, 
and would not necessarily have mitigated the poor performance of battlecruiser fire control in 
the Great War’s early months. However, such a doctrine almost certainly would have 
prevented Fisher and D’Eyncourt presenting the Grand Fleet with five ships that, even in 
early 1915, were clearly unsuited for the war that was being waged, and unwanted by the 
commanders on the scene. The ships were more or less ideal for Fisher’s coherent 
battlecruiser doctrine, but at that point, it existed mostly in his own head, and he lacked the 
statutory ability to impose it on his nominal subordinates.  
  
*** 
 
 By contrast, the United States entered the war years with a firm battlecruiser doctrine 
focusing on scouting and detached operations, but no battlecruisers, and seemingly no 
immediate prospects of obtaining them without compromising the Navy’s all-important 
battleship program. When events in 1915 allowed for the expansion of the U.S. Navy, its 
leadership opted for a battlecruiser program in line with their prewar expectations. The war 
provided the resources, but for the most part their ideas about how to use them remained 
stable. 
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American officers paid keen attention to the events in Europe, but the quality of 
information available made drawing firm conclusions difficult. Proceedings did publish a 
“War Notes” section throughout the conflict, including official and press accounts of the 
major engagements, but the information that did reach the United States came mostly from 
the Allied side, through severe censorship. As a result, the United States had a reasonably 
good idea of what happened during the war, but very little of the why or how. 
 What information there was seemed to support the Navy’s pro-battlecruiser faction, 
the majority opinion within the Navy’s uniformed leadership since at least 1912. Late in 
1914, Commander P. Symington, an attaché in London, wrote to Captain James H. Oliver, 
the Director of Naval Intelligence, to press the case for battlecruisers. Although Symington 
was a longstanding supporter of the ships, the events of the Great War gave his opinions a 
new urgency. Perhaps with the November German raid on Yarmouth fresh in his mind, he 
wrote of his fear that American communications in a war with Japan would be “helpless . . . 
should the Japanese have the use of four Kongo ships for raiding purposes.”77 Two months 
later, William Sims reworked his 1911 Long Course scouting paper for the benefit of the 
General Board, which commented approvingly on battlecruisers in the scouting and 
screening missions, though not for raiding enemy communications or coastlines.78 Although 
the U.S. Navy had considered using battlecruisers to raid enemy communications and 
isolated outposts, raiding civilian settlements is one idea that does not appear in the Navy’s 
battlecruiser deliberations. The Board was not, however, above using the shocking German 
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attacks to their advantage, especially in the cause of embarrassing the Secretary of the 
Navy—whom they saw as a poor advocate of the uniformed Navy’s priorities.  
Using events abroad to score political points at home reflected the dynamics of the 
prewar U.S. Navy, and would in turn affect the eventual building and use of battlecruisers. 
Early 1915 was an especially fraught time in the relationship between the Navy’s senior 
leadership and Secretary Daniels. Faced with what he saw as Daniels’s dangerous 
complacency in readying the fleet for a possible war, Bradley Fiske, the Aide for Operations, 
the closest thing to a chief of staff in the Navy, presented Daniels with a paper detailing the 
flaws in the Navy, especially the lack of a specialized staff.79 When Daniels declined to act 
on his recommendations, Fiske blasted Daniels in his testimony over the 1915 Navy bill, a 
bold step for an officer to take. Even further, Fiske, with the support of his General Board 
colleagues, went behind Daniels’s back, and laid out the case for a naval general staff to 
Congressman Richmond B. Hobson, an ex-Navy officer. With Hobson’s backing, the House 
Naval Affairs Committee sent a Navy Bill with provisions for creating a naval general staff.80 
Proceedings also got into the act, awarding its 1915 essay prize to an article by 
Lieutenant Commander Dudley Knox, “The Rôle of Doctrine in Naval Warfare.” Published 
in the March-April issue of the magazine, Knox argued for the establishment of a service-
wide doctrine, as opposed to the narrow tactical doctrine he had helped Sims forge in the 
Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla. Such a doctrine “should not be built up from the little things to the 
larger ones, separately in each branch,” but should instead come from the top of the service. 
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By creating a “concrete, comprehensive and coherent conception of modern war,” (emphasis 
in original), the Navy could develop “strategy, tactics, logistics, gunnery, ship design, ship 
exercise, shore and ship organization and administration,” with the greatest possible 
efficiency. Although Knox demurred from an explicit call for a general staff, such a staff was 
the only body that could possibly create that “conception of modern war.”81 
Having caught the general staff bill early, Secretary Daniels was able to water down 
its provisions in the full House and Senate. While an Office of Naval Operations was 
established, the Office and its Chief were merely responsible for the active fleet and 
developing war plans; the unruly Bureaus remained under the direct supervision of the 
Secretary.82 Although the navalists were getting something like the dreamed of central 
commander and staff, their champion Bradley Fiske would not shift into the new office. As 
Fiske later admitted, his testimony in favor of a strong naval staff had thoroughly poisoned 
the well, and he submitted his resignation early in April after hearing that “things were being 
done by Dept. [i.e. Daniels] in work of Division of Operations without my knowledge.”83 
It was unlikely that Daniels would choose someone aligned with Fiske, a category 
that ruled out much of the Navy’s senior leadership and most of the obvious candidates. 
Indeed, in late April 1915, Daniels nominated Captain William Shepherd Benson, the 
commander of the Philadelphia Navy Yard for the CNO post, a competent officer, but not 
one who had any specialized knowledge or interest in the area of staff work, and certainly 
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not a man considered to be on the fast track for high command.84 Benson himself later related 
that he was “the most surprised person in Washington,” when his appointment was 
announced.85 
Even before the identity of Fiske’s successor was known, the Board was planning a 
poison pill for him. Every summer, the Atlantic Fleet undertook a series of tactical and 
strategic exercises, but in 1915, the Board devised the exercises, rather than letting the 
Atlantic Fleet commander come up with his own.86 By itself, the idea was benign, an attempt 
to make the exercises serve the purposes of strategic planning, much like the Board’s 
commissioning of reports from Newport. In this case, however, the Board—and the Assistant 
Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt—worked with a clear political purpose in mind. The 1915 
exercises would serve to bolster the case of naval expansion by “making the game show what 
would really happen if a hostile fleet should start for our eastern coast.”87 In Roosevelt’s 
words, the exercises would “be made to serve an object lesson to the country.”88 
Although Daniels expressed his clear opposition to such a “realistic” exercise, in mid-
March, approving the exercises with the understanding that the “American” fleet would win, 
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Roosevelt and the Board devised a scenario in which the fleet representing the U.S. would 
have little chance of success.89 An aggressor fleet based on the German High Seas Fleet, of 
ten dreadnoughts, four battlecruisers, and eight pre-dreadnoughts faced off against an 
American fleet of six dreadnoughts and ten pre-dreadnoughts, playing out a scenario in 
which the “German” fleet would attempt to land 200,000 troops “somewhere between 
Eastport, Me., and Cape Hatteras.”90 This scenario, it hardly needs saying, was risible. Even 
had the High Seas Fleet not been somewhat busy in the North Sea, carrying 200,000 men 
across the Atlantic to land on a hostile shore was a task probably beyond the capacity of 
period militaries.91 However, the exercise was carefully crafted to imply that the most 
densely populated portion of the country was under threat of invasion. Unsurprisingly, the 
Atlantic Fleet was routed in the ensuing exercises, which took place in mid-May, allowing 
the “German” fleet to land its invasion army in the undefended Chesapeake.92  
In his report on the exercises for Daniels, the referee, NWC President Austin Knight, 
left no doubt where he thought the causes of defeat lay: 
Admiral [Frank Friday] Fletcher’s plan was excellent but it gave little hope of success 
in view of the marked superiority of the enemy in scouts. The advanced forces came 
in contact . . . on the 20th and within a few hours seven of the fifteen blue scouts were 
destroyed, the most effective work against them being done by the enemy battle 
cruisers whose high speed and long range guns enabled them to pick off the slower 
and weaker Blue cruisers almost at will while themselves eluding the supporting 
dreadnoughts.93 
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Knight’s conclusion highlights the extent to which the 1915 exercise was intended to prove a 
point rather than to provide an examination of open strategic or tactical questions. The 
General Board must have been aware that the premise of the exercise was entirely unmoored 
from any war experience to date. The entire situation reminds one of nothing more than a 
War College war game with real ships, and it returned the solution that Newport war games 
had been providing since about 1911: the United States Navy needed battlecruisers, not for 
use against battleships, but to dominate the scouting situation. The Board, especially Knight, 
made sure that the press got the message. Another set of less-publicized exercises was run in 
the early fall, again suggesting, somewhat more honestly, that battlecruisers were a critical 
gap in American capabilities.94 
 Fiske’s autobiography suggests that the idea for the May exercises may have come 
from an article in the New York World newspaper, so it is no surprise that the press was quick 
to notice the “lessons” of the exercise.95 Scientific American, for example, argued that “[i]f 
the General Board send in recommendations for battle cruisers only . . .  they would be fully 
justified, not only by the events of the war, but also by the general conviction throughout the 
country.”96 For their part, the editors of The Navy took the exercises as clear evidence “that 
the navy of the United States is lacking in battle cruisers.”97 On May 27, the New York Times 
published an article on the war games, with the headline “Battle Cruisers won for 
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‘Invaders,’” and suggested that Congress would be forced to approve battlecruisers in the 
next navy bill.98 
 Even Proceedings ended its battlecruiser interdict, publishing a number of pro-
battlecruiser articles in the months after the exercises. The first, Commander Ralph Earle’s 
“Naval Scouts” in the July-August issue was probably written before the exercises, and was 
rather lukewarm in support, claiming that battlecruisers, while ideal scouts, “are probably 
outside the question for this country.”99 In the November-December issue, however, the 
journal published three pro-battlecruiser articles. One of those three articles, Lieutenant R.A. 
Dawes’s “Battle Tactics,” was written before the war, but the latter two, Assistant 
Constructor Beirne Saunders Bullard’s “A Plea for the Battle-Cruiser,” and Commander 
Yates Stirling’s “The Arrival of the Battle-Cruiser” were undeniably written in 1915. Given 
the journal’s previous policy, it is impossible to explain away this cluster as chance. Given 
the prominence of Proceedings and the Naval Institute within the Navy (at the time Bradley 
Fiske was the president of the USNI), it is equally impossible to imagine that its editors were 
unaware of the content and scope of the Board’s proposals for the 1916 Navy bill, discussed 
at length below.   
 Stirling, who had been a member of the first Long Course, wrote an article that 
reflected some of the more overheated rhetoric concerning battlecruisers that was in vogue 
during the early years of the war. After all, apart from the Dardanelles bombardments, 
battlecruisers had been the only capital ships to see action, and outcomes of those actions—
the Goeben chase, German raids on the English coast, Heligoland Bight, the Falklands, 
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Dogger Bank—burnished the reputation of the type. As Stirling put it, “the naval lesson of 
the war [is that] . . . [t]he dreadnought battleship has passed away.” In its place, “[the battle-
cruiser is the mistress of the sea, and he who commands the most powerful fleet of battle-
cruisers commands the sea.”100 
 Bullard’s piece, rather more restrained than Stirling’s, neatly reflected the outer limits 
of “acceptable” battlecruiser discussion within the Navy. Bullard argued that battlecruisers 
“should be nothing more than higher speed battleships” in fleet engagements, and while this 
is further than the General Board was willing to go, it was clearly an attitude shared by many 
in the Navy. Sims, for example, would show himself a partisan of this position in testimony 
before Congress in early 1916. Bullard also, however, pointed towards Dogger Bank and the 
Falklands, emphasizing the battlecruiser’s utility for “independent service,” more in keeping 
with the General Board-approved consensus forged before the war.101  
 At Newport, Lieutenant Commander H.E. Yarnell also weighed in for battlecruisers. 
Yarnell, a student in the Long Course class that began in July 1914, was clearly a coming 
man in the Navy (he spent the war years on Sims’s planning staff in London), and advocated 
for battlecruisers based on competition, rather than first principles. To Yarnell, the basis of 
American naval policy was that “[o]ur naval force must be such as to defeat our most 
probable opponent. . . . Japan.” To that end, “[i]f Japan builds battle cruisers . . . we must 
build the same, only a few more, and a little faster and more powerful.” Interestingly, Yarnell 
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was on the fence about their utility as a fast wing, pointing out that contemporary American 
range finders were useless even at 12,000 yards, dangerously close for battlecruisers.102  
 More important than the press, Proceedings, and discussions at Newport, however, 
was the response of the Wilson Administration. The larger “Preparedness” campaign initiated 
by the government was certainly not a response to the naval exercises, but they, along with 
the course of the war, and the sinking of the ocean liner Lusitania in May 1915, contributed 
to a climate where a large navy was no longer unthinkable, even to a Democratic 
administration. The Wilson administration was not noted for its friendliness to naval 
interests; as recently as January 1915, Wilson had pressed for a one-battleship program in the 
cabinet.103 In late July, however, Wilson informed Daniels that the Navy Department should 
prepare for a new, large, building program.104 This request was quickly passed on to the 
Board, and six days later, the Board developed a new naval policy, committing the United 
States Navy to equal “the most powerful [fleet] maintained by another nation . . . not later 
than 1925.” Alongside that declaration, the Board discussed the addition of battlecruisers to 
the 1916 building program, which was approved with the assent of all present except Benson, 
the new CNO.105 In October, Daniels clarified the scope of future construction, telling the 
Board to prepare a five-year, $500 million program.106 Two days later, the Board returned to 
Daniels with a program that called for the construction of six battlecruisers, ten battleships, 
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ten scouts and a host of other vessels.107 Benson, again, tried to curb the battlecruisers in the 
program, submitted a resolution to that effect two days later, but again, he was outvoted by 
the rest of the Board, demonstrating the strict limits on the authority of his new, 
impressively-titled position.108 
 Interestingly, the Board divided this $500 million program into two parts: the 
construction needed to “balance the present seagoing fleet” and entirely new construction 
based on the new goal of naval supremacy by 1925. The ten battleships and two of the 
battlecruisers were provided for under the latter rationale, but four of the battlecruisers and 
four of the scouts were described by the Board as necessary for the functioning of the 
existing fleet, presumably making them a higher priority than the rest of the proposed new 
construction. The meeting minutes lack any sort of detailed account of the proceedings, but 
the “necessity” of four battlecruisers to accompany the Navy’s seventeen authorized 
dreadnought battleships is essentially identical to the General Board’s recommendation for a 
4:1 battleship to battlecruiser ratio in their proposed 1912 building program.109 If we accept 
the impossibility of building ½ of a battlecruiser, it also explains the additional two requested 
alongside the ten new battleships in the next planned phase of building.  
 To put it bluntly, the General Board’s six-battlecruiser program had nothing to do 
with a reappraisal of the battlecruiser type in light of wartime evidence, a misconception that 
is repeated throughout the relevant historical literature.110 The Great War certainly created an 
                                                           
107
 General Board Meeting, October 9, 1915, Proceedings and Hearings, Roll 3, 299-303.  
108
 General Board Meeting, October 11, 1915, Proceedings, and Hearings, Roll 3, 304.  
109
 General Board, “Building Program, 1913-1917,” September 25, 1912, RG 80, E 281, File 420-2, NARA 
Washington. 
110
 These problematic assertions span the entire historiography of the World War I era, from the 1930s to the 
present In The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton UP, 1939), one of the earliest and most influential 
284 
 
environment where the Navy finally received “enough” money for both battlecruiser and 
battleship construction, but the request for six battlecruisers was merely the application of the 
1912 formula to the 1915 fleet and the ten new battleships in the Board’s program. 
Furthermore, the Board actually went out of its way to highlight the differences between 
foreign, especially British, battlecruiser practice and the nascent American battlecruiser 
doctrine.  
 Indeed, if the Board’s request for battlecruisers was based on the war’s experience, 
then the Board’s first set of battlecruiser specifications are very difficult to explain. The 
preliminary designs that had been submitted for the1912 battlecruiser were based on one of 
Constructor Robinson’s 11” armor designs, but the new 1915 specifications from the Board 
had more in common with Robinson’s lighter 8” belt designs. The General Board asked for a 
35-knot ship with ten 14” guns and only five inches of main belt armor.111 By the Navy’s 
own calculations, this made the battlecruisers’ armor proof against 6” shells at best, the 
caliber of main battery found on light cruisers.112 Five inches was about half the thickness of 
the main belt armor of the latest prewar British and German battlecruiser construction, 
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suggesting very strongly that the General Board considered these ships more scouts than fast 
wing and, indeed, had taken those predilections to a new extreme. Likewise, the Board 
requested a 12,000-mile cruising range at 10 knots. 113 Even though the U.S. Navy was long-
legged compared to most others, the endurance was somewhat higher than that for American 
battleships, suggesting again that the battlecruisers were intended for operations independent 
from and in advance of the battle fleet.114  
  The battlecruiser mission was also borne out by the Board’s annual construction 
program memo, written in late November. Noting that many American observers had been 
impressed by the performance of British battlecruisers in the war to date, the Board’s letter 
took pains to note that “the particular course of the present war does not justify the prevalent 
exaggerated idea of their importance.” Instead, the role of battlecruisers was “chiefly . . . to 
secure information . . . and break through a hostile screen,” while protecting its own. 
Secondarily, battlecruisers could be used to protect sea lanes, and launch torpedo attacks on 
enemy ships, though it is telling that in five paragraphs on battlecruisers the latter mission 
only warranted a single sentence.115 This set of missions was nearly identical to that proposed 
at the War College in 1911-12, and adopted by the General Board in late 1912. Tellingly, the 
Board did not suggest following the British lead in using the vessels as anti-battlecruiser 
specialists. In the United States, at least, the primary role of battlecruisers was to allow the 
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battle fleet to do its war-winning job with greater efficiency and security, not to usurp those 
functions. 
 William Sims, on the other hand, took a position in advance of the Board, asserting a 
more urgent need, and proposing a more muscular role in the heart of battle for the ships. In 
March 1916, he told the House Naval Affairs Committee that “[o]ur great necessity now is 
for battle cruisers.”116 While Daniels and the Board saw Wilson’s blank check as the prelude 
to a dramatic expansion of the battle line, Sims went a good deal further and argued that 
battleship construction should be halted until the Navy had built “eight or nine battle 
cruisers” to support the fleet.117 Indeed, Sims unconsciously echoed Fisher in suggesting that 
the two battleships of the previous year’s program ought to be converted into battlecruisers, 
if possible.118 As one might expect with this aggressive stance, Sims conceptualized 
battlecruisers as decisive instruments of the fast wing in battle, rather than very capable 
scouts, telling the committee that the ships “have the power of battleships . . .  speed and 
power and have got armor resistance, which is very considerable.”119  
 Oddly enough, Sims’s enthusiasm was not dimmed by a close study of the Falklands 
engagement. While the gunnery officers present at the battle focused on the breakdown and 
malfunctioning of ranging and gunlaying equipment, Sims, who had made his career on the 
strength of his gunnery expertise, focused on the issue of range. Like Jellicoe, Sims believed 
that decisive gunnery results were only achievable within maximum torpedo range, arguing 
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for a battle range of about 10,000 yards.120 At those ranges, talk of the “considerable” armor 
resistance of battlecruisers, even before Jutland, sounded rather out of place. Even from the 
United States, it was clear that Lion was seriously damaged, and Blücher near-fatally 
wounded at much longer ranges than 10,000 yards at Dogger Bank.  
  The Navy’s strategic elite, however, tended to agree with the Board’s more 
restrained approach, acknowledging the battlecruiser’s potential for the fast wing, but 
identifying its main role as scouting and screening. In June, 1916, the NWC held a 
conference on “tactical principles,” which concluded that while the ships could be used “for 
gun and torpedo fire in cooperation with battleships,” their main utility lay “[i]n the broader 
field of tactics wherein it merges into the strategic field.”121 The individual papers for the 
conference said much the same thing. Captain A.P. Niblack, an officer bound for high 
command, submitted a paper that agreed with the points made above, though he emphasized 
the raiding mission, which Sims and the Board had neglected to discuss.122 Commander 
Waldo Evans, one of the instructors, asserted that the ships “are built primarily more for 
strategic work,” although in battle they could contribute to the fast wing if necessary.123 
 The near-unanimity expressed by the War College—usually the seat of intense 
debate—suggests something of the extent to which battlecruiser doctrine was a settled debate 
in the U.S. by mid-1916. Battlecruisers were primarily scouts, with a secondary mission of 
using their speed to perform the fast wing mission in battle, with a special emphasis on 
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torpedo attacks. Even Sims’s rebutting of the General Board in front of Congress modified, 
rather than negated, this consensus; Sims’s approach placed more emphasis on the tactical 
over the strategic, but his fellow officers agreed that if battlecruisers were used in a general 
engagement, their place would be outside of the line proper, making attacks on the opposing 
battle line. Oddly, the use of battlecruisers to counter enemy battlecruisers in battle does not 
seem to have been a terribly important part of these discussions, only blunting their effect as 
raiders, scouts, and screens. 
 As discussed earlier in this chapter and elsewhere, this nascent battlecruiser doctrine 
was the U.S. Navy’s own. The debates in the United States over the ships from 1910-1916 
bear little relation to similar discussions in Britain, Germany, and Japan. Apart from the 
secondary fast wing mission, one suspects that officers from those countries would have 
found American battlecruiser doctrine unrecognizable and, perhaps, overly cautious.  
 
*** 
 
 The Courageous-class cruisers were effectively the last act of the Churchill-Fisher 
Admiralty. Due to fallout from the joint operations at the Dardanelles, both men left their 
posts in late May; Fisher resigned on the 22nd, and Churchill was removed on the 25th.124 As 
war leaders, the flaws of both men were magnified. Whatever their strengths, neither man 
was willing to go through the normal channels of administration. Both preferred to rely on 
their own counsel, or ad-hoc committees thrown together to rubber-stamp their actions. In 
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that sense, it is appropriate that the Dardanelles campaign—started when Churchill contacted 
Vice Admiral Carden behind the Admiralty Board’s back—brought both men down.  
 For his part, Fisher avoided these issues in the operational realm, with the possible 
exception of the successful Falklands expedition. Instead, Fisher indulged his autocratic 
instincts in the field of warship design, where he single-handedly laid down the parameters of 
five new battlecruisers. Without meaningful consultation, the Renown and Courageous-class 
warships reflected Fisher’s predilections, more than the needs of the service. The 
Courageous-class, especially, were hamstrung by the requirements for Fishers’ abortive 
Baltic campaign, and his insistence on building them in defiance of the government’s 
interdict against new capital ships.  
 Unsurprisingly, the ships built without meaningful outside input proved ill-suited for 
the sort of war Jellicoe and Beatty were fighting in the North Sea. Although the two 
commanders were happy to have more battlecruisers in the North Sea, increased armor was 
considered a must, both to counter German battlecruisers and to operate near the German 
battle fleet. Instead, Renown was designed with lighter armor than any battlecruiser since 
Indefatigable, and the Courageous-class somehow had even less. Likewise, gunnery issues 
led Jellicoe to request a fourth turret on the Renowns, to aid with fire control. This request 
was rebuffed and, indeed, Courageous and Glorious only had four guns in two turrets, while 
Furious was designed, beyond sense or reason, with two 18-inch guns in single turrets.  
 Compared to Britain, the situation in the United States was rather more harmonious. 
By 1915, pro-battlecruiser sentiment was so strong that the General Board was able to turn 
the 1915 Atlantic Fleet exercises into an elaborate advertisement for the class. Support for 
the Board’s position can be found in Proceedings, as well as testimony in late 1915/early 
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1916 in front of Congress. Although some officers, most notably Sims, supported a more 
robust role for battlecruisers, the U.S. Navy’s initial foray into battlecruisers was rather less 
contentious than its dreadnought conversion.  
 The battlecruiser switch came too early for the Chief of Naval Operations or the new 
OpNav staff to play a role. Instead, the events of 1915 and 1916 represent the height of the 
War College’s influence on warship design. The battlecruiser-as-scout idea, of course, 
originated in the War College. Beyond that, many of the key officers in the process all shared 
a War College background. Fiske, who led the charge on the 1915 exercises, was a War 
College graduate, as were seven of the nine General Board members who planned the 1915 
exercises in March, and six of the eight who apparently voted in favor of battlecruisers in 
July.125 Constructor Robinson’s initial battlecruiser studies had also been discussed at the 
War College in 1912.  
 This background may have helped the U.S. Navy settle on a role and mission for its 
battlecruiser. Although the Board’s 1915 design bore some similarities to Fisher’s Renown, 
especially in speed and armor, the American design was the product of five years of debate 
and prototype designs, while Renown was largely the work of Fisher, acting alone. The 
General Board’s design sacrificed armor for speed and firepower, for the scouting mission 
that was its explicit raison d'être, a mission that was intelligible to any American officer who 
paid attention to the intellectual side of his profession.  
 Renown and, especially, Courageous were designed to Fisher’s pattern, in service of a 
role that other British officers neither comprehended nor shared. Unlike the American scouts 
and adjunctions, Fisher wanted his ships to play a war-winning role, in defiance of 
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operational commanders who had their own, more conventional, ideas for the ships. Still, 
because of the administrative structure of the Royal Navy, Fisher’s design vision won out 
over the explicit complaints of Admiral Jellicoe, and the “lessons” of the war to date. 
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CHAPTER 7: “PUT AGAINST BATTLESHIPS, THEY MUST EXPECT TO SUFFER” 
 
 The Fisher-Churchill axis proved disastrous for the Royal Navy. Though both 
possessed undoubted mental gifts, each required levelheaded advice to temper some of their 
wilder ideas. With the two of them filling the top posts in the Admiralty, and disinclined to 
listen to subordinates, such advice was not forthcoming. The two did, however, manage to 
avoid butting heads; each was allowed to pursue his fanciful schemes in peace. The result, as 
shown in the previous chapter, was disastrous. Before both men were removed in May 1915, 
Churchill’s Dardanelles misadventure and Fisher’s new battlecruisers had been imposed on 
an unwilling Navy.  
 In their stead, Prime Minister Asquith appointed Arthur Balfour, a former Prime 
Minster to the post of First Lord, and Admiral Henry B. Jackson as First Sea Lord. Both men 
were utterly unlike their predecessors. Balfour and Jackson took a decidedly phlegmatic 
approach to administration and leadership, avoiding the highs and the lows of Churchill and 
Fisher. Although Balfour exhibited “more than a hint of laziness” in the post, Jackson was a 
competent administrator. Under them, the machinery of the Admiralty began to function 
somewhat as advertised. 1  
 Although Jackson was hardly an inspired choice, he was well placed to run the 
Admiralty. Prior to his elevation, Jackson had been a member of Churchill’s War Staff Group 
and consequently had as much understanding of the naval war’s inner workings as anyone 
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outside of Churchill, Fisher, and Jellicoe. Jackson also came to the post with a background in 
administration and planning, having served as Chief of the War Staff in 1912-14, after a stint 
in command of the War College.2 Under Jackson, the Naval Staff was used to greater effect, 
and the Admiralty Board restored to something of its earlier role of considering strategy and 
service policy. Altogether, his tenure was a marked improvement over what came before.3 
 In the United States, the situation appeared more placid. The previous chapter 
covered the war years in the U.S. up mid-1916. By that point, although the U.S. Navy’s 
leadership paid close attention to the war, they had found nothing that contradicted their 
prewar notions of what a battlecruiser was for or how it was to be used. Instead, the U.S. 
Navy had an agreed-upon battlecruiser doctrine and had Administration support for a 
building program that included six of the ships. 
 Matters would change dramatically in both countries in the wake of the Battle of 
Jutland, fought from May 31-June 1 between the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet. There 
had been naval battles during the first two years of the war, but Jutland was the first clash 
between fleets. As such, like Tsushima during the last major war, it provided a chance to test 
the doctrines and practices of prewar fleets. In that sense, the battle proved a disappointment. 
The opposing battle line were barely in contact, certainly not for enough time to suggest 
generalizable conclusions about naval tactics. The main theoretical takeaway was negative: 
perhaps modern fleets were too large for one commander to exercise effective control.  
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 The most striking lesson of the battle, however, was the vulnerability of battlecruisers 
to swift destruction. The British and German battlecruiser formations bore the brunt of the 
fighting and four, three British and one German, were lost. The three British ships all 
succumbed to explosion, raising serious questions about British battlecruiser employment 
and design. In the wake of the battle, the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the Admiralty contemplated 
serious changes to ways battlecruisers were designed and used.  
 Similar questions were asked on the other side of the Atlantic, but in the in the nine 
months after the battle, the U.S. Navy’s leadership found little wrong with American 
battlecruiser doctrine and design. Serious contemplation of changes would only come after 
the United States joined the war in April 1917, and American officers had the opportunity to 
access British documents and speak to their British counterparts. By the end of 1917, the 
U.S. Navy’s battlecruiser consensus of mid-1916 would be just a memory.  
 
*** 
  
 A prime example of the new Admiralty in action was the design process for the Royal 
Navy’s new capital ship, begun in mid-November, when the Board recommended the 
construction of at least one new battleship in the coming year.4 This was the first time in 
years that the Board, as a corporate body, had a serious impact on warship design.5 
According to guidelines issued by the 3rd Sea Lord, F.C.T. Tudor, the goal was to create as 
ship as close as possible to the Queen Elizabeths “in attack or defence, and . . . far superior to 
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her in defence against under-water attack as it is considered at present to be practicable.”6 
Eustace D’Eyncourt, still the DNC, submitted a preliminary 26.5 knot design, based on the 
armor and firepower of the Queen Elizabeths.7 Unfortunately, D’Eyncourt’s first effort had a 
length of 800 feet and a beam of 104, rather larger than Queen Elizabeth in both dimensions, 
and too large for the berthing and repair facilities at RN dockyards.  
 Jackson, furthermore, was opposed to the new design. Citing cost, he noted the size 
issues and also faulted the design for its lack of horizontal protection, especially above 
magazines, and the narrowness of its main belt. In short, Jackson asked Tudor and 
D’Eyncourt to provide a lighter, shorter design, at the cost of some speed. It is possible that 
Jackson’s motivations may not have been entirely focused on the expense of the ship. In the 
same memorandum, he worried that a new paradigm of battleship design would “give our 
richer friends across the Atlantic a new idea, which they would be able to develop more 
rapidly than ourselves.” One class of 25-knot battleships, one presumes, could be written off 
as an experiment, but making it the new standard could spark an arms race.8  
 On January 6, D’Eyncourt and Tudor presented Jackson with a modified sketch 
design, “B” (the original November sketch being “A”) with ten feet less length and breadth 
and a 1,500 ton smaller displacement, purchased at the cost of 1.5-2 knots’ speed. Even those 
designs were too large for Jackson, who asked D’Eyncourt to work on designs “C1” and 
“C2,” 22-knot ships with major savings in weight, length, and horsepower.9 These four 
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designs were taken to the Sea Lords in a January 25 meeting. Although Hamilton, at least, 
was favorably impressed by the original 26.5-knot design, the sea lords asked D’Eyncourt 
and Tudor to develop a design with the underwater protection of the “A” design, and the 
speed of the Queen Elizabeths, a compromise design that was eventually referred to as “D.”10 
 However, that compromise never came to fruition. Astoundingly, the Admiralty had 
not consulted Jellicoe on the subject of new construction until after they had seemingly 
settled on the “D” design. Asked for his opinion on the matter in early February, Jellicoe 
indicated that the Grand Fleet was in need of battlecruisers more than battleships, in light of 
alleged German construction along those lines.11 Beatty concurred, expressing doubt that the 
BCF could handle its opposite number. Not only were the supposed monster German 
battlecruisers a danger to his command, but the three Invincibles had proven themselves “no 
better to us than battleships” in a battlecruiser fight, on account of their low speed, while 
Repulse and Renown were facing construction delays, and the “freak ships,” of the 
Courageous-class were self-evidently useless for the task at hand.12  
 Faced with those opinions from the senior officers in the North Sea, the Board rapidly 
changed course, and asked D’Eyncourt to come up with a set of battlecruiser designs instead. 
D’Eyncourt produced six, the first three with eight 15” guns and the latter three with four, 
six, and eight 18” guns respectively, based on Jellicoe’s desire for a larger gun. However, 
these last three designs were deemed impractically heavy, and the Board settled on the third 
design, a 32-knot ship. The armor, though lighter than that of period battleships, was much 
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thicker than on Fisher’s five wartime battlecruisers: an 8” belt and 10” protection for the 
turrets and conning tower.13 The Board approved the new design on March 6, and on March 
30, they agreed to build four.14 Ironically, the final battlecruiser design ran roughshod over 
Jackson’s concerns about size, cost, and, to some extent, novelty. The First Sea Lord had 
blanched at a 800’ battleship, but the new battlecruisers—referred to as the Hood-class or 
Admiral-class—were 810 feet long and cost 5.6 million pounds, more than twice as much as 
the 2.2 million pound Tiger and 2.4 million pound Queen Elizabeth.15   
 However, Hood was at least two years away from entering the fleet. In the meantime, 
Beatty and his subordinates were unhappy with the fleet at their disposal and continued their 
earlier efforts to have the Queen Elizabeths assigned to the BCF. On February 18, 1916, Rear 
Admiral Osmond Brock, the commander of the 1st BCS, argued for a swap of the 5th Battle 
Squadron (the Queen Elizabeths) for the 3rd BCS between the BCF and the High Seas Fleet. 
The battleships would stiffen the spine of the battlecruiser fleet, while the older battlecruisers 
could serve as the Grand Fleet’s fast wing just as well as the fast battleships.16 The 
implications of that statement are interesting. As we have seen, Jellicoe certainly assumed 
that the role of the BCF in battle was to fulfill the fast wing mission, but here one of the 
BCF’s senior officers implied that the Grand Fleet’s fast wing needed to be found within the 
fleet at Scapa Flow.  
 The next day William Pakenham, 2nd BCS commander, extended the argument 
further. Since the BCF was “the most important factor in command of the sea,” Pakenham 
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believed that they should receive the Queen Elizabeths to increase its chances of survival.17 
One might be forgiven for wondering how 25-knot battleships would help the BCF chase 
down 28+ knot battlecruisers, but Pakenham was concerned that if the German battlecruisers 
put to sea in company with the German battle line, the BCF could be drawn into a trap from 
which it would have been impossible to escape. The addition of the fast battleships would, he 
argued, allow the BCF to disengage from such an action, the heavily armored battleships 
covering the retreat of the battlecruisers.18 Underlying both of these letters was a profound 
disappointment with the material available. As Pakenham put it, “six of the British 
[battlecruisers] have little armour protection, and . . . even the best protected have armour of 
less thickness than the ‘Moltke,’ possibly even the ‘Von der Tann,’” highlighting again the 
extent to which British design and practice had diverged even before the war. To make 
matters worse, of course, Renown and Repulse only exacerbated the armor issue (Pakenham’s 
letter did not even bother discussing the “freaks”).19 By early 1916 the frailties of the 
Renowns were much-discussed in the Grand Fleet, Balfour’s naval secretary telling Roger 
Keyes in April that the ships were “rather jeered at in the Grand Fleet . . . [w]e don’t know 
yet what ‘Renowns’ are to do.”20  
 Given the state of the material, though, it is worth mentioning again that the mismatch 
between the BCF’s strategy and material was a two way street. Pakenham’s letter highlighted 
the inferior armor protection of prewar British battlecruisers, a weakness that was known, 
and discussed at length before the war. Yet, neither letter suggests a change in the BCF’s 
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mission or tactics. Throughout his term in command of the 1st BCS and BCF Beatty had been 
given an unusual freedom to define his own mission, and had settled on the counter-
battlecruiser mission well before war. Despite strong wartime evidence suggesting that his 
ships were simply incapable of annihilating their German opposite numbers, Beatty does not 
appear to have reconsidered his squadron’s mission. To that end, he passed along 
Pakenham’s letter to Jellicoe with an endorsement that said, in part, that the Queen 
Elizabeths of the 5th Battle Squadron would “be in a position to afford support to my Fleet in 
secondary operations, giving us a definite superiority over anything less than the High Sea 
Fleet.” He also assured Jellicoe that if the 5th BS were attached to the BCF, they “should yet 
be available to assume the position assign to them in your Battle Orders,” in the event of 
contact with the High Seas Fleet. 21 
 Jellicoe immediately rejected the idea, reminding Beatty again that the Queen 
Elizabeths were not fast enough for service with the BCF. Even if they were, the fast 
battleships were certainly not fast enough for the newer, faster, German battlecruisers that 
both men were concerned about. Essentially, the 5th BS, if released to the BCF, ran the risk of 
being left behind in an action, like the slower battlecruisers at Dogger Bank. Jellicoe did 
admit that he agreed with his subordinate on the material problems with the BCF, but placed 
the blame squarely on the Admiralty for discontinuing battlecruiser construction, and 
interesting claim to make, considering that Beatty had been Churchill’s naval secretary 
before taking up command of the 1st BCS.22   
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 His second response to Beatty’s request, sent to Jackson in London, is rather more 
illuminating, focusing on his and Beatty’s incompatible views on battlecruisers. Jellicoe’s 
primary concern was that “the stronger I make Beatty the greater is the temptation for him to 
get involved in an independent action,” a rather prescient claim, given Beatty’s future actions 
at Jutland.23 Although Beatty appeared functionally independent, being stationed apart from 
the rest of the Grand Fleet, the BCF was not an independent formation, but an integral part of 
the Grand Fleet, with a role to play as the fast wing to the battle line, rather than taking on the 
German fleet by itself, and then running away. Beatty’s independence raised a serious 
concern in Jellicoe’s mind that his subordinate would start a battle, and then fail to link up 
with the British battleships, leaving the Grand Fleet with no fast battlecruisers or fast 
battleships. Indeed, giving the BCF the 5th BS only made such a scenario more likely; “[t]hey 
are . . . only useful as a force on which to fall back if he meets the High Sea Fleet. He can 
equally well fall back on me,” ensuring a concentration of British capital ships when action 
came.24  
 This debate continued through the spring. In mid-May, Jackson met with Beatty and 
Jellicoe to discuss moving some elements of the Grand Fleet south to Rosyth to aid the BCF 
in responding to German raids. This support was to take the form of the 1st or 2nd Battle 
Squadrons; dreadnought battleships, but not the 5th BS, which was to remain with Jellicoe. 
However, Beatty did receive permission for temporary control over the 5th BS, while the 3rd 
BCS, the oldest battlecruisers in the RN, took firing practice in Scapa Flow. 25 As it 
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happened, this was the situation when the entire Grand Fleet sortied on the evening of May 
30, in response to the High Seas Fleet leaving harbor for a raid. 
 This time, the two fleets found each other, and the subsequent battle of Jutland was 
the largest naval engagement of the war. Although its outcome was tactically indecisive, with 
the British suffering more losses, but maintaining the tactical initiative, in strategic terms it 
merely served to confirm the existing order in the North Sea: the Grand Fleet remained 
stronger than the High Seas Feet, preventing it from reaching the open ocean. As in the other 
naval battles of the war, the British battlecruisers were in the thick of the fighting, and 
three—Invincible, Indefatigable, and Queen Mary—blew up with the loss of nearly all hands, 
although one German battlecruiser, Lützow was scuttled after the battle.26  
 The disposition of the British forces reflected both the distance between Scapa Flow 
and the Firth of Forth, and the Admiralty’s understandable concern about the danger of raids. 
Indeed, although the Admiralty was aware that the entre High Seas Fleet was out of harbor, 
they were not aware that it was sailing in support of the 1st Scouting Group’s raid. As a 
result, the BCF was sixty miles to the south of the Grand Fleet, in a position to fix the 
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German battlecruisers and give the Grand Fleet time to get between it and the British coast, 
but too far for the Grand Fleet to offer effective support.27  
 When the German battlecruisers were spotted in mid-afternoon, Beatty gave chase, 
while the German ships fell back towards their battleship support. During this “run to the 
south,” Indefatigable and Queen Mary were sunk in the space of about 45 minutes, both 
ships succumbing to dramatic explosions. Soon after Queen Mary sank, the BCF came across 
the entire German battle fleet and turned back to the north, towards the Grand Fleet. Due to a 
signaling mishap, the 5th BS continued steaming south for some time and took a battering 
from the van of the High Seas Fleet and the German battlecruisers the entire way back to the 
Grand Fleet.28  
 Worse, the entire BCF neglected to tell Jellicoe about the German fleet, leaving the 
Grand Fleet entirely in the dark as to German dispositions.29 The first unit of the Grand Fleet 
to spot the BCF was the 3rd BCS. Though tied to the Grand Fleet, it took up station ahead of 
the BCF and fired on the battlecruisers in the German van, from ranges as close as 9,000 
yards, before Invincible, with the squadron commander, Rear Admiral Horace Hood, was 
itself blown up less than a half hour after joining the action. By this point, the Grand Fleet 
had completed its deployment, and had begun firing on the German battlecruisers and 
battleships. Faced with the entire Grand Fleet, the German commander, Reinhard Scheer, 
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turned his fleet around, and was able to escape to Germany in the night, although there were 
several narrow escapes along the way.30 
 After the battle, debate and concern in Britain centered on the loss of the three 
battlecruisers, usually blamed on their light armor.31 Nicholas Lambert has rather 
conclusively settled the debate over how the Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible sank; 
the matter had more to do with improperly handled cordite and deliberate sabotaging of anti-
flash protection than faulty armor. In effect, the turret and barbette armor of the battlecruisers 
failed to keep out ordnance it was not designed to keep out, and negligence turned bad 
situations into disasters.32 It is worth reiterating, though, that British battlecruiser armor, 
especially in the older “I” ships was unequal to the demands of fleet battle. HMS Defence, a 
Minotaur-class armored cruiser with near-identical armor protection to Invincible, was sunk 
by a magazine explosion that appears to have had nothing to do with the turrets. Warrior, a 
slightly older cruiser, was heavily battered by German battlecruisers, and abandoned to 
founder the next day.33 
 Heavier armor, however, would have mitigated the cordite and anti-flash situations by 
keeping German shells out of British turrets. The 5th BS, for example, was under sustained 
fire for much longer than any battlecruiser, suffering a total of 28 hits from heavy shells.34 
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None of these strikes caused anything close to the damage suffered to the BCF, which lost 
three ships, and nearly a fourth. Overall, it does not seem as if British armor thicker than 9” 
was penetrated by German shells.35 Beatty’s claim that British “methods of ships 
construction are seriously at fault,” went too far, but, if nothing else, the immediate attention 
paid to armor can be seen as a belated admission that battlecruiser design and practice had 
drifted dangerously far apart, with lightly-armored ships thrown into the thick of fleet 
actions.36 More importantly, the armor issue dominated both the “lessons” that the Royal 
Navy took from the battle, and the information given to their American allies after April 
1917.  
 Unsurprisingly, one of the strongest responses came from the officers of the BCF. 
Immediately after the battle, Beatty appointed a series of committees to examine the battle 
and its lessons. The “Committee on Construction of Battle Cruisers,” chaired by Pakenham, 
concluded by mid-June that “British battle cruisers, whether in service or about to be 
commissioned, are unequal to the duties assigned to them,” on account of their thin armor.37 
Even taking into account that this body was invested in placing blame on battlecruiser design 
(rather than their ammunition-handling practices), the committee’s judgment here is hard to 
rebut. If Beatty’s use of the ships under his command can be taken as the BCF’s “duties,” a 
fair reading of his opinions stretching back to mid-1913, their armor was a liability. The 
prewar designs in the BCF were simply not designed to stand the punishment of mid-range 
fire from other capital ships for extended periods of time, and the five forthcoming 
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battlecruisers were even more lacking in that regard. Still, it is shocking to see a panel of 
BCF officers tacitly admit that their formation was unable to perform its mission, even if they 
did blame technical factors beyond their control.  
 Their proposed solution shows how much the battle affected British naval opinion. 
The committee recommended that the Royal Navy cease battlecruiser construction altogether 
and in its place build fast battleships, on the model of Queen Elizabeth, but with “higher 
speed, greater protection and greater offensive power.”38 Although it was too late for the five 
battlecruisers begun under Fisher’s watch, the committee, after consulting with D’Eyncourt, 
also called for a dramatic thickening of the armor on the Admiral-class battlecruisers, to 
about the standard of the Queen Elizabeths.39  
 The battle also brought up larger issues of Grand Fleet cooperation and coordination. 
Many observers noted the disconnect between Beatty’s battlecruisers and the main fleet. As 
Richmond put it on June 4: 
A Battle Fleet 60 miles astern of the Cruiser Squadron—that is to say, our main Fleet 
divided into two parts out of supporting distance of each other . . . by nearly 2 hours’ 
steaming. The mathematician with his rule & compass of course says there is no 
danger. They are more numerous than the enemy battle cruisers & have the legs of the 
battles & can avoid them. But this action shews [sic] how wrong the mathematician . . 
. may be.40 
   
As we have seen, Jellicoe began the war wanting to keep his battlecruisers close enough to 
deploy with the main fleet—recall that in the August 1914 Grand Fleet sweep of the North 
Sea, Beatty’s squadron was stationed only fifteen miles ahead of the battleships. By 1916, 
this distance had quadrupled. Part of the blame can be laid at the feet of the redeployment of 
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the Grand Fleet’s battlecruisers to Rosyth, but an equal share must undoubtedly be given to 
Beatty’s seeming independence, exacerbated by his fixation on sinking German battlecruisers 
rather than finding the German fleet.  
 There was much to discuss when the Admiralty Board met with Jellicoe and Beatty in 
late June. The conference reached a firm agreement to strengthen the armor in the Repulse 
and Glorious classes before they would be allowed to join the fleet. Indeed, the Admiralty 
would later determine that the latter three ships were to be classified as light cruisers and 
placed in the light cruiser squadrons attached to the BCF, rather than placed with their 
heavier cousins.41 Jellicoe also suggested that Fisher’s battlecruisers would be admirably 
suited “to obtain a position of torpedo advantage,” over German ships, a tacit admission that 
they were incapable of engaging the same ships in a gunnery duel.42 
 However, Jellicoe and Beatty were at odds concerning the fate of the 5th BS and the 
shape of future battlecruiser deployment. According to Jellicoe, the conference with the 
Board determined that “the battle-cruisers should not be advanced so far from the support of 
the Battle Fleet as had been customary in the past.” If a raid did come, necessitating an 
independent BCF sortie, the Admiralty Board would give Beatty and Jellicoe very specific 
orders about how far from support they were allowed to range. At all times, the BCF was to 
avoid confrontation with a superior German fleet.43  
 When reminded of the conference a month later, Beatty petulantly asked if 
“superiority of construction” were a factor in determining a superior foe as “[t]here is the 
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unfortunate fact that our ships blow up after only a short period of punishment, whereas the 
enemy’s ships never do.” He also questioned Jellicoe and the Admiralty’s understanding that 
the conference had arrived at new battlecruiser procedure, which was missing in his personal 
notes from the conference.44 Beatty believed that these instructions fettered his decision-
making capacity, bringing up the specter of Troubridge during the Goeben chase. More 
substantively, he took issue with the underpinnings of the new instructions, seeing them as a 
too-cautious blueprint for withdrawal rather than helping to “maintain touch with a superior 
force, and draw the enemy towards our Grand Fleet.”45 
 Jellicoe’s response, sent to the Admiralty, again expressed his frustration over his 
subordinate’s failure to appreciate his position in the chain of command and the “real” role of 
the battlecruisers:  
Any misconception existing in the mind of the Vice-Admiral may to some extent be 
due to the use of the term ‘Battle-Cruiser Fleet’ to describe the force under his 
command. This nomenclature may be taken to imply that it is a force distinct from, 
and not an adjunct to, the Battle Fleet and that, owing to its advanced position, it is 
expected to fulfill the role of a fast battle squadron and not that of a powerful scouting 
force possessing a speed which enables it to accept or refuse action with an enemy 
possessing no force of equal power which can compel it to accept action.46 
 
Leaving aside this extract’s insights into Jellicoe’s conception of naval warfare (Beatty, of 
course, would have argued that no admiral in his position could be compelled to fight, seeing 
as it was the raison d'être of a navy), it highlights his change of opinion about the Grand 
Fleet’s battlecruisers. Earlier, of course, he had expressed similar exasperation with Beatty’s 
tendency to freelance, but portrayed it as a risk to the Grand Fleet’s merger before battle and 
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the BCF’s critical fast wing role. Here, Jellicoe had switched to calling the battlecruisers a 
“scouting force,” a clear response to the chastening experience of Jutland, and an early sign 
that he was moving away from his previous battlecruiser advocacy.  
 Beatty was evidently under the impression that the 5th BS had been permanently 
attached to him after the battle, presumably to make up numbers.47 When it became clear at 
the conference that this was not the case, he continued his struggle to get the fast battleships 
under his command throughout the summer. Interestingly, Beatty initially justified his 
request using Jellicoe’s earlier attachment to the BCF as a fast wing, claiming that the 5th BS 
would allow the BCF “to keep touch with the head of the enemy’s line and administer severe 
punishment while doing so,” although he did not explain why the 5th BS could not perform 
that same role if attached to the Grand Fleet’s battleships.48 This request, and another one 
made in August, were rejected by Jellicoe and the Admiralty.   
 The Board, Jellicoe, and Beatty were all, however, united in their opinion that the 
Admiral-class battlecruisers required a significant redesign. By the end of August 1916, 
D’Eyncourt returned to the Board with a design that sacrificed two knots of speed in 
exchange for more armor. The main belts were thickened from 8” to 12”, the barbettes from 
9” to 12”, and the deck armor over the magazines greatly strengthened. On the whole, the 
new design displaced about 3,000 more tons than the pre-Jutland design, consisting almost 
entirely of expanded armor protection.49 Initially the redesign was intended for the last three 
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vessels of the class, but the redesign was quickly applied to the under-construction Hood as 
well.50 
 Although there was some brief discussion of whether or not the new design 
constituted a “fast battleship,” the redesign proved to be the final wartime word on 
battlecruiser design in Britain.51 Despite discouraging gunnery issues and the disasters at 
Jutland, the Royal Navy maintained its desire for battlecruisers, with perhaps less ardor than 
before. Tellingly, as the Navy moved into 1917, the only new capital ship construction on the 
docket remained the Admiral-class battlecruisers.  
 This was the situation at the end of 1916, and the one facing the Royal Navy when the 
United States entered the war in April 1917. The Admiralty quickly made the decision to be 
generous with advice and information with their new cobelligerent (far more generous, in 
fact, than they were with their longstanding Japanese allies). The information given reflected 
this new state of affairs. Although the RN was not officially willing to call the Admiral-class 
“fast battleships” yet, it is clear that they were viewed as something more than the standard 
sort of battlecruiser, a paradigm that the British had soured on.  
  
*** 
 
 In the United States, news of Jutland came just as Congress was determining the final 
size and shape of the bill. The Navy’s united front in favor of battlecruisers in House 
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testimony evidently worked too well, and the version of the bill that passed the House called 
for the construction of five battlecruisers and no battleships. Although the House was 
controlled by Wilson’s fellow Democrats, they presumably believed the claims of the Navy 
Department that battlecruisers were the key gap in the Navy’s force structure, and the 
missing element in the fleet’s “balance.” The Senate, on the other hand, also controlled by 
the Democrats, wrote an Administration-friendly version of the bill on June 30, authorizing 
ten battleships and six battlecruisers.52 
Combined with the sobering news from the North Sea, one might imagine that the 
Navy was rethinking their commitment to battlecruisers. After all, the Navy’s adoption of 
battlecruisers was primarily because of the role they could play in scouting and the early 
stages of major fleet actions, and here was one such scenario in which battlecruisers had 
evinced a shocking vulnerability to gunfire. Even the most ardent American critics of 
battlecruisers had never imagined a scenario quite like one exploding from a single salvo, let 
alone three such incidents in the same battle. 53 Considering the adamant opposition to 
battlecruisers from the Navy’s senior leadership as recently as 1910 and the fact that no work 
had started by June 1916, the scene seem set for a comprehensive rethink.  
 Nothing of the sort happened, because the Navy’s senior leadership already viewed 
battlecruisers as very much subordinate to battleships, and not suitable for the uses to which 
Jellicoe and Beatty put them. The ailing Admiral Dewey (or an aide) laid out the “official” 
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view of the battle in a July article for Sea Power, the Navy League’s new journal. To Dewey, 
the battle confirmed the U.S. Navy’s longstanding opinion that “in the final issue it is the 
dreadnought [battleship] which means victory or defeat.” At the same time, he asserted that 
“[t]he usefulness of the battle cruiser or the scout cruiser has not been disproved, but the 
inadvisability of depending upon fast lightly-armored vessels in a clash in which 
dreadnaughts [sic] are engaged is shown.” The lighter ships had an important role to play, he 
argued, but popular agitation for battlecruisers to replace battleships was seriously 
misguided.54 
 As it happened, the battle made very little immediate impact on American policy. 
Congress passed a final version of the bill in August based on the more expansive Senate 
version, and a comprehensive rethink of the battlecruiser idea never seems to have taken 
place. There is one document in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy’s files warning 
against the light armor of the American design, and suggesting a redesign reminiscent of 
Hood’s, but on the whole, the Navy’s leadership seemed happy with both their battlecruiser 
doctrine and their particular battlecruiser design.55   
 This contentment remained even after more detail emerged concerning Jutland. 
Writing in the New York Herald in late 1916, Sims placed the blame for the battlecruiser 
disasters squarely on “the attack of a superior force (German battleships) by a greatly inferior 
force (British battle cruisers).” Nothing from the battle, he claimed, should detract from the 
U.S. Navy’s need for battlecruisers, and he restated the Navy’s favorite doomsday scenario 
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of a hostile fleet arrayed against the Eastern Seaboard. Indeed, one of Sims’s key takeaways 
from the battle was “the extraordinary resistance battle cruisers can sustain and the 
extraordinary amount of damage they can inflict, even against battleships.” Still, he conceded 
that battlecruisers “must suffer” when sent against battleships by themselves. On the whole, 
Sims’s article set the tone for discussion of the ships in the months leading up to American 
entry into the war: battlecruisers remained a critical part of any well-balanced fleet, and a 
gaping hole in American capabilities.56 
 Both Sims and the Board—in the person of Rear Admiral Charles Badger, deputizing 
for Dewey during the latter’s final illness—had the opportunity to recapitulate these 
arguments in front of Congress in December, 1916. In front of the House Naval Committee, 
Sims reaffirmed his belief that battlecruisers could perform the fast wing mission, arguing 
that at long ranges both types of capital ship were equally vulnerable to plunging fire and, at 
any rate, battlecruisers would be deployed across the head of an enemy column, masking 
most of their fire. He also took time to highlight the utility of battlecruisers in the scouting 
mission, which he had comparatively neglected in his earlier newspaper article.57 
 Badger, on the other hand, presented the more modest case for battlecruisers that the 
General Board had made in 1915 and early 1916. Avoiding the topic of Jutland, Badger 
contended that battlecruisers were “information-gathering” vessels, “a backer up of the 
scouting line,” not a ship intended for the thick of battle. Their great size and firepower were 
designed more for use against foreign battlecruisers than battleships. These “special ship[s] 
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for special duties,” were a necessity in modern warfare, but only to fill a narrow, though 
important, strategic niche.58 
 The evidence suggests, however, that Badger’s statement misled Congress as to the 
full extent of the Board’s battlecruiser plans. Some sense of the General Board’s feelings on 
the vessels can be seen in a note sent to Daniels on the possibility of war with Japan in early 
1917. Although Badger had claimed that the U.S. Navy desired battlecruisers only because 
other powers had them, the General Board’s plans for Japan suggested a utility independent 
of Japanese ships. The Board wanted another six battlecruisers under construction by mid-
1918, rather a lot of overkill against a Japanese Navy with only 4 battlecruisers. With twelve 
battlecruisers, the U.S. Navy would be able to keep six as scouts with the main fleet and use 
the other six, along with 18 large destroyers, as a “raiding force,” to “seize [Japanese] 
outlying possessions . . . and operate against his . . . forces that may attempt to base in those 
islands.”59 An analysis from Captain H.P. Huse at the Naval War College agreed. 
Battlecruisers, “an essential part of the fleet,” were unsuccessful at Jutland but of immense 
“value to use in the broad stretches of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It cannot supersede 
the battleship, but it is indispensable in protecting our own scouting line or in breaking up the 
scouting line of the enemy.”60 
 Those documents give a sense of what American officers meant when they discussed 
battlecruisers and “distantial” operations. A raiding force of six battlecruisers and eighteen 
destroyers is rather more robust than, say, the Royal Navy’s prewar “fleet units” or even the 
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1914 Falklands deployment. While their British counterparts had spent the time since Jutland 
discussing ways to keep the BCF within supporting distance of the Grand Fleet, the U.S. 
Navy’s leadership was still devoted to a vision of warfare that, given distances in the Pacific, 
could place some battlecruisers thousands of miles away from battleship support. Clearly, the 
Americans were more confident in the ability of their battlecruisers to run away from the 
Japanese battle fleet if encountered, a not-unreasonable confidence borne from their seven-
knot speed advantage over the Kongos. In the unlikely event of a fight with the Japanese 
battlecruisers, a squadron of six Lexingtons against the four Kongos would mount sixty 14” 
guns against thirty-two.61 While the Kongos were better armored, the war had shown that 
their armor protection, on a par with the Lion-class battlecruisers and Tiger was insufficient 
to keep out 14” ordnance at long ranges.  
 Although there was some dissent over the armor protection of the new battlecruisers 
inside the U.S. Navy before April 1917, the most pressing critique of the design concerned its 
armament, some believing that they would be better served with 16” guns, even at the cost of 
losing a two-gun turret to maintain speed and weight. Within the Navy, this criticism came 
from the Bureaus of Ordnance and Construction & Repair, both of which wrote to Benson, 
asking for a switch to a 16” main battery in early 1917, although the issue had been 
percolating since the Board had “finalized” the battlecruiser design in October. Badger and 
Sims, for example, had been asked about the issue in their December 1916 testimony.  
 While this came from the technical bureaus, the argument touched on the rationale 
and mission of the battlecruisers. Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, the head of the Bureau of 
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Ordnance, argued for the switch because “[a] battle cruiser must be able to inflict fatal 
damage on the enemy’s most powerful vessels . . . Battle Cruisers should be able to open an 
engagement at ranges of maximum visibility where one hit or even the possibility of one hit 
will seriously embarrass the enemy.”62 Rear Admiral David Taylor, the chief of Construction 
& Repair made a similar argument, urging for battlecruisers to have the same armament as 
contemporary battleship construction.63 
 Both of these arguments rested on the assumption that battlecruisers were intended, 
on some level, to fight with battleships. Furthermore, the letters assumed that the only thing 
preventing the Navy’s battlecruisers from fighting foreign battleships at maximum efficiency 
was their armament. Earle, a gunnery specialist, had highlighted that this fighting was ideally 
to take place at long ranges, where the battlecruiser’s lighter side armor would be less of an 
issue. At any rate, neither letter met with success. In response to their contentions, Badger 
wrote Daniels that the American battlecruisers were not intended for the line or fast wing, but 
“specifically designed to offensively screen the fleet, to protect and strengthen our own 
Scouts, to threaten and destroy those of the enemy, and to engage vessels of their own or 
inferior class.” This was a list of missions that required heavy weapons, but certainly not the 
heaviest, and certainly not at the cost of a substantive redesign.64 Although Badger left out 
the “distantial” operations portfolio, his response to Earle and Taylor encapsulated the 
General Board’s opinion on battlecruisers when the United States entered World War I in 
early April 1917. 
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 The first major decision facing the Navy was the status of the new building program. 
By this point, it was clear that the major issue facing the Allies at sea was the German 
submarine campaign, which required destroyers and other flotilla vessels, and certainly not 
the battleships and battlecruisers at the heart of the building program. On April 20, a General 
Board memo, “Types of vessels required for present and future conditions,” bemoaned the 
lack of fast scouts in the Navy, pointing out that the American scouting force would not have 
been able to penetrate the German or British screens deployed at Jutland. Furthermore, the 
situation was the same in the Pacific, although the U.S. Navy as a whole was larger than the 
IJN. With screening and scouting the main gaps in the American force structure, they urged 
that battlecruiser construction be expedited rather than canceled.65 As David Trask has noted, 
though without the perhaps obligatory sense of irony, the Board’s argument was Mahanian in 
conception. No matter the state of the war, the true importance in naval affairs rested on the 
battle fleet and its attendants and, whatever the circumstances, those issues had to be tackled 
first.66  
The Office of Naval Operations (OpNav), and Williams Sims, now the chief 
American liaison in London, however, had other ideas, arguing that the main need was for 
destroyers and submarine chasers. By June William Pratt, the Assistant Chief of Naval 
Operations, had written up a list of fourteen construction priorities for the U.S. Navy, headed 
by submarine chasers and destroyers. Battleships were marked as the fifth priority and 
battlecruisers dead last at fourteenth.67 Pratt, of course, was a longtime opponent of 
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battlecruisers, but his stance prevailed. Facing a supply crisis brought on by German 
submarines, and secure in the belief that the war would be over by the time the American 
battlecruisers could be completed, construction on the six battlecruisers was suspended for 
the duration in July.68 
 The most important development of the early American war for the Navy, though, 
was the establishment of a headquarters for U.S. Navy forces in Europe. As mentioned 
earlier it was placed under the command of Sims, who had been sent to liaise with the Royal 
Navy in the weeks before the United States went to war. With the war joined, he was 
promoted to the command of all American naval forces in the area. Of course, Sims had been 
seen as an up-and-coming officer ever since his association with Theodore Roosevelt in the 
early years of the century, but this was still quite the promotion for a man who had recently 
been in command only of the Atlantic Fleet’s torpedo flotilla.  
 There is no doubt that Sims was the right man for the job, not necessarily for his 
qualities as a leader or administrator, which proved adequate for this task, but for his 
longstanding association with the Royal Navy and its officers, which dated back to his 
contact with gunnery pioneer Percy Scott when both were stationed in China. Over the 
ensuing fourteen years, Sims had made a number of trips to Britain to study new 
developments in gunnery and naval technology, and had cultivated a number of influential 
friends in the Royal Navy, who had given him access to information and material—including 
a tour of the under-construction Dreadnought—that, strictly speaking, he should never have 
seen. Within the U.S. Navy, Sims was well known as an intense anglophile, even drawing an 
official reprimand for a 1910 speech at London’s Guildhall, which suggested the U.S. would 
                                                           
68
 Trask, Captains, 116-25.  
318 
 
come to Britain’s aid in a European war.69 His reputation along these lines was such that 
Benson reportedly told him “Don’t let the British pull the wool over your eyes,” upon his 
embarkation for London in 1917.70  
 This history made Sims the perfect choice for his new post. Not only was Sims on 
friendly terms with a number of senior British officers, including First Sea Lord Jellicoe, but 
he was also a well-known friend of Britain, something that could not be said for all of Sims’s 
peers. The Admiralty would, of course, have collaborated with anyone in Sims’s position, but 
it is hard to believe that his selection played no part in the Admiralty Board’s instructions 
that Sims was to have almost complete access to the Admiralty and its offices. Furthermore, 
staffers were urged to communicate anything that could be of use to Sims’s office, including 
the records of the war to date. Indeed, by November, Sims sat in on the Admiralty’s daily 
meetings, and only the reluctance of superiors in Washington kept him from being named an 
honorary member of the Admiralty Board.71 By the middle of 1917, Sims’s office in London 
and American liaisons with the fleets were sending a steady stream of reports back to 
Washington. Indeed, Sims’s earliest dispatches from London, based on consultations with 
Jellicoe and senior political leaders, had been a crucial data point in favor of suspending the 
capital ship program in favor of destroyers.72 
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 Battlecruisers featured heavily in much of this discussion. American liaisons with the 
Grand Fleet noticed the Royal Navy’s new mistrust of battlecruisers, especially Fisher’s 
youngest “children.” One of those liaisons, when asked by the General Board about the 
Courageous-class vessels, responded “[j]ust what they expected to do with them I could not 
find out,” the remainder of his testimony making it clear that this was due to British 
confusion more than intentional obfuscation.73 Another, a naval constructor, gathered from 
his British contacts that the Courageous-class were viewed as “a complete failure,” by the 
Royal Navy.74 In December, another liaison laid out the Grand Fleet’s cruising and battle 
formations for the General Board, discussing changes to keep the battlecruisers nearby—no 
more than 10 miles from the 5th BS and 15 miles from the rest of the battle line. In battle 
formation, the 5th BS served as the fast wing, “considerably ahead and inside [of the battle 
line] for torpedo work, while the battlecruisers steamed with the light cruisers several miles 
ahead.75 
 It is no wonder, then, that Rear Admiral Albert Winterhalter, a former Aide for 
Material, had reminded his colleagues in August that the United States was free to “prescribe 
the military characteristics . . . [and] to be sound upon the principles,” with their forthcoming 
battlecruisers.76 Just beneath the surface of that statement was a thinly veiled criticism of 
British design and practice as unsound, an obvious conclusion for an American officer to 
reach even before liaison reports began to pour in. Although the British had a decade’s more 
experience with battlecruisers, there was a sense on the Board that they did not necessarily 
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have anything to teach the United States on some of the more general issues relating to 
battlecruisers.  
 This is not to say that there was nothing concerning battlecruisers in the RN’s 
experience of use to the United States. A number of reports sent back to Washington in 1917 
suggested that the Royal Navy was far ahead of the U.S.N. in fire control. Indeed, the first set 
of liaison officers sent to the Grand Fleet sent back such disturbing news of British gunnery 
prowess that they were asked to return to Washington at once.77 As one of those officers, a 
Lieutenant Commander Castle, put it, the British “talked gunnery and battle tactics at the 
same time,” a wartime development in British practice that was still lacking in the United 
States. More importantly, the British fire control system was far superior to that used in the 
United States, both in their provisions for director salvo firing, and in foul weather 
gunlaying.78 
 The most important piece of information from Britain, though, came in the shape of 
detailed plans for HMS Hood (construction of the other three Admiral-class ships being 
suspended in March), conveyed to Washington by Stanley Goodall, an Admiralty naval 
constructor who remained in Washington throughout the war to consult with his American 
colleagues.79 Not only was Hood the world’s first post-Jutland capital ship design, but as a 
battlecruiser/fast battleship, it was a direct challenge to the U.S. Navy’s battlecruiser designs. 
Although Hood and Lexington were designed for very different environments, the plans for 
Hood showed that the British and American navies were moving in very different directions 
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as far as battlecruiser designs. Give that Hood’s modifications were based on direct war 
experience, the disconnect was enough to trouble even the most confident battlecruiser 
partisan in the United States.  
 By early September, Hood loomed large in the Navy’s deliberations over 
modifications to their battlecruiser design, made possible by the wartime construction freeze. 
Interestingly, the discussion did not turn on the issue of armor. D.W. Taylor, head of the 
Bureau of Construction and Repair, pointed out in September that Hood, though more 
heavily armored and about as powerful as Lexington, lacked the speed to catch her, and the 
General Board seemed convinced by that line of thought.80 The revised battlecruiser 
specifications, issued by the General Board in mid-September, kept the armor scheme of the 
original design. When the Bureau of Ordnance made a final attempt to get the armor 
thickened, the Board responded that “in battle cruisers protection must be sacrificed to the 
imperative necessity for high speed and great gun power.”81 More intriguingly, there were 
suggestions in October that the 7.5” guns on the new British Hawkins-class light cruisers 
could enable a squadron of scouts to overwhelm one of the American battlecruisers, their 
armor not being proof against 7.5” shells.82 
 Changes did, however, come in the ships’ armament, the Board finally being 
convinced that a battery of eight 16” guns was superior to ten 14”.83 Interestingly, this switch 
was not finalized until December, with the Bureau of Construction & Repair (C&R) leading 
the charge against the change. Although the Bureau had been in favor of the switch earlier in 
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the year, by November, Taylor felt as if the switch would necessitate a redesign of the entire 
ship as the constructors dealt with heavier turrets. The probable result was a decrease in 
speed, and an increase in draft beyond the Board’s guidelines.84 However, a letter from 
Badger to Daniels in late November seems to have settled the issue, and by December, C&R 
had acquiesced to the change.85 
 At least in the short term, the Navy’s only change to their battlecruiser designs in 
light of Hood was a shift in the main battery from 14” to 16” guns, and even that can be seen 
as a function of the construction delay; keeping the design current, rather than a specific 
response. At any rate, the General Board had doubled down on their high speed/low armor 
battlecruiser design, in face of a great deal of information from Britain that suggested the 
importance of thicker armor. Between the battle of Jutland and American entry into the war, 
the Board maintained Jutland had very little to do with proposed American battlecruiser 
practice, and that an American battlecruiser squadron would never find itself in the BCF’s 
position at the battle’s start. Their behavior over the next several months confirms that this 
was a deeply held opinion, not just an attempt to put a brave face on the situation and 
preserve battlecruiser funding.  
 However, battlecruisers were not the only, or even the main, difference between the 
two allies. During 1917, it became clear that the two navies had radically different 
conceptions of naval theory and doctrine. One modern writer has noted that in the war, 
British planning tended to be simplistic, and focused on means rather than ends, while the 
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U.S. Navy remained concerned with comprehensive planning, which he chalked up to the 
“rigid and Mahanite” Naval War College. Calling the War College “rigid” is almost certainly 
unfair, but the fact remains that the two navies had mutually incomprehensible approaches to 
planning.86 This difference can, in fact, be traced to the importance of the War College in the 
U.S. and the comparatively minor importance of the analogous British institution. As 
discussed in a previous chapter, a war college tour was something that high-achieving British 
officers avoided (although many spent mid-career time at the technical shore establishments) 
and, as the first American selection board showed, a valued resume line in the U.S. Even 
Benson, specifically chosen for his distance from Fiske’s Newport-associated clique of 
modernizers, had attended a Summer Conference.  
 This difference proved to be more than an interesting sociological note. Combined, 
one suspects, with the longstanding American practice of giving its officers a university 
education at Annapolis, this difference made American officers much more comfortable with 
thinking and writing about naval theory and strategy. The idea of a service-wide strategic and 
tactical “doctrine,” rapidly gaining purchase in the U.S., was foreign to the Royal Navy. This 
highly theorized way of thinking about war permeated the American discourse on naval 
policy especially, as we have seen, in warship design, though it also affected the American 
approach to the development of naval strategy and tactics.  
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 It is likely, then, that when Pratt wrote Sims in July for the “Admiralty’s strategical 
and tactical conceptions,” he thought he was making a simple request that would be easy for 
Sims to fulfill. Indeed, Pratt’s language made clear that, in his opinion, the Royal Navy was 
holding back this information, “things we have a right to know. . . . We could work so much 
more intelligently toward the same unite ends, if we knew a little more.”87 In retrospect, Pratt 
was asking for something that simply did not exist. Had it existed, it might have rationalized 
the battlecruiser design process and saved the Royal Navy a great deal of discomfort in the 
first half of the war.  
 Sims was obviously unable to procure such a document from his hosts, and the matter 
languished until the arrival of a large American delegation in London for multilateral naval 
talks. At those meetings, the Admiralty’s Plans Division produced a memorandum for 
Benson on the “Naval Policy of the Allies,” an anodyne document that laid out the basics of 
Allied (British) naval policy, like continuing the distant blockade of Germany, and hunting 
German submarines. Benson was not impressed.88 Soon after receiving the memorandum, he 
informed Daniels that the “British are not prepared now to offer definite plans of their own 
for our consideration. . . . [S]uch plans . . . cannot be developed until we virtually establish 
the strictly planning section for joint operations here [in London].”89  
 The U.S. Navy’s London Planning Section was set up soon after Benson’s visit, 
consisting of a handful of officers with no other administrative duties. Sims had already 
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made the War College-trained Captain Nathan Twining his chief of staff and, naturally, 
selected officers with a War College pedigree for the new Planning Section. These officers 
mostly came from the post-1911 Long Courses rather than the Summer Conferences, of 
which Sims had been a longtime critic. His picks also demonstrated a keen eye for talent. The 
first officers he installed in the planning section were Captains F.H. Schofield, H.E. Yarnell, 
Dudley Knox, and Colonel R.H. Dunlap of the Marines.90 Schofield, of course, had designed 
the torpedo battleship tested at the War College. Dudley Knox was on the cusp of a career as 
a renowned naval commentator and historian. Yarnell, mentioned earlier as a strong 
proponent of battlecruisers, became an aviator after the First World War, and played a major 
role in developing carrier attack tactics in the interwar years.91 
 As Knox wrote after the war, the Planning Section’s remit ran from “a broad survey 
of the course of the war as a whole,” down to “a more detailed consideration of the important 
lesser aspects” of the naval campaign.92 The very first memorandum, about the less-than-
successful Navy Department plan to mine the northern exit of the North Sea as an 
antisubmarine measure, bore the hallmarks of the Section’s shared War College training in its 
structure and language.93 By mid-January they were, in an echo of Newport assignments, 
referring to their prompts as “Problems.”94   
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Likewise, in late 1917 Benson, with Pratt’s help, released a Navy Department 
memorandum on “Doctrine,” a favorite topic of War College-trained officers. The document 
suggests something of what Pratt was looking for when he asked Sims for the “strategical 
and tactical conceptions” of the Admiralty. In the words of the memorandum, doctrine was 
“a conception of warfare which is common alike to the Commander-in-Chief [of a fleet] and 
his subordinate commanders; . . . [a] basis for decisions before and during battle.”95 The 
doctrine laid out in the memorandum is itself nothing that a reasonably careful reader would 
have not picked up on by now—a focus on offensive battle, a preference for action over 
maneuver, an emphasis on concentration—but the importance of such a document lay in its 
existence more than its content. The paper was an attempt to create an animating doctrine for 
the service. In this case, the U.S. Navy was intellectually homogenous enough that it merely 
formalized one that effectively existed. Still, a written doctrine gave commanders formal 
guidelines on how to operate in lieu of orders, or with incomplete orders. As the example of 
the Dogger Bank showed, such understanding was quite valuable in times of war.  
 
*** 
 
Some months after Jutland, Jellicoe left the Grand Fleet to assume the responsibilities 
of the First Sea Lord in London, replacing the competent, but stolid Henry Jackson. There, 
Jellicoe hoped that “he could bring to the Admiralty fresh ideas about how to deal with the 
new U-boat offensive,” a greater threat than the German battle fleet. On the way out, Jellicoe 
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tried to manage his succession. Although Beatty was the obvious choice, Jellicoe did not trust 
him and lobbied against both Beatty and Sturdee, the next strongest candidate, in favor of 
Charles Madden, his brother-in-law and chief of staff. First Lord Arthur Balfour, however, 
overruled him, and Beatty became the Grand Fleet commander upon Jellicoe’s departure.96 
 Arriving in London with a host of Grand Fleet officers and, soon, a new First Lord, 
Edward Carson, Jellicoe set to work reforming the Naval Staff. Under Jackson, Churchill’s 
War Staff Group had retained a great measure of power, but Jellicoe quickly moved to 
expand the statutory War Staff’s size and influence. Alongside that, changes came to the 
Admiralty staff’s structure. In May the War Staff’s name was changed to the Naval Staff. 
Most importantly, its structure was modified. The Chief of Staff post was merged with that of 
the First Sea Lord. Under the First Sea Lord/Chief of Staff were the Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff (DCNS) and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (ACNS), and both were given 
places on the Admiralty Board. 97 In theory, the two new officials were responsible for, 
respectively, surface operations and coordination of the antisubmarine campaign.98 These 
new administrative arrangements finally made the Naval Staff an integral part of Admiralty 
decision-making. 
 In practice, the impact of these reforms was blunted by Jellicoe’s misunderstanding of 
staff duties, a common defect in the Royal Navy’s senior leadership. Though the DCNS and 
ACNS positions had been set up to free Jellicoe for major elements of policy and strategy, he 
buried himself in the details of the staff, far too much work for one man to handle. This focus 
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kept Jellicoe from attending to the properly executive functions of his new, dual-hatted, role, 
and his clogged docket led to delayed action on the issues that were more properly his 
responsibility. Although convoys were established, very little else got done in the Naval 
Staff, and Jellicoe was removed in late 1917, by a new First Lord, Eric Geddes, who 
bemoaned the inefficiency of the Admiralty. In his stead, Geddes appointed Rosslyn 
Wemyss, an unimpressive thinker, but a better delegator.99  
 While in Whitehall, Jellicoe continued to worry about the battlecruiser situation in the 
North Sea. In late July 1917, he send a panicked memorandum to First Lord Geddes, 
bemoaning the battlecruiser situation in the North Sea. The Germans, were, he warned, 
nearly catching up to British battlecruiser strength, with six battlecruisers to Britain’s seven. 
Although the German Navy only had five battlecruisers in reality—Jellicoe believed that the 
Germans had a fourth Derfflinger-class ship, the imaginary SMS Manteuffel—his argument 
hinged more on the characteristics of British and German battlecruiser design. None of the 
British battlecruisers, especially the Renowns, with “the protection of armoured cruisers and 
not of battle-cruisers,” could be trusted to hold their own in a fight with the 1st Scouting 
Group. With that qualitative edge, Jellicoe reckoned, German battlecruisers could raid the 
English east coast with impunity, and drive in the Grand Fleet’s scouts before battle. 100 
 Jellicoe’s solution to the problem was unorthodox. With no new battlecruisers 
forthcoming until Hood in late 1918 at the earliest, he suggested that the Royal Navy buy two 
of Japan’s Kongo-class battlecruisers for service with the BCF. Somewhat surprisingly, 
Geddes and the Cabinet agreed to look into it. Although the Japanese government quickly 
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shot the idea down, it emphasizes the extent of Jellicoe’s concerns over British battlecruiser 
strength.101 Lest the reader think that this plan was a passing fancy of Jellicoe’s, it is worth 
noting that the idea was resurrected in Sims’s London Planning Section towards the end of 
the war in contingency plans for German battlecruisers breaking out of the North Sea.102 
 Like Jellicoe, officers with the Grand Fleet shared his concern over the British 
battlecruiser fleet. On his way to the Admiralty, Jellicoe had managed to get the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet downgraded to a mere Force, which mirrored its drop in prestige after 
Jutland.103 Although Jellicoe, as First Sea Lord, exercised very little control over Beatty, the 
new commander of the Grand Fleet felt his way towards a more restrained battle doctrine. 
Belying his reputation as an aggressive, even foolhardy commander, Beatty’s tenure with the 
Grand Fleet confirmed the cautious, reactive, strategy endorsed by his predecessor. 
 This was, to put it mildly, surprising. Although Jutland had drained Beatty’s faith in 
the material of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, he had shown no regrets for the aggression of British 
battlecruisers there. A week after the battle, he told Admiral Hamilton that “You should have 
seen [Horace Hood] bring [the 3rd BCS] into action, it would have done your heart good, no 
one could have died a more glorious death.”104 As discussed above, Beatty also rankled at the 
restrictions the Admiralty placed onto the BCF’s freedom of action in the weeks after the 
battle.  
 Beatty’s first action as Grand Fleet commander was in keeping with his aggressive 
reputation. It was understandable that Beatty would feel uncomfortable on Jellicoe’s flagship, 
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Iron Duke, and he soon moved to shift his flag. Rather than choosing one of the 21-knot 
dreadnoughts, or even one of the 23-knot R-class ships, Beatty insisted on the 25-knot Queen 
Elizabeth, which robbed the 5th BS of one-fifth of its strength. While doing so, Beatty 
intimated that a 25-knot flagship would allow him to steam around looking for “the most 
favourable position for exercising supreme command in battle.” With this role, Beatty 
threatened to subordinate effective management in the fleet to his own impetuousness.105  
Likewise, Beatty changed the Grand Fleet’s Battle Orders, bringing them in line with 
the instructions he had issued to the 1st BCS in 1913, and extended to the BCF in 1915. As 
Andrew Gordon noted, there was much to appreciate in Beatty’s focus on decentralization 
and initiative from squadron commanders.106 Richmond, for example—now captain of the 
pre-dreadnought HMS Commonwealth—lauded Beatty’s new battle orders, “marked by a 
high degree of courage and preparedness to accept risk. If such orders at been in existence on 
May 31 last year . . . I make small doubt that the High Sea[s] Fleet would have been 
destroyed.”107 As Richmond’s analysis noted, the decentralization of command increased the 
likelihood that squadron commanders would engage enemy formations, even in the absence 
of firm orders from the top.  
Still, there were concessions to the newfound vulnerability of battlecruisers. No 
longer the “tip of the spear,” he informed his captains in July that the battlecruisers would, in 
concert with the battle fleet, “keep close company up to the moment of contact.”108 By 
January 1918, he had relaxed somewhat and allowed the BCF to “afford support to the 
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British advanced forces,” and keep the enemy fleet “under observation, taking care not to be 
brought to action by superior force.” If battle was joined, and the German battlecruisers not 
present, the first mission of the BCF was to launch a torpedo attack on the enemy line, which 
would allow them to present a more elusive target to German gunners.109  
This caution came in spite of a dramatic numerical superiority in favor of the BCF. 
Even after Jutland, the British maintained a 7-5 lead in battlecruisers. In the following 
months, Repulse and Renown entered the fleet, as well as two of the “freaks” (by 1918, 
Furious had been effectively converted into a carrier), more than making up for losses from 
the battle. However, Beatty evidently did not feel that these eleven warships had a qualitative 
edge over the six the Germans were believed to possess in early 1918 (in reality the number 
was five).110 
Likewise, the men in command of the Grand Fleet’s battlecruisers took their own 
initiatives to compensate for what they saw as unforgivably thin armor. Vice Admiral 
Pakenham, now in command of the BCF, issued a set of “Battle Cruiser Force Orders.” 
Pointedly, Pakenham’s Orders set the BCF’s ideal fighting range at 16,000 yards, further 
than the ranges at which Queen Mary and Indefatigable had been hit and sunk at Jutland, and 
a range calculated to “minimize the disadvantage of our lighter protection.” Based on war 
experience it was also, however, beyond the effective range of British gunnery, negating 
much of the utility of their heavy guns.111  
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 Further special discussion was required for the light battlecruisers that came into the 
fleet after Jutland. The Courageous and Glorious went into light cruiser squadrons attached 
to the BCF, but they were not part on the main BCF formation. Renown and Repulse, on the 
other hand, were added to the 1st BCS. Pakenham’s solution to the lighter armor of the two 
newer battlecruisers was to place them on the disengaged side of the BCF formation in 
action, about two miles away from the other ships. Although the new arrangements would 
keep the thin-skinned newcomers safe, adding another two miles to the 16,000-yard firing 
range would make their accuracy—especially with only six guns each—highly suspect.112 
By the late summer of 1918, Pakenham and the new 1st BCS commander, Rear 
Admiral Henry Oliver, put the squadron’s dispositions in contortions to keep the firepower of 
the new battlecruisers, while sheltering them from hostile fire.113 Oliver suggested dividing 
the 1st BCS into two “sub-divisions,” the first consisting of Lion, Princess Royal, and Tiger, 
and the second Repulse and Renown. By dividing the squadron in two, Oliver hoped to utilize 
the new ships’ firepower while keeping them out of the range of German guns where 
“REPULSE and RENOWN” would probably last a very short time. In normal cruising 
formation, Oliver wanted to keep the 2nd subdivision ahead of the first, where they would be 
well positioned to chase German battlecruisers and engage the rear ship at long range. If they 
turned to fight, the 2nd subdivision could fall back on the first at a combined speed of 54 or 
55 knots, though the Lion and her near-sisters were hardly an impregnable citadel.114  
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 As the preceding pages show, the Grand Fleet was able to come to something of an 
tactical doctrine amenable to battlecruisers. This understanding was reached at the cost of the 
offensive spirit that Beatty’s appointment seemed to herald. Although Beatty’s instructions 
and mindset pointed towards a more aggressive approach and, in the tactical realm, delivered, 
concern over the BCF hamstrung British operational initiative as surely as Jellicoe’s overly 
centralized command structure before 1917. The BCF and the 5th BS were the only ships in 
the Grand Fleet that could hope to force an engagement on an unwilling German fleet, but 
the example of Jutland provided a terrible reminder of what could happen to such ships 
without heavier support. By the end of the war, the battlecruisers may well have been, to 
borrow a phrase from prewar discussions, the cavalry of the fleet, but only in the sense that 
they were limited to reconnaissance, pursuit, and harrying a defeated enemy.  
 
*** 
 
The Royal Navy’s lack of a coherent service-wide doctrine in any sense of the word 
can be traced through the First World War up to, and past, Jutland. It stands out most starkly, 
however, in the service’s wartime battlecruiser policy. From Fisher’s five “children,” to 
Beatty’s repeated requests for the Queen Elizabeths, to Jutland, the design and employment 
of battlecruisers were marred by serious disagreements amongst the Royal Navy’s senior 
leadership, disagreements that could, and should, have been handled and worked out in 
peacetime. One could, in fact, make a strong case that the Beatty/Callaghan stance on using 
British battlecruisers to hunt German ones represented a sort of nascent doctrine, but this 
agreement was shattered by the appointment of Jellicoe at the beginning of the war, and 
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exacerbated with the return of Fisher, a First Sea Lord who interpreted his responsibilities 
rather broadly. The effects of this confusion have been noted throughout this chapter. Surely, 
it is telling that the Admiralty did not feel the need to create a binding battlecruiser doctrine, 
in conference with Jellicoe and (to some extent) Beatty, until after the battle of Jutland 
proved its necessity.  
The tactical-technical synthesis revolving around short engagements at medium 
rangers highlighted by Sumida was perhaps the closest the Royal Navy came to reaching 
such a doctrine. By 1913 it does indeed seem as if the Admiralty, and the next Home Fleet 
commander, Jellicoe, were on the same page when it came to a doctrine of short-range battle, 
to the point where the design of the R-class battleships was shaped by these considerations. 
However, Jellicoe only became the Grand Fleet commander at the beginning of the war, and 
thus was unable to spread the doctrine throughout the fleet, forcing Jellicoe to modify his 
ideal tactical precepts.115 Furthermore, the replacement of Battenberg with Fisher, who was 
clearly out of the loop regarding this new doctrine, placed further restrictions on Jellicoe’s 
behavior. Sumida’s argument is mostly convincing, and also goes some way to explain the 
lack of long-range fire exercises in the prewar Royal Navy.116 
No such problems arose in the United States Navy, which, admittedly, was not 
operating under the same pressures as the Royal Navy. The groundwork for the Navy’s 
eventual battlecruisers had begun as early as 1911, and when the time came to design the first 
class of American battlecruisers, the process went off well, as did the eventual switch to a 
16” main battery. Even within the General Board, the process appears to have gone 
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smoothly, the only dissenter being Benson who, to be brutally honest, was probably not on a 
Board-bound career trajectory when elevated to the CNO post by Daniels. The U.S. Navy 
was so united and confident in its ideas that both the battle of Jutland and the first eight 
months of contact with the Royal Navy failed to make an impression on the Board’s 
battlecruiser stance. Compare that, for example, to the Russo-Japanese war which hastened 
American acceptance of dreadnought battleships and was the dominant factor in the death of 
the armored cruiser in the United States. By contrast, the confidence—one is tempted to call 
it complacency—emanating from the General Board in 1916-17 is striking. If anything, 
Jutland seemed to confirm the correctness of the Board’s scouting battlecruiser.  
Ironically, Fisher’s abortive second term at the Admiralty, where the difference in 
design process was the greatest, probably saw the closest agreement between American and 
British conceptions of battlecruiser design. Neither the British nor American navies knew it 
at the time, of course, but the original Lexington design reminds one of nothing so much as 
an up-gunned Repulse. One could even make a reasonable argument that both the Repulses 
and Lexingtons were designed for similar “distantial” operations, although the American 
ships were also designed for scouting and screening in conjunction with a battle fleet.  
Hood, however, showed that British and American conceptions were again drifting 
apart, despite wartime ties. By the end of 1917, calling Hood a “battlecruiser” may be 
somewhat incorrect. The only capital ship under construction at the time, Hood combined 
great firepower and at least adequate armor. Already, some in the Royal Navy were thinking 
about the heavy battlecruiser as a “fast battleship,” and the future of capital ship design, a 
stance the Royal Navy moved towards semi-officially in 1918. As a battlecruiser, Hood 
presented a challenge to the American battlecruiser design, but as a battleship, she presented 
336 
 
a potential challenge to the entire American naval worldview. This challenge would 
overshadow any parochial battlecruiser concerns in the United States through the middle of 
1919, and in some sense, loomed large over the remainder of the American battlecruiser 
experiment.  
 While Hood served as the lodestar for future fast capital ship design in Britain, the 
Grand Fleet under Beatty also came to a battlecruiser doctrine based on an appreciation of 
the type’s strengths and weaknesses. The term “doctrine” is used advisedly; Beatty’s 
truncated fighting instructions included very specific guidance on how battlecruisers were to 
be used. Furthermore, this doctrine was shared by the BCF commander, in contrast to the 
situation in 1914-16. Although he had no impact on the Grand Fleet’s dispositions, it is worth 
noting that Jellicoe’s actions as First Sea Lord suggest that he implicitly agreed with Beatty’s 
new, more cautious approach.  
 The new—the first—British battlecruiser doctrine was clearly a temporary stopgap. It 
was an entirely negative approach based on the perceived flaws of the battlecruiser type in 
general, and British designs in particular. The chastening effect of Jutland produced a 
doctrine that emphasized safety and survivability over offensive action, a perfectly 
reasonable approach, but one that flew in the face of the aggressive spirit of the 1st BCS 
before the war and the BCF until Jutland. A solution, however, was on the horizon. A 
postwar navy built to the Hood pattern promised a return to an aggressive posture with the 
fleet’s fast capital ships.  
 Likewise, Hood would come to challenge the U.S. Navy’s understanding of 
battlecruiser warfare. The value of speed in large warships had been firmly established 
amongst the Navy’s leadership by the end of 1917. In 1917, the British example fired the 
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imagination of the Navy’s technical bureaus, suggesting the possibility of combining speed, 
armor, and firepower on a true “compromiseless ship” on nearly the same displacement on 
the Lexingtons. Moving into 1918, the British design would also raise questions amongst the 
Navy’s strategic thinkers, especially in OpNav and at Sims’s London headquarters. Why not, 
they asked, follow the British lead, and built one sort of capital ship in the future? Such a 
warship would have nearly the same scouting value as the Lexingtons, while giving a 
commander more options in a pitched battle. 
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CHAPTER 8: FAST BATTLESHIPS 
 
Apart from some occasionally conflicting analysis of the Russo-Japanese War, the 
ideas with which the participants entered the First World War were based on peacetime 
theory rather than wartime experience.1 The Great War allowed these ideas to be stress-tested 
and, in many cases, they proved problematic. Furthermore, the years of conflict spawned new 
ways of solving old problems, new issues like unrestricted submarine warfare, and ad-hoc 
tactical and organizational fixes to deal with them. The end of the war in 1918 brought the 
opportunity for both the American and British navies to consider the “lessons” of the war at 
length.  
 In Britain, these lessons were especially negative. Although the Allies won the war, 
aided by a large contribution from the Royal Navy, the sense within the service was that its 
operational and tactical performance left much to be desired. The key disappointment of 
course, was Jutland, where a numerically superior British fleet failed to destroy the High 
Seas Fleet. Furthermore, the RN managed to lose three battlecruisers and their crews under 
circumstances that suggested faulty design or faulty construction.  
 At the same time, the end of the war brought a new set of challenges in the strategy 
and policy arenas. The immense expenses of the First World War left Parliament unable to 
find funding to resume capital ship construction, while the results of the war gave the British 
                                                           
1
 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), 
579. The consequences of this constitute the main part of his conclusion (pp. 576-601). Although he does not 
always acknowledge his subjects’ lack of other examples to draw from, the entire section is a thought-
provoking examination of these issues.   
339 
 
two new potential enemies to consider: the United States and Japan. Although the United 
States and Britain had no outstanding disputes or points of friction, the potential of the 
British Navy ceding supremacy to another country was perhaps the ultimate fear of British 
policymakers, and had been for at least a century prior.  
The Japanese situation was almost as serious. Although Britain and Japan were still 
formally allied, that alliance had been signed because of shared Anglo-Japanese mistrust of 
Russian and German designs in the Asia-Pacific region. With the collapse of the German and 
Russian empires in the recent war, there was very little keeping the alliance together besides 
a shared mistrust of the United States, and even that was tenuous; the British preferring a 
hedge against American adventurism more than an anti-American combination. Without a 
firm relationship with Japan, Britain’s strategic problems grew even larger. Policymakers in 
Whitehall realized that Japan was a revisionist power, especially after the Paris Peace 
Conference, and if it was not allied with Britain, then the many British possessions in the 
region would look rather tempting. Confronting that threat, however, would require a 
wholesale rethinking of British defense policy and the construction of expensive new basing 
facilities in the Far East. 2   
 These challenges forced a great deal of rethinking from the Royal Navy’s leadership. 
Practically speaking, there was no money for anything else immediately after the war. More 
substantively, the perceived failures of the Royal Navy in the war—poorly-designed 
battlecruisers, an inadequate response to the unrestricted submarine campaign, and a baffling 
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inability to defeat the High Seas Fleet in battle—were issues that could not be met with a 
material response. Issues that, in theory, could have been met that way, like the new U.S. 
Navy, were impossible to in the postwar fiscal environment. Any changes in the postwar era 
would have to be intellectual ones.  
 As the British situation suggests, the issues facing the United States were rather less 
severe. The U.S. Navy, especially the all-important battleship fleet, had not been subjected to 
as much strain and doubt as its British equivalents during the war years. Uninvolved in 
Jutland, or any other ship-to-ship surface action, the U.S. Navy remained convinced that its 
tactical and operational apparatus was fit for purpose, though the British experience was 
studied in depth. As in Britain, the threat of Japan was increasingly worrisome, though in the 
American case this necessitated a much smaller shift in resources and attention.  
In late 1916 and early 1917, the U.S. Navy’s leadership had declared themselves 
utterly unconcerned about the supposed lessons of Jutland for battlecruiser design, placing 
their trust in the United States’ novel battlecruiser doctrine. Upon further reflection, though, 
some American officers reassessed their commitment to the lightly armored battlecruisers 
under construction in the United States. In something of a throwback to the end of the 
previous decade, the U.S. Navy found itself torn by the issue of battlecruisers; whether to 
stay with the native design approved in 1916, or build something mimicking HMS Hood.  
 
*** 
 
One could be forgiven for looking at the U.S. Navy in late 1917 and thinking that 
battlecruisers were a settled issue. After all, at the end of that year the Navy had a 
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battlecruiser doctrine, a battlecruiser design, and authorization for the construction of six. As 
the United States Navy entered what would be the final year of the First World War, 
however, it found itself conducting a host of missions—escorting convoys, chasing 
submarines, laying mines in the North Sea, supporting the British Grand Fleet—that were 
entirely at odds with its alleged purpose and the proclivities of the officer corps. Despite 
these new and unexpected roles, the three major foci of American wartime naval thought—
William Sims and his Planning Section in London, the Office of Naval Operations, and the 
General Board—were able to spend much of their time discussing plans for the future. Near 
the top of their respective lists was the fate of the six battlecruisers authorized in 1916, whose 
construction had been suspended for the duration of the conflict.  
 Despite approval of the shift from 14” to 16”guns in the sketch design, problems 
remained in producing plans detailed enough for construction. In their first hearing of 1918, 
the General Board discussed two outstanding issues that remained in the new design. The 
first was armor, with some Board members dubious about the utility of two thinly armored 
decks instead of one armored deck of moderate thickness. More important, though, was the 
torpedo issue. The narrow, crowded hulls of the Lexingtons made it difficult to find a place 
for the eight torpedo tubes called for in the design. Even worse, if space could be found, it 
was beyond the capability of American torpedoes to be fired from either broadside at the 
ships’ projected 35-knot top speed, a critical flaw, especially for those who felt the ships had 
a major role to play in fleet actions.3 
 It is unsurprising, then, that the Navy used the construction respite to refine the 
design. In February the Bureau of Ordnance asked the British naval attaché in Washington, 
                                                           
3
 General Board Hearing, January 2, 1918, Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board of the U.S. Navy 
1900-1950 (Washington: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1987), Roll 12.  
342 
 
Guy Gaunt, for the Royal Navy’s “general opinion as to thickness and dispositions of armour 
for battlecruisers,” indicating that the designs were being held in anticipation of such 
information.4 No information was forthcoming from the Admiralty, which reminded Gaunt 
and, presumably, the Americans that they were already in possession of the full plans for 
Hood, which represented current best practices in the Royal Navy.5 In April, Captain William 
Pratt, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, tried a more personal touch, writing to Sims in 
London, asking for his opinion on when the U.S. could resume its capital ship program. 
Additionally, he asked for a description “of the characteristics (in sufficient detail to be 
readily understood by the technical experts) of all our leading types . . .  particularly that 
outline for the battlecruiser.”6 
Sims’s Planning Section had done some work that touched on the battlecruiser issue. 
In January, they had advocated for convincing Japan to add its four battlecruisers to the 
Grand fleet. Like Jellicoe in 1917, the Planning Section feared the effects of German 
battlecruisers breaking out into the North Atlantic to attack shipping, and felt that the 
Japanese ships were necessary to provide full coverage.7 A follow-up memorandum in mid-
May gave detailed suggestions, including placing American battleships with convoys, using 
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destroyers to hunt for the vessel, and a team of two or three battlecruisers to run the raider 
down once found.8 
 This scenario does not seem to have exercised Sims’s imagination as much as the 
Royal Navy’s Hood. In late 1916, Sims had reaffirmed his belief in the U.S. Navy’s 
battlecruiser design, claiming that one of the key lessons of Jutland was “the extraordinary 
resistance battle cruisers can sustain,” in battle.9 Now Sims—and his staff—believed that the 
ideal American battlecruiser should have twelve-inch armor, eight 16” guns, and a speed of 
32.5 knots on a displacement of 42,000 tons. Those specifications almost exactly match those 
of HMS Hood, a repudiation of his earlier confidence in the original Board design of 35 
knots, 14” guns, and 5” belt armor. Besides changes to the battlecruiser design, Sims’s 
response to Pratt called for the building program to resume as soon as conditions allowed, for 
use against a possible naval alliance of Germany, Austria, and Japan.10  
 Ironically, however, given Sims’s concern with thicker armor, early 1918 also saw 
American officers increasingly question the utility of battleship armor, especially side armor, 
which seemed to lose value at the long ranges and high angles of attack produced by modern 
conditions. Yates Stirling, an officer most associated with submarines, but a strong 
battlecruiser partisan nonetheless, suggested in Scientific American that this made battleships 
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vulnerable to battlecruisers, as neither type could carry adequate deck armor to keep out high 
caliber plunging shells. Stirling went one step further, though, taking the Fisherite position 
that the greater speed of battlecruisers gave them the advantage in these sorts of long-range 
gunnery duels, eventually forcing a merging of the two types into an unarmored ship of about 
40,000 tons with twelve 14” guns, any armor being “weight wasted,” at combat ranges.11 
Stirling’s argument against battleship armor and Sims’s recommendation for 
battlecruiser armor (and they were hardly the only people making such arguments in early 
1918) suggested the possibility of a hybrid along the lines of Hood: a fast, moderately 
armored, battleship that could replace both types. In early April, Chief Constructor Taylor, 
impressed by the plans for Hood ferried to Washington by the British constructor Stanley 
Goodall, instructed his Bureau to begin consideration of such designs, with an eye towards 
getting them approved for the following year’s program.12 This was a somewhat unusual step 
for C&R to take. As we have seen with Constructor Robinson and his series of battlecruiser 
studies in 1911-12, the Bureau was certainly willing to sanction the development of 
speculative designs, but Taylor attempted to confront the General Board with a fait accompli 
rather than a proof of concept. By May 10, the designs were finished and Taylor, 
presumably, set out to convince the heads of Steam Engineering and Ordnance of the wisdom 
of the hybrid, soon dubbed a “fast battleship.”13 
In early June, the chiefs of the three technical Bureaus submitted a memo to the 
Secretary and General Board with four designs. Design A was the South Dakota-class 
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battleship design, built to the Board’s specification and B was a modification of the existing 
battlecruiser design, which increased the main armor belt from 5” to 9” and incorporated 
improved torpedo resistance at the cost of two knots’ speed. At the heart of the memo, 
though, were C and D, two fast battleship designs with the same 12x16” armament as the 
South Dakotas and, respectively, 30 and 29 knots’ speed (Design D was shorter than C and 
carried an extra belt of armor above the main belt). As the table below shows, both designs 
were obviously intended to outclass Hood and, indeed, the British fast battleship was the only 
foreign comparison brought up in the memo:14 
 
Lexington 
(as of 
1/1/18) 
Design B Design C Design D HMS Hood 
Speed 35 kts 33 kts 30 kts 29 kts 31 kts 
Main 
Battery 8x16” 8x16” 12x16” 12x16” 8x15” 
Armor: 
Belt 5” 9” 12” 12” 12” 
Deck 2” 2” 3” 3” 3” 
Turrets 6” 12” 16” 16” 15” 
 
According to the memo, the bureau chiefs were driven to take this drastic step 
because of wartime lessons, which, they hinted, the General Board had ignored. In their 
words, the war had “emphasized the importance of adequate armor protection,” leading the 
Bureaus to question the wisdom of battlecruiser armor designed to keep out nothing larger 
than a 6” shell. With battleships, although the South Dakotas were two knots faster than their 
21-knot predecessors, the trend seemed to be for even more speed. More fundamentally, the 
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memo strongly suggested that the time had come to amalgamate the battleship and 
battlecruiser classes into “a high-speed battleship, or a heavily armed and armored battle 
cruiser as preferred.”15 
The technical bureaus’ suggestions went directly against the stated wishes of the 
General Board, as the submitters must have known. In late 1917, the Board had refused to 
consider any changes to the battlecruiser design beyond the switch in main battery. 
Additionally, in early June 1918, the Board had submitted their own construction program 
for the coming fiscal year; five battlecruisers and two battleships for the 1918-19 fiscal year, 
and 10-12 more battleships and 15-16 battlecruisers under construction by 1920 on top of the 
remaining construction authorized in the 1916 bill.16 For the Board, then, the suggestions 
from Taylor and his associates would seem to have been as unwelcome as they were 
unsolicited.  
The Board did take the new designs seriously, however, holding three hearings on the 
issue over the course of the month. The highlight of the first, on June 17, with Constructor 
Robert Stocker, focused on the comparison between the B design and Hood, with Stocker 
admitting that the changes suggested would not bring its protection to Hood’s level, while 
also lessening its speed advantage.17 In the third meeting, with Ralph Earle, the Chief of the 
Bureau of Ordnance, the topic turned towards the fast battleships after Earle admitted 
towards the beginning of the hearing that he did not care for the B design, in keeping with his 
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earlier assumption that battlecruisers should be designed to fight battleships. Instead of a 33-
knot battlecruiser, he suggested, why not build a 30-knot battleship with more firepower and 
armor? Even with the fast battleships, though, the Board’s questioning betrayed concern over 
both the armor in the C and D variants and their expense, compared to the A design.18 
 Both of these concerns came out in the Board’s July 6 formal response to the 
“ABCD” memo, where the Board indicated their support for A, the prevailing battleship 
design, as well as the already-approved battlecruiser design with a 5” belt. In their own 
words, the Board could see “no advantage in increasing the thickness of armor above 5”, 
having in view the sacrifice this would entail in speed and other characteristics.” Even before 
C&R’s modifications the Board’s battlecruiser would be, they claimed, more powerful than 
any existing or projected battlecruiser.19 Here, the Board reaffirmed their belief that the main 
role for battlecruisers lay outside of the line, and indeed, outside of large battles in general. 
The 5” armor, of course, was less than that given to American armored cruisers at the turn of 
the century, derided at the time for their thin armor.  
The main purpose of the Board’s response, though, was to savage the case for fast 
battleships, the General Board providing an eight-point list of problems with the concept:  
Merging two types, each of which is needed, into one failing to answer fully the 
requirements of either, on account of 2. Loss of speed as battle cruiser, and 3. Loss of 
protection as battleship; 4. Will introduce new elements into fleet maneuvering and 
tactics being 5. More disturbing to homogeneity, without compensating advantages to 
the fleet as a whole. 6. Represents a radical departure from the gradual increases 
hitherto prevalent in battleship construction and, therefore, 7. Would demand a re-
building of the fleet, similarly to the introduction of the dreadnaught [sic]; this 
necessity the General Board is not prepared to admit; 8. Is unnecessarily large and 
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therefore inordinately expensive, considered either as a battleship or battle cruiser, for 
meeting the like type of possible enemy.20  
 
The financial case made by the Board was rather curious. Since its inception, the Board had 
been willing to present building programs that were unacceptable to the Secretary or 
Congress, as they had done just five weeks earlier. It is hard to avoid the feeling that the 
Board tailored its argument to its audience here, figuring that Daniels would be swayed by 
financial considerations rather than tactical issues.  
 The Board’s response suggests that there was something more fundamental to its 
opposition than just financial considerations or other tangible reasons. After all, they had 
argued within the space of a paragraph that fast battleships were less effective than 
battlecruisers and battleships at their missions and that these less-effective ships would force 
the scrapping and rebuilding of the entire battle fleet. Just beneath the surface of this 
argument, and indeed much of the Board’s discussion of battlecruisers, was their intense 
belief in rigid class distinctions based on armor, firepower, and speed. The Board had made it 
clear that battleships were powerful, heavily armored ships, with little need for speed, but 
battlecruisers had become a key part of this worldview. A decade earlier, this 
uncompromising view of naval design led the Board to reject battlecruisers as an unnecessary 
frill. Now it was being marshalled in favor of keeping the design of those same warships as 
pure as possible. Battlecruisers, then, were ships marked by their speed and firepower, and 
any deviation from this ideal battlecruiser was inherently flawed.  
 Although Earle made another pitch for fast battleships in August, the Board remained 
steadfast, and retained the battleship/battlecruiser split in their annual construction memo.21 
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Specifically, the Board asked for 12 battleships, 16 battlecruisers, and 6 aircraft carriers to 
enter the fleet by 1925, on top of the still-uncompleted ships from the 1916 program.22 
Rather than backtracking on battlecruisers, the Board’s suggested building program evinced a 
stronger support for the type than they had previously expressed. The 1916 program was laid 
out in accordance with the 1:4 battlecruiser/battleship ratio the Board had arrived at in 1912 
(four battlecruisers for the 17 extant battleships and two battlecruisers for the 10 new 
battleships), while the Board’s new suggestions would have pushed the overall ratio much 
closer to 1:2. Hood and the prospect of a war in the vast Pacific with Japan may have made 
the Board desirous of more fast ships with big guns.  
 From the late summer of 1918, the Board was opposed by OpNav’s own planning 
section, started by veterans of Sims’s organization in London. That August, Benson and Pratt 
repatriated H.E Yarnell from Sims’s Planning Section to form a similar group in OpNav. 
Soon, he was joined F.H. Schofield and Dudley Knox from Sims’s staff, along with other 
talented officers.23 Before Yarnell left London, he, Knox, Schofield, and the Planning 
Section’s Marine representative drafted a memorandum on how a similar organization in 
Washington should be organized.  
 The resultant report bore the unmistakable imprint of the War College practices 
instilled in the Planning Section’s members. The members of the Washington office would, 
of course, be War College trained “as far as practicable.” That office, of fifteen officers, 
should be organized into committees to policy, strategy, tactics, logistics, and education. As 
at a Summer Conference or Long Course, individual committees would be given a 
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“problem,” and then provide a solution to the other committees. If that solution withstood 
scrutiny, it would then be given over to the Chief of Naval Operations.24 
The eventual organization resembled the London Planning Section’s report, and 
marked a watershed in OpNav’s development. Although Pratt had tried to create something 
similar in the months before April 1917, American entry into the war forced his planning 
staff into administration. To fill the gap, the War College offered to create a planning group 
before it was shuttered for the duration. Of course, the General Board jealously guarded its 
prerogatives, and assured OpNav that policy and planning were under the Board’s remit.25 
By creating his own planning department, Benson ensured that OpNav could develop policy 
as well as carry it out.  
 This group of, as Yarnell put it, “a considerable number of capable youngsters . . . full 
of vim and vigor,” had two major advantages over the General Board.26 The first was in 
training. OpNav had at its disposal a number of officers with recent training in the War 
College’s Long Course, while the General Board had none. These officers included, after the 
war, the core members of the London Planning Section. The new planning section also had 
the advantage of considering policy in concert with tactics, education, and logistics, which 
were all controlled by OpNav rather than the General Board. In short, OpNav’s planning 
efforts had the benefit of a well-trained staff and an intimate knowledge of the whole of naval 
administration.  
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These advantages shone through in one of their early tasks, the development of an 
OpNav building program. Based on “a careful study of the General Board’s argument in 
favor of the two types,” the ABCD memo, and foreign construction, the committee 
determined that the General Board’s plan was insufficient. Instead of building 28 capital 
ships split between battlecruisers and dreadnoughts, the committee felt the U.S. Navy’s needs 
would be better met with 27 of the type C fast battleships proposed in the ABCD memo, with 
construction to finish by 1923, rather than the Board’s already-optimistic date of 1925. The 
Planning Committee argued that this homogenous force would be faster than almost all 
foreign battlecruisers, whiles sporting more guns and armor than the vast majority of extant 
or planned foreign battleships. It is true that the OpNav plan would have cost about $200 
million more than the Board’s (using the General Board’s unit cost estimates from the their 
response to the ABCD memo, the cost would run to approximately $995,328,675, as opposed 
to $777,396,300), a considerable gap equivalent to the cost of two years of the 1916 program, 
but financial realities had historically exercised little impact on the Board’s own programs. 
At any rate, both programs were so out of line with Congress’s willingness to pay as to make 
financial factors irrelevant. 27    
 Sims also entered this debate, sending a November 14 letter to the Navy Department 
that repudiated his earlier pro-battlecruiser views, and again suggested that the United States 
follow the Hood model. His previous suggestion to that end, made in the middle of the year, 
assumed that Hood was a battlecruiser, and that if an American Hood were built it would be 
built alongside a heavier, slower, battleship. Now, however, Sims followed the type C 
partisans in arguing that the Hood model could replace both types, based on British 
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experience: “The HOOD Class are referred to officially as Battle Cruisers, but since the date 
of their design it is a notable fact that no design of a Battleship has been prepared by the 
Admiralty.” The British officials Sims talked to, including Grand Fleet commander David 
Beatty and Director of Naval Construction Eustace D’Eyncourt, viewed the American 
battlecruisers as “a grave mistake . . . they feel we have not fully grasped . . . the outstanding 
lesson of the Battle of Jutland,” which they saw as the necessity for heavier battlecruiser 
armor. Those same sources all agreed that Hood could perform as a battleship, and would be 
the pattern for subsequent construction.28 
 Sims’s arguments were backed up by a paper on the ideal construction program from 
the London Planning Section, commissioned on the express orders of Benson, who wanted 
“definite recommendations” that he could forward to Daniels from his perch in Europe. As 
per their normal practice, the Planning Section, now composed of Captains Schofield, Knox, 
and Luke McNamee, who switched places with Yarnell a few weeks prior, began with first 
principles, copied from their May memorandum on the same subject:  
The Navy of the United States shall be a self contained organisation [sic] designed to 
exercise, in the Pacific, a commanding superiority of naval power, and, in the 
Atlantic, a defensive superiority of naval power, against all potential enemies who 
may seek to extend their sphere of influence over, or to impose their sovereignty on, 
any portion of the American continent or islands contiguous thereto.29 
 
Although that goal remained, the main enemy was no longer a German-Austrian-Japanese 
alliance, but Britain. As the memorandum presciently predicted: “[a]ny additions made to the 
British Fleet must be made with reference to the United States as a possible enemy. Any 
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additions United States Fleet must be made with reference to Great Britain as a possible 
enemy.”30 
 With that in mind, the memorandum suggested that “we cannot afford to give too 
much weight to current British opinion.” Instead, the U.S Navy would have to “decide now 
from our own judgment of experience and tendencies what type of capital ships we should 
build.” With battleships, the Planning Section argued that the key goal was to outshoot the 
Grand Fleet, instead of outrunning. To that end, they suggested maintaining the American 
tendency towards heavily armed and armored battleships, even at the cost of some speed. 
Eventually, the speed of American battleships would need to reach 25 knots, but that was not 
an immediate concern.31  
For speed, they turned to their battlecruiser design from May, a 32.5-knot ship with 
eight 16” guns and 12” armor. Although this ship had fewer guns than OpNav’s preferred 
type C fast battleship, the memorandum implied that the speed gained would be of great 
assistance in their primary mission of chasing down enemy cruisers and battlecruisers, while 
the armor would allow them to participate in fleet actions. At any rate, the London Planning 
Section suggested an immediate building program of six battleships, six battlecruisers, and 
forty-eight scouts with the speed to keep up with the battlecruisers. Other construction would 
follow based on British intentions.32 
  Despite these dissentions, the General Board won this particular dispute, with 
Daniels putting forth a second three-year ten battleship/six battlecruiser program in late 1918; 
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a victory for capital ship bifurcation if not the Board’s specific plan.33 Interestingly, though, 
Daniels was himself opposed to the Board’s stance on fast battleships. In late October, 
Benson informed Pratt that Daniels had hoped to put at least a squadron of the type C fast 
battleships into the departmental budget. 34 This was based on Benson’s own advice, 
suggesting that he was convinced by the OpNav Planning Committee’s arguments in favor of 
fast battleships.35  
 Benson wrote Pratt from Paris, where he had accompanied President Wilson’s advisor 
Edward House to negotiations amongst the Allies about structuring the Armistice. Benson 
remained in Paris until June of 1919. Although he maintained a hand in naval administration, 
especially on large questions of policy, day to day, the service was effectively run by his 
deputy, Pratt to January 1919 and, after Pratt left for the fleet, Rear Admiral Josiah S. 
McKean.36 Although both men were competent—especially the brilliant Pratt—neither had 
Benson’s rank or authority in the Navy’s internal deliberations. As the Navy turned to 
consider the lessons of the First World War, the most powerful advocate for the new OpNav 
staff was missing.  
 Perhaps Benson’s absence also goes some way to explaining Daniels’s failure to act 
on his desire to put type C fast battleships in the Navy Department Budget. His decision is 
still somewhat baffling. By late 1918, the CNO and his staff, Sims and the London staff, the 
technical bureaus, and the Secretary of the Navy supported the type C battleship—the 
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service’s entire political, strategic, and technical apparatus except the shuttered War College 
and the recalcitrant Board. It is true that the General Board had historically been the final 
uniformed authority on yearly construction plans, but that role was not statutory, and had 
never been construed to imply an obligation on the part of the Secretary to follow it. The 
final decision on the Navy’s construction program remained in the hands of the Secretary, 
subject to Congressional approval and modification. In the years since the Board’s first 
construction memorandum in 1903, successive Secretaries had seen fit to modify or ignore 
the Board’s suggestions, though not, admittedly, to the point of modifying the types 
themselves.  
 This support came not just from the subordinate technical bureaus and a CNO widely 
regarded as the Secretary’s creature, but from officers like Sims, who detested Daniels (the 
next year he tried to keep his wife from visiting him in Europe if it meant coming with 
Daniels’s peace conference delegation). If he had so desired, Daniels could have used this 
backing to strike at the General Board’s influence—perhaps a fair payment for five years of 
undermining and backbiting on their part.37 From a modern perspective, it would be fair to 
argue that the shape of the building program more properly belonged to the OpNav staff 
instead of the General Board, which was essentially the same setup as prevailed in Britain. 
Perhaps Daniels, always wary of a “Prussianized” naval staff, wanted to avoid granting 
OpNav any more power, or felt that a fight against the General Board before Congress was 
unwise. Whatever the reason, the opening rounds of the fast battleship fight certainly 
belonged to the General Board on points.  
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 As soon as Benson heard news reports of the new building program, he dashed off a 
cablegram to Daniels, bemoaning the Secretary’s “grave error.” Benson pointed to the 
proposals from the technical Bureaus, Sims, and OpNav for support. He almost noted that the 
performance of lightly armored battlecruisers forced “the complete change of British policy 
after the battle of Jutland.” To avoid a similar shock, and to increase the utility of the 
American fleet, Benson stopped just short of demanding that Daniels rescind his budget and 
submit a construction plan of 16 type C battleships to Congress while also asking for funds to 
convert as many of the 1916 ships as possible to that standard.38 Later that month, he again 
urged Daniels to reconsider. Battle cruisers, he said, “may fill a certain need,” but their 
construction costs were “a great deal of money to be putting into a vessel we are not certain 
about and a type that all foreign countries have abandoned.”39 
 Benson’s cable also expressed certainty that “those who have been in most intimate 
contact with the lesson which should be drawn from this war,” would agree with the fast 
battleship position.40 Here, Benson proved correct. While OpNav continued to carry the fast 
battleship banner, their case was bolstered by officers who spent the war in operational posts, 
now free to turn their attention to the future. The first of these was Sims’s letter from 
November. He was later joined by Henry T. Mayo, wartime commander of the Atlantic Fleet, 
and Hugh Rodman, commander of the battleship squadron that joined the Grand Fleet in 
Scotland. Their prodding caused the issue to snowball as more authors, weighed in with 
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articles in the naval and popular press. All of this took place against the background of the 
peace talks in Paris and the specter of a postwar Anglo-American-Japanese naval arms race.  
 In front of the House Naval Affairs Committee, three General Board members—Rear 
Admirals Badger, Fletcher, and Winterhalter—presented a united front in favor of 
battlecruisers. Badger called the ship a “glorified scout . . . well able to perform other 
combatant services,” like torpedo attacks on enemy battleships, while pointing to the 
Falklands and Jutland as proof of their utility. Badger also went on to note that the General 
Board had considered fast battleships over the summer and Badger dismissed them in 
substantially the same language the Board used in their response to the ABCD memo.41 
 Within the Navy and in front of Congress, Mayo and Rodman argued against the 
Board’s viewport. Instead, the two men argued for the cancellation of battlecruiser and 
battleship construction, and a switch to the fast battleship model. Though not in contact with 
the Royal Navy in the normal course of his duties, Mayo had traveled to Britain during the 
war, and he came back from his last trip convinced that the U.S. Navy needed to build 
aircraft carriers for scouting purposes.42 By January 1919, Mayo was claiming that carriers 
and new light cruisers along the lines of the British Hawkins obviated the need for 
battlecruisers to scout. Their light armor made them “inefficient in a major engagement,” 
suggesting that there was no rationale for building them.43 Indeed, in front of Congress Mayo 
wrongly claimed that the stated rationale for American battlecruiser construction in 1916 was 
based exclusively on fear of German ships of that type. At any rate, he urged that the four 
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battleships and six battlecruisers yet to be laid down from the 1916 act be converted into ten 
Hood-type fast battleships.44  
 Rodman’s conclusions were substantially the same, albeit with a different rationale. 
Rather than viewing battlecruisers as newly unnecessary, Rodman argued that battlecruisers 
were necessary but had “a tendency to merge and come in toward one type” with 
battleships.45 Their critical missions, then, could be fulfilled by a ship type that also bolstered 
the U.S. battle line. Speaking before the General Board several days later, he further claimed 
that a fast battleship could “do the work just as well as a battlecruiser and can resist an 
attack.”46  
 OpNav also weighed in on the side of fast battleships. Though content with the 
retention of the dreadnought philosophy for battleships, OpNav’s Planning Section argued 
that the battlecruiser design was fatally flawed. It lacked the armor to contend with either its 
Japanese opposite number, the Kongo-class, or Japanese battleships. Unlike the Board, the 
staff believed that battlecruisers were impossible to justify without an ability to fight enemy 
battleships on reasonable terms. As one of their memoranda put it, the American ships were 
“simply huge destroyers, entirely unable to be placed in the line of battle. Nor can it be 
understood how they can engage  . . . the Japanese battle cruisers with double the thickness of 
armor.” Still believing in the need for battlecruisers in the U.S. Navy, persisting with the 
same design, they argued, would “be a blunder of the first order . . . this design of battle 
cruiser is not the answer.” If possible, they urged, the battlecruisers ought to be replaced with 
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either the “C” or “D” fast battleships. Failing that, the extant battlecruiser design needed far 
more armor.47  
In May, the Planning Section again proposed their own building program, suggesting 
a program of 21 battleships and 10 “fast battleships,” presumably the technical bureaus’ C 
type design from the previous year. The plan represented something of a change from their 
1918 request for 27 type C fast battleships and the end of “traditional” battleship or 
battlecruiser construction.48 It is true that the Planning Section’s interventions into the post-
Armistice debate evinced less hostility to bifurcation, their ire tending to focus on the 
supposed failings of the Board’s battlecruisers. However, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the main cause of the revision was cost, with the fast battleship designs about 125% as 
expensive as the type A battleship.49 
 This debate was covered at length by the specialized naval press. Along with an 
inconclusive editorial, Sea Power published an unsigned article (suggesting that the author 
was a serving officer) which argued that the current craze for fast battleships ran counter to 
the precepts of Mahan, who warned against an undue focus on speed over firepower.50 In the 
general press, Scientific American, a frequent entrant into debates of naval design, pushed for 
fast battleships in their May 5 issue, noting that the most prominent uniformed supporters of 
fast battleships spent the war in active service abroad, while their detractors had remained in 
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the U.S.51 Likewise, The New York Times published two articles on the issue in March, one 
falsely claiming that that Daniels “has not taken sides in the dispute, nor have his three chief 
technical advisers.”52 
 The most interesting piece on the debate, though, came from Constructor C.F. Eggert 
in the May issue of Proceedings. In a piece rather at odds with his Bureau’s stated positions, 
Eggert argued that, at modern combat ranges in excess of 16-20,000 yards, battlecruisers 
could indeed fight battleships at reasonably equal terms, since neither battlecruisers nor 
dreadnought battleships had adequate protection against plunging fire. Given that 
impossibility, Eggert suggested doing away with battlecruiser armor altogether and instead 
mounting a greatly increased battery—twelve 14” or nineteen 12” guns—allowing them to 
fight dreadnoughts at long range with an equality or superiority of firepower. With this shift, 
Eggert foresaw an American fleet with battleships handling close and medium range fire, 
with battlecruisers fighting in line, but a separate line several thousand yards further out.53 
 This issue would not be decided in the press, however, either popular or technical. In 
early March, Daniels suspended work on the battlecruisers to allow for a full reconsideration 
of the type. The Board, unsurprisingly, remained resolute, but Daniels also brought the 
technical bureau chiefs with him on a trip to Europe. While there, the party met with their 
European counterparts, and toured new construction, including Hood. Earle, the head of 
BuOrd, suggested that British officers deliberately underplayed their support for 
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battlecruisers in order to turn the Americans away from the Lexingtons, which frightened 
British planners. However, the Admiralty in early 1919, though admittedly anti-battlecruiser, 
had come to their conclusions honestly; as we have seen, they really were not in favor of the 
pre-Hood battlecruiser model.54 
 When the bureau chiefs returned from Europe, Daniels called a special session of the 
General Board to settle the fast battleship/battlecruiser debate. Along with the Board, the 
session included the senior officers afloat and the bureau chiefs, although Benson was still in 
Paris. The course of the meeting itself is unclear, but by its end, a compromise had been 
forged. Rather than continuing with the initial design, or switching to a fast battleship 
paradigm and delaying construction even further, the conference declared that “the six battle 
cruisers now authorized be completed as expeditiously as possible, but with additional 
protection, particularly to turrets, conning towers, magazines and communications at the 
expense of a small reduction in speed.”55 
 The conference’s statement was rather hazy on details, but as C&R began to modify 
the design, it was clear that the compromise was along the lines of their type B design from 
last summer’s memo. In exchange for a reduction in speed from 34.8 to 33 knots, the 
Lexingtons gained two more inches of belt armor and nearly double the armor protecting the 
conning tower and turrets.56 The deck armor was also strengthened, giving the ships a 
minimum of approximately five inches of horizontal protection over the magazines and 
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propelling machinery. Lastly, the beam was increased, giving constructors space for more 
elaborate anti-torpedo and mine protections.57 
 
*** 
 
 As we have seen, Stanley Goodall, the British naval constructor seconded to the U.S. 
Navy Department during the war, had a good working relation with his hosts. Privately, 
though, he despaired about increasing American naval power and the hardening of attitudes 
towards Britain. Soon after the war, he wrote his supervisor, Eustace D’Eyncourt, the DNC, 
with his impressions of the United States, darkly warning that “there are movements here 
which gravely endanger the future of the British Empire.” Not only did Goodall believe that 
the large German-American population and the financial sector contributed to an anti-British 
mood, but the U.S. “means to have a big navy,” potentially a mortal threat to the British 
Empire.58 
 Specifically, Goodall was worried about the second ten battleship/six battlecruiser 
construction program before Congress, and asked D’Eyncourt if he could return to Britain, to 
brief members of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. As it happened, 
British negotiators at the conference were able to blunt some of the threat from the United 
States, trading British support for the Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations in 
exchange for an American promise to cancel the second large Navy bill. Still, that agreement 
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left the prospect of sixteen new American capital ships entering the U.S. fleet in the next few 
years, each newer and more advanced than anything in Britain save for the under-
construction Hood.  
 In truth, the financial pressures of dealing with a hostile United States were an even 
greater concern than the strategic consequences of the American navy. In that sense, the 
question of responding to American strength was purely academic. Even before the April 
agreement at Versailles, the Admiralty was forced to cancel construction of the remaining 
three Hoods, leaving the Royal Navy with only one post-Jutland ship under construction, and 
that a hastily-redesigned battlecruiser.59 Simply put, Britain could not afford to maintain 
naval supremacy with new construction. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June, 
the Cabinet adopted a series of strategic policies intended to keep the military budget in 
check. In addition to an assumption that war would not come in the next ten years, the 
Cabinet also set a cap of £135 million on military spending, forcing a round of military belt-
tightening.60 The Admiralty was restricted to a budget of £60 million; comparable to the last 
sets of prewar budgets.61 
 Like Goodall, British policy towards the United States was conflicted. This attitude is 
best summed up in in a July 1919 memorandum from M.P.A. Hankey, the CID’s influential 
Secretary. Hankey found the prospect of a war with the United States “almost unthinkable,” 
and he was further convinced that Britain could not possibly win such a war. Hankey 
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advocated maintaining at least naval parity with the United States, however suggesting that 
British security could not be maintained with anything less.62 
 Walter Long, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, did not share Hankey’s view. In 
August 1919, he assured the Prime Minister that he had spent his time “engaged in pressing 
reductions and economies upon all Branches. . . . I am very hopeful that the result of this will 
be very large reductions.”63 Shipbuilding, as a major contributor to the budget, bore the brunt 
of this austerity drive. Eustace D’Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, was forced to 
suggest in September that, rather than focus on building ships, his department should produce 
a yearly set of designs “embodying all the latest improvements” in naval science. These 
designs would not necessarily be built, but by providing the Board with constantly updated 
sets of modern designs, it was hoped that the Navy could prepare for modern construction 
when budgets loosened.64 
 The problems facing Britain did not end on the other side of the Atlantic. Towards the 
end of the First World War, the War Cabinet again took up the issue of imperial defense in 
the Far East. An initial Admiralty proposal to create a single Imperial Navy in May 1918 was 
quickly shot down by Dominion ministers, but the Admiralty continued to consider the best 
way to defend Hong Kong, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, and the valuable sea lanes 
connecting them to the metropole through the immediate postwar period.65 Like Fisher nearly 
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a decade earlier, many of the proposed solutions centered on battlecruisers as a type of large 
ship uniquely suited for distant operations in conjunction with light forces.  
 Battlecruisers also had the added benefit of cost-effectiveness. Battleships, designed 
for use in squadrons and fleets, would have required an immense financial outlay for 
effective duty in the colonies. At the very least, berthing facilities east of Suez would have 
needed a major expansion to handle any appreciable number of battleships at once. At any 
rate, slower battleships were hardly the ideal sort of warship for the sea lane protection 
envisioned as the Royal Navy’s main mission outside of Europe. On the other hand, the 
battle of the Falklands had proven that one or two battlecruisers could effectively hunt 
cruisers and, with their great speed, could remain based in or around Britain. Indeed, a 
document from the naval staff on the expansion of Empire oiling stations, written in late 
October 1918, suggested that a unit of two battlecruisers and six light cruisers could be used 
as a sort of standard contingency force for emergencies in in the South Atlantic, Indian 
Ocean, East Indies, and Pacific.66  
 At least some in the Admiralty considered stationing a British battlecruiser in the 
Asia-Pacific region alongside HMAS Australia. A memorandum for First Lord Walter Long 
from February 1919 suggests that a preliminary decision had been made to station a British 
squadron of one battlecruiser, five light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and twelve submarines 
in the Far East. This was, the memorandum assured Long, “sufficient to safeguard the 
interests of the Empire in those waters,” at least as long as the Japanese alliance remained 
intact.67  
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 Although the Dominion governments had rejected the Imperial Navy proposal in mid-
1918, they expressed a desire for a Royal Navy representative to visit, and make 
recommendations as to the future of their naval establishments.68 Admiral Jellicoe, out of a 
job after the war, was picked to be that representative, one suspects, out of a desire to remove 
him from Britain for an extended period.69 Whatever the cause, Jellicoe left on his fact-
finding mission in mid-1919 with a remit to “confer with and advise the Dominion 
Authorities on Naval Matters.”70 
 Jellicoe returned from the trip with a report written with his characteristic intelligence 
and commitment to detail. Despite victory in the recent war, Jellicoe’s reported urged the 
bolstering of British naval strength in the Western Pacific. Instead of “fleet units,” he called 
for a combined British-Australian-New Zealander “Far Eastern Fleet,” representing a 
significant portion of postwar Imperial naval strength. With eight battleships and eight 
battlecruisers of “modern” (that is, post-Jutland, apart from HMAS Australia) type, ten light 
cruisers, forty destroyers, thirty-six submarines, and four aircraft carriers, this was to be a 
fleet capable of protecting the Far East without reinforcement from home waters.71 
 One might imagine that this robust fleet was intended to protect British possessions 
from the Americans, but Jellicoe’s report made it clear that the anticipated enemy was Japan, 
and the eight battleship/eight battlecruiser Far Eastern Fleet derived from Japan’s similar “8-
8 fleet” building program. While acknowledging Britain’s alliance with Japan, Jellicoe saw 
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them as a revisionist power, and foresaw inevitable conflict between the two countries due to 
economics and restrictive immigration policies in Australia and New Zealand. Preparing for 
a Japanese war would also require a major investment in naval infrastructure east of Suez, 
where there were no berthing facilities for the most modern capital ships.72 
 Jellicoe’s suggestions had dramatically overstepped the bounds of his appointment, 
which made no mention of strategic or diplomatic suggestions. His pessimism concerning 
Japan, though shared by some in the Admiralty, could hardly become the basis of British 
policy towards a country that—barely—remained a treaty ally. First Sea Lord Rosslyn 
Wemyss, especially, “was appalled by Jellicoe’s presumption.”73 The focus of policymakers 
in 1919-20 was the United States, a potentially apocalyptic threat to British naval supremacy, 
the bedrock of British power. 74 
 As a result, the postwar fleet organization closely tracked the Europe-heavy prewar 
disposition, albeit with fewer ships—sixteen battleships and four battlecruisers. By 1920, 
there were three battle squadrons: two in the Atlantic Fleet in home waters (the Queen 
Elizabeth and “R” class battleships), and one in the Mediterranean (the Iron Dukes). The four 
battlecruisers (Hood, Tiger, Repulse, and Renown) were attached to the Atlantic Fleet. Each 
fleet maintained one carrier. Despite grandiose plans for stationing fleets in the Far East, the 
only large ships east of Suez were the carrier Ark Royal, and the eponymous dominion’s 
HMAS Australia. 75 The Navy was certainly interested in placing more in the region, but the 
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money for ships, crews, and expanded shore establishments was lacking, and none could be 
spared with an increasingly hostile United States just across the Atlantic.  
 Against this background, the Royal Navy began to assess the war and discuss the 
future of their fleet and naval construction. Although shrinking budgets may have may new 
ships impractical, this did not stop serious debate over what Britain should build if 
construction ever restarted. Understandably, much of this discussion and speculation centered 
on the eventual fate of the battlecruiser. Not only had British battlecruisers delivered a very 
mixed performance in the recent war, but Hood suggested that battlecruiser speed could be 
maintained in a more heavily armored ship. At the very end of the war, William Sims had 
spoken to a number of British officials, including Beatty, on the subject of HMS Hood, and 
all seemed to indicate that they saw the new ship as the future of capital ship construction. If 
battlecruisers were to survive in British planning, it was clear that a new paradigm was 
needed.76 
 One of the few things all could agree on by early 1919 was the unsuitability of the 
battlecruisers possessed by the British at the beginning of the war and the battlecruisers 
produced during it. Beatty, of course, had identified problems with his “bloody ships” at 
Jutland, presided over a BCF battlecruiser inquiry, and minimized their exposure upon taking 
command of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe, who released a book on the Grand Fleet in early 1919, 
claimed that at the time of Jutland British battlecruisers “were very inadequately protected by 
armour.” 77 Coming from a man who had been on Fisher’s original “Dreadnought” committee 
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in 1904-5 and heavily involved in the design of Lion, this bit of revisionism rang rather 
hollow, as Director of Naval Construction Eustace D’Eyncourt pointed out in an acerbic 
commentary on the text.78 
 Beyond sniping at Jellicoe, D’Eyncourt played a major role in the Navy’s postwar 
design debate. Most immediately, the D.N.C’s Department defended its prewar work, 
maintaining that the battlecruiser was an inevitable evolution of the armored cruiser pattern 
(D’Eyncourt came to the Admiralty too late to affect the design of the prewar battlecruisers). 
Not only could the D.N.C.’s office not be blamed for the original idea, but their designs were 
also impacted by “the insistent demands of the strategist for the highest speed obtainable.”79 
D’Eyncourt did, however, distance himself from the five wartime battlecruisers, taking pains 
to note that they were built “on the initiative of Lord Fisher” in a speech before the 
Institution of Naval Architects in April 1919.80  
 Looking forward, though, D’Eyncourt seemed to agree with Jellicoe and Beatty that it 
was perhaps time to move away from Fisher’s battlecruiser ideal. In a July memorandum on 
the war’s impact on warship design, D’Eyncourt suggested that a merger of the battlecruiser 
and battleship types had the potential to be “a more efficient unit” than either of the older 
types separately. At the same time that the U.S. Navy was deciding to stick with bifurcation, 
D’Eyncourt pointed out that a homogenous fleet of fast battleships would avoid a repeat of 
Jutland, with a formation of lighter ships going into combat without backup from the battle 
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line. Despite the cancellation of its three sister ships, Hood, D’Eyncourt argued, remained the 
model for hybrid fast battleships, especially since its design was the largest that could be 
serviced at existing port facilities.81 
 In early 1919, a memo circulated around the Admiralty that made the case that Britain 
should avoid future capital ship construction. This argument rested both on the increasing 
sophistication of torpedoes and naval artillery and the grim prediction that outbuilding the 
United States in capital ships was impossible, leaving Britain with “the second best Navy,” 
which history had shown to be “not much use.” Instead, the memo suggested, the Royal 
Navy should focus on aircraft and submarines. By shifting the basis of British power onto 
these new types, the Royal Navy could avoid the worst consequences of inevitable capital 
ship inferiority and build a navy better suited for modern conditions.82  
 Taken as a whole, the postwar debate over the future shape of the Royal Navy was 
rather more cacophonous than similar debates on the other side of the Atlantic, which 
revolved around comparatively minor differences over battleships, battlecruisers, and fast 
battleships. In an attempt to make some sense of this, the Admiralty created the Post-War 
Questions Committee in mid-1919 under the charge of Vice-Admiral Richard Phillimore, 
who had commanded a battlecruiser squadron and the Grand Fleet’s aircraft-carrying ships 
during the war. Phillimore and the other nine members of the committee were to “consider in 
the light of the experience of the war, the military uses and values of the different types of 
war vessels [and] [t]o report which types of vessels should compose the Principal Fleet on 
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mobilization for war, and in what proportions they should be provided.83 Before coming to 
their conclusions, the committee interviewed an array of officers off a standard set of 
questions that covered the length and breadth of warship design and its inputs, including a 
question that asked if battlecruisers were necessary in the future.84 Although the similarity 
was surely unintentional, the process does remind one of the standard procedure for War 
College summer conferences at Newport.  
 The evidence taken by the committee suggested that support for capital ships 
remained robust in the Royal Navy, but battlecruisers were only grudgingly accepted. 
Broadly speaking, many of the officers interviewed suggested that the ships were a 
lamentable development, but necessary to counter foreign ships of the same type. Without 
the Japanese, and especially American, battlecruiser programs, the type would be 
unnecessary. One interviewee, Vice-Admiral Sydney Fremantle hoped that a construction 
freeze on the part of Britain would lead the type to “die out” as the Americans and Japanese 
lost the stomach for such expensive ships.85 Somewhat surprisingly, there seemed to be little 
desire for building a single type of fast battleship.86   
 The Committee’s final report echoed these concerns. Although their interim report, in 
late 1919, claimed, “the Battle Cruiser has quite justified her existence,” by the final version 
of the report, they had somewhat soured on the type, seeing them as a necessary evil.87 In that 
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document, released in late March 1920, the Committee agreed with its interviewees that 
Britain “should not require” battlecruisers in the absence of foreign analogues. The 
Committee also agreed with wartime concerns that British battlecruisers were too light, 
suggesting design parameters more akin to Hood than Repulse. However, Hood was taken as 
a starting point for battlecruiser design, not capital ship design; the Committee took a firm 
stand in favor of bifurcation, laying out the case for a 23-knot battleship.88 
 Despite their stark division between battleships and battlecruisers, the Committee’s 
suggestions for battlecruiser design would have placed the ship in the “fast battleship” 
category in the United States. The Committee declined to give specifics of armor, choosing 
instead to suggest armor between ten and twenty percent weaker than on their battleship, 
rather more armor than earlier generations of battlecruiser. Ideally, the ships would have 
eight guns of at least fifteen inches, and at least 33 ¼ knots speed—the speed of USS 
Lexington. Indeed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Committee’s parameters were 
specifically formulated to counter the six American battlecruisers.89  
 The Post War Questions Committee, though, was simply an advisory body and, while 
it presented a fair survey of the officer corps’ viewpoint, especially those in the grades from 
captain to vice admiral, it was not the Admiralty, which approached the issue with a much 
greater commitment to staff work and doctrine than its prewar iteration. As we have seen, the 
war brought about great changes in the structure and work of the Admiralty staff. By war’s 
end, a great deal of operational authority had been concentrated in the hands of the First Sea 
Lord. Under Jellicoe the post of Chief of the Naval War Staff had been subsumed into that of 
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First Sea Lord, both removing an officer who could offer separate advice to the First Lord, 
and placing the First Sea Lord in more direct contact with staff work. Combined with reforms 
that removed most purely administrative functions from the First Sea Lord’s remit, the office 
achieved a level of formal control that Fisher could only have dreamed of.90 
 The Naval Staff had been a qualified success during the war, but peacetime presented 
very different challenges.91 At the very least, the war years had convinced the Royal Navy of 
the necessity of staff officers, although their numbers were cut after the War as part of 
Long’s economy drive. More importantly, the wartime Naval Staff had focused most of its 
attention on operational matters. The postwar period also demanded skilled staff work, but 
more in the vein of training, preparing war plans and, of course, warship design. It was an 
open question whether or not the Admiralty’s wartime structure could be adapted to meet 
postwar demands.  
 A serious attempt was made to push naval staff training in that direction, part of an 
effort amongst British reformers to refashion British naval education. American officers who 
worked with the Royal Navy came away impressed with the caliber of officer on their flag 
staffs, but reformers within the Royal Navy tended to disagree.92 For example, an August 
1919 article in the Naval Review argued that the British staff system was hopelessly broken 
at the fleet and Admiralty levels. The staff officers themselves—“very nice chaps as a 
rule”—seemed to be picked more on their personal connection to a flag officer than “their 
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original knowledge of, or aptitude for their work.”93 Although the article’s author was rather 
unkind towards wartime staff officers—many of whom were quite distinguished—it was 
undoubtedly true that very few had adequate preparation for their tasks.94 The solution the 
Review article identified was to treat staff work as a specialization akin to gunnery or 
torpedoes, so that select officers could receive training in and make a career out of staff 
work.95  
 While the Admiralty was unwilling to go that far, changes were put in place after the 
war to improve the quality of staff work. First Sea Lord Rosslyn Wemyss, who had attended 
the War College twice, in 1908-9 and 1911, took the issue of staff education very seriously.96 
In April 1918, he had appointed Herbert Richmond to the new post of Director of Training 
and Staff Duties, and Plans. This was a marker of seriousness—appointing someone with 
Richmond’s views on training and staff duties could hardly be anything else—but Richmond 
was not able to do very much before his characteristically prickly demeanor forced his 
removal at the end of the year. Wemyss also presided over the elevation of the Admiralty’s 
Plans Division to a central role in developing naval policy. By the 1920s, First Sea Lords 
used the Plans Division as their “policy-making advisory staff.”97 
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 After the war, Wemyss led the way in creating  a Naval Staff College at Greenwich to 
train officers for duties of that nature, providing a more specialized training to more junior 
officers than were typically admitted to the War College; mostly commanders and lieutenant-
commanders.98 The school was placed under the command of Captain Reginald Plunkett-
Ernle-Erle-Drax, one of the Naval Review’s founding members, and a veteran of the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet who had served on HMS Lion as Beatty’s flag commander. 
 In an essay written for the 1919 edition of Brassey’s, Drax laid out a radical plan for 
the reorganization of British naval education. In some ways, Drax’s vision was of the merger 
of the best qualities of the American and British naval educational systems, adding the 
qualities of intellect and theory to the traditional R.N. virtues of character and practical work. 
He showed himself to be in favor of some increase in the theoretical training of officer cadets 
and midshipmen, though not at the expense of their intensive practical education aboard ship. 
Drax also stressed the need for a shared understanding of warfare throughout the service, 
arguing that “[a]n Admiral who has been a Gunnery Lieutenant should look at the big 
problems of war in exactly the same way as an Admiral who has been a submarine or signal 
officer . . . specialization is a means to an end and not an end in itself.”99 Put simply, Drax 
called for a standardization of theory in the service that his American counterparts could take 
for granted.100  
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 Drax’s proposal relied on the production of manuals and training at the War and Staff 
Colleges to instill this understanding in the officer corps. The manuals, hopefully produced 
by the War College or Admiralty staff—“the best brains the Navy can produce”—would 
cover the entirety of naval warfare and administration, from strategy and the “functions of 
different types of warships,” to “principles of . . . training.” On top of this was an expanded 
role for the two colleges at Greenwich. All officers in the combat branches, he hoped, would 
have to take a 2-3 month “short course” at Greenwich immediately before or after the 
training that qualified them in their particular service branch, to ensure that every officer with 
the chance to command a ship received some high-level instruction in strategy.101 
 Additionally, the most promising candidates would be selected for the “long course” 
of at least twelve months, which would prepare them for “filling War Staff appointments at 
sea, in war or peace, and billets in the Admiralty Naval Staff.” While Drax made it clear that 
he wanted to avoid a “‘War College’ clique,” he hoped that the long course training would be 
seen as a positive for officers being considered for flag rank. However, the primary goal of 
this educational scheme was to provide the Royal Navy with a critical mass of trained staff 
officers to support commanders. To Drax, the moral qualities required for command were 
innate and not frequently found in combination with those qualities that made a good staffer. 
By supplementing the former with staffs of the latter, Drax hoped to combine those qualities 
in Admiralty and fleet leadership.102 
 The similarities between Drax’s proposals and the educational system in the United 
States Navy are striking and almost certainly intentional. However, he did not intend to copy 
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the American system. As he obliquely noted, the “War College clique” in the United States 
was influential, and viewed War College training as a prerequisite for command, not just staff 
work, a line of thought Drax rejected. He also sought to preserve much of the practical 
education in the British officer training system, rather than the U.S. Navy’s entirely academic 
approach. Still, his piece was an admission that something was very wrong with the 
intellectual formation of British officers. Great admirals may have come into the Navy with 
an ingrained air of command, but staff officers, contrary to prewar assumptions, required a 
rigorous training.  
 It is worth noting that Drax did not outline what principles that critical 
“understanding” should be based upon. The man best placed to do so was Herbert Richmond, 
now the head of the War College at Greenwich. Richmond had a great deal of experience as a 
staff officer, from a stint as one of Fisher’s assistants to two postings in the Admiralty during 
the war: A.D.O.D. from 1913-15, and Director of Training and Staff Duties in 1918. 
Richmond was also one of the founders and editors of the Naval Review, a journal that 
constantly agitated for advanced tactical and strategic thought in the Royal Navy.   
 In his postwar lectures, Richmond showed that he shared Drax’s concern about the 
state of tactical and strategic thought in the Royal Navy. Like Drax, Richmond expressed 
concern that the prewar training regime had created an officer corps that subordinated tactics 
to technical factors, especially “the demands of the individual gun” over the proper 
employment of an entire fleet. Strategy, Richmond argued, was more than opening fire first 
or at the longest ranges. Both goals, of course, had been obsessions of Fisher and Jellicoe 
during their careers.103 
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 Richmond, however, did not share Drax’s enthusiasm for standardized doctrine, at 
least not on the strategic or tactical levels. Although he did recognize some very general 
principles—a preference for the offensive and a focus on the destruction of the enemy being 
the two dearest—he was generally opposed to the sort of all-consuming doctrine posited by 
Drax and practiced in the United States. Although Richmond made frequent use of Corbett 
and Mahan in his lectures, he warned that their principles stood the danger of becoming 
“mere catchwords, repeated without understanding . . . [w]e are not entitled to say that the 
action of a Commander was wrong because he violated some principle, unless we can shew 
[sic] that the violations produced evil results.”104 Strategy and tactics, he argued, could be 
taught in a classroom, but strategists and tacticians could only be produced by experience.105  
 At least for the immediate postwar period, Drax’s vision won out. In early 1920, First 
Lord Long laid out a scheme of naval education that had much in common with Drax’s 
musings from the previous year. No great changes were announced in the system for training 
officer candidates, but Long indicated that 25% of especially promising sub-lieutenants 
would be given extra university training, which would include a war course at Greenwich. 
Long also affirmed the importance of the Staff College, saying that the officers trained there 
would “ensure a common doctrine on strategical and tactical questions, the right application 
of the lessons of the past, and the ability to foresee the requirements of the future.”106 Like 
Drax’s suggestions, the “Americanization” of mid-career training only went as far as staff 
                                                           
104
 Richmond, “Strategy III,” in Lectures; Spring Session 1920, Volume I; Policy and Strategy, RIC/10/1, 
NMM, 22. 
105
 Richmond, “Introductory Address,” in Lectures; Volume I, 8-10. 
106
 First Lord Walter Long, “Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 
1920-1921,” March 1920, 6-11. 
379 
 
officers; nothing in Long’s document suggested that staff officers were necessarily destined 
for command.  
 Despite these changes, progress would be difficult. Writing in his journal in late 1920, 
Richmond despaired of the raw material available to him at the War College. His students 
were” unable . . .  to express themselves at all. They cannot analyse a situation. They cannot 
define their objectives in a given situation. . . . Yet these are our future guides in all high 
matters.”107 Essentially, senior officers in the immediate postwar period were doomed to 
failure measured against Richmond’s standards. As Drax’s essay emphasized, producing a 
better sort of officer was a project that began with cadets, and required periodic instruction 
throughout their careers. Although the Royal Navy would eventually improve the strategic 
and tactical grounding of their officer corps, the project would not bear fruit for a long time. 
Still, the belated recognition of the importance of staff work suggested that the Royal Navy 
recognized some of the intellectual problems that plagued the wartime effort. 
 
*** 
  
 In the United States, the internal wrangling over fleet composition was, though 
important, not the main factor affecting naval policy. Secretary Daniels may have brought the 
bureau chiefs with him to Europe in March 1919, but the real purpose of the trip was for 
Daniels to join Benson in the Paris Peace Conference, where naval issues had driven a major 
wedge between the American and British delegations, the latter viewing the American naval 
program with trepidation. British officials saw naval supremacy as the key to their national 
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defense, and by 1918, it was clear postwar Britain lacked the financial capacity to win a 
naval arms race with a naval-minded United States.  
 Even before the war ended, the Admiralty had tried to dissuade the Navy Department 
from resuming capital ship construction.108 Well aware of this British fear, the Wilson 
Administration pushed naval construction as a way to force British concessions in Paris. 
Although Daniels’s budget called for a doubling of the 1916 bill, he and other Administration 
officials made it clear to a reluctant Congress that the threat of continued naval construction 
was key to the American negotiating position. Because of Administration pressure, the bill 
was rushed through the House Naval Affairs Committee by mid-February, albeit with a rider 
that no construction would take place before February 1, 1920. In other words, the 
Committee assumed, correctly, that the bill was intended to bring the British to the 
negotiating table more than to actually increase the size of the navy.109 
 By March, when Daniels and Benson were in Paris, the parameters of the proposed 
bill were of great concern to their British counterparts. Soon after their arrivals in London, 
Daniels and Benson went through a series of stormy meetings with First Lord Geddes and 
First Sea Lord Wemyss, where the two admirals nearly came to blows.110 In early April, 
though, the British and American delegations had come to a gentleman’s agreement on the 
shape of the American naval program: in exchange for British support for the League of 
Nations and the Monroe Doctrine, the Administration agreed to torpedo the new naval 
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program and to slow further construction on the 1916 bill ships, especially the yet-to-be-
commenced battlecruisers.111 
 Although American politicians in Congress and the Executive Branch saw the 
proposed 1919 bill as a bargaining chip rather than a real blueprint for expansion, the Navy 
saw it as essential to American naval strength, and continued to agitate for more construction. 
The Planning Section’s program of 21 battleships and 10 battlecruisers, for example, came 
just weeks after the April 9/10 agreements. Naval leaders remained focused on the real 
imbalances between the American and British fleets, imbalances that may have worsened 
with Hood, especially after the agreement. A September 9 talk by Lieutenant Commander 
H.H. Frost, a recent War College graduate, noted that in the event of war with Britain, the 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet would be forced to avoid action with its opposite number, granting the 
initiative to the U.K. Although Frost painted an admittedly rosy picture of the course of such 
a war, he freely granted that British naval superiority would be “overwhelming.”112 
 Despite the obvious dangers of a war with the U.K., it had never been the focus of 
American planning, and any deal with them, though dispiriting from a materiel standpoint, 
was of secondary importance for the Navy. Japan received the lion’s share of the U.S. Navy’s 
attention after the destruction of German naval power in 1918. Before the First World War, 
U.S. Navy planning had tended to assume that Germany was the most dangerous realistic 
foe, but Japan the most likely, a pattern that held from 1918 on, with the British in place of 
the Germans. Like Wilhelmine Germany in the Atlantic, Japan was a revisionist power that 
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had proven to be rather aggressive in pursuit of influence and colonies, as recent wars with 
China, Russia, and Germany had shown; all three wars serving to expand the size of Japanese 
territory and increase its influence in East Asia and the Pacific.113 
 Furthermore, Japanese immigration was a major political issue in the United States, 
with the authorities and population at large in the Western United States treating Japanese 
immigrants with undisguised contempt. Both the legal barriers thrown in the face of 
immigrants and periodic waves of mob violence were, understandably, intolerable to the 
Japanese government, which had lodged a serious of protests with the federal government 
over this treatment. Indeed, one of these issues—the segregation of Japanese students in the 
San Francisco school system had nearly led to war in 1906/7. Despite the Roosevelt 
Administration’s subsequent “Gentleman’s Agreement” with Japan, “Asiatic Exclusion” 
remained the bedrock of American immigration policy.114 
  The U.S. Navy was well aware of these issues. A Planning Section document from 
April 1919 called Japanese policy “frankly imperialistic,” and suggested that “Race 
prejudice. . . . Our [“open door”] policy in China. . . . [and] The Philippines,” were all 
potential triggers for war, and all more or less permanent issues that were resistant to 
negotiation or agreement. If that war came, the Planning Section argued that the Japanese 
fleet would be able to seize Guam and the Philippines, cut off U.S. trade with Asia, and 
launch attacks on Alaska before the U.S. Navy would be able to respond. Even after the 
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Navy was fully engaged, the prospects for victory with the extant fleet and Pacific facilities 
were remote.115 
 Among the issues noted by the OpNav staffers was the lack of a coherent war plan, 
detailed anti-Japanese planning being a casualty of the recently ended war.116 To that end, 
Benson instructed Sims, the newly reinstated President of the Naval War College, to focus 
the forthcoming course’s attention on Japan.117 Along those lines, in mid-1919, Daniels 
authorized the creation of separate Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, each having about half of the 
Atlantic Fleet’s original strength, a move Benson had suggested in December 1918.118 
However, it became clear that the Pacific Fleet was now the Navy’s premiere formation. The 
dreadnought battleships assigned to the Pacific were newer, partially due to the ready 
availability of oil and paucity of coal on the West Coast, although both fleets had an equal 
number of coal-burning pre-dreadnoughts.119 Moreover, it was widely understood that the six 
battlecruisers, when finished, would be stationed with the Pacific Fleet.120 
 Such a departure from the Navy’s ‘til-then-standard insistence on a unified battle fleet 
mostly passed without serious criticism. One of the few exceptions was a rather intemperate 
editorial from Sea Power, which, falsely, claimed that the shift of warships to the Pacific was 
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imposed on the Navy by Daniels. To them, the move was intended “to make votes for the 
Democratic party in the coming presidential election,” by giving the West Coast its long 
hoped-for fleet. Although the editorial claimed that the move was widely unpopular amongst 
the officers and men of the Navy, this appears to be one of the few major decisions made by 
the rather unpopular Daniels supported by the officer corps.121 
 However, this “Pacific pivot” did not solve all of the Navy’s problems. A July 10 
memo sent over the signatures of most of the OpNav staff lamented that the Navy had “no 
type of cruiser capable of performing the duties that would be required of that type in a 
modern war,” the memorandum went on to suggest that the near-useless extant cruisers could 
be used as flagships or for diplomacy.122 In both oceans, the U.S. Navy’s cruisers remained 
overmatched and outnumbered, making the glacial progress on battlecruiser construction 
especially grating. Six battlecruisers would not close the cruiser gap in either case, but six 
large ships too fast for the British or Japanese navies to catch would improve the U.S. fleet’s 
scouting arrangements.  
 Both OpNav and the Board, however, recognized that even finishing the authorized 
construction on the original timetable was insufficient to meet Japan with the overwhelming 
superiority the American ethos of the offensive demanded. Along with urging the completion 
of the 1916 bill ships, the General Board also requested two new battleships, one 
battlecruiser, and two carriers to be laid down in the 1920-21 fiscal year, as well as ten scout 
cruisers, five flotilla leaders, and six submarines, though Congress late rejected the plan.123 
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Less than two weeks earlier, the Board had discussed the new Japanese 8-8 plan with a Japan 
expert from the Marine Corps. The meeting confirmed that Japan intended to construct and 
commission four dreadnoughts and eight battlecruisers by the end of 1923, an output the 
United States could only match with prompt resumption of the 1916 ships.124 
 Further confirming the alleged threat from Japan was OpNav’s own building program 
memo, written two weeks after the Board’s. While the Board’s memo made no specific 
mention of a country, the OpNav program asserted that Britain and Japan were the United 
States’ two potential enemies, and that preparations for Japan demanded the highest priority 
given the conflict between Japanese and American policies in the Pacific. The report also 
contained an outline for a plan of war against Japan, allowing the Plans Division to make 
suggestions based on specific scenarios and issues brought up in a potential war. The plan 
envisaged Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Guam, and other American possessions in the 
Western Pacific, followed by an American advance across the Pacific to recapture Guam. 
Once Guam was secure, the plan called for the capture of outlying Japanese islands and a 
close blockade of Japan, leading to an eventual surrender. Unfortunately, the study 
concluded, the USN as then constituted was unable to fulfill the plan.125 
 Capital ships, though, were not the issue. The OpNav plan recommended suspending 
battleship and battlecruiser construction after the completion of previously authorized 
construction, a change from their earlier advocacy of an enormous new construction 
program. If capital ships were needed in the future, the authors suggested the construction of 
“C” type fast battleships over separate battlecruiser and battleship types. Instead, the greatest 
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needs for the Navy were in light cruisers and carriers, both types being essential for the 
blockade phase of the war against Japan, and both types being major gaps in the American 
force structure. With that in mind, the Plans Division suggested the construction of four 
carriers and twenty light cruisers in the 1920-1 fiscal year. The latter were a particular 
favorite of the Plans Division; the report recommended the construction of twenty every year 
until the United States had at least 100 more light cruisers than Japan.126  
 Although formal responsibility for the Navy’s building program requests remained 
with the General Board, the OpNav plan highlighted some of the advantages of placing 
responsibility for building programs in the hands of those responsible for developing war 
plans, as the new British staff system did. The General Board plan was based on a policy of 
making the U.S. Navy “equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the 
world,” a materialist goal divorced from strategic plans or principles.127 A navy of that size 
would have given the USN enough materiel to engage with Japan or, if it came to that, 
Britain, but the Board’s understanding of “balance” still rested on a split between the 
expensive carrier, battleship, and battlecruiser types rather than the allocation of more 
resources to the flotilla. OpNav, on the other hand, produced a building program that was 
part of an integrated whole, prioritizing new construction base on the context of Pacific 
bases, manpower needs, and the newest war plans.  
 The structure of the report was almost as interesting as its suggestions. Unlike the 
General Board’s brief memorandum, this report was structured like a NWC “problem,” 
answering the question “In consideration of the international situation, our foreign policies, 
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and present relative strength of our own and foreign navies, what should be our naval 
building program?”128 The report then proceeded to answer the question starting at first 
principles and the definition of a “naval building program,” before laying out the plan for war 
with Japan and the ships needed to meet that plan’s requirements. Both in form and 
conclusion, the plan reminds the reader of nothing so much as a War College report produced 
during the post-1912 “Long Course” period, when the focus of the institution shifted to 
deeper education of a smaller number of students rather than the yearly summer conferences. 
 If nothing else, the report demonstrated the importance of the Naval War College to 
providing the new naval staff with both officers and a shared ethos. Of the thirteen members 
of the OpNav Plans Division in mid-1919, six, including the chair, were Long Course 
graduates; one had attended the Summer Conference in 1912 and Pratt, though not a War 
College graduate, had been a War College instructor during the first Long Course. By 
comparison, at the end of 1920, only 24 of 69 flag officers, 65 of 239 captains, and 31 of 410 
commanders in the Navy were Long Course graduates.129 Checking OpNav staff rosters 
against the lists of Newport attendees confirms that a stint at the War College was a very 
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important qualification for a position on the naval staff and long course experience especially 
valuable for those tasked with charting the Navy’s future.  
 It undoubtedly gave OpNav a different perspective than the General Board, where 
only Sims, the War College President, was a long course graduate and, at any rate, stationed 
far from Washington. The fissure that opened between the two bodies also suggests that the 
Board had lost something of its once-close connection to the Naval War College, which was 
under the direct supervision of the CNO and the chief source of OpNav staffers. While the 
Board had been mildly progressive during the prewar years, eventually promoting 
dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers against traditionalist resistance, it now found itself 
as the voice of conservatism in internal debates.  
 The increasing size and prominence of the OpNav staff, and its intimate ties to the 
War College, came close to bringing the dreams of Fiske and other reform-minded officers to 
fruition. As Sims noted in a speech to the December 1919 War College class, their 
coursework and war gaming at Newport would allow them to “develop new applications of 
the principles of warfare as applied to modern naval conditions. . . . They will also explain 
how the tactical game demonstrates the necessity for new or modified types of vessels, or 
new or modified uses for those already built.”130 Rather than trying to influence the General 
Board at Summer Conferences, Sims could be reasonably certain that many of the War 
College graduates would later find themselves in the Office of Naval Operations, directly 
shaping naval policy.  
 Proponents of the War College were fond of saying that one of their main missions 
was to “indoctrinate,” the Navy, especially its future leaders, with the proper understanding 
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of naval theory and strategy. Dudley Knox, a veteran of Sims’s Planning Section and the 
OpNav staff, and a member of the new Command Department of the Naval War College, 
argued in an August 1919 Proceedings article that OpNav could contribute to that mission. 
While the War College could train some leaders, a staff could make sure those methods and 
ideas spread throughout the fleet. The recently concluded war, he argued, had demonstrated 
the necessity for a “highly specialized General Staff,” in charge of “planning, indoctrination, 
and other higher branches of the profession.” Indeed, Knox’s article skirted close to 
suggesting that it would be best for OpNav to usurp all of the remaining functions of the 
General Board. 131 
 Based on the fast battleship fight and the alternate building programs, the CNO, 
OpNav, and perhaps the Secretary also believed that the naval staff was best situated to take 
on all planning functions. Less controversially, however, OpNav enthusiastically took on the 
“indoctrination” brief. As we have seen, Benson released a memorandum, “Doctrine,” in late 
1917 that laid out American naval policy in very broad terms, but elements in his staff 
wished to go much further. The thirteen authors of an OpNav memorandum (a group that 
included five flag officers) on the splitting of the battle fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific 
suggested that their office could maintain commonality between the two fleets by issuing “a 
common fleet doctrine which shall embody the doctrines of the various force organizations, 
this doctrine not to be altered except by the Department.” Furthermore, they suggested that 
the Plans Division be given the responsibility for developing the exercises and fighting 
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instructions of the fleet, rather than allowing individual commanders the latitude to determine 
these on their own.132 
  To some extent, the General Board was in the process of being superseded; perhaps 
due to its increasing isolation from the intellectual ferment of Newport (the last Summer 
Conference had taken place in 1913). Although the initial response to the creation of the 
CNO and OpNav had been cool amongst reformers, presumably due to Daniels’s treatment 
of Fiske, by the end of the War, the three most notable wartime commanders, all Newport 
graduates, had stood with OpNav against the General Board, joined by the technical bureaus 
and a substantial portion of the press.  
 At the heart of this shift was the debate over battlecruisers. The Board’s persistent 
and continuing support for them stood against the lessons of the war as understood by much 
of the U.S. Navy. As recently as 1914, support for battlecruisers was indicative of avant-
garde thinking in the U.S. Even as late as early 1917, the General Board’s contention that 
British failures with the type had little to do with American battlecruiser doctrine went 
essentially unchallenged inside the Navy. Exposure to the Admiralty during the War, 
however, and the example of Hood swiftly killed support for battlecruisers within the Navy’s 
strategic elite, outside of the General Board. By early 1919, support for battlecruisers in the 
U.S. had become a mark of old-fashioned thinking.  
  This state of affairs, however, was not a simple resurrection of the old-fashioned, 
pre-war anti-battlecruiser faction that existed in the US around 1910. The new opposition to 
battlecruisers did not stem from a retrograde belief that “speed is weakness,” but rather from 
an appreciation of the importance of speed to fleet operations and the belief that fast 
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battleships would allow the U.S. Navy to marry speed and protection in a single class of ship. 
This blend of capabilities was not a figment of some future technological dream, but 
stemmed from extant British plans for HMS Hood, which many fast battleship advocates saw 
as a jump in naval construction comparable to HMS Dreadnought a decade and a half ago. 
Previous rounds of naval debate could be reasonably portrayed as a forward-looking Board 
fighting against the hidebound bureaus and unreconstructed Mahanians. In the immediate 
postwar period, however, the General Board appeared ossified, pitted against sentiment in the 
War College and the War College-trained OpNav staff.  
 
 *** 
 
 The 1918-19 period solidified the different design philosophies at work in the US and 
UK. In Britain, both the Phillimore Committee, which remained committed to capital ship 
bifurcation, and draft designs at the Admiralty, which did not, confirmed that Hood would be 
the postwar pattern for fast capital ships in Britain. Even officers like Jellicoe, who had 
eagerly participated in the design or employment of prewar battlecruisers, came to see the 
Fisher-style battlecruiser as an irreparably flawed design. While the Royal Navy could not 
afford to scrap its prewar models, they were not to be repeated whenever construction was 
allowed to resume. 
 The U.S. Navy did not reach so harmonious a position. The Board’s thin-skinned 
battlecruiser easily survived scrutiny in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Jutland, and 
even American access to British records on the battle. It could not easily survive the 
conviction, increasingly common as 1918 went on, that Hood represented a new paradigm of 
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capital ship construction, superseding the Dreadnought/Invincible revolution of 1904-6. By 
late 1918, the Board’s design was facing united opposition from the Bureaus, active 
commanders, and OpNav. Although the Board managed to weather the storm with their 
design reasonably intact, it was an early signal that their influence over the Navy’s long-term 
procurement policy was not secure.  
 Instead, planning in the U.S. Navy seemed to be moving towards a staff system of the 
sort maintained by the other major naval powers, including the British. Although reformers 
had pushed for a naval general staff in the wake of the Spanish-American War, a central staff 
organization was not created until 1915. Even then, the new OpNav staff did not really find 
its feet until the 1917 wartime expansion of the Navy and its strategic apparatus. Like the 
Planning Staff at Sims’s headquarters in London, OpNav provided a suitable home for the 
talents and training of graduates of the War College’s Long Courses. With more recently 
trained staffers than the General Board, and a more secure position in the organizational 
chart, by 1919 OpNav had begun to take on the General Board’s war planning functions and 
threatened to supplant it entirely.133  
 In Britain, the Admiralty staff had grown in size and improved in effectiveness over 
the course of the war, but questions remained about its ability to transition to peacetime 
work. As reformers like Drax and Richmond noted, and the Admiralty implicitly accepted, 
the state of training for potential staff officers was dire. This was especially notable in the 
sort of “big picture” thinking required for effective peacetime staff work, as opposed to the 
narrower skillset required for wartime operational work. Given the challenges facing Britain, 
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the Naval Staff’s suitability for that role was subjected to a stress test immediately after the 
war, which continued through the 1921-22 Washington Conference. 
 The early postwar results were promising. Although financial difficulties prevented 
the immediate construction of new capital ships, Wemyss and his assistants ensured that the 
basic structure forged during the war remained. Of special interest are the education 
initiatives pushed by Wemyss, to ensure the supply of well-trained officers for service with 
the naval staff. The Wemyss Board was also able to use the Phillimore Committee to collect 
as many lessons from the war as possible, aiding in the future development of policy.  
 
*** 
 
 Signs in the U.S. were less promising. Before the First World War, the U.S. Navy’s 
inefficient planning and policy apparatus functioned because the strategically minded parts of 
the officer corps had collectively decided that it had to work. The General Board, for all its 
limitations, was the only permanent planning body in the Navy, making General Board 
service prized, and its decisions well regarded.134 The General Board, for all its faults, was 
the only permanent planning body in the Navy. Officers aspired to be on it, and it represented 
the voice of the line officers to the Secretary and, in many ways, against the technical 
Bureaus. The General Board, for example, had led the advocacy for dreadnought-style 
battleships in 1904-8, while the technical bureaus and the Board of Construction resisted. 
 However, the creation of OpNav in 1915 and, especially, the new OpNav Planning 
Section at the end of the war, confused the picture. These decisions were, in a vacuum, 
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excellent developments that rationalized policy formulation and war planning in the Navy. 
The General Board, however, was left outside of these arrangements, and suffered for it. 
Although the CNO, Admiral Benson, was a member of the Board, he frequently disagreed 
with its decisions. Even worse, OpNav took many of the talented officers who would have 
ordinarily been in line for a General Board post. Thinkers like Knox, Yarnell, and Schofield 
were ensconced in staff postings with OpNav; their predecessors ten, or even five, years 
earlier would have had a good chance to spend time as members of the General Board, and 
lend their expertise to its deliberations.  
 Despite these weaknesses, the General Board could not be ignored. Although the 
Board was, in theory, only as powerful as the Secretary allowed it to be, it maintained a 
strong influence on war plans, and a firm grasp on warship specifications, despite clashing 
with OpNav, senior commanders, and Secretary Daniels on the latter point. Put simply, the 
U.S. Navy faced a conflict between those charged with designing warships and those charged 
with utilizing them, a situation akin to the difficulties facing the Royal Navy during Admiral 
Fisher’s first term as First Sea Lord.  
 If the American and British navies had had comparable administrative setups, the 
year after the First World War would have produced a commitment towards fast battleships 
on the Hood model in both countries. In reality, only the Royal Navy managed to secure that 
commitment. A plurality of senior officers and staffers in both countries supported fast 
battleship construction, based on a similar reading of the First World War and the Battle of 
Jutland. In Britain, wartime changes to the Board of Admiralty and the Naval Staff ensured 
that such decisions were made collectively by the Board, with extensive support from the 
Staff, in the persons of the ACNS and DCNS on the Board. In the United States, the General 
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Board, slipping out of the mainstream of U.S. naval thought, managed to force the retention 
of the lightly armored battlecruiser, a decision that ran counter to majority naval opinion.  
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CHAPTER 9: DROWNED IN INK 
 
 Had the matter been left to the admirals, Britain, the United States, and Japan, would 
have been well into a three-headed naval arms race by the end of 1919. Fortunately, it was 
not. Politicians and economic common sense blunted those impulses in the U.S. and in 
Britain, although Japan continued with its “8-8” program. Despite these brakes on warship 
construction, the Admiralty and the Navy Department continued to think about potential new 
designs.   
 As both navies tried to develop vessels for the postwar era, battlecruisers seemed to 
slip down the priority list. In the United States, the rapid development of aircraft carriers 
threatened to usurp many of the scouting and screening functions for which the Lexington-
class battlecruisers were intended. More importantly, Congress showed little interest in any 
form of naval construction. After Administration arm-twisting, they had approved a doubling 
of the 1916 program in early 1919 for use as a bargaining chip at Versailles, but only with a 
tacit agreement that those ships would never actually be built. Increasingly, they seemed to 
treat the 1916 ships current under construction the same way. Congress refused to 
appropriate funds for the full-speed construction of the 1916 ships, a blow that fell 
disproportionally on the delayed and redesigned battlecruisers. 
 In Britain, the problem was simpler—there was no money for new warships. Indeed, 
there was hardly money for old warships, as the size of the fleet shrank dramatically after the 
Armistice. The Admiralty remained committed to the capital ship as the standard of naval 
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power, but believing it was not the same as getting one built. If they were to be built, 
questions remained over their design. Hood represented the final word in wartime naval 
design, but battlecruisers remained controversial in Britain, especially after Admiral Beatty 
took over as First Sea Lord in late 1919.  
 In both countries, these debates ultimately were superseded by the Washington 
Conference in 1921-22 and its associated treaties, but neither navy could have known that. 
The dramatic cuts and cancellations at the heart of the treaty were the result of an American 
plan finalized barely two weeks before the Conference’s start. No one—certainly no one in 
the Admiralty or Navy Department—could have expected the unprecedented terms of the 
Washington limitations regime. With that in mind, the last years before the Conference 
should not be viewed as the coda to a fading age of dreadnoughts. In London and 
Washington, naval strategists and constructors busied themselves debating and designing 
ships that they sorely wanted built; ships they deemed necessary to an imminent war between 
some combination of the U.S., the U.K., and Japan.  
 
*** 
 
 Part of the reluctance of avant-garde American officers to endorse the prewar 
battlecruiser paradigm during the 1918-19 fast battleship controversy came from the only 
truly new class of ship to come out of the First World War: the aircraft carrier. Although the 
United States Navy had been an early pioneer in launching and landing airplanes from and on 
warships, the British were the first to use ships specifically for aircraft; seaplane tenders early 
in the war, followed by ships with decks that could accommodate the launching and recovery 
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of wheeled airplanes.1 By mid-1918, carriers were considered a key part of British fleet 
operations, as Admiralty constructor Stanley Goodall related to his American hosts in two 
August memoranda. Specifically, the Royal Navy found aircraft essential to the scouting 
prior to a major battle.2  
 While Goodall’s advice probably played a role in the General Board’s September 
1918 request for six carriers as part of the next construction program, the U.S. Navy already 
sported a number of officers with bullish opinions on the potential of carriers. Around the 
time that Goodall was describing British practice, Admiral Benson commissioned a panel of 
OpNav officers to investigate the potential of aircraft. This body suggested an even greater 
scope for naval aviation than Goodall, noting the potential to perform “fighting, spotting, 
scouting, torpedoes, and bombing” missions.3 In other words, naval aviation could perform 
the scouting and combat functions of a battlecruiser, perhaps at a lower price. More 
importantly, aircraft could, in time, fulfill those functions with greater efficiency and fight in 
fleet actions with less risk to the vessel. Admiral Mayo, in his early 1919 appearance before 
the House Naval Committee made this point explicitly, arguing that a combination of aircraft 
and light cruisers would make battlecruisers unnecessary.4 
 This feeling was widely shared in and around the U.S. Navy. Bradley Fiske, now the 
President of the U.S. Naval Institute agreed, with the rosy predictions of carrier development. 
Fiske, who had patented a mechanism for airdropping torpedoes in 1912, gave a lecture at the 
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War College in September 1919 suggesting that Argus and Eagle (two British aircraft 
carriers) could be the battleships of the future.5 Bombers could be deterred by ship borne 
anti-aircraft guns, but with effective torpedo ranges as far out as 16,700 yards in the newest 
American models there was little a battleship line could do to prevent attack from swarms of 
torpedo airplanes.6  
 Even with predictions like those from Fiske and the OpNav committee, decision-
makers and the strategic apparatus of the U.S. Navy continued to advocate for battlecruisers, 
at least if fast battleships were no longer an option. In early 1920, for example, Ralph Earle, 
head of the Bureau of Ordnance, told Robert E. Coontz, the new CNO, that it would be best 
to expedite the construction of the 1916 Bill’s battlecruisers, even if it meant sidelining 
battleship construction.7 While he had supported the C type fast battleship through the 1918-
19 debates, it was “essential” that the U.S. Navy had a ship that could outrun and outshoot 
Japanese battlecruisers. But even Earle was already cracking open the door for a new set of 
priorities based on carriers. His note also suggested that aircraft carriers or cruisers with 
“facilities for carrying aircraft,” were “the most urgent need for a naval campaign in the 
Pacific.”8 A later note from Coontz indicated his support for Earle’s recommendations.9 A 
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document from the War College staff written a few weeks later made a similar point: 
battlecruisers, impossible to counter without similar ships, were the only major Japanese 
advantage over the U.S. in the Pacific.10 
 The War College class that graduated in June 1920, having, on Benson’s orders, spent 
their course focused on the Japan (“Blue-Orange”) problem, tended to agree that 
battlecruisers and carriers were necessary for American power in the Pacific. Captain James 
Oliver, the director of OpNav’s Plans Division, forwarded a selection of the class’s final 
theses to Coontz for suggestions on the future course of Pacific policy. Oliver suggested that 
the opinions of “30 able and experienced officers of the Navy,” after “a year’s study,” would 
be valuable in shaping future policy.11 This was unsurprising from Oliver, an officer who had 
done four tours at the War College (student 1889, instructor 1902-3, 1907-8, and 1910-11), 
an almost unprecedented amount of time in Newport outside of officers like Mahan and Luce 
who remained connected to the War College long after retirement. While in keeping with 
Oliver’s background, forwarding these student theses also highlights the increased rigor of 
the War College after the institution of the Long Course; rather than singling out an 
especially brilliant officer’s report, the entire class’s output was seen as worthy of 
consideration. 
 Like Earle and Coontz, the students were broadly in favor of both carriers and 
battlecruisers (notably, none of the quoted sections advocated for fast battleships). Of the 26 
theses quoted in Oliver’s memorandum, seventeen pinpointed battlecruisers as the main 
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weakness in the fleet and advocated expedited construction and/or subsequent battlecruiser 
production and fifteen (there was quite a lot of overlap between the two groups) pushed for 
increased carrier construction. Rear Admiral L.H. Chandler, the highest-ranking officer in the 
class, seemed to speak for his fellows when he suggested that the U.S. Navy build “all that 
Congress can be induced to provide.”12 
 Even the fast battleship booster Chief Constructor Taylor had come around to 
supporting battlecruiser construction by mid-1920, confirming in an April speech on warship 
design and the lessons of the Great War that battleships and battlecruisers remained “the 
foundation of sea power.” Furthermore, Taylor appeared to moderate some of his earlier 
criticism of the type. On the performance of battlecruisers at Jutland, Taylor noted that “the 
losses . . . bear out to some extent the pre-war contentions of those who maintained that it 
was not fit to take its place in the line,” but countered that the ships “acquitted themselves 
with credit . . . the value of their great speed [was] demonstrated,” and proved that 
battlecruisers were crucial for any future fleet actions.13  
  Indeed, Taylor’s speech can be read, in part, as an implicit admission that he was 
content with the modified design of the Lexingtons, an opinion shared by many internal 
critics of the original Lexington design. By mid-1920, the ill feelings over the fast battleship 
debate seem to have dissipated. Opinions differed over whether or not the United States 
should build more battlecruisers, but decision-makers inside the Navy continued to hold 
sacrosanct the completion of the extant battlecruisers in accordance with the 1919 redesign—
although the General Board did request an additional one in their October 1920 construction 
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memorandum.14 Despite OpNav’s lingering discontent with the 1919 deal, all stakeholders 
were agreed that some sort of fast and powerful ship was needed in the Pacific, and that its 
mere existence was more important than whether it was used for scouting or the line.15 
 By the end of 1920, that ship’s existence was threatened. As Congress grew 
increasingly skeptical of naval spending after the war, they were unwilling to provide 
funding to complete the 1916 ships at full speed, which hurt the battlecruisers more than the 
battleships, given the pause in battlecruiser construction. On November 1, 1920, the 
battlecruiser farthest along was just shy of 6% complete, according to C&R. On the other 
hand, nine of the ten 1916 program battleships were already under construction, ranging from 
the 9% complete Iowa to the 84% complete Maryland.16  
 Against that background, completing the battlecruisers became rather more important 
than details of their design; any delay might convince Congress to cancel them altogether. 
Surely, six flawed capital ships were better than none. The results of the November 
presidential election cemented this siege mentality. The new President-elect was Warren G. 
Harding who, despite supporting a big navy earlier in his career, had appeared to support 
some form of arms limitation during the campaign.17 Even before Harding took office, the 
outgoing Daniels justified his refusal to push for new construction by pointing to “this 
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Congress [;] . . . not disposed to authorize the construction of any capital ships.”18 In other 
words, a penurious Congress and hostile voting public were the common enemies of all naval 
officers interested in expanding the fleet, as the vast majority of U.S. Navy officers did.  
 Congress’s unwillingness to build new ships opened the door for a new round of 
internal wrangling over fleet composition. With the battlecruiser/fast battleship debate 
settled, tension in 1921 centered on the role aircraft carriers and aviation would play in the 
Navy of the future. The U.S. Navy was already working on a carrier, converting the fleet 
collier Jupiter into the experimental carrier Langley, and even before its commissioning in 
1922, there was agitation in and outside of the Navy to make the construction of purpose-
built carriers the Navy’s highest priority.19 
 The Board opted to double-down on capital ships. Writing to Daniels in early 
February, the Board reiterated its longstanding opinion that battleships, the only vessels that 
could “deliver and receive the heaviest blows,” were the final arbiter of naval power. They 
were, the Board admitted, expensive, but over the years many had put their hopes in “any 
scheme, proposition or invention which appears to offer a less expensive, shorter road to 
victory,” and none of those— cruiser-based guerre de course, torpedo boats, or 
submarines—had proven equal to the task of making up for an inferiority in battleships. 
Here, the Board bolstered their argument by including text from First Lord Walter Long’s 
                                                           
18
 Daniels to General Board, January 22, 1921, RG 80, E19, Piece #8557-283, NARA Washington.   
19
 Along with the Lexingtons and California, Jupiter was fitted with a new turbo-electric drive train. While 
turbine engines allowed for greater speed than reciprocating engines, their high rotational speed, compared to 
the lower ideal speed of the propellers they drove, made them less fuel-efficient. The most common solution to 
this problem, after 1910, was a complicated set of reduction gears. In the turbo-electric system, the turbines had 
no direct connection to the propeller shaft. Instead, the turbines were used to power a set of electrical motors, 
each connected to a propeller shaft. This allowed for rotational speeds closer to the propellers’ ideal, reducing 
wear and tear and increasing fuel efficiency, a critical attribute for any ship expected to accompany the fleet 
across the Pacific, especially as a scout. For more information see William McBride, Technological Change and 
the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 2000), 95-110.  
404 
 
Estimates speech from the previous year, which also defended capital ships against the 
charge of obsolescence.20   
 Aircraft, they argued, were simply the latest of these unsound fads, a stance that 
seemed to run counter to the Board’s own recent inclinations. In late 1919, the Board had 
called the potential of aircraft “so great that it is impossible to foresee.”21 In September 1920, 
the Board warned that immediate construction of carriers, “an absolutely essential type,” was 
“urgently needed.”22 Just months later, however, the Board argued that “[g]reat things, not 
yet accomplished, are predicted by the inventors and enthusiastic supports of these new 
weapon . . .  if past experience has any value, it may be as confidently predicted that [aircraft] 
. . . will continue to be only adjuncts of the fleet,” though adjuncts of great value.23 While the 
Board’s fundamental stance on carriers had not changed in the previous six months, its 
rhetoric certainly had. It seems that the threat to capital ships had hardened the Board’s 
hearts. Rather than trying to convince civilian policymakers to build carriers, the Board had 
shifted to convincing them to finish incomplete capital ships.24  
 The Board, though, did not represent the views of all senior officers. Coincidentally, 
soon after the Board’s report, a number of flag officers, including William S. Sims, Charles J. 
Badger, Fiske, Coontz, D.W. Taylor, and the Army’s William Mitchell, were called before 
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Congress for a hearing on naval aviation. The testimony of the naval officers showed that the 
relative position of carriers in the fleet going forward had the potential to cause a split akin to 
the fast battleship controversy in the upper echelons of the navy. Although all five of the 
naval witnesses agreed that carriers were essential to future naval operations, the question of 
how essential proved difficult to resolve. The testimony did show, however, that 
battlecruisers remained popular with officers on both sides of the nascent carrier divide.  
 Sims, a member of the General Board through his position as War College President, 
became an enthusiastic proponent of carriers while running the London headquarters during 
the war.25 Indeed, he believed that carriers were not just the capital ship of the future, but the 
present, claiming that a carrier’s “offensive is more powerful than that of a battleship . . . she 
can send her planes out from a distance of 100 miles or more from the battleship and attack 
from the air.” Rather than seeing them as a useful addition to the battle line, he later argued 
that a fleet of twenty carriers would defeat a fleet of sixteen battleships and four carriers, 
provided that the twenty-carrier fleet was adequately supplied with cruisers, destroyers, 
submarines, and auxiliaries.26 
 Chief among these supporting vessels were battlecruisers, which Sims pinpointed as 
the perfect escort for aircraft carriers or, indeed, battleships. Although Sims had been one of 
the first officers to turn away from lightly armored battlecruisers in 1918, he bemoaned the 
slow progress made on the 1916 ships, “resisted,” he claimed, “for some reason which I have 
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never understood.” Not only would the completion of the 1916 ships balance the 
battlecruisers possessed by other navies, but they would also screen carriers from potential 
attack by the limited number of enemy surface combatants fast enough to catch up with an 
ideal carrier of 30-35 knots’ speed. Rather than replacing the very incomplete battlecruisers 
with carriers, Sims suggested that the U.S. Navy cancel construction of up to six of the 1916 
battleships and replace them with purpose-built carriers. Fiske’s arguments largely tracked 
those of Sims, albeit with greater technical detail.27 
 On the other side of the ledger, both Badger and Coontz remained skeptical of the 
potential of naval aviation to replace battleships, seeing them instead as a vital supplement to 
the battle line. Badger, in particular, railed against enthusiastic carrier advocates, claiming 
that “[i]t would be the height of unwisdom to pin our faith . . .  on mere theories.” Instead, 
Badger and Coontz suggested that battlecruisers and carriers could work in concert to bolster 
the Navy’s scouting and screening, which remained a weakness. As far as combat strength 
went, however, Badger only granted an aircraft carrier about 10% the fighting power of a 
modern battleship.28  
 Although the General Board explored the possibility of cannibalizing one of the 
battlecruiser power plants or hulls for use in a carrier later in February, it was clear that both 
sides of the carrier divide within the Navy saw battlecruisers as a crucial part of the 
American force structure going forward.29 Indeed, both the maximalists and minimalists 
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agreed that there was a symbiotic relationship between carriers and battlecruisers, the latter 
escorting and protecting the former. Whether they were used for scouting or as protection for 
the main fleet, the position of battlecruisers within the Navy was as secure as it had been 
since the months between the passage of the 1916 Act and U.S. entry into the Great War. 
While some officers surely would have preferred to build fast battleships, the financial and 
political climate made it clear that the options for the Navy were six battlecruisers or no fast 
capital ships at all. Faced with that choice, the Navy fell in line behind the battlecruisers, 
ships that added speed to a slow battle fleet and steel to a weak scouting force.  
 Outside of the Navy, however, the barely-commenced battlecruisers were a juicy 
target for proponents of aviation, those who wanted to cut the naval budget, and those who 
advocated both. Mitchell, the Army’s most prominent airpower advocate, had suggested in a 
recent book that the work of battlecruisers could be filled at far less cost by airships.30 In 
Congress, the picture was equally bleak. Echoing the nation’s mood, the House declined to 
authorize any new ship construction, or money for airplanes. Furthermore, their version of 
the bill only appropriated enough money to build the remaining 1916 ships at half speed. 
Although a majority of the Senate was in favor of a more robust program, a filibuster 
prevented the addition of more funds.31 In May, the Senate passed Senator William Borah’s 
(D-ID) resolution urging a naval limitations conference, one that they clearly hoped would 
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remove the 1916 program from the books and obviate the need for any other large programs 
in the future.32 
 1921 was also the year of Mitchell’s famous Ostfriesland tests. That summer, the 
Army and Navy held tests to determine how a variety of warships would handle damage 
from aerial attacks. In the final part of the demonstration, Mitchell’s pilots sank the ex-
German dreadnought Ostfriesland with 1,000 and 2,000-pound bombs. Though it was 
obvious to most informed observers that unmolested aircraft could, given enough time, sink 
an unmanned battleship at anchor, his sinking of a modern dreadnought bolstered claims that 
all major surface combatants, save for carriers, were bound for the scrapheap.33 
 Even before the tests, some naval observers tried to downplay their importance, one 
critic noting in Sea Power that under the unrealistic constraints of the exercises, it would be 
impossible for the test ships to survive.34 However, the sight of airplanes sinking a battleship 
struck a chord with the public and Congress, leading to a number of suggestions that some or 
all of the 1916 battlecruisers be replaced by carriers. In the Senate, William King (D-UT) 
introduced a bill to cancel six of the 1916 battleships, three of the program’s battlecruisers, 
and covert two of the remaining battlecruisers into carriers. King defended his position on 
both financial and strategic grounds, arguing that the lessons of the Great War and the 
Ostfriesland tests proved the importance of naval aviation, allowing the scrapping of nine 
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capital ships, saving “hundreds of millions of dollars.”35 Likewise, the New York Herald 
suggested converting all six battlecruiser into carriers.36 Within the Navy Department, the 
assistant secretary, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., also suggested converting one or more of the 
Lexingtons.37 
 The biggest challenge to continued battlecruiser construction, however, came from a 
prospective arms limitation treaty, a goal shared by the Harding Administration and 
Congress. In the midst of Mitchell’s tests, Senator Borah’s resolution for a naval limitation 
conference passed the House and on July 11 (a week before the Ostfriesland was sunk), 
President Harding formally issued an invitation to a naval conference to foreign 
governments.38 On the back of these developments, Harding’s Secretary of the Navy, Edwin 
Denby, asked the General Board to begin investigating arms limitation.39  
 The Board approached the issue with ill-disguised hostility, expressing concern that 
any program of limitations would be inimical to American interests. Reducing the size of the 
Navy carried with it the risk of forcing an end to the traditional American policy of 
neutrality, and endangering the Monroe Doctrine, the Open Door policies in China and the 
American immigration policy based on “exclusion of Asiatics.” Furthermore, limitation 
might lead to the codification of an unacceptable balance of forces between the U.S. and 
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Japan, especially with the Anglo-Japanese alliance taken into account.40 In two follow-up 
memoranda, the Board suggested an international agreement based on the completion of all 
ships laid down before November 1921 in the U.S., U.K., and Japan. After that, cuts could be 
made, based on a 10-10-5 ratio between the capital ship tonnage of the three major naval 
powers.41 
 It is impossible to tell if the General Board’s plan was serious, or a disguised attempt 
to scotch the whole notion of arms control. Either way, the Board’s plan was politically 
untenable. To build up to a cap, instead of cutting to a floor, may have reduced international 
tensions and defused the arms race, but by mid-1921, even friends of the Navy in Congress 
recognized the need for some sort of peace dividend. Completing the entire 1916 program 
was simply not in the cards; there was a fair amount of support in Congress for scrapping all 
sixteen even without a limitation conference.42 After a scolding from Denby, the Board 
submitted a second program that scrapped two battlecruisers and battleships each from the 
1916 program, giving the U.S. a 19-dreadnought, 4-battlecruiser fleet by 1928.43 
 Unsurprisingly, that plan also failed to meet Denby’s specifications, and in mid-
October, Denby turned to a troika of Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. 
(technically, Theodore Roosevelt III), CNO Koontz, and Captain William V. Pratt, the main 
technical advisor to the U.S. Conference delegation and newly assigned to the General 
Board, to formulate a limitation program and liaise with the State Department. Although the 
troika expressed support for the Board’s final program, they soon suggested a second 
                                                           
40
 General Board to Secretary, September 12, 1921, Folder 5, Box 99, RG 8, NHC. 
41
 General Board to Secretary, September 17 and October 3, 1921, Folder 5, Box 99, RG 8, NHC. 
42
 Sprout and Sprout, New Order, 139-40.  
43
 Board to Secretary, October [14], 1921, Folder 5, Box 99, RG 8, NHC. 
411 
 
program that would cut another four ships above the Board’s second program. When asked 
which ships should bear the blow, the Board reluctantly suggested that the additional four be 
battlecruisers.44 The three-man committee also suggested a third program, which cut three 
battlecruisers and three battleships, arguing that the two battleship, six battlecruiser 
suggestion was  “not a good plan in that it scraps all the battle cruisers and leaves an 
unbalanced fleet.”45 
 Despite the Board’s support for battlecruisers as a pressing need, in their minds, and 
in the minds of many other naval planners around the world, battleships remained the 
standard of naval power; the prospect of cutting any more battleships above the Board’s 
second program was unthinkable. Just as importantly, the 1916 battlecruisers were intended 
to constitute a homogenous squadron of two divisions. Four battlecruisers could work as a 
single squadron or division, but anything less than that would represent a rather slim 
maneuver unit. Worse, three battlecruisers would fail to match the four extant Japanese 
battlecruisers. Viewed in that light, there was not much use for only three battlecruisers.  
 Even that plan was too much for Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. The leader 
of the U.S. conference delegation, Hughes was disinclined to allow the completion of any 
unfinished construction. An information request to that effect on October 21, prompted dark 
warnings from the Board five days later that the 1916 program had brought Japan to the 
negotiation table and that cancelling it would leave Japan “free to pursue untrammeled her 
aggressive program.” Despite their protests, the Board provided Hughes with a list of ships 
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that would represent a commensurate sacrifice from the Japanese and British navies. 46 That 
same day a plan, probably written by Pratt, was submitted to Hughes “on the principle of 
‘stop now;’” which was eventually adopted by the full American delegation on November 2. 
47
 On November 12, Hughes unveiled that program at the Conference’s opening session.48  
 As an examination of the record shows, the United States did not give up 
battlecruisers at the Washington Conference for any strictly naval reasons. Two of the 
cancelled battlecruiser hulls—Lexington and Saratoga—were converted into carriers, but that 
has more to do with frugality and the high-speed electric drive intended for the Lexingtons 
than any sort of intentional choice on the part of the Navy. Indeed, the Navy fought tooth-
and-nail to maintain its battlecruiser program against all threats after the 1919 battlecruiser 
settlement. Instead, the decision was a political and economic one, out of the Navy’s hands. 
From the moment it became clear that the U.S. would cut construction instead of building to 
a cap (and, despite the Board’s first plan, it was obviously in the cards from the Senate’s 
conference resolution at the latest), the six battlecruisers were effectively doomed. No 
responsible government could fail to cut the ships that were the most expensive and furthest 
from completion.  
 Given this process, to say, as one historian has, that “[t]he the decision to convert two 
of the cancelled battle cruisers to aircraft carriers was the correct one,” misses the point 
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entirely.49 During the conference, it was certainly the right decision for Assistant Secretary 
Roosevelt to agitate for a conversion clause, but by mid-conference there was no choice 
between building battlecruisers and carriers; instead there was a choice between scrapping 
the battlecruiser hulls and conversion.50 From a naval perspective there was no decision 
made; Hughes and the civilian members of the delegation decided to sacrifice the 
battlecruisers for financial and political concerns. Similarly, the carriers were not a 
“replacement” for the battlecruisers in a naval sense, but ships with their own separate 
missions and roles in the fleet. As the U.S. Navy made clear on a number of occasions from 
1918 through 1921, aircraft carriers were not a like-for-like replacement for battlecruisers, 
but a supplementary class meant to act in concert with them. Those officers who tended to 
take a more optimistic view of the role of carriers than Navy policy allowed for also saw 
battlecruisers performing key tasks in a carrier-dominant navy. For both the battleship and 
carrier partisans of the day, losing those six battlecruisers was a blow that was only partially 
offset by the carrier conversion.  
 
*** 
 
 The advent of aircraft carriers had less effect on the Royal Navy’s battlecruiser 
policies. Unlike the United States, Britain had an independent Royal Air Force, which had 
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full control over all military aircraft, pilots, and support staff, including those intended for 
carrier operations. With almost all trained naval aviators absorbed by the RAF from mid-
1918, the Royal Navy lost its most obvious constituency for increased carrier resources. For a 
variety of geographical, strategic, and historical reasons, the new RAF could not claim, as 
Mitchell did in the United States, that aircraft could be Britain’s first line of defense against 
attacks from the sea. Instead, it poured all of its financial and intellectual resources into 
developing a doctrine of offensive strategic bombardment.51 As a result, aircraft carriers did 
not threaten the traditional surface fleet in Britain to nearly the same extent they did in the 
U.S.52 
 Instead, the challenges facing the Admiralty when Admiral David Beatty took over as 
First Sea Lord in November 1919 remained financial. Hood neared commissioning, but there 
were no other capital ships under construction or, it appeared, the prospect of new capital 
ship authorization from the Cabinet or Parliament. If money could be found, there remained 
the question of what to build: battleships, battlecruisers, or some sort of hybrid? Although 
their development was cut short by the Washington Conference, by the end of 1921 the 
Admiralty had lined up squarely behind the fast battleship paradigm. 
 Despite his faults, Beatty was the obvious choice for the office of First Sea Lord, 
having commanded the Grand Fleet at the end of the war. Although Beatty personally 
disliked First Lord Long and showed a marked preference for active service, he clearly 
desired the prestige of the office, and would stay at the Admiralty until mid-1927. 
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Unsurprisingly, then, Beatty did not enter the Admiralty with any closely held policies 
beyond preserving British supremacy in capital ships, and nothing in the way of dramatic 
reforms. Critically, Beatty, though no intellectual himself, understood the importance of staff 
reform, and lent his prestige and support to the efforts of officers like Reginald Drax and 
Herbert Richmond to build a functioning staff run by qualified officers, and these efforts 
continued under his leadership.53 
 While he took office too early for the staff training reforms to take effect, the 
composition of Beatty’s Admiralty Board reflected, perhaps unintentionally, something of 
the reformers’ desire for unity of purpose. Within months of Beatty assuming office, four of 
the other five naval billets on the Board were filled by officers who had served under Beatty 
during the war, especially in the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The two staff officers on the Board, the 
ACNS (from March 1920), Ernle Chatfield, and the DCNS, Osmond Brock, had an 
especially close connection to Beatty, having served as his flag captains during the war 
(Chatfield in Lion and, later, Queen Elizabeth; Brock in Princess Royal when Lion was under 
repair after Dogger Bank).  
 Beatty’s appointment also coincided with a few changes to the Royal Navy’s staff 
section. In addition to the changes in the training system discussed in the previous chapter, 
Long’s 1920 message to Parliament tweaked the responsibilities of the Admiralty staff. The 
ACNS/DCNS split had originally been made to reflect the bifurcation of the naval war effort, 
but Long and Beatty put it on a peace footing. The deputy chief would be responsible for 
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“operations, policy, intelligence, and training,” while the assistant chief would focus on “the 
development and use of material, including types of vessels, weapons, and tactics.”54 
 Long’s message made it clear that the placement of the ship development portfolio 
with the ACNS was a response to prewar shipbuilding policy. Previously, the 3rd Sea Lord 
had supervised the design and construction of ships, but primarily in a financial sense. By 
placing that responsibility with the staff, in the person of the ACNS, Long and Beatty 
showed that they understood the source of some of the problems with Royal Navy ships in 
the recent war:  
The war has enabled us to test the weapons forged during a century of peace, and has 
shown that some of them were unsuitable and inadequate. It is clear that the reason 
they were so was not so much the fault of the design or manufacture as that the 
designers are now shown to have been incorrectly or incompletely advised as to the 
fighting requirements of the moment. . . . The design of our ships must not and should 
not depend on the impulse of an individual nor merely on the mechanical possibilities 
of the moment.55 (Emphasis added) 
 
After Jutland, Beatty and his BCF officers had railed against the “defective” design of their 
vessels using language that suggested the problem lay with the Director of Naval 
Construction and his office. This new approach, however, took aim at the real source of the 
problem; the lack of effective checks on the influence of an active First Sea Lord. Although 
the document did not say it directly, this administrative shift worked to prevent the 
possibility of a latter-day Fisher hijacking naval policy as Fisher had in 1914-15 and, 
arguably, from 1904 to 1910. The control of warship design would instead reside with the 
staff, ideally situated to ensure that warship design and operational doctrine were in concord. 
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 The officer in charge of this process had firm views on warship design. Like his 
superior, Ernle Chatfield had nearly lost his life aboard Lion due, in part, to Admiral Fisher’s 
predilection for speed over armor in battlecruisers. Chatfield, given significant input into the 
reworking of the ACNS role, ensured that his would be the loudest voice on the Board 
regarding ship design. The 3rd Sea Lord retained supervision of the Director of Naval 
Construction’s department and shipbuilding, but the ACNS advised the First Sea Lord on 
matters of warship design, and then liaised with the 3rd Sea Lord and DNC to put those 
recommendations into action.56 In effect, Chatfield filled a role in warship design somewhat 
analogous to the General Board in the United States though, of course, Beatty could overrule 
him.  
 At the end of his career, Chatfield reminisced that he was “determined not to build 
British ships that were unsuitable, after our lessons of Jutland,” especially those with “too 
little protective armour, as had been the case in our battle-cruisers; ships that a lucky shot 
could blow up with their crews.”57 This distaste encompassed Hood, the jewel of the postwar 
Royal Navy. In March 1920, at the conference of the Institution of Naval Architects, 
Chatfield informed the attendees that, given a chance to design a new warship, it was 
unlikely that RN officers would choose to build another Hood, pointing to its great speed and 
firepower, but denigrating its barely-adequate armor scheme added very late in the design 
process.58  
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 Chatfield’s point was bolstered by a Naval Review article from May, which argued 
that Hood was too big and too expensive to be a sound basis for naval policy. At the same 
time, the author argued that the tradeoffs in her design were an uneconomical use of her size. 
As far as armor and armament, Hood was roughly comparable to the earlier Queen Elizabeth-
class battleships, yet displaced 15,000 more tons. Clearly, much of that weight went to speed, 
which the author found an insufficient rationale, especially since he regarded Hood as a 
particularly fast battleship rather than a battlecruiser. Going all the way back to Mahan’s 
1906 Tsushima essay, the author went on to argue that the high unit cost of fast battleships 
would rob the Royal Navy of the advantages of numbers. Yes, the Royal Navy could build 
more fast battleships than its potential opponents could, but a fleet of fifteen Hoods was 
obviously harder to split than something the size of the wartime Grand Fleet.59 In his autumn 
War College lectures, Richmond expressed similar concerns about the cost and likely 
scarcity of warships built to the Hood standard.60 
 Regardless, Long’s statement, like the Phillimore Committee’s final report, assumed 
that capital ships, of roughly the prevailing pattern, remained at the center of naval warfare. 
Both Beatty and Chatfield shared this attachment to the traditional, gun-based, capital ship. 
The two men also believed that the U.K. would have to resume capital ship construction 
shortly—a stance to which Beatty was able to convert Long to by the summer.61 As a result, 
under the new Admiralty Board, DNC Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt’s commitment to stay 
abreast of the times with sketch warship designs took on new urgency.  
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 Though D’Eyncourt vociferously defended Hood and his wartime construction record 
in his early contacts with the new Board, he seems to have remained in favor of bifurcation. 
With the Board in favor of a four-capital-ship program for the 1921-2 budget, D’Eyncourt 
wrote the Third Sea Lord, Frederick Field, suggesting a building program of two battleships 
of “improved ‘SOUTH DAKOTA’ type,” and two battlecruisers built to an “improved 
‘LEXINGTON’” standard, the latter suggesting a design with far less armor than Hood.62 
D’Eyncourt even suggested that the ships could be referred to as “‘Replace Dreadnought,’ 
‘Replace Collingwood,’ etc.,” to avoid the impression of an arms race with the United States. 
D’Eyncourt also proposed bolstering the deck armor of the prewar Queen Elizabeth and R-
class battleships to make their magazines proof against 16” shells, though he estimated that 
the cost would be “very considerable.”63 
 In early June, Chatfield came to D’Eyncourt with a set of preliminary guidelines; so 
preliminary, in fact, that Beatty had not yet seen them. Despite his evident misgivings, 
Chatfield’s guidelines made provision for both battleships and battlecruisers (two weeks 
earlier, D’Eyncourt suggested an enigmatic third class, the “battleship cruiser,” which 
suggests something very lightly armored and heavily armed, to no evident effect). For the 
battleship, Chatfield wanted a 45,000-ton design, with a minimum speed of 23 knots and nine 
18” guns. For protection, he desired vertical protection proof against the American 16” gun, 
horizontal protection proof against an 18” gun over the magazine with an elaborate system of 
splinter decks, and underwater armor sufficient for a torpedo with a “750-lb. head.” In 
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essence, the battlecruisers were to have the same battery as the battleship, and the same deck 
armor, but vertical armor “reduced as necessary” to match Lexington’s 33-knot speed.64 
 D’Eyncourt’s ideas were evidently trending in that direction, because three days later 
he presented the 3rd Sea Lord with a preliminary study on two standards of protection, one 
against 15-16” guns and one against 18.” D’Eyncourt’s estimation for the protection 
demanded by Chatfield ran to 15” of vertical armor, and a staggering 8.75” of deck armor, 
almost four inches more than the thickest deck armor on the R-class ships, and a tremendous 
addition to a ship’s weight (D’Eyncourt estimated a displacement of about 50,000 tons for a 
battleship proof against 18” guns and 43,500 tons for one designed against 15 to 16” guns). 
Battlecruisers, he suggested, could be built on approximately the same displacement and 
cost, though that cost, approximately £10 million, would be £4 million more than that of the 
Hood, a huge increase to justify in the strained budgets of the postwar era.65 
 It is worth noting here that Chatfield’s understanding of a “battlecruiser” had little to 
do with how the term was understood on the other side of the Atlantic. By mid-1920, the 
American understanding of the word “battlecruiser” was a large, fast, ship with big guns and 
light armor. Anything else, from the Hood to the ships Chatfield and D’Eyncourt discussed 
here, were—the three “large light cruisers” apart—usually described as “fast battleships,” 
reflecting the American belief that the lighter ships were primarily scouts, and the heavier 
ships an integral part of the battle line/fast wing. Chatfield, and indeed most of the British 
naval leadership at the time, did not draw such distinctions. In their understanding, a 
“battlecruiser” was a capital ship with speed far in excess of the standard battleship, 
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regardless of armor. This, of course, was in keeping with the majority British view that 
battlecruisers were not primarily scouts, but ships intended for fleet action.  
 D’Eyncourt’s armor schemes reflected this understanding. Although the figures 
presented were just for a battleship, Stanley Goodall calculated that D’Eyncourt’s June 16”-
proof design had 17,500 tons of armor, making its displacement about 40% armor by 
weight.66 This can be compared to similar figures of 33.5% for Hood, 31% for the Queen 
Elizabeths, and 32% for the R-class battleships, all designed by D’Eyncourt.67 Clearly, then, 
Chatfield’s focus on armor above firepower and speed was making an impression, especially 
his fixation on magazine protection, forged in the BCF. Though the vertical armor on 
D’Eyncourt’s designs was somewhat thicker than that on his prewar battleships, the main 
growth in the displacement on the newer design came from the dramatic increase in 
horizontal protection.  
 Nicholas Lambert’s argument that the loss of three British battlecruisers at Jutland 
had more to do with poor ammunition handling procedures than insufficient deck armor is 
widely accepted amongst historians, but his essay also argued that the Royal Navy’s post-
battle focus on armor rather than ammunition amounted to an official cover-up. While that 
may have been the case at the wartime Admiralty, the behavior of the Board here suggests 
that this opinion was held honestly by some in the Royal Navy, especially BCF veterans. 
Beatty was a vain and petty man, who grew vainer and pettier by the day at the Admiralty, 
and it is true that focusing on armor avoided difficult conversations about his leadership of 
the BCF, but it beggars belief that he and his handpicked Board would base the future of 
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British sea power on a deliberate falsehood. Building capital ships to the prewar model 
would have been easier and far cheaper. Beatty’s actions during and after the war paint a 
picture of a man who genuinely, and wrongly, believed that insufficient deck armor was the 
cause of the Jutland disasters.  
 D’Eyncourt spent the rest of the year refining designs based on Chatfield’s 
instructions. The DNC initially began with a single fast battleship design, but by the fall, he 
had begun development of plans for a lighter, faster, companion, probably intended for use 
against the Lexingtons, though these were allowed to lapse. In late November, D’Eyncourt 
presented the Board with “I.3,” a 32.5-knot ship. Slightly faster than Hood, I.3 displaced 
9,000 more tons, mostly due to increased torpedo protection, and deck armor. The design 
also carried 9x16” guns in three turrets, an improvement on Hood’s 8x15” on four, and the 
smaller number of turrets kept the displacement less than it could have been.68 
 I.3 was, however, entirely out of touch with the austere budget environment. Of 
course, as a heavier ship with about 30,000 more horsepower, I.3 was bound to cost more 
than Hood; standard procedure as far as follow-on construction went. However, at 925’ long 
and 108’ wide, I.3 was too large for existing docks in the U.K., let alone the rest of the 
Empire and, as designed, was “outside, or very near the limits of the capacities” of the Suez 
and Panama canals. The Panama issue was not terribly serious, but a warship too big to 
transit the Suez Canal was too big to aid in the defense of British possessions in the Far East, 
a major postwar mission of the Royal Navy.69 
                                                           
68
 D’Eyncourt, “Legend of Particulars of Proposed New Battle Cruiser Design,” November 27, 1920, ADM 
1/9232, TNA.  
69
 D’Eyncourt, “New Designs – Battleship & Battle Cruiser. Summary Of,” December 13, 1920, ADM 1/9232.  
423 
 
 As a result, D’Eyncourt was asked to modify the I.3 design closer to the dimensions 
of Hood, and he returned early in the new year with what would become “G.3.” The new 
design was slightly smaller (856’ by 106’) and lighter at 48,000 tons, but most of the 
particulars remained unchanged, apart from the armor, which was somewhat increased in 
total and by percentage. While I.3’s displacement was approximately 28% armor, the G.3 
design devoted approximately 30%. This percentage was somewhat lower than Hood or the 
prewar battleships, but the armor scheme placed more armor where it was needed, and rather 
less elsewhere.70 
 While Admiralty memoranda tended to refer to G.3 as a battlecruiser, four ships built 
to that pattern were the only capital ships the Admiralty had planned for construction in the 
1921-2 estimates and, conceptually, were indistinguishable from the “fast battleship” 
motivations that underlay the Hood’s post-Jutland redesign. A useful comparison can be 
made between G.3 and the final Lexington specifications:  
 
Lexington (1919) G.3 (1921) 
Displacement 43,500 tons 48,000 tons 
Horsepower 180,000 160,000 
Speed 33.2 kts 31-2 kts 
Main Battery 8x16” 9x16” 
Armor: Belt 7” 14” 
Deck 2.25” 8” 
Turret 11” 17” 
Looking at their speed and firepower, it is tempting to see the two as equivalent, but their 
respective protection shows that these were designs intended for wildly separate missions. 
The former similarity, of course, was a clear British attempt to match the speed of the 
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Lexingtons, while the armor issue speaks to the ridiculousness of the “battlecruiser” label. 
Whatever can be said about the relative merits of the designs, it seems laughable to place 
them in the same “battlecruiser” box.  
 In fact, it can be argued that both designs were admirably suited for their particular 
mission. As discussed earlier, the Lexingtons were intended to form the heart of the U.S. 
Navy’s future “scouting force,” a formation of battlecruisers, light cruisers, long-range 
destroyers, and, from about 1918, carriers, intended for “distantial” operations against 
Japanese islands, supply lines, and battlecruisers, as well as scouting for the battle fleet.71 
Although their heavy guns and torpedoes would be used on the wings of the main battle line 
if they were present for a fleet action, their primary mission was very much not to attack 
foreign battleships. 
 On the British side, the evidence suggests that the Admiralty and the active fleet were 
on the same page, even without full War College and Admiralty staff “indoctrination.” 
Despite their lack of success in that role during the war, the Royal Navy persisted in seeing 
their battlecruisers as tactical scouts and a fast wing. The Atlantic Fleet’s exercises from 
early 1921 show the persistence of this thinking. Although the Atlantic Fleet’s battlecruiser 
commander, Vice Admiral Roger Keyes, took care to keep his “Blue” battlecruisers away 
from “Red’s” battleships in the opening stages of the encounters, matters were different when 
the fleets met. At that stage, Keyes used his ships as a fast wing, taking his ships within 
torpedo range of the other side’s battleships, or to put it another way, well within gun 
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range.72 The G.3 design was clearly intended to fulfill this sort of role with less risk than pre-
Armistice models.  
 Based on that evidence, Beatty’s Board was a success in terms of warship design. 
Broadly speaking, there were two directions British battlecruiser policy could have gone 
immediately after the Great War. The first, the option taken by the United States, was to 
develop a battlecruiser policy that emphasized scouting and “distantial operations” rather 
than tangling with battleships. The second was to maintain the fast wing ideal and to design 
warships with increased survivability in that environment. G.3 represented that latter impulse 
and, arguably for the first time, united British battlecruiser design and practice. Historians 
may disagree on the wisdom of this particular doctrine, but any unified doctrine to guide 
design was better than the state of affairs at the start of the First World War.  
 However, these new plans were placed under a great deal of scrutiny outside of the 
Admiralty, led by retired naval officers. This criticism came not so much against the 
Admiralty’s particular battlecruiser design choices (which, of course, were still closely held 
secrets), but over the wisdom of building any more capital ships after the lessons of the war. 
The retired admiral Percy Scott, along with other critics, had argued since the end of the war 
that the development of submarines and the prospective development of aircraft had rendered 
capital ships obsolete. Scott’s concern was picked up on by the Times, which called for an 
inquiry into the lessons of the First World War in early December, 1920.73 The Cabinet 
agreed, and on December 7, appointed a committee of the CID under Andrew Bonar Law, 
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the Leader of the Conservative Party, to explore the issue of future capital ship construction, 
publicly announced two days later in Parliament.74 
 Somewhat surprisingly, naval opinion on the issue was not monolithic. Although 
Beatty, a committee member, pushed hard for the resumption of capital ship construction, 
some naval officers, Scott foremost among them, pushed back against capital ships from the 
pages of the Times. Instead, the officers suggested, British naval strength should be based on 
aircraft and submarines, weapons that could strike against capital ships with some measure of 
impunity.75 Likewise, the Bonar Law Committee heard similar suggestions from some of the 
serving officers they queried, most notably Rear Admiral de Bartolome and Herbert 
Richmond.76 
  Against such opinions, the Admiralty put a full-court press on the committee. 
Although First Lord Long was a member of the committee, he was ill (Long would be 
replaced as First Lord by Viscount Arthur Lee in mid-February), and took little part in the 
committee’s deliberations. However, Beatty was a member and, joined by his friend Winston 
Churchill, now Secretary of State responsible for the Army and the RAF, aggressively 
pushed the need for capital ships. Two points dominated the Admiralty position: first was the 
danger of the United States achieving naval superiority in the next few years absent British 
construction, and second was the danger that the warship industry in Britain would atrophy 
without new construction, especially manufacturers of armor plate and guns.77 As Roskill 
                                                           
74
 Roskill, Naval Policy I, 221-4.  
75
 “Flag Officer,” “Guns and Torpedoes,” December 1, 1920; Rear Admiral S.S. Hall, “Our Obsolescent Navy,” 
December 7, 1920, in Future of Navies, 3-27.  
76
 Roskill, Naval Policy I, 224.  
77
 Beatty, CID Memorandum, December 14, 1920, CAB/24/119, TNA.  
427 
 
noted, Beatty’s dire predictions of American strength ignored the obvious political problems 
faced by the U.S. Navy, but his concerns about the warship industry proved prescient.78 
 As the committee approached its end, a serious split developed, as Beatty, Long, and 
Churchill announced that they could not support its recommendations. Bonar Law, ex-First 
Lord Eric Geddes, and Board of Trade President Robert Horne became convinced over the 
course of the inquiry that capital ships would soon become obsolete, replaced by cheaper 
airplanes and submarines, and attempted to issue a report to that effect. As a result, the 
committee, split down the middle, released two contradictory reports in March, solving 
nothing.79 
 The upcoming Washington Conference allowed the Cabinet to have it both ways. 
Although its initial instinct was to deny the Navy money for new ships, Beatty appears to 
have convinced them that approaching negotiations with no construction pending would 
weaken Britain’s position. As a result, the 1921-2 Estimates included a nominal sum, 2.5 
million pounds, “for replacement of obsolete ships.”80 The Navy took that a as a sign to 
request bids for four new fast battleships, but the sum was small enough that it could be 
easily written off if the conference took the ships off the table. Clearly, then, the Cabinet had 
given the Navy permission to build the four ships as a bargaining chip. The penurious initial 
outlay, however, confirmed that the Cabinet and Parliament dearly hoped the ships would 
never be built.81 
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*** 
 
 As it happened, the British politicians got their wish at Washington, as did their 
American counterparts. Recapitulating the entire Washington Conference is beyond the 
scope of this project but at its end in 1922, the participants signed a set of treaties than ran 
very close to the “stop now” plan drawn up by Pratt and used in Hughes’s conference-
opening speech.82 Apart from allowing two new capital ships, and letting Japan and the 
United States keep a nearly-completed ship apiece, the treaty provisions forced the three 
major naval powers to cut ships to a roughly 5:5:3 ratio in capital ship tonnage.  
 The three major powers were allowed to convert two of the just-cancelled ships each 
to aircraft carriers, allowed under the treaty as a way to use scrapped tonnage and allow for 
some naval development. In all three countries, the ships chosen for conversion were 
battlecruisers: Lexington and Saratoga from the United States, Glorious and Courageous 
from Britain, and Akagi and Amagi in Japan (Amagi was seriously damaged in the 1923 
Great Kanto Earthquake and replaced for conversion by the battleship Kaga). Not only did 
battlecruiser hulls and power plants provide the size and speed for ideal carrier operations, 
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but in the American and Japanese cases, using under-construction battlecruiser hulls also 
saved money. In Britain, it was a relief for the problematic Courageous and Glorious to 
follow their half-sister Furious into the carrier fleet. 
 For the U.S. Navy, it must be mentioned again that this was an undesirable state of 
affairs. As its leadership made clear in 1920-21, American policy and strategy called for 
battlecruisers and carriers acting in concert. Under the constraints of Hughes’s negotiations, 
getting permission from Japan and Britain to build large carriers on the corpses of the 1916 
battlecruisers was a coup, but the loss of those ships was felt keenly. In the wake of the 
Conference, the U.S. Navy concluded that the settlement left them vulnerable to the Royal 
Navy and the four British battlecruisers—ships the U.S. Navy had no counter for—loomed 
large in those calculations. Indeed, with Britain retaining 22 capital ships and the United 
States 18, Hood, Renown, Repulse, and Tiger represented the British margin over the 
American fleet.83  
 In Britain, on the other hand, the post-conference focus was on a replacement for the 
four G.3 “super Hoods,” which were far larger than the allowable 35,000-ton restriction. 
Work on their replacements began early in Britain. By November 1921, Beatty had relayed 
enough information back to London to indicate that Britain would be allowed a limited 
amount of new construction, at a limit of 35,000 tons each. The super-Hoods obviously 
conflicted with the new size limit, so D’Eyncourt prepared two new battlecruiser designs, 
“F.2” and “F.3,” in late November after receiving information from Chatfield in Washington. 
The chief difference between the two was their armament: 6x15” in F.2 and 9x15” in F.3. As 
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a result, F.2 had slightly more weight given over to armor and engines than F.3, the former 
having a speed of 30 knots, and the latter 28.5.84  
 Both designs were weaker and smaller than the original battlecruiser proposals, but 
with less volume to protect, their armor was rather substantial by battlecruiser standards, with 
12” side armor and 7” deck armor over the magazines. When D’Eyncourt declared that 
reduced armor scheme “can be accepted with reasonable security,” his pride was reasonable. 
Despite the handicap of displacement, D’Eyncourt had created a reasonable approximation of 
G.3’s capabilities on 13,000 fewer tons.85 Both designs would have fit in with the British 
practice of placing battlecruisers in or near the line.  
 These decreases in armor appeared to be too much for Beatty and Chatfield. By the 
end of the Washington Conference, D’Eyncourt was working on a 23-knot (in practice, about 
20-knot) battleship design that emphasized firepower and armor at the expense of speed. In 
fact, both of the latter specifications were nearly identical to those of the cancelled G.3s, save 
for slightly reduced deck armor. Stephen Roskill has suggested, probably correctly, that this 
design reflected the “lessons of Jutland,” as learned by the Admiralty staff, but that 
explanation is not sufficient.86 After all, the same group of officers enthusiastically endorsed 
the G.3 design, set to enter production in 1922. It would be more accurate to say that this 
“treaty battleship” represented the lessons of Jutland as filtered through the technical 
constraints of the Washington settlement.  
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 Both the British and American navies had many opportunities to move away from 
battlecruisers voluntarily in the aftermath of the First World War, and neither did so. In 
Britain, the cloud of Jutland hung over battlecruisers, and a move away from speedy, 
expensive, capital ships would have been understandable. In the United States, the internal 
and external pressures against continuing with the Lexingtons were intense; acquiescing to 
the fast battleship or carrier agitation in and outside of the Navy would have certainly been 
easier politically. In the end, both navies stuck with their battlecruisers as long as they did 
(too long, many historians would argue), because their understanding of warfare required 
some sort of large, fast, ship for scouting (the U.S.) or the fast wing (the U.K.). If we are to 
assign credit or blame for the end of the battlecruiser era, the lion’s share must go to Senator 
Borah, Secretary Hughes, and the postwar British economy well before aircraft carriers, 
submarines, or the legacy of Jutland. 
CONCLUSION: THE GHOST SQUADRONS OF WASHINGTON 
  
 Looking back from 2015, battlecruisers may seem like a failed experiment from 
World War I period arms races—“eggshells with hammers,” to borrow a phrase from 
Churchill—of little more than antiquarian interest in the present. After all, it has been a very 
long time since battlecruisers were a major part of naval construction. The Washington 
Conference, which ended the “battlecruiser age,” finished more than 90 years ago, and the 
world’s last battlecruiser, depending on your definition, was commissioned sometime 
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between 1920 (Hood) and 1944 (Alaska and Guam), and certainly left service soon after the 
Second World War.1 
 Still, the history relayed in the previous chapters touches on issues that are still very 
relevant today. The salience of Proceedings to debates within the U.S. Navy has declined 
somewhat since Mahan and Sims were at loggerheads over Tsushima, but its recent numbers 
suggest that arguments over the interplay between warship design, doctrine, and construction 
remain. For example, Proceedings recently published an article, “Designing Future 
Warships,” whose conclusions resemble this project’s own: 
[In designing warships] the first step . . . is achieving a consensus on the size and 
shape of future ships. Leadership to create this vision is less a matter of seniors’ 
directions than an organizational consensus created by experienced officers with the 
cooperation of experienced shipbuilders. . . . The goal should be to seek a bottom-up 
consensus while being careful to avoid a top-down order. . . . While every officer has 
an opinion on the mission and design of warships, this organizing function cannot be 
a senior officers’ debating society but a cabal of dedicated, knowledgeable, and 
respected officers, engineers, and builders who represent all aspects of the mission, 
design, and execution of the program. . . . The outcome of this initial effort is to 
define in general terms the warfare requirements the ship is to fulfill.2 
 
As if to drive the point home, this piece was placed just seven pages before one on the 
troubled Littoral Combat Ship program.3 
 The warship design process the author describes sounds much like a blend of the 
successes of American and British approaches to warship design in the First World War 
period. The “bottom-up consensus” in the United States was, by the First World War, very 
much in favor of building battlecruisers for the Navy. Likewise, a “cabal of dedicated, 
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knowledgeable, and respected officers, engineers, and builders,” is a fair description of the 
1911 and 1912 Summer Conferences that proved so useful in suggesting the form and 
function of the Lexingtons.  
 There are not many positive lessons to draw from the introduction of battlecruisers 
into British service, but Beatty’s Admiralty after the war was organized on ideal lines for 
linking warship design and policy. The staff representatives on the Board, especially 
Chatfield, were able to link the supposed lessons of the First World War with a modified 
surface warfare doctrine, and tie both together in a design, G.3, that reflected the Royal 
Navy’s consensus on the future direction of naval warfare.  
 These lessons do not suggest any specific policies or stratagems for the present. That 
is always a dangerous exercise for historians, and more so in this particular case; both navies 
have allowed their capacity to design warships wither since the Second World War.4 Still, 
there is, I think, some utility in relating two general conclusions from this project. The first is 
the importance of doctrine in weapons system acquisition. Along with its operational uses, a 
well-crafted doctrine provides planners with some feel for the long-term needs of the service 
and the capabilities required to fill those needs. Whatever one might say about the design of 
the Lexington-class or G.3, they were intended for a specific set of missions within a 
recognized and accepted operational framework.  
 This project also highlights the salience of structural factors. The story of 
battlecruisers in the two navies is not just one of personal enthusiasms and perceived 
strategic necessities. The creaking machinery of American naval administration and the 
Royal Navy’s mixture of centralized administrative responsibility and diffuse executive 
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responsibility were critical to warship design and development in the two countries. Were 
Fisher an American officer, for example, he would have never gotten the chance the 
opportunity to put his schemes into action. Perhaps, we would remember his battlecruiser 
ideas with the same mixture of skepticism and amusement we view F.H. Schofield’s torpedo 
battleship.  
 That prewar American system of administration was far too flawed and inefficient to 
represent an ideal blueprint, but the dissemination of policy and operational ideas to all levels 
of the fleet and the careful consideration of new ideas and models were factors worth 
preserving. So, too, was the intimate relationship between the planning, executive, and 
operational functions of the Royal Navy’s Admiralty in the years after the First World War.  
 Lastly, this project shines some light on a rather neglected episode of American naval 
history. Consideration of the American battlecruiser program shines light on the U.S. Navy’s 
decision-making process and intellectual development in World War I. Both were placed 
under a unique strain by the novelty of battlecruisers. At the same time, proper consideration 
of the American battlecruiser program is critical to understanding the U.S. Navy in the 
interwar years, especially the development of carrier warfare and the design of the heavy 
cruisers used in the Second World War.  
 
*** 
 
Both navies’ experience with the post-treaty “tinclad” heavy cruisers shows that they 
had, for the time being, learned these lessons. The transition was easier for the Royal Navy; 
the Washington Treaty’s cruiser limitations were organized around the capabilities of the 
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British Hawkins-class light cruisers. These ships were an unconscious echo of Fisher’s first 
battlecruisers, designed for the sea lane protection and imperial defense missions. However, 
instead of a small number of very capable, centrally located, ships, the new model focused on 
a large number of smaller ships at sea. Although there were complaints that Hawkins—
“deficient in speed, protection, and gun power”—represented a return to the armored cruiser 
class, the consensus was that the Hawkins-class design was a sound one for its intended 
mission.5 Like the Invincibles at their date of construction, the Hawkins-class ships could 
catch and destroy anything smaller and weaker, while being able to run away from anything 
more powerful.6  
 In the United States, the cancellation of the Lexingtons did not dim the leadership’s 
enthusiasm for a cruiser to dominate the scouting and screening situations in the Pacific. To 
that end, while developing their post-Washington policy, the General Board held it as an 
article of faith that they would “build no small cruisers.”7 Several months later, Captain 
Schofield, now a General Board member, laid out the Navy’s reasoning on cruisers in a 
lecture to the Army War College. There were, he told his audience, only two important 
capabilities for a new cruiser:  
[S]peed and gun power . . . it will probably be necessary in our new designs to 
forsake nearly all  attempt at passive defense of these vessels—armor— in order to 
have weight available for the full development of speed, steaming radius and gun 
power. . . . [O]nce an American cruiser comes in contact with an enemy cruiser its 
gun power must be superior to the gun power of that enemy cruiser and its speed 
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sufficient to keep its guns within range, no matter what sacrifices in protection have 
to be made to achieve these superiorities.8 
 
This, of course, was identical to the Board’s rationale for building the Lexington class in the 
first place. While the Washington Conference made it impossible to design a ship that could 
meet the Kongos on equal terms, Schofield’s lecture suggested that the Board was trying to 
preserve as much of that capability as possible on 10,000 tons—building down from the 
battlecruiser class instead of up from light cruisers.  
 The U.S. Navy’s strategic elite also recognized that the cancellation of the Lexingtons 
left a hole in the American force structure that no amount of 10,000-ton “heavy” cruisers 
could completely fill. Both major competitors of the U.S.—Japan, and the U.K.—possessed 
battlecruisers, and assessments of American weakness in those vessels were grim. In October 
1922, Sims noted, in a memorandum for the Navy Department, “the greater speed of the 
British heavy ships which would enable them to impose . . . disadvantageous conditions . . . 
should battle occur.”9 After consultation with the Bureau of Ordnance, the General Board 
endorsed Sims’s conclusions, though they felt his calculations overrated the survivability of 
British battlecruisers.10 As late as 1930, American war planners rated British battlecruiser 
strength as a major British advantage over the U.S. Fleet in raiding as well as on the fast 
wing in a major battle.11 
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 Still, the U.S. Navy tried their best to make up those qualities as best they could. 
Compare, for example, the first American “tinclad” with the first generation of post-Treaty 
British heavy cruisers:  
 
USS Pensacola 
(1925) 
British County-class 
(1924) 
Speed 32.7 kts 31.5 kts 
Main 
Battery 10x8” 8x8” 
Armor: 
Belt 4” 4.5” 
Deck 1.75” 3.5” 
Turret 1.5” 1” 
As the table shows, the Americans were willing to make more sacrifices in armor to achieve 
a higher speed and more firepower than the British warship. The difference in protection, in 
fact, is greater than the table suggests, because Pensacola had minimal torpedo protection, 
while the British County-class were built with anti-torpedo bulges.12  
 The County-class cruisers were designed for trade protection, while Pensacola was 
undoubtedly a battlecruiser replacement, as Schofield’s words suggested. In keeping with the 
final plans for the Lexingtons, the American heavy cruisers, as they were completed, were 
detailed to the Scouting Fleet (the Scouting Force from 1932). As the pre-Washington plans 
indicated, this was a force of cruisers and long-range destroyers able to operate 
independently at great remove from the battle fleet. The carriers, on the other hand, steamed 
with the Battle Fleet/Force, where they provided long-range strike power and some scouting, 
though the main work of strategic aerial scouting was eventually detailed to long-range 
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flying boats.13 This division of responsibilities strongly suggests that the Navy’s leadership 
was telling the truth in 1920-21 when they claimed that aircraft carriers were not a 
replacement for battlecruisers: instead, they saw them as warships with very different, and 
necessary, missions.  
 Still, the treaty cruisers, especially the American ones, did not represent a resounding 
success. Based on their record in the Second World War, the ships placed too much emphasis 
on speed and firepower, and not nearly enough on protection. Still, one should not lose sight 
of the fact that both design strands represented successful attempts to build ships under 
severe constraints and tailored to a specific set of missions; commerce protection on one 
hand, and battle scouting on the other. They show again that both navies had, by the 
Washington Conference, managed to link war planning and warship design to a degree 
unimaginable in 1904. 
 
*** 
 
 In both the United States and Britain, the years between 1904 and 1922 were key to 
the development of robust organs of naval administration and policymaking. At the 
beginning of this period, neither navy’s organization was ideal; the Royal Navy’s was too 
reliant on individual biases and enthusiasms, while the American system lacked clear lines of 
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authority. By 1922, however, both navies had created policymaking systems that combined 
input from well-trained staff officers with clearly delineated policymaking organs.14 
 Battlecruisers provide an ideal window onto to these processes. Although they were 
built in relatively small numbers, their newness presented challenges that other types of 
warship did not. Unlike submarines, another relatively new ship class, battlecruisers did not 
demand entirely new ways of thinking for naval organizations. At the very least, submarines 
required combining technologies—torpedoes, internal combustion engines, battery power, to 
name the most obvious—in new forms with which most sailors were unfamiliar. To some 
submarine partisans, including Admiral Fisher, effective submarine utilization required a 
wholesale rethinking of naval force structure and tactics.  
 Compared to that, the requirements for battlecruisers were rather mild. Battlecruisers 
sprang from the tweaking or combining of attributes that naval professionals had been 
dealing with for the entire ironclad age. It is true that the story of battlecruisers involved new 
technologies like advanced fire control, turbine engines, and ever-larger guns, but these were 
technologies that mirrored long-term developments in battleship design. Although 
battlecruisers, arguably, could not have existed without steam turbines and director fire 
control, these were not technologies unique to battlecruisers.  
 Instead, battlecruisers required measured consideration in the context of prevailing 
naval strategy and tactics.15 Battlecruisers could not be profitably fit into pure cruiser or 
                                                           
14
 The American system, which set up the General Board and the Office of Naval Operations in a somewhat 
adversarial relationship was not, from the outside, as ideally organized as the post-Wemyss Admiralty but, as 
John Kuehn demonstrates in Agents of Innovation, the interwar successes of the U.S. Navy were so great as to 
rule out pure accident.  
15
 That statement, of course, assumes that adopting the entirety of “Fisher’s revolution” was a non-starter in 
contemporary navies. Despite some compelling evidence as to Churchill’s policies in the concluding chapters of 
Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, there is little evidence that the mass of officers in Britain, or any other 
country, were capable of accepting such radical changes.  
440 
 
battleship molds. Though more capable than armored cruisers, battlecruisers were far more 
expensive, and never built in the numbers to offer a one-for-one replacement. Likewise, 
although they shared certain visual similarities to dreadnought battleships, battlecruisers 
could not fill the battleship role without incurring an unacceptable level of risk.  
 Consideration of battlecruiser doctrine was hamstrung by their novelty. During the 
entirety of the “Battlecruiser Age,” there was no single pattern for battlecruiser design, as 
arguably existed with dreadnought battleships. The British, German, Japanese, and 
Americans built battlecruisers to unique patterns, optimized for some possible missions, but 
compromised in others. German battlecruisers, for example, were built with protection that, 
in many other navies, would place them in the battleship category. Although the resultant 
ships were somewhat slower than the British counterparts, and lacked range, they were ideal 
for the Kaiserliche Marine’s strategy of using them in the thick of battle.  
 As the British example shows, battlecruisers built for one mission but used for 
another, were dangerous for their crews. Admiral Beatty’s operational doctrine during the 
First World War, for example, would have been perfectly sound with the heavily armored 
German battlecruiser force, but was reckless with the ships under his command in 1916. On 
the other hand, the U.S. Navy developed their battlecruiser doctrine in concert with their 
battlecruiser design, which emphasized speed and firepower over protection. Battlecruisers, 
then, highlight the importance of naval institutions, culture, and doctrine. Naval 
administrators and staff officers may not have had the romantic cachet of dashing 
battlecruiser commanders steaming through battle at thirty knots, but their work was critical 
in tying warship construction with warship utilization, an especially important mission for 
warships with no “traditional” mission or design.  
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 Based on Fisher’s invention of the type, and the loss of three at Jutland, discussions 
of battlecruiser development tend to focus on the Royal Navy. Many of the conclusions 
reached about the utility of battlecruisers draw on evidence from the Royal Navy’s 
experience with the types, especially the battles off the Falklands and Jutland. As this 
dissertation has, I hope, shown, the Royal Navy, before World War I, was, perhaps, uniquely 
ill placed to initiate a new warship class. This role was something of a novelty for the Royal 
Navy, which had historically preferred to learn from other navies’ mistakes and teething 
issues. It was a role that sat uneasily with its structure and typical management style. A navy 
that, in Richmond’s words, was “in the hands of every faddish who has a gift of the gab and a 
little more intelligence than the average,” lacked the capacity to make major innovations 
responsibly.16  
 Battlecruisers show the proof of this. The structure of the Royal Navy prevented the 
Admiralty from fully adopting Fisher’s battlecruiser ideas or fully rejecting them. Whatever 
one thinks about the soundness of his views, either option would have been preferable to 
spending tens of millions of pounds on ships with no agreed-upon mission. From the release 
of Fisher’s first “Naval Necessities” to the building of Courageous, Glorious, and Furious, 
British battlecruiser design was proof of a very broken system. Substantial—and effective—
changes only came when the First World War dredged up a long list of problems with 
Admiralty administration. 
 These were exacerbated by the strategic culture of the Royal Navy’s prewar 
leadership. Their opponents dismissed them as “materialists,” and that label is apt. What, for 
example, was the point of HMS Lion? Fisher, of course, believed that it would be the ship 
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that completed the battlecruiser/battleship transition, but it was clear well before Lion’s 
design that the Admiralty Board would not consent to such a radical plan. For their part, once 
the issue of battleship replacement was off the table, the rest of the Admiralty Board seemed 
content to have a battlecruiser design faster and more powerful than extant German 
construction, without stopping to consider what mission Lion and future battlecruisers would 
have.  
 The comparatively ignored American battlecruiser program throws these issues into 
sharp relief. I leave it to the reader to come to their own determination as to the utility of 
American battlecruiser design and doctrine, but it was a robust process. In the U.S. Navy, 
these ships were a topic of lively debate at all levels of the officer corps. From Ensign 
Riggs’s Proceedings article, to War College Conferences, to General Board deliberations, the 
U.S. Navy thoroughly examined all aspects of battlecruiser function and design in the years 
before the First World War. Although the General Board could not bring itself to press home 
the case for battlecruiser construction until 1915, the battlecruisers in the 1916 Navy Bill 
were anything but an afterthought. Instead, they were a key facet of the Board’s three-year-
old vision of how an effective modern navy ought to be organized.  
 By the Washington Conference, however, the U.S. Navy found itself in a position 
akin to the Royal Navy before the war, as the General Board pressed for the construction of 
ships that most naval officers—certainly most World War I commanders and staff officers—
saw as unequal to wars with Japan or the United Kingdom. Most importantly, the Chief of 
Naval Operations and his new planning staff found the Lexington designs as inimical to their 
war plans. Although formal responsibility for war plans did not rest with OpNav until 1923, 
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this breach between the General Board and OpNav was a troubling indication of what could 
happen with two bodies with overlapping responsibilities.17 
 Even though OpNav and the General Board disagreed on battlecruiser design, they 
agreed on the mission for battlecruisers built to the Board’s pattern. Neither OpNav nor the 
active fleet would have been willing to send the Lexingtons—“simply huge destroyers”—
against Japanese battleships or even an equal number of battlecruisers.18 This was the result 
of a pool of staff and high-ranking executive officers who had been thoroughly 
“indoctrinated” by the War College. Officers trained, as many OpNav staffers were, to utilize 
Newport’s “applicatory” method of approaching problems could not have consented to 
sending under armored battlecruisers into to the thick of battle.  
 These conclusions regarding the American battlecruiser program are the project’s 
major intervention into the historical literature. American naval historiography for this period 
tends to look back from the 1940s to find the antecedents of the fearsomely effective U.S.N. 
of the Pacific War. With regard to battlecruisers, this viewpoint tends to distort or ignore the 
Navy’s view of and plans for their Lexington-class battlecruisers. That approach can be 
profitably taken back to the mid-1920s, but has considerably less value before the 
Washington Conference. Before 1922, the Navy’s intellectual energies and productive 
capacities were turned to a set of issues that bore little relation to the monomaniacal focus on 
Japan exhibited from 1923 on.  
 Viewed in their proper historical context, the six American battlecruisers were an 
important part of the Navy’s bid for global dominance, which the General Board had been 
                                                           
17
 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 82.  
18
 Captain H.E. Yarnell to Admiral Benson, April 2, 1919, M1140, Subject 100-17.  
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laying the groundwork for as early General Board No. 420 in 1903. Three of the planned 
Lexingtons—Constellation, United States, and Constitution—bore names from the Navy’s 
“original six” frigates from 1794, and just like their forebears, the American battlecruisers 
marked an inflection point in American naval development. In this case, the development of 
battlecruisers, and the explication of their mission showed that the U.S. Navy had begun to 
realize that a fleet of battleships was not enough to win a war; even a war decided by a titanic 
fleet action.  
 The probable role of these ships has been discussed at length elsewhere in the 
dissertation, but it is worth reiterating that the General Board and, especially, officers at the 
War College felt that these ships had a value beyond their use in the various iterations of War 
Plan Orange. From about 1911, the subset of American officers who expressed opinions on 
matters of naval policy were convinced that battlecruisers were crucial to the functioning of a 
serious and balanced fleet. The six battlecruisers were the last piece of making the U.S. Navy 
a force to be reckoned with, in the minds of its leadership.  
 The Washington Conference halted battlecruiser development in both countries, but it 
is possible to discern the beginnings of Anglo-American convergence. Both services 
appeared to be moving towards the “fast battleship” model exemplified by HMS Hood and 
the type C sketch design in the U.S.: ships with heavy guns and armor that, while fast, were 
not quite the fragile “high speed thoroughbreds” that both navies designed during the First 
World War. Although there were still likely differences in their employment—the British 
ships were battleship and battlecruiser replacements, intended to supplement the battle line, 
while American doctrine would have probably used many type C ships for “distantial” 
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operations—the designs themselves were converging, much like dreadnought battleship 
designs around the world did by about 1910. 
 Battlecruisers were the cutting-edge weapons systems of their days. Their 
effectiveness relied upon, if not always technological innovation, wringing every bit of 
capability out of legacy technologies.19 At the beginning of the battlecruiser age, the 
Invincible-class ships helped to introduce turbine engines in major warships, and their 
development was intimately bound up in new technologies for fire control and spotting. At 
its end, C&R constructors put a new turbo-electric drive into the Lexingtons and fretted over 
placing the requisite number of boilers in such a narrow hull. Even the torpedo-attack 
mission, proposed a various times for both countries’ battlecruisers, relied on the 
development of new torpedoes with unprecedented range. 
 The engineering efforts in both the United States and Britain were successful, but the 
necessary mental efforts were less successful. The American General Board took several 
years to work out a battlecruiser mission and, in the meantime, allowed the U.S. Navy to be 
lapped by its three major competitors. The British Admiralty was unable to develop and 
promulgate a policy for battlecruiser design and employment until the postwar years. Fleet 
commanders, left to their own devices during the First World War, placed battlecruisers in 
unreasonable situations, leading to the deaths of thousands of sailors at Jutland. Though both 
navies entered the Washington Conference with set battlecruiser doctrines, their maturation 
took far too long. 
                                                           
19
 Refer, for example, to Sumida’s discussion of fire control machinery in In Defence of Naval Supremacy and 
McBride’s discussion of the Lexingtons and the turbo-electric drive in Technological Change and the United 
States Navy. 
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 Battlecruisers may or may not have been a developmental dead end in naval history. 
Their well-documented problems cannot, however, be chalked up to “faulty” design, as the 
officers of the BCF claimed in 1916, and many historians have in the intervening century. In 
the immediate postwar years, both the American and British navies found a place for 
battlecruisers built to a pattern that reflected their service doctrine. If the Washington 
Conference had been less effective, battlecruisers would have been critical to both sides in 
the Third Anglo-American War of 1925, and it is a fair bet that there would have been no 
repeat of Jutland.  
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APPENDIX A: THE BIRTH OF THE BATTLECRUISER  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tennessee 
(US) 
Tsukuba 
(JP) 
Lord 
Nelson(UK) 
Minotaur 
(UK) 
Dreadnought 
(UK) 
Invincible 
(UK) 
Blücher 
(DE) 
Type Armored 
cruiser 
Proto-
battlecruiser Battleship 
Armored 
cruiser Battleship Battlecruiser 
Proto-
battlecruiser 
Program 
Year 1903 1904 1904 1904 1905 1905 1906 
Displacement 
(tons) 14,500 13,750 16,500 14,600 18,110 17,370 15,590 
Length (feet) 504 450 44.6 490 527 567 530 
Breadth 
(feet) 73 75 79.6 74.5 82 78.5 80 
Designed 
Speed (kts) 22 20.5 18 23 21 25 24.25 
Horsepower 28,000 20,500 16,750 27,000 23,000 41,000 34,000 
Armor (in): 
Belt 5 7 12 6 11 6 7 
Main Deck 1.5 3 1.5 2 3 2.5 3 
Turret 7 7 12 7 11 10 7 
Barbette 7 7 12 8 11 7 7 
Main Battery 4x10" 4x12" 4x12" 4x9.2" 10x12" 8x12" 12-8.2" 
Secondary 
Battery 22x3" 
12x6", 
12x4.7" 
10x9.2" 
24x3" 10x7.5" 8x3" 12x4" 8-5.9" 
Crew 874 879 752 825 695-773 784 847-1026 
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APPENDIX B: BATTLECRUSIERS FROM THE 2ND GENERATION TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
Von 
der 
Tann 
(DE) 
Lion 
(UK) 
Kongo 
(JP) 
Queen 
Elizabeth 
(UK) 
Renow
n (UK) 
Courageous 
(UK) 
Hood 
(UK) 
Lexington 
(US) 
Amagi 
(JP) 
G.3. 
(UK) 
Program Year 1907 1909 1911 1912 1915 1915 1916 
1916 
(1919 
redesign) 
1920 1921 
Displacement 
(tons) 19,064 26,270 27,500 27,500 26,000 19,171 42,670 43,500 41,217 48,000 
Length (feet) 563 700 704 645 794 786 860 850 826 860 
Breadth (feet) 87 89 92 90.5 90 81 104 105 101 106 
Designed 
Speed (kts) 24.75 27 27.5 25 32 32 31 33.5 30 31-2 
Horsepower 43,600 70,000 64,000 56,000 112,000 90,000 151,000 180,000 131,200 160,000 
Armor (in.):  
Belt 10 9 8 13 6 3 12 7 10 14 
Main Deck 3 1 1.75 2 1 1.5 3 2.5 3.9 8 
Turret 9 10 9 11 8 13 15 11 11 17 
Barbette 9 9 10 10 7 7 12 9 11 14 
Main Battery 8x11.1" 8x13.5" 8x14" 8x15" 6x15" 4x15" 8x15" 8x16" 10x16" 9x16" 
Secondary 
Battery 
10xf5.9
" 
16x4" 16x6" 14x6" 25x4" 18x4" 12x5.5" 16x6" 16x5.5" 12x6" 
Crew 923-1174 997 1201 925-951 
953-
1223 828-842 
1397-
1477 1297-1326 N/A ~1500 
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